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ABSTRACT
The thesis addresses the implications of new management and production 
techniques for workers and unions within a developing country. The specific focus is 
the white goods industry in Brazil during a period of political and economic transition 
from 1985 to 1994. In addition to analysing industrial modernisation by four firms, the 
study uses worker interviews and a review of the unions' identities to provide a 
comprehensive image of the ‘politics of modernisation’ in Brazil.
The thesis draws on critical work which suggests that modernisation may not have 
the optimistic effects on labour processes and industrial behaviour that some authors 
have suggested. Factory regimes are also felt to be strongly related to their particular 
context. However, the thesis attempts to deepen the degree to which foreign capital and 
traditional norms of industrial behaviour are considered. Forms of power and resistance 
are also made more explicit.
The study’s analysis of the modernisation process suggests that managerial intent 
must be questioned. Even the most comprehensive examples of modernisation suggest 
that labour control still drives change. Yet a somewhat ‘softer’ implicit bargain has 
replaced the wage-effort contract in such firms.
Interview material confirms this mixed picture. Modernisation and related policies 
have allowed the most advanced firms to foster a more company focussed labour force 
- one which has embraced new tasks and responsibilities. However, other indicators 
such as wages and attitudinal factors caution that this situation is neither benign nor 
immutable.
Despite a less normative industrial relations framework, the harsh political and 
representational situation facing Brazilian unions has simply been further complicated 
by ‘modernisation’. Yet, while workers have become more positive about their 
employers, to call this change ‘employer allegiance’ would be an exaggeration. 
Conflict, albeit of a different nature, still underpins industrial relationships.
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THESIS OUTLINE
New models of industrial modernisation are said to have profound effects on 
the nature of work and worker subjectivity. Much more consensual relations are 
claimed to have replaced control and conflict - as the basis for workplace relations - 
within this new paradigm. These changes at the workplace also signal a new, more 
collaborative role for unions if they are to survive.
This thesis investigates these issues within the Brazilian white goods industry. 
How and why have work/labour processes and industrial relations changed during the 
process of industrial modernisation in Brazil, are the central questions of this thesis. 
Part A (Chapters 1-3) of the thesis sets the scene for this study. Chapter 1 surveys the 
recent empirical and theoretical literature on the ‘transformation’ of management and 
the workplace, noting both the positive and negative claims made about the processes 
and outcomes involved. The chapter also presents hypotheses and a methodology for 
the study.
Chapter 2 examines the specific context of Brazil. This provides the economic, 
political and labour relations’ environment for the detailed case studies discussed in 
subsequent chapters. Chapter 2 also reviews the specific Brazilian literature on 
modernisation and thus sets up the specific themes and questions to be examined 
within the empirical analysis. Chapter 3, on the other hand, presents an overview of the 
political economy of the white goods industry in Brazil and provides background 
information on the firms and plants that were selected for detailed study.
Chapters 4 to 7 present the empirical findings for the workplaces, workers 
and unions involved in this study of the modernisation process in Brazil. Part B 
(Chapters 4 & 5) analyses the nature of modernisation and how it has affected work 
and labour processes. Part C (Chapters 6 & 7) examines industrial relations issues. 
How has modernisation affected workers’ attitudes to the employer and the union 
and how have unions responded to this situation? The thesis conclusion draws from 
all aspects of this study in its summary of the consequences of industrial 
modernisation for work, the labour process and industrial relations in Brazil.
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PART A:
MODERNISATION: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ISSUES
CHAPTER 1:
MODERNISATION THEORY AND THE THESIS’ METHODOLOGY
1.1 INTRODUCTION
‘This Japanese model...it isn't appropriate in Brazil,...it doesn't fit well with 
Brazilian realities and Brazilian culture’1. As highlighted by this quote from a Brazilian 
factory worker, this thesis was prompted by an interest in the applicability of new 
models of industrial modernisation in a country such as Brazil. Some authors are very 
optimistic about the ‘mutual gains’ to employers, workers and unions if they embrace 
industrial modernisation. Equally, other authors (in Brazil and in the West) question 
the nature of modernisation and its effects on work, worker subjectivity and union 
behaviour. Consequently, the aim of this chapter is to analyse the modernisation 
concept and the various international interpretations of its determinants and effects. 
This discussion sets the scene for the ensuing empirical analysis of modernisation 
(Chapters 4-7) as applied in the broader Brazilian (Chapter 2) and the specific case 
study (Chapter 3) contexts.
In terms of the international literature, this chapter argues that key aspects of an 
optimistic interpretation of modernisation are very much open to debate. The partial 
nature of most examples of modernisation seriously challenges optimistic claims about 
changes to work and attitudes. The reality of the suggestion that new types of co­
operative relationships will or must emerge between capital and organised labour can 
also be questioned.
What emerges from the literature is that the form of modernisation will be 
uncertain due to the moderating effects of the context into which it is introduced. More 
fundamentally, interpreting modernisation in a most optimistic way lacks realism due 
to the assumptions we are asked to believe about the intent of employers and the degree 
to which modernisation will affect work, workers’ attitudes and unions’ strategies.
1 Brastemp-Rio Claro interview, RCL8, 9/93.
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Even in those firms which are successfully employing a comprehensive modernisation 
model, these effects are uncertain -  they remain empirical issues. For these reasons, a 
key comparison for study is between partially and comprehensively modernised firms.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 defines the concepts and 
processes behind an optimistic view of modernisation. It also notes the key areas of 
debate between optimistic and more sceptical commentators. The most applicable 
model for the industry and products of this study is the so-called ‘Japanese/lean 
production’ model.
Section 1.3 reviews a number of key international studies of modernisation. 
These studies suggest that any changes to work and attitudes, as a result of 
modernisation, may be far more limited than optimists predict. These findings suggest 
even greater caution when modernisation is considered in LDCs such as Brazil.
From a more theoretical angle (section 1.4), an optimistic modernisation 
schema seriously challenges a traditional labour process perspective. However, while 
the ‘politics of production’ is seen to provide a useful guide to an analysis of 
modernisation and labour processes2, it can be improved upon as a framework. A more 
robust consideration of power, control, resistance and contextual factors would allow 
this.
Section 1.5 takes these issues of power, control and resistance further by 
considering the challenges modernisation raises for unions. Militant unionism seems to 
be under threat due to factory level modernisation and broader structural and political 
changes. However, there are serious questions as to whether moderate unionism can be 
an effective alternative strategy, especially in already ‘hostile’ industrial relations 
environments such as in Brazil. Section 1.6 summarises the themes raised by this 
discussion and sets out the methodology for this study.
2 M. Burawoy, The Politics of Production. (London, 1985).
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1.2 INDUSTRIAL MODERNISATION - CONCEPTS AND PROCESSES
The 1980s and 1990s saw a renewed emphasis on the need to modernise 
management and workplace systems, both in developed and in developing countries3. 
Quality, flexibility and efficiency have emerged as the dominant catchcries of firms 
wishing to prosper within rapidly changing markets4. It would be wrong to suggest to 
these objectives have not been important in the past and terms such as quality and 
flexibility are often ill defined5. However, trade and investment flows are more open in 
much of the world and many firms have been experimenting with an ‘industrial model’ 
based on these premises6. Accordingly, the following discussion of the modernisation 
concept starts with the presentation of a composite of the common aspects of the 
models of key optimistic writers on modernisation7.
The Optimistic Hypothesis:
The starting point for an optimistic view of modernisation is that management 
comes to employ a clearer strategy and a more open approach8. Quality and continuous 
improvement should be promoted not only through a new mission statement but also 
through simpler organisational structures and more generous and democratic human 
resource policies and incentive systems. All levels of management must support these 
policies and processes.
3 The international literature is discussed below. For a recent expose o f the modernisation argument 
for Brazil see, J. Gonfalves and C. Dreyfus (coords), Reengenharia das Empressas -  Passando a 
limpo, (S2o Paulo, 1995).
4 A key early exponent o f ‘quality’ was, W. Deming, Out o f the Crisis, (Cambridge, 1986). The 
integration o f this into a flexibility ‘concept’ can be seen in, M. Piore and C. Sabel, The Second 
Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity. (New York, 1984).
5 Well discussed in, Making Quality Critical -  New Perspectives on Organizational Change, eds. D. 
Knights and H. Willmott (London, 1993) and R. Hyman, Tlexible Specialization: Miracle o f Myth?’ 
in New Technology and Industrial Relations, eds. R Hyman and W. Streek (London, 1988).
6 Clear from this chapter (section 1.3) and for Brazil (Chapter 2, section 2.4).
7 The optimistic elements noted below are derived from -  Piore and Sabel, Second Divide. H. Kern 
and M. Schumann, The End o f the Division o f Labour? (Munich, 1984), R. Walton, ‘From control to 
commitment in the workplace’, Harvard Business Review, (1985), 3-4, pp78-84; J. Lincoln and A. 
Kallenberg, Culture, Control and Commitment. (Cambridge, 1989); J. Womack, D. Jones and D.
Roos, The Machine that Changed the World, (New York, 1990), M. Piore, Unions: A Reorientation 
to Survive’, in Labor Economics and Industrial Relations, eds. C. Kerr and P. Staudohar (London,
1994), pp512-544; T. Kochan and P. Osterman, The Mutual Gains Enterprise, (Boston, 1994) and E. 
Appelbaum and R. Batt, The New American Workplace, (New York, 1994).
8 The following elements are discussed in Kochan and Osterman, Mutual Gains. pp45-58.
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At the shopfloor, modernisation will involve new production technologies and 
techniques and a new approach to work. Optimists argue for work which has more 
responsibility and worker autonomy. Furthermore, they suggest that employee relations 
will be based on much higher levels of involvement than in the past. Consequently, 
individualism and collectivism combine in new ways in the modernised firm9.
These changes to the firm are based on the apparently simple idea that 
modernisation will lead to a change in attitudes and that this will translate into the 
enhanced performance of the firm10. There are three major causal links within this idea. 
These relate to the suggested effects of modernisation policies on 1) work and attitudes 
to work, 2) the degree of worker attachment to the firm, and 3) the nature of worker 
representation. Worker allegiance to the firm emerges so that the concept of ‘us and 
them’ is no longer relevant and unions have to modify their behaviour so that they 
don’t now become the ‘them’ in workers’ eyes11.
First, some combination of new technologies and techniques in production will 
change workers’ tasks and responsibilities. Multiskilling is a term often used for these 
new skill profiles, ones which recombine conception and execution skills12. The jobs of 
direct production workers, in particular, will now include process monitoring and 
greater responsibility for maintenance13. Combined with the new tasks involved in 
teams and other involvement initiatives, work itself will become more satisfying. This 
has also prompted some writers to coin the phrase, ‘working smarter, not harder’14.
Secondly, even if these changes to work are not enough to indirectly enhance 
the firm’s performance, a matrix of incentives and structures to ‘go the extra mile’ for 
the firm will directly create the right corporate culture for the level of quality,
9 See - N. Bacon and J. Storey, ‘Individualism and Collectivism and the Changing Role o f Trade 
Unions’, in The New Workplace and Trade Unionism, eds. P. Ackers, C. Smith and P. Smith, 
(London, 1996), pp41-76.
10 A point succinctly made in Lincoln and Kallenberg, Culture. p4.
" See on this concept, - J. Kelly and C. Kelly, “Them and Us”: social psychology and ‘the new 
industrial relations’, British Journal o f Industrial Relations. (1991), 29, 1.
12 See Piore and Sabel, Second Divide.
13 See Kern and Schumann, Division of Labor.
14 An argument popularised by, Womack et al, The Machine
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efficiency and flexibility the firm needs from its workforce15. These include the 
decentralisation of operational decision making across the firm, the creation of team 
based production and the offering of internal labour market (ILM) conditions such as 
training and greater job security. Decision making is closer and more personal, workers 
appear to have more responsibility, involvement and autonomy and all ‘associates’ are 
encouraged to see their future as one and the same as the firm’s.
The third link within the optimistic modernisation argument relates to the role 
of unions, particularly if workers are being encouraged to have more attachment to the 
firm. Many authors suggest that unions must co-operate, perhaps dispensing with their 
earlier political agendas but definitely focussing on ways in which they can promote 
both the interests of the firm and its workers16. Means suggested for achieving this 
include greater participation in committee structures, negotiated trade-offs and works 
council type models17.
In summary, these changes to management (style, structures and policies) and 
the workplace (tasks, employee relations and employment conditions) appear to stand 
in stark contrast to traditional Fordist and Taylorist practices. Work will become more 
interesting, autonomous and responsible. Most importantly, the ‘old’ wage-effort 
bargain has been replaced by a psychological bond between the employee and the 
company. The importance of new workplace processes to the modernising firm also 
suggests that the firm has become more dependent on (the attitudes and behaviour of) 
its employees than in the past18.
When these modernisation policies are applied in a comprehensive way, the 
organisational attachment which emerges is expected to have a variety of important 
effects on the firm’s performance19. For example, workers will be motivated to produce 
quality (low defect rates, minimum waste) and always search for improvements to
15 See, Lincoln and Kallenberg, Culture, ppl3-16.
16 See, Piore, Unions...Reorientation’ and, Kochan and Osterman, Mutual Gains. Ch. 6.
17 Discussed in section 1.5.
18 A key implication of, Womack et al, The Machine, and N. Oliver and B. Wilkinson, The 
Japanisation o f British Industry. (Oxford, 1988/92)
19 Succinctly summarised by D. Guest, Human Resource Management, Trade Unions and Industrial
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processes and products. In addition, the firm will make savings on their organisational 
and supervisory budgets due to reduced bureaucracy, lower turnover rates and the more 
effective amortisation of training resources. Moreover, organisational attachment 
implies that workers will prefer the firm’s ‘view of the world’ to the views of others. 
This suggests that unions must develop more co-operative approaches to the firm, a 
development of further benefit to the firm’s performance.
Model Variety and Definitional Debates:
While the specific form of modernisation is often divided into a number of ideal 
types20, many of these models use similar concepts. For instance, the ‘flexible 
specialisation’ hypothesis built on the idea of Kem and Schumann that conception and 
execution skills were being recombined21. The flexibility concept even came to be 
associated with new inter-firm relations within older industries in regions of Germany 
and Italy and the ‘German Diversified Quality Production’ model22.
A principal difference between ‘Continental European’ models and more recent 
Anglo-Saxon ‘strategies’ (such as ‘lean production’ and the ‘Japanese’ model) has been 
that the former stressed the role of new technologies23. In contrast, the later models 
have come to put more emphasis on process improvements and more detailed human 
resource policies24. In the UK and the US (new) models of ‘Human Resource’ and 
‘Total Quality’ management (HRM/TQM), which are assumed to use these ‘softer’ 
qualitative processes, have become very popular25.
The industry (white goods) chosen for this study is a relatively low skilled 
producer of discrete, standardised products for mass markets. As such, the most
Relations’, in Human Resource Management- A Critical Text, ed. J. Storey, (London, 1995), p i 13.
20 For a discussion o f these models see, Appelbaum and Batt, New Workplace, pp27-55.
21 A la Piore and Sabel, Second Divide; Kem and Schumann, Division o f Labour.
22 Appelbaum and Batt, New Workplace, pp37-39, pp39-42.
23 J. Morris and B. Wilkinson The Transfer o f Japanese Management to Alien Institutional 
Environments’, eds. Introduction, Journal o f Management Studies - Special Issue. (1995) ,32 , 6, 
pp719-720.
24 Ibid.
25 For a discussion o f these see, Human Resource Management: A critical text, ed. J. Storey, (London,
1995) and Making Quality Critical, eds. D Knights and H. Willmott.
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applicable referent for the case studies of this research is the so-called ‘Japanese/lean 
production’ model. This is a composite model based on perceptions of large Japanese 
firms and an MIT portrayal of ‘best practice’ human resource management26.
In its most circumspect form the ‘Japanese’ model has been defined as 
follows27. First, it uses production flow concepts such as Just-in time (JIT), Statistical 
Process Control (SPC) and Kanban workplace practices. Secondly, it emphasises 
continual leaming-by-doing improvements (Kaizen) and task dexterity. Thirdly, it puts 
a priority on quality through participative groups and non-linear structures of 
production. Other authors have broadened the discussion to include features more 
peculiar to certain Japanese firms such as lifetime employment, company unionism and 
seniority based wages28.
However, there are a number of difficulties evident in some writings about the 
‘Japanese’ model and, subsequently, in relation to the question of transferability. For 
example, those Japanese firms which have appeared to apply the model are not 
homogeneous and are still experimenting29. In addition, the so-called ‘three treasures’ 
of the model (lifetime employment, company unionism and seniority based wages) are 
quite specific to the Japanese development process thus making it uncertain whether 
they can be transferred30.
More critically, these ‘treasures’ appear to be supported by less positive 
features such as a very distinct and precarious secondary labour market and 
subcontracting system -  factors which may have merely helped Japanese employers 
control workers and unions more effectively31. In addition, studies of the Japanese
26 Best popularised by Womack et al, The Machine.
27 See, J. Humphrey, The Adoption of Japanese Management Techniques in Brazilian Industry’, 
Journal of Management Studies -  Special Issue.(1995), 32, 6, p769.
28 On this see, Oliver and Wilkinson, The Japanisation and Applebaum and Batt, New Workplace, 
pp46-52, Table 4.1.
29 Well discussed by, S. Wood, ‘Japanization and/or Toyotaism?, Work. Employment and Society,
(1992), 5 ,4 , pp567-600.
30 For a review of the Japanese experience see C. Littler, The Development o f the Labour Process in 
Capitalist Societies, (1982), Ch. 10.
31 See, for example, S. Ackroyd, G. Burrel, M. Hughes and A. Witaker, The Japanization o f British 
Industry’, Industrial Relations Journal, (1988), 19, 1, ppl 1-23. See also, T. Elgar and C. Smith,
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experience suggest that workers in Japan have a low level of satisfaction with their 
work32. More productive behaviour stems more directly from allegiance to the firm33.
These definitional debates have led some to suggest that, for other situations to 
be realistically analysed relative to the ‘Japanese/lean production’ model they must be 
defined relative to what their features do to promote production objectives such as 
smooth production flow, continuous improvement and quality products34. Accordingly, 
the means chosen to achieve these objectives include the adoption of a quality strategy 
(e.g. TQM), JIT methods and associated process techniques and technologies. In line 
with these systems, initiatives which promote closer employee relations (e.g. reduced 
supervision and involvement schemes) and enhanced employment conditions (e.g. 
training) also appear fundamental. However, whether a firm chooses to use more far 
reaching examples of these themes such as, opening up the firm to more democratic 
processes, the offering of job security and promotion prospects and a truly inclusive 
role for unions, is less certain.
A Sceptical Critique:
Aside from these definitional debates, the degree of change implied by an 
optimistic view of modernisation is open to three related critiques. These concern the 
benchmark used to evaluate change, the assumptions involved in the hypothesis and the 
effects of an ‘alien’ context. First, the degree to which present Fordism and Taylorism 
were applied in the past is seriously questioned in the literature. For example, the 
timing, form and degree of diffusion that Fordism/Taylorism took in the US differed 
significantly to that in the UK and in Brazil35.
‘Global Japanization? Convergence and competition in the organization o f the labour process’, in 
Global Japanization, eds. T. Elgar and C. Smith, (1994), p41-45 and Morris and Wilkinson,
‘Transfer.. .Japanese’, pp723-725.
32 Noted for the literature in Lincoln and Kallenberg, Culture. p4 and for their study , Ch. 9. In fact, 
international studies note that job satisfaction has strong links to reduced turnover and absenteeism 
and not to company allegiance (D. Guest, Human Resource Management and industrial relations’, 
Journal o f Management Studies. (1987), 24, 5, p513-514 and Lincoln and Kallenberg, Culture. p25.
33 Ibid.
34 As argued by Humphrey, ’Japanese Management...Brazilian Industry’, p769.
35 See E. Silva, “Remaking the Fordist Factory?: Industrial Relations in Brazil in the past and for the 
future”, conference paper - ‘Autor du Modele Japonais: Automatisation, Nouvelles Formes
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More importantly, how far the ‘Japanese’ model really differs from, as opposed 
to improves on, features such as the task division, surveillance and incentive principles 
of the Fordist/Taylorist model has been questioned for some time. For example, an 
emphasis on continuous improvement, non-linear teamwork and participatory forums 
may be new. Task profiles may also be new. However, once established, tasks may be 
subject to the same evaluative (but ongoing) process associated with Taylorism36. 
Incentives may also be of a different or better form but decentralised processes may 
make peer pressure an even more effective method for enforcing productive behaviour 
than do piece rates and overt supervision37. In terms of a management model, the real 
processes behind TQM and associated human resource strategies may be just as ‘hard’ 
(i.e. efficiency vs humanistic orientated) as Fordism38.
The internal mechanisms and assumptions optimists ask us to believe about 
employer intent, work and industrial relations effects have also been questioned in their 
own right. For instance, the effect of modernisation on skills and tasks is very unclear. 
Product market, local labour market and globalisation strategies are just a number of 
the factors still clouding the discussion of job redesign and the debate about the effect 
of technology on skills39. In contrast, the optimistic view suggests that there will be a 
clear change in the firm’s approach to skill development and task allocation.
However, it is just as likely that skills will become more polarised between 
groups of workers or that, where skill changes occur, multitasked is a more apt 
description of their new jobs40. Even if production workers are given ILM like 
conditions for motivational reasons, their tasks may remain repetitive and/or be more
d’organisation et de Relations de Travail’, Paris, (1990).
36 Noted some time ago, even for the Japanese auto sector, by K. Dohse et al, Trom “Fordism” to 
“Toyotism”? The social organisation of the labour process in the Japanese automobile industry’, 
Politics and Society. (1985), 14,2, ppl 15-146.
37 As argued by G. Sewell and B. Wilkinson, ‘Someone to watch over me: Surveillance, discipline and 
the Just-in Time labour process’, Sociology. (1992), 26, 2, pp271-289.
38 Well argued by A. Tuckman, The Yellow Brick Road: Total Quality Management and the 
Restructuring o f Organizational Culture’, Organizational Studies. (1994), 15, 5, pp727-751 and A. 
Spencer, ‘Models o f Organization and Total Quality Management: A Comparison and Critical 
Evaluation’, Academy o f Management Review, (1994), 19, 3, pp446-471.
39 Arguments made by J. Kelly, Scientific Management, Job Redesign and Work Performance. (New 
York, 1982) that seem just as valid in this context.
40 See, for example, D. Gallie, ‘Patterns of Skill Change: Upskilling, Deskilling or the Polarization of
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demanding41. More drastically, rather than production workers gaining new 
maintenance responsibilities, maintenance workers may merely take on their (less 
skilful) production tasks and jobs42.
Turning attention to more structural issues, an anti-bureaucratic emphasis 
pervades the work of many optimistic writers43. This contradicts earlier sociological 
traditions which suggested that organisational structures could be technically efficient, 
conflict reducing and consent promoting44. Thus, optimists appear to be asking for a 
high level of faith that fewer hierarchies will help to promote an attitude much stronger 
than consent.
On the other hand, many modernisation authors also make ample use of a 
simple and optimistic interpretation of the ILM as a key facilitator of allegiance45. 
However, while ILMs may be an effective productivity mechanism for employers, new 
screening and selection methods might be used to the disadvantage of employees who 
take a more questioning approach to the new unitary message of the firm46. 
Alternatively, ILMs may create no more than a comfortable ‘cage’ of employment 
conditions for workers, many of whom may also like greater flexibility in the open 
labour market47.
Skills?’, Work. Employment and Society. (1991), 5, 3.
41 See, R. Delbridge, P. Turnbull and B. Wilkinson, ‘Pushing Back the Frontiers: management control 
and work intensification under JIT/TQM factory regimes’, New Technology. Work and Employment.
(1993), 7, 2, pp97-107.
42 Noted by, B. Dankbaar, N ew  Production Concepts, Management Strategies and the Quality o f  
Work’, Work. Employment and Society. (1988), 2, 1, pp25-51.
43 For example, Piore and Sabel, Second Divide; Walton, ‘From Control..’, and Womack et al, The 
Machine.
44 That is, Weber’s idea that bureaucracy helps make authority less visible and conflictual (M. Weber, 
The Theory o f Social and Economic Organization. (London, 1964)); Durkheim’s concept o f the moral 
authority o f the firm (E. Durkheim, The Division o f Labour in Society. (London, 1984)); and 
Williamson’s argument that bureaucratic structures can be conducive to an atmosphere where 
individual differences (‘opportunism’) are minimised and corporate objectives given primacy (O. 
Williamson, Economic Organisation. (Brighton, 1986)).
45 An argument integral to -  Lincoln and Kallenberg, Culture. Applebaum and Batt, New Workplace 
and Kochan and Osterman, Mutual Gains.
46 An argument popularised (with a neutral efficiency slant) by P. Doeringer and M. Piore, Internal 
Labour Markets and Manpower Analysis. (Lexington, 1971) and then given a more discriminatory 
emphasis by, R. Edwards, M. Reich and D. Gordon, Labour Market Segmentation, (Lexington, 1975)
47 See, P. Dawson and J. Webb, New  Production Arrangements: The Totally Flexible Cage?’, Work,
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In terms of industrial relations, workers may enjoy many aspects of 
modernisation. Thus, unless dual allegiance to the employer and union is a real 
possibility48, this will create difficulties for unions. When management has significant 
prerogative over workplace conditions and the role of unions at the workplace, unions’ 
future success may require new types of combative strategies for countering the 
message of the modernised firm. Such policies may be all the more difficult in 
countries (e.g. Brazil) which have a harsh facilitating environment49.
Following this last point, the third strand to the critique of the degree of change 
implied by an optimistic view of modernisation is thus, will an ‘alien’ context alter the 
form of modernisation being considered50? Employers may think, ‘in this particular 
location what do we have to offer, and how much, to gain the required level of work 
effort and firm attachment?’ Terms such as ‘teamwork’ and ‘participation’ are capable 
of a wide variety of interpretations51.
At a broad level, factors such as the macroeconomic and political environment 
may affect the nature of a modernisation strategy. At the local level, additional issues 
such as educational levels, unionisation and labour supply may be determinant. In 
Brazil (as in other environments) the influence of both local and broader contexts must 
be kept in mind52.
Taking these contextual considerations further, the debates about modernisation 
and its transference are complicated by the locational choices of transnational capital
Employment and Society. (1989), 3 ,2 , pp221-238.
48 Not likely as studies have shown that dual attachment is low in most countries, even in Japan 
(Guest, ‘Human Resource Management’, p i 15). Nevertheless, a more complicating observation is that 
many different combinations o f attachment (0-high) to the company, work and union may be possible 
and that these may vary by issue -  see ibid., pp 113-115 and Lincoln and Kallenberg, Culture. pp23- 
24
49 See, on this issue, -  S. Deery et al, ‘Predicting Organizational and Union Committment: The Effect 
of Industrial Relations Climate’, British Journal o f Industrial Relations. (1994), 32, 4, pp581-597. The 
Brazilian ‘facilitating environment’ is fully summarised in Chapter 2.
50 A key theme o f ‘The Transfer of Japanese Management to Alien Institutional Environments’,
Journal o f Management Studies- Special Issue, (1995), 32, 6.
51 Highlighted by M. Gaudier, ‘Workers’Participation within the new industrial order: A review of  
literature’, Labor and Society. (1988), 13,2.
52 A view strongly endorsed for Europe (C. Lane, Management and Labour in Europe, (Aldershot, 
1989)) and Brazil (Sobre O Modelo Japones. ed. H. Hirate (Sao Paulo, 1993).
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(TNCs)53. The use of ‘greenfields’ sites in low wage, depressed environments is an old 
theme given added prominence by the modernisation debate. From a radical 
perspective, the international division of labour may be heightened by modernisation54. 
This is because TNCs may use more modem techniques in the parent country while 
Fordism and Taylorism may even be reinforced in ‘satellite’ production centres such as 
Brazil.
In summary, these critiques of the internal processes, structures and the context 
surrounding any modernisation experiment act to question the attitudinal and 
behavioural basis of the optimistic modernisation argument. Even if work is more 
skilled and interesting, modernisation may not actually mean that worker control and 
forms of resistance have disappeared and been replaced by worker allegiance and union 
co-operation. A worst case scenario is that workers may actually be under greater 
stress, surveillance and control in these new systems and that unions are not in a 
position to do much about it55.
The next three sections of this chapter consider these critiques more closely. 
Section 1.3 examines a number of key international studies of management and 
workplace change and section 1.4 provides a more theoretical critique of the 
processes involved in modernisation. These themes are elaborated for the union 
dimension in section 1.5.
53 See, on this, Global Japanization? The transnational transformation o f the labour process eds. T. 
Elgar and C. Smith (London, 1994).
54 See, A. Lipietz, Towards Global Fordism?’, New Left Review, (1982), 132; A. Pollert, The 
Flexible Firm: Fixation or Fact?’, Work, Employment and Society. (1988), pp281-286 and Hyman, 
‘Flexible Specialisation’. Views reinforced more recently in Elgar and Smith, ‘Global Japanization’, 
pp53-54.
55 For workers see, Sewell and Wilkinson, ‘Someone to watch over me’ and Delbridge et al, ‘Pushing 
back the frontiers’. An authoritative volume on union issues is, The New Workplace and Trade 
Unionism, eds. P. Ackers, C. Smith and P. Smith, (London, 1996).
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1.3 MANAGEMENT AND WORKPLACE MODERNISATION -  WHAT HAS 
REALLY CHANGED?
By the mid-1980s, some authors claimed to have observed a new commitment 
based approach to industrial organisation within their work as management 
consultants56. By the mid-1990s, others claimed to have a mix of survey and case study 
evidence which suggested that a discernible process of modernisation was underway 
and that it could be a positive development for workers and unions57. This section 
reviews this evidence and compares it to critical studies of these and other 
modernisation experiments, in the US and the UK in particular.
Prominent Optimists:
One very bold portrayal of modernisation is that put forward by Kochan and 
Osterman58. They claim to have evidence to show that many US firms are attempting to 
create what they call the ‘Mutual Gains’ firm. As summarised in section 1.2, their 
model has three levels -  the strategic, the functional/HRM level and the workplace 
level59.
Other authors such as Applebaum and Batt express a similar level of optimism 
but one which is more nuanced60. Conceptually, what they suggest is that two types of 
model are emerging in the US61. Up to the mid-1980s, they describe most attempts to 
modernise as partial -  simply the application of a few human resource policies to 
existing Fordist processes and low trust industrial relations. However, they feel that 
many firms are now using what they call US lean production (USLP) and US team 
production (USTP).
56 For example, Walton, ‘From control’.
57 Two keys works are, Applebaum and Batt, New Workplace, and Kochan and Osterman, Mutual 
Gains.
58 Kochan and Osterman, Mutual Gains.
59 Ibid., Ch. 3, where all three levels are discussed.
60 Applebaum and Batt, New Workplace.
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These two strategies are very similar in that they are based on TQM/JIT 
principles. Quality and continuous improvement processes are applied throughout a 
leaner firm. However, USLP relies more heavily on a top-down process and ‘harder’ 
evaluative procedures. A USTP approach, on the other hand, is ‘softer’ in that it also 
applies decentralised decision making and teams (with broad responsibilities and 
humanistic goals) to its production strategy.
Applebaum and Batt suggest that the results for the firm’s performance from 
both approaches are very similar62. Yet the processes and outcomes for tasks and 
employee relations may be different. Similarly, as suggested by Kochan and Osterman, 
in practice either strategy may exist in a non-union environment. However, the longer- 
term sustainability of a modernisation strategy will be enhanced if unions have an 
active and inclusive role63.
Many of the arguments of these authors are echoed within an in-depth 
comparison of a large sample of US and Japanese firms by Lincoln and Kallenberg64. 
The model of these authors, ‘Welfare Corporatism’ (WC), is based on structures and 
incentives which promote -  participation, integration, mobility, careers and legitimacy 
and constitutional order within the firm65. The authors claim that their model is also a 
practical view as it mirrors their analysis of many Japanese firms66.
Lincoln and Kallenberg’s approach uses a more sophisticated view of structures 
and incentives than do the above authors. For example, the WC firm retains centralised 
control but decentralised decision making combined with extensive employment 
benefits and welfare services help promote allegiance (commitment) to the firm. 
Secondly, they are more categoric in their view that allegiance to the company does not 
flow from work satisfaction67. Thirdly, these authors also believe that modernisation 
has a better chance if unions are involved. Yet, rather than arguing for whole hearted
61 Ibid., Ch. 8.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., Ch 6 and 9; Kochan and Osterman, Mutual Gains, Ch 6.
64 Lincoln and Kallenberg, Culture.
65 Ibid., ppl4-16.
66 Ibid.
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union co-operation, they suggest (based on the Japanese example) that it should be a 
type of unionism which does not overly divert attention away from a focus on the 
firm’s success68.
Through the examination of both internal structures and external factors69, 
Lincoln and Kallenberg test whether the cultural context of the model determines its 
applicability and success. They conclude that while culture is important, it only has an 
indirect and additive influence on whether ‘Welfare Corporatism’ can lead to company 
allegiance and enhanced company performance70. Thus the apparent commitment 
(allegiance) they observe can be replicated.
Lincoln and Kallenburg then suggest that the important (additional) aspects of 
Japanese firms which US companies should incorporate into their modernisation effort 
are -  broader and more generous ILMs, greater worker input (at all levels of the 
enterprise) and fewer real inequalities between employees71. Finally, Lincoln and 
Kallenberg’s analysis is more empirically robust and less normative than the other 
studies mentioned above. However, the changes they suggest would make US firms 
look very much like US team production (USTP) and the ‘Mutual Gains’ enterprise.
‘Optimistic’ Survey and Case Study Evidence:
The evidence that writers rely on to support an optimistic hypothesis comes 
from surveys and from a variety of case studies. For example, Kochan and Osterman 
draw from their own national establishment survey and an international survey of TQM 
practices72. The authors note that, from within a list of workplace practices, over 50% 
of US firms use teams and one third of establishments employ TQM techniques73. 
While the percentage of employees involved in any one technique is low and even 
though firms are using workplace techniques in diverse clusters, they also report that
67 Ibid., p4, p254.
68 Ibid., pp229-232.
69 Ibid., Ch 8.
70 Ibid., pp250-251.
71 Ibid., pp248-249.
72 Kochan and Osterman, Mutual Gains. pp79-109
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nearly 40% of the sample used to at least two practices for which a minimum of 50% of 
employees were involved74.
Similarly, the surveys reviewed by Applebaum and Batt suggest that up to a 
third of enterprises have made changes to the organisation of work and that a third of 
large firms have serious quality programmes75. Many of these are reported to be 
working well. Based on significant growth in modernisation initiatives between 1987 
and 1990, the authors suggest that this momentum will not abate76.
However, these surveys are not as convincing as they might appear. For 
example, low diffusion rates (of employee involvement) and the random clustering of 
technique use do not bode well for an argument which suggests that a new paradigm of 
industrial organisation is emerging. Secondly, these surveys rely on management 
responses, just those people who may have a motive to play up the significance of their 
‘innovations’. The careful compilation of case study evidence could address these 
uncertainties.
The case studies reviewed by these authors, on the other hand, while playing up 
the success of a number of well-known ‘best case’ firms, do not paint such an 
optimistic picture of change77. What they do achieve is to alert the reader to the 
prevalence of partial modernisation and to the problems this creates. They then use 
these issues to promote their ‘menus’ for change.
For instance, frequent reference is made to the high profile, comprehensive 
experiences of US ventures such as Saturn, NUMMI, Xerox, Motorola, Hewlett 
Packard and CAMMI78. In the UK, the experience of Nissan is often heralded for its 
comprehensive approach to lean production and TQM79. Most of these examples have
73 Ibid., p83.
74 Ibid., p86.
75 Applebaum and Batt, New Workplace. pp57-68.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid., pp69-97 ; Kochan and Osterman, Mutual Gains , pp58-77.
78 Kochan and Osterman, Mutual Gains. pp58-77
79 See, P. Wickens, ‘Lean Production and Beyond: The System, its Critics and the Future’, Human 
Resource Management Journal. (1994), 3 ,4 , pp 75-90.
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made real changes to management and workplace practices and the scope and depth of 
employee involvement. However, while these examples most closely fit the optimistic 
model, they are in the minority and relate mainly to key players in the auto and 
electronic sectors.
The majority of case studies reviewed by these optimists fall far short of 
meeting the criteria of the model80. For example, at the workplace, instances of 
teamwork offer almost no examples of autonomy and only a few of semi-autonomous 
work groups81. Most teams are still heavily supervised, albeit often in more indirect 
ways. Moreover, it appears that, while workers prefer greater involvement, teams on 
their own do not satisfy this desire. Complementary pay policies and a real feeling of 
greater job security are also necessary.
Correspondingly, at the HRM level, most case studies suggest that involvement 
schemes are usually limited to a small number of ‘soft’ issues and remain relatively 
unimportant parallel (rather than integrated) structures within the firm82. Progress on 
the implementation of new pay policies is even less clear. Similarly, expanded training 
is often about the ‘firm’ and qualitative, firm specific techniques.
In addition, the case studies leave it uncertain whether new skills are rewarded. 
Employment security and promotional prospects may alleviate these concerns. 
However, gain-sharing schemes are seen with reservation unless an adequate base rate 
is guaranteed and only if industrial relations are already good83.
At the strategic level, the optimists’ case study examples appear to support a 
variety of ‘visions’ for company level change84. However, in terms of implementation, 
examples are still hierarchical, linked to ‘downsizing’ and overemphasise immediate 
performance objectives. Finally, it is interesting to note that it is almost always only at 
‘greenfields’ sites (where unions are absent or weak) that the components of the model
80 Applebaum and Batt, New Workplace, pp 69-97 ; Kochan and Osterman, Mutual Gains, pp 58-77.
81 Kochan and Osterman, Mutual Gains. pp68-71; Applebaum and Batt, op. cit., pp 75-88
82 Kochan and Osterman, op.cit., pp 71-74; Applebaum and Batt, op. cit., pp 75-88
83 Kochan and Osterman, op. cit., p74
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come together in a more comprehensive form85.
More Critical Studies:
Other studies of modernisation, in comparable production line industries to 
white goods, expand upon these critiques of the modernisation process. This is because 
context has an important modifying effect on the form of modernisation. Moreover, the 
changes to attitudes and behaviour implicit to an optimistic view are seriously 
questioned even in those firms who have achieved very high levels of performance.
For example, Kenney and Florida’s study of Japanese transplants and joint 
ventures in the US auto and electronics industries highlights how fully the ‘Japanese’ 
model is transferred in one industry (autos) and how partially in another (electronics)86. 
Changes such as team work, simplified job classifications, worker rotation, continuous 
improvement (Kaizen) initiatives and suggestion programmes are well developed and 
integrated in their nine Japanese auto examples87. In the four non-union, ‘greenfield’ 
auto sites new channels for employee involvement have been established and there is 
the suggestion that greater employment security will be forthcoming88. In the five union 
sites, changes have been secured through restructuring agreements which formalise the 
union’s role.
While the authors suggest that electronics ventures use a model which is more 
‘modem’ than US electronics firms, comparisons with the auto firms are striking89. For 
instance, while suggestion schemes often exist, there are fewer teams, less job rotation 
and minimal use of continuous improvement mechanisms. Electronics joint ventures 
base their strategies more on low wages, minimal unionism, stringent controls on 
absenteeism and a much greater divide between what is offered to the various skill
84 Ibid., pp74-75; Applebaum and Batt, op.cit., pp 88-91.
85 Kochan and Osterman, op.cit.. pp75-76.
86 M. Kenney and R. Florida, The Transfer of Japanese Management Styles in Two US Transplant 
Industries: Autos and Electronics’, Journal o f Management Studies — Special Issue, (1995), 32, 6, pp 
789-802.
87 Ibid., pp791-795.
88 Ibid., pp793-794.
89 Ibid., pp795-800.
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groups. In the absence of employment stability and any mechanisms to select out or 
persuade employees to be more loyal and productive, employers have tried to counter 
high levels of absenteeism by the use of younger workers and through the promotion of 
supervisors from the shopfloor.
Kenney and Florida’s study does note a number of negative aspects of 
modernisation, even for their more comprehensive auto examples. For instance, they 
observe that non-union sites discipline absent workers more and that peer discipline is 
a strong controlling mechanism at all auto sites90. Similarly, they note that the degree of 
modernisation has a relation to the role of a transplant within the global strategies of the 
parent company and the local context of the transferee91. However, their analysis stops 
at the structural level. Subjectivity receives little to no emphasis. Other studies of the 
‘Japanese’ model in these two sectors help to make up for these deficiencies.
For example, in a detailed participant observation study of a ‘typical’ Japanese 
auto transplant in the US, Graham suggests that the ‘Japanese’ model is actually a more 
thorough and sophisticated mechanism of control than past production systems92. Both 
technical and social control are enhanced as decentralised decision making helps to 
reduce worker autonomy and increase work pressure93. Jobs are different but they are 
just as fragmented as in the past. Monitoring is enhanced through new speed/quality 
checks and incentives and training are used to persuade workers to behave as the firm 
wishes.
The specific setting for Graham’s study was the production line94. For each 
station in the line duties were set and targets were established but the speed of the line 
could change. New tasks such as cleaning and minor maintenance were expected of 
‘associates’ and the workday commenced 5 minutes early with music, exercises and a 
‘pep’ talk.
90 Ibid., p794.
91 Ibid., pp801-802
92 L. Graham, ‘How does the Japanese Model transfer to the United States? A view from the line’, in 
Global Japanisation, eds. T. Elgar and C. Smith, (London, 1994), ppl23-151.
93 Ibid., p l24, 131 on these two areas of control.
94 Ibid., pp 126-131.
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Encompassing this setting, Graham suggests seven mechanisms through which 
the process of control operates95. First, the firm uses a detailed selection process 
whereby potential problem workers are eliminated through tests of aptitude and ‘team 
player’ potential. Secondly, all workers must progress through a series of orientation 
and training programmes. These cover new processes/concepts, the ‘firm’ and more 
detailed modules on attitudes and behaviour. The majority of this training is social.
Thirdly, at the team level it quickly becomes obvious that membership brings 
many pressures. Failure to meet targets will affect the workload of others and workers 
are made to feel guilty if they cannot make these new demands. Fourthly, the 
implementation of a continuous improvement philosophy (Kaizen) means that not only 
are new tasks subject to detailed time and motion study but that, when targets are 
reached, speed requirements are increased or ‘floaters’ (fill-in workers) are removed. 
Through Kaizen, pressure is increased, tacit skills can be used more fully and workers 
have fewer opportunities to manipulate workflow to give themselves rest or ‘space’ to 
socialise.
Fifthly, team based production acts to create specific group loyalties. However, 
worker competition is also enhanced within a broader environment which is 
encouraging greater identification with the firm. Mechanisms which may assist this 
process include new names for jobs (e.g. ‘associates’), a company song and sporting 
and cultural events.
The sixth and seventh mechanisms of control suggested by Graham relate to the 
computer assembly line and the JIT process. The new line sets the pace and registers 
times and fault rates. Attention is focussed on team and individual failure through a 
sound system, card records and team meetings. Inventory control within the JIT 
system, on the other hand, increases the speed and intensity of work. By connecting 
workers up and down the line, slowness and attempts to catch-up become very obvious.
95 Ibid., pp 132-141.
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The negative, encompassing image painted by this study raises the question - 
‘what role does resistance now play?’ On this issue, Graham notes that within this 
system control may be greater but it is not total96. However, individual opportunities for 
resistance are much less effective than the past. Collective resistance is more likely to 
be effective and includes (anonymously) stopping the line and protesting against rituals 
or extra duties.
The themes that Graham raises about managerial intent and work processes 
within a ‘Japanese’ firm have also been considered for other high profile, 
comprehensive auto ventures such as CAMMI (a GM/Suzuki joint venture) in Canada 
and Nissan in the UK. The studies by Rinehart et al and Garrahan and Stewart also put 
a negative, control based interpretation to the role played by selection procedures, 
training schemes, teams, Kaizen processes and the ‘culture’ promoting policies of 
these firms97. However, they add to Graham’s study of modernisation in a number of 
important respects.
For example, Garrahan and Stewart’s study of Nissan also makes the point that 
Nissan’s policies would not have been as effective if Nissan had not been located in a 
depressed part of North-east Britain where unemployment was high and wages low98. 
This context also included a reasonably well-educated (but young) potential labour 
force in much need of work. This made a single union deal relatively easy to organise.
On the other hand, the study by Rinehart et al of shop floor relations at 
CAMMI adds further depth to Graham’s observations about worker attitudes and 
opportunities for resistance. For example, Graham noted that features such as the 
selection process had prompted a number of different responses from workers99. Some 
workers were cynical whereas others seemed to be positive about the firm and its
96 Ibid., ppl41-147.
97 J. Rinehart, D. Robertson, C. Huxley and J. Wareham, Reunifying conception and execution o f  
work under Japanese production management: A Canadian case study’, in Global Japanization. eds. T. 
Elgar and C. Smith, (London, 1994), pp 152-174; and P. Garrahan and P. Stewart, ‘Work 
Organisations in Transition: The Human Resource Management Implications o f the “Nissan Way”’, 
Human Resource Management Journal. (1992), 2, 2, pp46-62.
98 Garrahan and Stewart, ’’Nissan Way”, pp49-50, p59 and p60.
99 Graham, ’A view from the line..’, pp 141-147.
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approach.
By focussing on Kaizen processes, Rinehart et al confirm these responses and 
add one other. Some workers saw Kaizen as useful but believed that it could have been 
better organised100. Originally, these workers had keenly participated in the company’s 
initiatives but as time progressed participation declined. Many were now taking an 
instrumental approach to suggestion schemes and quality circles. This was in spite of 
the growing view that ‘voluntary’ participation was being used for evaluative purposes.
Team and union leaders had other concerns101 - that the workforce would 
become more divided, that ideas were not used and that rewards were insignificant. 
However, of even greater significance was whether participation actually benefited 
workers. For example, decisions often placed little importance on safety issues.
More subtly, there was concern that workers could be drawn into a situation 
where they start to think it is for and by them102. For instance, greater job rotation may 
reduce monotony but it could also reduce upskilling opportunities and, at the same 
time, reduce injury downtime. Moreover, the firm benefits most from the use of 
‘floaters’, particularly when it is they who have the option not to replace them. In this 
situation, as Rinehart et al suggest, control becomes more diffuse and sophisticated but 
no less strong103.
The authors conclude that empowerment and autonomy are not clear 
outcomes104. Workers have more voice but no ‘vote’. While CAMMI illustrates some 
positive developments, its contradictions mean that high involvement does not equate 
to company allegiance or even work satisfaction. For example, the authors’ final survey 
of workers noted that 61% agreed that work was harder rather than smarter105. 
Furthermore, confirming Graham, the authors emphasise that resistance (individual or
100 Rinehart et al, ‘A Canadian Case Study...’, pl64-165.
101 Ibid., ppl66-168.
102 Ibid., pl69.
103 Ibid., ppl61-163.
104 Ibid., pp 170-171.
105 Ibid., p i69.
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collective) is harder to sustain106.
The above examples of comprehensive modernisation caution how the 
modernisation process is interpreted. Studies of modernisation which go beyond the 
structural framework of Kenney and Florida present a very different image of 
modernisation in the auto sector. Similarly, other studies of modernisation in the 
electronics sector amplify Kenney and Florida’s already critical conclusions about 
modernisation in electronics.
For example, in a study of a comprehensively modernised Japanese transplant 
in England, Delbridge describes a process whereby the application of JIT/TQM results 
in a more intense and stressful situation for workers107. As noted by the above studies, 
while workers’ responsibilities and levels of involvement increase, more intrusive and 
effective systems of surveillance, monitoring and peer pressure encompass labourers 
work lives to a level not experienced before108.
In terms of resistance, Delbridge notes that previous factory systems gave 
workers some opportunity to resist -  through unions, custom and practice, tacit skills 
and buffer stock creation109. While some of these methods may have also assisted 
productivity, modernisation practices greatly limit these options for resistance. Non­
union sites or single union deals usually secure more compliant industrial relations. 
Team peer pressures, electronic monitoring, zero stock systems and ILM incentives 
make individual resistance strategies much more problematic. The author is even more 
pessimistic than Graham over the efficacy of resistance in the face of comprehensive 
modernisation110.
Studies of other firms in the electronics sector add further points to consider in 
relation to the modernisation process. For instance, in a comparative study of a
106 Ibid., pp 170-171.
107 R. Delbridge, Surviving JIT: Control and Resistance in a Japanese Transplant’, Journal o f  
Management Studies -  Special Issue. (1995), 32, 6, pp803-817.
108 Ibid., pp809-812.
109 Ibid., pp812-814.
110 Ibid., p813
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Japanese transplant in Wales and a British firm using the ‘Japanese’ model, Taylor et al 
111 note that neither firm appears more dependent on their workers and both use more 
traditional mechanisms (e.g. gender segregation, fear of economic failure) to obtain 
consent from their key (male) workers112. What does appear to be different between the 
firms, however, is that the Japanese transplant does have an ILM where workers labour 
under less Fordist/Taylorist conditions. However, this ILM is in the Japanese parent 
company in Japan113.
This point is elaborated in a study of Japanese electronics transplants in 
Australia114. Dedoussis observes that the conditions offered to different categories of 
workers in the same firm vary more in transplants than in corresponding firms in 
Japan115. The ILMs of transplants also cover a smaller proportion of the workforce. 
Transplants often remain peripheral to the parent company and conditions offered to 
employees in the host country reflect this. To achieve their quality, productivity and 
flexibility objectives the transplant (or emulator) introduces just enough to make the 
production facility work in that particular environment116. Finally, this variability in, 
and scepticism about, the modernisation experience is also evident from cross­
country117 and cross sector studies118.
111 B. Taylor, T. Elgar and P. Fairbrother, Transplants and Emulators: The Fate o f the Japanese Model 
in British Electronics’, in Global Japanization. eds. T. Elgar and C. Smith, (London, 1994), pp 196- 
225.
112 Ibid., p208, pp222-223.
113 Ibid., p200.
114 V. Dedoussis, ‘Simply a Question of Cultural Barriers?: The Search for New Perspectives in the 
Transfer o f Japanese Management Practices’, Journal of Management Studies -  Special Issue. (1995), 
32, 6, pp731-745.
1,5 Ibid., p743, 736.
116 Ibid., pp742-745
1,7 See, for example, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Labour 
Market Flexibility and Work Organisation -  Conference o f Experts. 17-19/9/90, ‘Synthesis o f Responses 
of National Administrations to OECD request for information’, Directorate o f Social Affairs, Manpower 
and Education, OECD, Paris, 1990. This survey noted massive variety in the modernisation experience 
between countries. It also noted that, while workers may be more positive about some aspects of  
modernisation, this will not be sustained unless greater rewards and job security were forthcoming. 
(OECD, Labour Market Flexibility, ‘Synthesis Report’ by J. Rojot, pp26-30.)
118 See, for example, the cross-sectoral study o f B. Wilkinson, J. Norris and M. Munday, The Iron 
Fist in the Velvet Glove: Management and Organisation in Japanese Manufacturing Transplants in 
Wales’, Journal of Management Studies -  Special Issue. (1995), 32, 6, pp819-830.
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In summary, this section has demonstrated the wide range of views regarding 
the existence, processes and outcomes of modernisation, within and across a number of 
country and sectoral contexts. Comprehensive modernisation may deliver much better 
results for the firm compared to traditional and partial modernisation strategies. 
However, many of these studies have seriously questioned the intent of employers to 
embark on wholescale change.
The main reasons for questioning how far firms will modernise and what 
effects would be forthcoming related to the context and to the implicit assumptions 
about the effects of modernisation on the attitudes and behaviour of workers and 
unions. It is more probable that the situation has simply become more difficult for 
unions and that workers’ ‘us and them’ attitudes, while muted, still remain. In this 
regard, a principal theme which emerged was that, rather than allegiance, worker 
control may remain as a constant issue within the firm. The next section delves more 
deeply into the theoretical roots of this control debate and its relation to this and other 
empirical studies.
1.4 LABOUR PROCESS THEORY AND THE MODERNISATION PROCESS
Labour process theory most clearly challenges the implications of an optimistic 
view of modernisation. Labour control, skill degradation and inherent conflict stand out 
as key themes within many labour process writings. Early attempts to describe the 
processes involved in factory life characterised control, skill and conflict in a relatively 
simple way119.
Over time, institutionalists and sociologists improved on this approach in the 
light of empirical evidence which suggested the emergence of more nuanced 
managerial strategies and work systems120. This section briefly traces these theoretical
119 H. Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital. (New York, 1974)
120 For example, see- A. Friedman, Industry and Labour: Class Structure at Work and Monopoly 
Capitalism, (London, 1977) and R. Edwards, Contested Terrain. (London , 1979) and Burawoy, 
Production Politics.
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developments. It finishes with a description of how the labour process framework 
might be improved by taking better account of the issues raised by recent empirical 
critiques of the modernisation process.
Traditional Labour Process Theory:
The labour process debate is about the implications of the separation of the 
ownership and control of the means of production121. Potential labour power becomes 
real labour power, and thus surplus value occurs, due to mechanisms of managerial 
control such as the separation of conception from workers’ duties. Moreover, these 
mechanisms conceal the means through which more is extracted from workers than 
what they are paid.
The centrality of skills and control issues to labour process analysis were 
solidified by the work of Braverman122. His view was that there was an inevitable and 
monotonic process of deskilling underway. The logic of the capitalist labour process 
was, for him, encapsulated in a trend towards the greater separation of conception and 
execution skills. Management's control of labour power was thus to be found in the 
dominance and continuation of a Taylorist division of tasks. The eventual end to this 
process would only be brought about by worker resistance in the form of class action123.
While skill and control issues continue to stay at the centre of the labour 
process debate, the arguments used by Braverman have been strongly criticised124. For 
instance, a much greater range of skill outcomes and ways of seeing skill (e.g. as a tacit 
and subjective issue) have emerged compared to Braverman's craft ideal and his view 
of its monotonic decline125. Relatedly, Braverman's view of management was a
121 See, Littler, Labour Process. Part 1, and Labour Process Theory, eds. D. Knights and H. Willmott 
(London, 1989), pp2-7.
122 Braverman, Monopoly Capital.
123 See P. Thompson. The Nature o f Work. (London, 2nd ed. 1989), Ch. 3 and Labour Process 
Theory, eds. Knights and Willmott, pp7-10.
124 See, Labour Process Theory, eds Knights and Willmott, pplO-19 .
125 See T. Manwaring and S. Wood, 'The Ghost in the Labour Process', in Job Redesign, eds. D. 
Knights et al, (London, 1985), ppl71-193.
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relatively one-dimensional, universal Taylorist model126. Thirdly, outside of eventual 
class action as a response to economic exploitation, resistance and subjectivity received 
insufficient attention127.
Fourthly, Braverman's vision of the labour process has been criticised as being 
a one-sided approach to an analysis of the division of labour128. For instance, the design 
of jobs will also be determined by product market and competition factors. These are 
decided outside of the factory floor. This, as is noted below, is not a totally fair 
criticism of all studies which base their research in the labour process. However, the 
consideration of influences outside of the point of production leads to a more realistic 
picture of the diversity of production process and skill possibilities than that suggested 
by Braverman129.
Many of the skills and management control criticisms of Braverman have been 
improved upon in the works of Edwards130, Friedman131 and Coriat132. These authors do 
not base their theories on a monotonic process of deskilling. Their focus is more upon 
the development of less onerous management methods due to the visible, and thus 
dysfunctional, nature of Taylorism. For Edwards this represents a movement from 
coercive to bureaucratic control and for Friedman the gradual evolution of some 
‘responsible autonomy’ for workers. Coriat's vision of an evolution from imposed to 
stimulated to negotiated control echoes a similar line of thinking.
These strategies represent a new realisation by management that, in certain 
circumstances, profitability may require a different type of mechanism for ensuring 
labour power. For example, the processes and ‘carrots’ of bureaucracy and ILMs may 
generate enough self-interest to make workers consent to working more efficiently, 
harder or differently. Structures and rewards such as teamwork, reduced supervision
126 See, Friedman, Industry and Labour ; Edwards, Contested Terrain.
127 Well discussed by Burawoy, Production Politics, Ch. 1.
128 J. Kelly, Scientific Management, Job Redesign and Work Performance, (London, 1982).
129 As suggested by ibid. and Thompson, Work. p218.
130 Edwards, Contested Terrain.
131 Friedman, Industry and Labour.
132 B. Coriat, ‘Du Fordisme au Post-Fordisme’ in , Mutations Industrielles. Une Decennie de 
Modernisation Quels Modeles Socio-Productifs, ed B. Coriat (Paris, 1991).
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and career opportunity may promote the ‘community’ of the firm and thus allow the 
greater co-ordination of the interests of capital and labour. Yet none of these authors 
shy from a belief that control and conflict have disappeared, they have simply taken on 
a new form. The stages they suggest represent ‘frontiers’ or ‘terrains’ of temporary 
stability - akin to a truce. A greater amount of voluntarism arises but this is still within 
a context based on fundamental domination and exploitation133.
These arguments are a considerable improvement on earlier labour process 
theory. However, factors outside of the point of production which affect the form of 
labour use still receive insufficient attention. Secondly, inherent antagonism between 
capital and labour remains central as a matter of faith, rather than as a testable 
proposition. Burawoy’s concept of the ‘politics of production’ represents a more 
adequate framework for considering control and the variety of influences on the labour
134process .
The ‘Politics of Production’:
To Burawoy, the context of production has an economic, political and 
ideological dimension. The political is evident in the form of social relations being 
promoted and the ideology relates to subjective responses to the (economic) production 
relations which have been introduced. Uncertainty over the generation of surplus value 
and the personal process by which this occurs make the point of production an 
important and unique locus to consider.
Like the authors considered above, Burawoy doesn't see new management 
strategies as any less coercive than simpler forms. However, his framework allows for a 
broader consideration of the influences on managerial strategy. The labour process is a 
key, but only one, factor within Burawoy’s ‘politics of production’. Factory regimes 
will also be influenced by state, company ownership and product market
133 See, for critiques o f these contributions, Thompson, Work, Chs. 5-6 and Managing the Labour 
Process, eds D. Knights and H. Willmott, (London, 1986) pp4-5, and Lincoln and Kallenburg,
Culture, pp8-10.
134 Burawoy, Production Politics.
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considerations. Thus the means by which capital and labour's interests are internally co­
ordinated are accordingly more open.
The apparent contradictions of a crude view of control are also more explicitly 
allowed for within Burawoy’s consideration of worker subjectivity. For example, a 
recognition that complete control cannot exist opens up ‘space’ for workers to find 
relative satisfactions in their work. These may relieve the boredom or oppression of 
work. More specifically, workers' ‘games’ (for Burawoy they came in the form of 
output bonus quota behaviour) directly involve workers in the process by which surplus 
values' creation is mystified - workers don't just make products and profits they also 
generate their own consent to this process through their ‘games’135.
This ambiguous but subjective view of the labour process is central to 
Burawoy’s schema136. For him the labour process should be seen in a dynamic way, as 
social relations between workers in production. Structural explanations offer a useful, 
but only partial, perspective on how subjective effects such as control or consent are 
manufactured in daily workplace routines.
Consequently, some of the ‘games’ which may evolve on the factory floor of a 
modernising firm may also represent resistance to the nature of expectations put on 
workers. Rather than being based on inherent conflict or the ultimate division of labour, 
class relations will be created and recreated in particular circumstances. Consent, 
control and conflict may co-exist quite comfortably in this context.
In summary, Burawoy’s framework suggests that control will emanate from 
relations in production, through the policies of the factory regime, from the state and 
from international market forces. It also makes a clear distinction between a company's 
ultimate objective (profit) and the organisational means chosen to achieve this. 
However, while many company decisions will not be made with labour process or 
control outcomes in mind, many will often impinge on the labour process.
135Ibid., p l l  andp39.
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Improving the Model -  The ‘Politics of Modernisation’:
Nevertheless, Burawoy’s framework has a number of weaknesses. For example, 
the role of the state and external influences are still left in a relatively one dimensional 
form137. Perhaps this is the reason Burawoy also succumbs to a somewhat deterministic 
set of models for the evolution of factory regimes. The ultimate of these (‘hegemonic 
despotism’) is where control once again becomes explicit due to more advanced forms 
of globalisation.
Within the realistic bounds of a research project there are ways in which 
Burawoy’s schema could be enhanced. For example, the consideration of control could 
be strengthened by the use of more detailed models of power, such as that by Lukes138. 
Control then, like power, has three dimensions. It can be explicit like in a stylised 
Taylorist/Fordist regime, the use of the police or via strict legislative controls. 
Secondly, control can be more diffuse such as through a set of general ‘rules of the 
game’ for industrial relations.
Recent modernisation strategies could be seen as a third and more subtle form 
of control -  one which gives more depth to Burawoy’s concept of the ideology of 
production. At this level, control involves the ability to influence the frame of reference 
agents use for seeing their situation. This is a key point which emerges from the critical 
studies noted in section 1.3. A shift in a company's labour use policies towards this 
more subtle type of control may affect subjectivity in new and unpredictable ways.
Accordingly, what might appear to be instances of resistance (consent or 
allegiance) could be more fully explored by applying these concepts within studies of 
modernisation. In this regard, the Burawoy schema has also been criticised as being too 
weak on resistance139. The consent ‘game’ he refers to (bonus ‘making-out’) may be
136 Ibid., Ch. 1. Also see, Knights and Willmott, Labour Process Theory. ppl6-18 for a summary.
137 See Knights and Willmott, Labour Process Theory, p i8.
138 S. Lukes, Power - a Radical View, (London, 1977)
139 See, for example, Skill and Consent -  Contemporary Studies in the Labour Process, eds. A. Sturdy, 
D. Knights and H. Willmott, (London, 1992), p6; D. Knights, ‘Subjectivity, Power and the Labour 
Process’, in Labour Process Theory, eds. Knights and Willmott, pp297-335; and Resistance and Power
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more strongly based on personal income maximisation than as a means of resisting 
feelings of control. On the other hand, the commitment that Lincoln and Kallenberg140 
claim to observe may not be such a strong behavioural reaction when seen through such 
a model.
In summary, as with the critical studies reviewed earlier, many of these 
theoretical contributions refute the idea that the ‘glue’ that makes workplaces more 
efficient can be allegiance. However, while the ‘politics of production’ allows for a 
spectrum of attitudinal responses it could be improved upon by a more detailed 
conceptualisation of control. This would more adequately reflect the subtle processes 
that have been observed within modernised factories141.
The empirical studies reviewed earlier also alert us to a second area in which 
theory must tread carefully. The international, national and local contexts surrounding 
any modernisation experiment appear very important. However, analyses must 
carefully assess the significance of the various contextual factors in such a way that 
they are neither trivialised nor used as the basis for a broad and generalised political 
discourse.
Finally, like control, resistance is a theme which requires further analysis. 
Burawoy’s study limits and confuses this issue. Yet it is an important theme to explore 
as critical studies of modernisation have noted that resistance is more difficult due to 
modernisation. With an increasingly encompassing factory regime, a key question 
therefore is - are unions becoming the ‘them’ or are they adjusting their strategies and 
strengthening their position. The next section considers these issues.
in Organisations, eds. J. Jermier, D. Knights and W. Norn (London, 1993) pp 1-11.
140 Lincoln and Kallenberg, Culture. Ch. 9.
141 Section 1.3 o f this chapter.
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1.5 THE CHALLENGE OF MODERNISATION FOR WORKER 
REPRESENTATION
The optimistic modernisation literature is littered with anecdotal evidence and 
descriptions of how unions have and must develop co-operative identities.142. Yet there 
appears to be a variety of conditions that need to be met before unions can safely take 
on a co-operative approach and remain effective and representative. The unitary 
message and persuasive policies of the modernising firm may compromise unions’ 
independent role as both factory representatives and political actors.
Many unionists have also questioned employer intent and the modernisation 
process143. The concerns they raise include work stress, the nature of involvement, the 
role of training and the Kaizen process but also broader implications for union 
collectivism. Consequently, this section looks at how unions might respond to 
modernisation. It also proposes a model of union identity for use within this thesis.
Modernisation -  Constraints and Opportunities for Unions:
Unions everywhere have been under considerable pressure during the 1980s 
and 1990s. There are now many studies of reductions in union militancy and 
coverage, in and across Western democracies144 Most studies have concentrated on 
structural explanations of union decline. However, also stressed are more subjective 
aspects such as changes in the political perspectives and workplace priorities of 
actual and potential union members145.
142 See, for examples, Piore, Unions..Reorientation’ and Kochan and Osterman, Mutual Gains. Ch. 6.
143 US studies include, M. Parker, Inside the Circle: A Union Guide to OWL, (Boston, 1985); M. 
Parker and J. Slaughter, Choosing Sides: Unions and the Team Concept. (Boston, 1988) and J. Black 
and P. Ackers, ‘Between Adversarial Relations and Incorporation: A Study o f the “Joint” Process in 
an American Auto-Components Plant’, in Global Japanization, eds. Elgar and Smith, pp297-326.
144 See; E. Kane and D. Marsden, 'The future o f trade unionism in industrialized market economies; J. 
V isser,' Trade unionism in Western Europe: Present situation and prospects'; and T. Kochan, 'The 
future o f worker representation: An American perspective' - all in Labour and Society. (1988), 13(2). 
See also, The State o f the Unions, eds. G. Strauss, D. Gallagher, J. Fiorite (Madison, 1993) and, The 
Future o f Labour Movements, ed. M. Regini (London, 1992).
145 As noted in,, R. Hyman, 'Trade Unions and the Disaggregation of the Working Class', in Future
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Most recently, growing individualism and the effect of new modernisation 
strategies on worker allegiance have received greatest emphasis as influences on the 
prospects of unions146. Some disagreement remains as to whether many of these 
challenges are new147. However, there appears to be general agreement that unions, as 
they are now configured, are facing a serious challenge.
This is particularly so as the prospect of greater participation, training and 
stability may be liked by workers. Yet many of these workplace changes fall outside of 
the traditional interests of most unions. Moreover, if workers are encouraged to focus 
their attention more on their specific workplace, broader political considerations and 
other labour market options may seem less relevant to them. In consequence, both 
unions’ political objectives and workplace relevance may be called into question.
Accordingly, some writers suggest the focus of unions should become firm 
specific and service orientated148. Others believe that unions should take on a 
reconstituted social role, possibly fusing with other social movements149. Still others 
see a mix of strategies, along the lines of Hyman's model of ‘business unionism with a 
social conscience’150. The greatest difference in these writings is, however, over 
whether unions should be moderate or militant.
The degree to which unions can take on moderate identities, and still survive as 
independent representative bodies, strongly depends on the nature of the facilitating 
environment. However, in less favourable economic conditions unions start in an even 
weaker position than the past and are likely to stand less chance of gaining from a more 
moderate approach, unless it is assumed that employers have begun to be pro-union.
Labour, ed. Regini, pp 151-167.
146 For a critique of these issues see, New Workplace and Unionism, eds. Ackers, et al. Typologies of  
union responses can be found in, Guest, Human Resource Management’ and R. Hyman, ‘Changing 
Trade Union Identities and Strategies’, in New Frontiers in European Industrial Relations, eds. R. 
Hyman and A. Femer (London, 1994).
147 Qualified acceptance that some change is occurring is well put by, R. Hyman, 'Unions and the 
Working Class', in Future Labour, ed. Regini, and J. Kelly, 'Union Militancy and Social Partnership', 
in New Workplace and Unionism, eds. Ackers et al.
148 See, P. Bassett, Strike Free: New Industrial Relations in Britain, (London, 1987) and M. Piore, 
'Unions.. Reorientation’.
149 See, Bacon and Storey, 'Individualism and Collectivism’.
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Moreover, even if employers take a pro-union stance, unions’ survival as 
independent, representative bodies would require that workers have allegiance to both 
the union and the modernised employer. Yet the empirical evidence does not support 
this. As noted earlier, even in Japan, where unions do not unduly threaten the firms’ 
goals, dual allegiance is considered to be very low151.
If then unions become mere service providers or just parts of a broader social 
movement, this would mean a major change to unions as most appreciate them. On the 
other hand, some suggest that unions should emulate the strategies of German and 
Swedish unions (as negotiators of labour process change), perhaps taking their role 
even further into areas such as workplace training152. However, despite the arguable 
benefits of workplace engagement in Germany and Sweden, few countries have, or are 
likely to develop, such a structure and history of workplace relations.
Furthermore, even in Germany and Sweden union engagement with 
management at the workplace may still lead to contradictions between firm based 
issues and a role of unions as independent representatives153. Current thought is that the 
relative success of these models is based on a variety of features beyond just an active 
workplace union role154. They also require macro union co-ordination and the 
independent, positive recognition of unions in law155.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Brazilian industrial relations environment does 
not exhibit such features. Constraining rules, high levels of managerial prerogative, a 
divided labour movement and low levels of education and pay distinguish the Brazilian 
context. Moreover, as noted in Chapter 3, these features may take on even more distinct
150 In R. Hyman, 'European Unions: towards 2000', Work Employment and Society. (1991), 5,4.
151 On Japanese unions’ engaged but not so conflictual role see Lincoln and Kallenberg, Culture. 
pp229-232.
152 See W. Streeck, 'Training and the New Industrial Relations: A Strategic Role for Unions?', in 
Future Labour, ed. Regini.
153 See H. Kern and C. Sabel, 'Trade Unions and decentralized production: a Sketch o f Strategic 
Problems in the German Labour Movement', in Future Labour, ed. Regini.
154 A point well made by M. Terry, 'Workplace Unionism: Redefining Structures and Objectives', in 
New Frontiers, eds. Hyman and Femer.
155 See on these points, C. Crouch, 'The Fate o f Articulated Industrial Relations Systems: a stock 
taking after the 'Neo-liberal' Decade', in Future Labour, ed. Regini and L. Turner, Democracy at
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forms due to the local context and TNC factors. The last part of this section presents a 
model of union identity which allows this thesis to evaluate the responses of the case 
study unions to the complex web of workplace and political pressures evident within 
this context.
Research Problematics and the Identity Model:
For traditional issues such as wages and benefits, the consideration of a union’s 
responses to a change in an employer’s policies may seem quite straightforward. 
However, many aspects of modernisation may act to accentuate existing problematic 
aspects of unions’ relation to, and strategies for, workers156. For instance, to what 
extent do worker responses reflect their unconstrained preferences as opposed to the 
political ideology of their employer or union?
More specifically, with the modernising employer increasingly trying to 
persuade workers to go ‘beyond (the wage-effort) contract’ and take a firm specific but 
individualist attitude, how far should unions try to influence, as opposed to follow, the 
opinions of workers and still be considered a representative and independent voice of 
workers? On the other hand, even if a union has been able to influence workplace 
conditions, who has this benefited? That is, how collective and representative are they 
as an organisation?
As the terms ‘moderate’ and ‘militant’ are not detailed enough in themselves to 
cope with these issues, in this thesis unionism is analysed using a dynamic concept of 
identity. The model employed is one which considers the nature of interests served by 
the union, its level of democracy and the union agenda157. Union identity is defined as 
the relationship of these factors to how a union is able to exert power/control within its 
particular environment. The elements of this model (see Figure 1.1) are discussed 
below.
Work: Changing World Markets and the future of Labor Unions. (Cornell, 1991).
156 On these ever present union debates see (eg union democracy, political action) see, State of  
Unions, eds. Strauss et al.
157 As developed by, Hyman, 'Union Identities'.
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Figure 1.1: The Identity Model
Union Interests Union Democracy
U nion
v Identity
Union Agenda Union Power
Source: Hyman, ‘Union Identities', p 120
i) Union Interests:
A union's interests relate to whom and in what types of issues it is interested. 
Challenges common to most unions are whether they can expand their interest base 
and still be representative. Unions may have more difficulty (than in the past) 
resolving their interests in an environment where internal factory conditions take on 
relatively greater importance (for workers) than factors external to the firm.
ii) Union Agenda:
A union's agenda is evident not only from its formal policies and constitution 
but also from the priorities implicit within its day-to-day strategies. In this regard, 
quantitative demands fit more easily within unions' traditional orientation. On the 
other hand, qualitative demands, such as those raised by modernisation, are more 
challenging of managerial authority
In the face of modernising employers, a union's agenda could (in a stylised 
sense) become either, 1) more collaborative and narrow in scope, or 2) actively 
questioning of employers and broader in focus. Modernisation optimists would 
suggest that the first option is both the more effective form of representation and the 
most likely to evolve if unions are to survive. An alternative to this would be for
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unions to become more like a social movement
iii) Union Democracy:
The third factor concerns the problematic issue of union democracy. To go 
fully into the debates about union democracy is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However, a principal question of these debates is whether an ‘iron law of oligarchy’ 
(a conflict between union efficiency and democracy) is inevitable158. Conflicts of this 
type are said to be heightened by modernisation159.
The analysis of this thesis is based on the proposition that participation is the 
key issue behind democracy and that this will also determine a union's effectiveness160. 
The concept employed, participant representation, departs from an internal electoral 
model of democracy often derived from the ‘iron law’ proposition. This ‘iron law’, or 
goal displacement proposition, was based on three related arguments. These were that; 
the demands of organisational effectiveness would lead to divisions between leaders 
and the rank and file; this would be perpetuated by leaders increasing interest in 
remaining in power and; that an antagonism of interests would grow between a radical 
workforce and growing moderation by union leaders161.
The internal consistency and assumptions of these arguments have been 
seriously challenged in the literature162. Furthermore, the use of electoral models and an 
emphasis on internal institutional aspects of unions163 neglects external factors164. Most
158 R. Michels, Political Parties, (New York, 1959, 1st ed. 1915).
159 As noted by Kem and Sabel, 'Unions and Decentralised Production'
160 As noted/used by W. Mangabeira, 'Union Politics and workplace militancy: a case study o f  
Brazilian steelworkers in the 1980s', (1991), PhD Thesis, LSE, University of London, Ch 1.
161 Ibid.
162 See ibid. and P. Cook, 'Robert Michels Political Parties in Perspective', The Journal of Politics, 
(1971) 33; and S. Hill, Competition and Control at Work. (London, 1981). Cook criticises the concept 
for implicitly assuming the working class as a radical group and leaders as supporting the status quo. 
Hill criticises a necessary link being made between goal displacement and oligarchic tendencies.
163 Such as is done by J. Edelstein and M. Warner, Comparative Union Democracy. (New Jersey, 
1979); R. Martin, 'Union Democracy: An Explanatory Framework', Sociology. (1968) 2, 2 and I. 
Roxborough, Unions and Politics in Mexico -  the case o f the automobile industry. (Cambridge,
1984).
164 As is argued by, E. Heery and P. Fosh, 'Introduction: whose union? Power and bureaucracy in the 
labour movement', in Trade Unions and their members: studies in union democracy and organization.
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importantly, the implicit assumption that unions must solely follow workers' demands 
does not necessarily indicate that unions are representative165.
What does appear important is whether active collaboration exists between 
workers and the union. The process of participative representation will be a function of 
resource availability and local conditions. It is a socially constructed process wherein a 
representative union seeks workers’ views, interprets their demands, proposes new 
themes, reports back to workers and pursues members' demands166.
Participant representation may be more difficult to achieve as modernisation 
proceeds. This is because modernisation may lead to 1) fewer workers being interested 
in the union, and/or 2) viewpoints of a union's role becoming more diverse or even 
diametrically opposed. This may or may not destabilise the union. It may or may not 
also lead to particular groups taking control of the union or others facing unfair 
obstacles to the challenging of this group (i.e. the ‘iron law’ debate). More 
fundamentally, modernisation could reduce the incentive for and effectiveness of 
mechanisms of participation and accountability.
iv) Union Power:
One possible power implication of this model is therefore that, as workplaces 
modernise unions will tend to become less powerful and influential at both the 
workplace and political level. On the other hand, optimists suggest that moderate 
unions which concentrate on workplace themes will be able to retain or regain their 
influence and power. This might also be the case if unions have little to do with 
workplace matters.
eds. P. Fosh and E. Heery (1990), pp 1-28; and in respect to Mexico, K. Middlebrook, 'Union 
Democratization in the Mexican Auto Industry', L.A.R.R.. 24,2.
165 Demonstrated in other Brazilian situations by Mangabeira, 'Union Politics', and J. Morais, 'New 
Unionism and Union Politics in Pernambuco (Brazil) in the late 1980s', (1992), PhD Thesis, LSE, 
University o f London.
156 Noted by Morais, 'New Unionism and Union Politics', Ch. 1.
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In summary, this section has elaborated upon the implications of many recent 
empirical studies of management and workplace change. Modernisation will intensify 
the difficult position in which most unions already find themselves - at the workplace 
and in the political arena. Despite the optimism of many recent writers, it appears that 
few environments offer unions the conditions which allow them to resolve these 
conflicts and remain representative and effective.
The prospects of - a truly inclusive stance by employers to unions, a facilitative 
framework and dual allegiance to the employer and union - do not look very high, 
especially in countries such as Brazil. However, the process by which a union responds 
to this situation is full of ambiguities and constraints. The use of a model of union 
identity, one which uses an interactive and contextually explicit concept of worker- 
union relations, should allow this process to be most adequately described.
1.6 A METHODOLOGY FOR THE ‘POLITICS OF MODERNISATION’ IN 
BRAZIL
How and why have work (especially labour processes) and industrial relations 
changed during the process of industrial modernisation in Brazil are the central 
questions of this thesis. More specifically, in what ways have the styles, structures and 
policies of firms changed and why? Secondly, how have work and attitudes to work 
changed? Thirdly, have workers’ attitudes to their employer and their union been 
modified and why? Finally, in what ways have unions been able to act as conditioning 
influences on this process - have their identities changed and have they been effective?
Optimists suggest that a clear change in management style has or will emerge. 
Structures will be more open and flexible and if unions are to have a role they will need 
to not be in opposition to a company's policies. These policies and new production and 
employment concepts will recombine conception and execution skills and make work 
more satisfying. Most importantly, modernisation will lead to a strong psychological
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bond between the employee and employer, a degree of organisational attachment which 
offers many benefits to the firm, it’s employees and their representatives.
On the other hand, sceptics refute the processes inherent within an optimistic 
hypothesis. They seriously question employer intent, the degree to which work will 
change and the necessary wisdom of a change in union strategy towards co-operation. 
Most fundamentally, their work challenges the view that control has been replaced by 
allegiance as the primary attitudinal link between workers and employers. Examples of 
partial modernisation clearly illustrate these criticisms of the optimistic hypothesis. 
However, even in successful comprehensively modernising firms, the form that 
modernisation takes and its effects on subjectivity remain empirical issues.
The methodology of this thesis is guided by a more sceptical theoretical 
viewpoint. However, this study hopes to add greater insights to its analysis of the 
‘politics of modernisation’. First, as highlighted by the literature, it is not only skills, 
tasks and conditions which are important but also the subjective nature of employee 
relations and the precise basis of management policy. Secondly, organised resistance 
from outside the factory is dealt with in great detail through the use of a dynamic model 
of union identity.
Thirdly, this study tries to sensitively consider how aspects of the international, 
national and local contexts may affect modernisation outcomes. Fourthly, due to the 
debates in the literature about the degree and consequences of factory level change, the 
primary division of data in this thesis is between partial and comprehensively 
modernising firms. Few studies of Brazil have attempted to apply such a methodology 
and even fewer have integrated detailed data on workers and their unions. Moreover, 
this is the first study of its type of the white goods industry.
As elaborated in Chapter 2, the case study period (1985-94) appears to be 
unique as it marked the start of more open economic policies and political processes in 
Brazil. Many employers have embarked on a process of modernisation and workplace 
conditions have become more open and legitimately contestable issues. However, the
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development process remains uncertain, many aspects of the corporatist industrial 
relations model remain, employers have been used to unfettered managerial prerogative 
and the union movement remains fragile and divided. This context is reflected within 
the recent Brazilian literature about workers, unions and factory regimes167.
Accordingly, the hypotheses of this thesis with respect to the ‘politics of 
modernisation’ in Brazilian industry are:
1. Modernisation in Brazil will show variety depending on the market, ownership 
and locality of the firm. Also, changes in Brazilian management style, structures 
and policies will be limited in scope and based on a skewed participatory 
orientation.
2. Changes to work will be far more limited than suggested by an optimistic 
interpretation of modernisation. Some workers may take on new tasks, even new 
conceptual skills, but there will be strong limits to how much work changes.
3. Workers are likely to be subjectively influenced by the ‘politics of 
modernisation’ and may even actively contribute to their own consent to it. 
However, while it is uncertain what effect modernisation may have on worker- 
union relations, the degree of worker attachment to the employer will be limited.
4. Despite employers' new interest in modernisation and human resources, unions 
will continue to be kept out of the picture. Unions' identities will be under intense 
pressure, if they wish to be both representative and effective.
The data used to investigate these issues was collected through management 
interviews168 and questionnaires, intensive workplace observation and discussions, 
union interviews and archives, detailed interviews with a sample of 93 workers from
167 See Chapter 2, section 2.4.
168 Both with and, more substantially, independently o f the project -B. Neto et al, 'A Industria de 
eletrodom^sticos de linha branca: tendencias intemacionais e situa$ao no Brasil', (1992) Institute de 
Economia, University o f Campinas, Brazil.
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four white goods firms169 and from complementary discussions170. A vast number of 
secondary sources of data were also accessed. These included the IGBE, FGV, 
ABINEE, SENAI and the BNDES171. A newspaper and periodical archive on the 
industry, companies and unions was also compiled and research staff at CEBRAP, 
DESEP and DIEESE were regularly consulted172. Material gained from these sources 
complemented the many articles, books and theses collected.
The primary data gathered in the course of this research is analysed in Parts B 
and C of this thesis. Part B (Chapters 4 & 5) deals with changes to the factories and to 
work/labour processes. Part C (Chapters 6 & 7) deals with industrial relations issues. 
The next two chapters (Chapters 2 & 3) of this part of the thesis describe the context 
against which this case study material is set.
Chapter 3 deals with two important sets of factors -  the case study industry and 
the local environments for each case study. Recent studies and critical theory have 
suggested that the issues of TNC involvement and local custom and practice may affect 
outcomes at the factory level. It is thus important to provide an overview of these 
factors for the case studies.
Chapter 2 summarises key aspects of Brazilian industrial relations which have 
and still shape workers’ conditions and unions’ abilities to act. The effects of recent 
political and economic changes on workers and the labour movement are also 
discussed. Most importantly, the chapter summarises key findings from the Brazilian 
literature on modernisation and sets up the more specific Brazilian modernisation 
themes to be analysed in the empirical chapters.
169 The original worker interview schedule is enclosed as Appendix D.
170 See Bibliography, Part 4.
171 These acronyms are defined in the ‘List o f Abbreviations’ at the start o f this thesis.
172 Ibid.
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CHAPTER 2:
MODERNISATION IN THE BRAZILIAN CONTEXT
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The first aim of this chapter is to specify those aspects of industrial relations 
and political economy which define the Brazilian context for this study. With this 
background in mind, the second aim is to provide an overview of modernisation 
developments in the recent period. This allows the implications of modernisation for 
work/labour processes and industrial relations in Brazil to be set out. These themes 
provide a basis for the analysis of the case study factories, workers and unions in 
Chapters 4-7.
Optimistic propositions about industrial modernisation have achieved greater 
prominence in Brazil due to the transition the country has undergone since 1985. 
Formally, democracy has been introduced, more open economic policies are being 
pursued and some changes have been made to the corporatist and exclusionary system 
of industrial relations. A more open and consensual form is being promoted for politics 
in general and for workplace practices and industrial relations in particular.
However, in contrast to the optimistic modernisation hypothesis, this chapter’s 
review of the Brazilian context argues as follows. First, the continuation of a number of 
historical features of Brazilian industrial relations and political economy suggest that an 
optimistic outcome is unlikely at factory level. Yet, theoretically at least, some factors 
(e.g. an already high level of flexibility in the allocation of labour) may make it easier 
for firms to partially modernise and recent political and institutional liberalisation may 
assist this process.
Secondly, despite these caveats, there is clear evidence that the number of 
comprehensive modernisation experiments is growing. However, present empirical 
work leaves it uncertain whether these changes are having effects on work, workers’ 
attitudes and unionism that conform to an optimistic vision. Thirdly, these observations
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confirm Chapter l ’s point that the best way to investigate the form and effects of 
modernisation is to compare the experiences of partially and comprehensively 
modernised firms.
This chapter has three substantive sections. Section 2.2 briefly reviews 
historical themes in Brazilian political economy which continue to influence industrial 
relations and working conditions in the current period. These relate to the normative, 
institutional role of the state, the constraining effect of political processes on the labour 
movement and the high degree of managerial prerogative that employers have over the 
use of labour.
Section 2.3 outlines the case study context for the years 1980 to 1994. The first 
subsection (2.3.1) summarises economic and political conditions and their impact on 
industrial labour. Subsection 2.3.2 underlines the uncertain effect of greater political 
and industrial relations liberalisation on the Brazilian union movement.
It is against this background that section 2.4 surveys and evaluates studies of 
modernisation across Brazilian industry during the case study period. Subsection 2.4.1 
notes that by the early 1990s the rate and depth of modernisation examples grew to a 
point whereby firm level performance improvements could also be seen. However, 
comprehensive examples of change were mainly isolated to key sectors and most 
prevalent in large and TNC dominated firms.
Subsection 2.4.2 summarises the main themes to emerge for work/labour 
processes and industrial relations as a result of these modernisation developments. 
These themes are similar to those identified in the international literature in Chapter 1. 
However, their form is often more peculiar to the Brazil context. Section 2.5 
summarises and concludes the chapter.
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2.2 BRAZILIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: 1930 - 1980s
The empirical studies discussed in Chapter 1 confirmed that context will affect 
what modernisation looks like within the firm. An important part of this context is the 
industrial relations setting. In Brazil, as in many other developing countries, the 
industrial relations environment has traditionally been a very tough and constraining 
one for workers and unions.
This section briefly reviews the rules, institutions and the ways in which 
Brazilian unions and workers have been treated in politics and the workplace in the 
past. Many aspects of this history have endured into the case study period. Explicit and 
paternal forms of control and a real lack of trust continue to pervade Brazilian industrial 
relations.
2.2.1 The Formative Role of the State
The coup which installed Getulio Vargas in power in 1930 marked the 
beginning of a new era in Brazilian history. A development model was promoted which 
gave a greater role to industrial interests but which put the leadership and organisation 
of economic and social issues much more strongly with the state1. The idea of a more 
autonomous development model took some time to clearly evolve into practice. 
However, a new set of rules and structures for organising and controlling workers and 
their organisations were quick to emerge2.
The application of this corporatist vision never totally fulfilled its theoretical 
foundations. For example, regulations applying to unions (sindicatos) were always 
applied more strictly than were those applying to employers. Secondly, between 1930 
and the mid-1980s the model was applied to varying degrees by populist, dictatorial 
and more democratic regimes. However, a most important fact is the survival of the
1 See, for example, G. Gomes, The Roots o f State Intervention in the Brazilian Economy. (London, 
1986).
2 Well described in, K. Erickson, The Brazilian Corporative State and Working Class Politics. (Berkeley, 
1977).
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model over this whole period3. The pillars upon which this model rested were - the 
regulatory role of the Ministry of Labour, the Labour Code and the related social 
welfare and labour court systems.
By 1939 the Ministry of Labour had the power to apply very encompassing 
conditions on industrial conduct. For instance, they had the right to - supervise union 
finances, oversee elections, veto candidates, demit union officers and appoint 
alternative union officials (interventors). Unions had to register with the Ministry and, 
by specifying union constitutions and functions (e.g. a non-workplace role), it appears 
that the state was trying to determine unions’ agendas.
Regulations, such as those ensuring a monopoly of representation (unicidade 
sindical), reinforced these controls. The unicidade sindical law defined a union’s 
industrial category by the major activity of a firm. A union’s ambit was defined as one 
or a number of local councils (municipos). Once these issues were decided, the union 
had a monopoly of representation for all workers within their category in that area. 
Beyond the local union, provision was made for category level federations (3 or more 
local unions in a category in a state) and confederations of these (5 or more) federations 
at a national level. This permitted the vertical co-ordination of union activity for the 
industrial categories recognised by the state. However, these provisions also meant that 
unions were detached from their base and no horizontal co-ordination across union 
groupings was allowed4.
What was rapidly to become the principal area of union finances, the IS 
(imposto sindical; 1940), was also used to support this corporatist framework. 
According to this law, one day's pay per year is deducted from every worker regardless 
of whether they are a paid up subscriber (socio) of the union or not. In exchange for 
this, all workers in the category are entitled to the benefits negotiated by the union and
3 The features o f the model described below are not disputed in the literature. See Erickson, Brazilian 
Corporative State. Ch 3; K. Mericle, 'Conflict Resolution in the Brazilian Industrial Relations System1, 
(1974), Phd Thesis, University of Wisconsin, and M. Alves, 'Trade Unions in Brazil: A Search for 
Autonomy and Organization' in Labour Autonomy and the State in Latin America, ed. E. Epstein 
(Boston, 1989), pp. 39-45.
4 Thus, when the term (union) ‘central’ is used in this thesis this refers not to a confederation in the 
commonly known sense o f the word but to one of a number of union factions who try to establish a co­
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from the work conditions specified by the Labour Code (Consolidagao das Leis do 
Trabalho - CLT). However, paid up socios also have access to a more extensive range 
of medical and social benefits.
While there therefore may have been some incentive for a worker to be a paid 
up socio, the law tried to make this a social welfare relationship only. This had a 
powerful influence on worker-union relations. That is, a union had a much greater 
chance of flourishing as an entity if it conformed to this social welfare model, if its 
local labour market category was large (re IS revenues) and if socio members, 
particularly active ones, were kept to a minimum.
The Labour Code of 1943 brought together the various regulations for direct 
employment related benefits, such as hours, minimum pay and leave, that had been 
passed up to that point. However, broader social benefits were being provided for by 
bipartite and tripartite arrangements. For example, by 1938 sector level social security 
schemes began to dominate (over earlier company level initiatives) and these 
developed strong links to the social welfare trade union model under construction5. The 
Government's ability to manage this situation was refined by the centralisation of all of 
these schemes in 1964-65.
A system of labour courts was also in place by the 1940s. Three levels of courts 
were established - local labour courts, regional labour courts and the superior labour 
court. Like the social security system, they also provided for tripartite representation 
and thus a role for ‘acceptable’ labour leaders. However, as with other aspects of the 
model there was a strong normative requirement that the labour courts play an active 
role in the prevention and mediation of conflict.
This overseeing and directive role of the courts can also be seen in the way 
strike legality has been managed6. In a few brief periods since 1930, when the strike 
option was fairly freely available, labour courts were still able to rule that a strike was
ordinating structure for unions.
5 On the history of the Brazilian social security system see, J. Malloy, The Politics of Social Security in 
Brazil, (Pittsburgh, 1979).
6 See Alves, 'Trade Unions in Brazil', p43-49.
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illegal and thus worker benefits and tenure could not be guaranteed during the strike. It 
also meant that the court could effectively rule on the objectives of a strike before any 
action had occurred. During the military regime (1964-85), the right to strike was most 
strongly curtailed and the police were regularly used to quell industrial disturbances.
The decision on wage rises is also an important role of the labour courts. As 
with strikes, during the military period the courts were required to apply much more 
severe and centralised (wage) guidelines than in the past7. The floor upon which wage 
decisions were based was the minimum wage (salario mmimo - 1940).
The high growth rates achieved with the Import Substituting Industrialisation 
(ISI) policies of the Kubitschek presidency and the massive growth rates of the military 
period were undoubtedly related to non-wage factors. However, the military regime 
required the courts to apply a centralised wage adjustment based on inflation and 
productivity estimates which grossly underestimated their real average levels8. Thus the 
control of union action and wage levels were also factors which contributed to the 
1968-1974 economic ‘miracle’.
Finally, another important area in which the military regime used the 
corporatist model to its advantage related to job security9. The Labour Code in 1943 
gave laid off workers with less than 10 years experience a payout of 1 month's salary 
for every year of service. Workers with 10 years experience or more had security of 
employment (or of salary receipt) unless a court decided the employee had wilfully 
defied their contract. This legal protection, plus the general tightening of the labour 
market during the 195Os-1960s, may have bolstered the labour market power of certain 
groups of workers and unions.
These arguments were used by the military regime to suggest that order and 
progress were under threat and that the job security regulations must be changed. In 
1966 the regulation became one where 8% of the salary of each employee was to be 
paid, by both employers and workers, into an account. Workers would receive this sum
7 Ibid., pp47-49
8 Ibid.
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if they were dismissed without just cause or they could have it transferred to their next 
employer. Thus job security, as it had been known, was no longer a right.
One consequence of these changes to statutory job security was that unions 
were less able to find and retain factory level representatives. The other was a massive 
growth in labour turnover10. The present period has seen the continuation of very high 
levels of labour turnover11. This issue plus low wage levels and an uncertain 
institutional and regulatory framework continue to distinguish the Brazilian industrial 
relations setting.
2.2.2 Political Processes and the Labour Movement
With the discrediting of fascism worldwide, considerable social pressure 
emerged against the regime which had instigated the policies of the ‘New State’ 
(Estado Novo). Accordingly, administrations between 1945-51 began to take a more 
open approach to the economy and social issues12. Consequently, many of the labour 
movement factions to survive into the post-war period came to give greater support to a 
regime which at least offered them some ‘voice’.
The populist Kubitschek regime (1951-61) took a more consistent and inclusive 
approach to development13. The political rhetoric was less radical and structures and 
development incentives helped to force rapid industrial growth. Patronage of key 
labour factions was used very cleverly and employer groups were brought more closely 
within the process of nation building. The Goulart regime (1961-64) took a more
9 Ibid.
10 E. Silva, 'Remaking the Fordist Factory?: Industrial Relations in Brazil in the past and for the future', 
Conference Paper, (Paris, 1990), p22, quoting statistics from - W. Barelli, "O Fundo de Guarantia e seu 
impacto no mercardo de trabalho", paper to the 'Seminario de Economia e Planejemento and FUNDAP, 
Sao Paulo, 23-25/11/77, mimeo - suggests that turnover rates in the 1970s nearly doubled compared to 
the 1960s.
11 See section 2.3.1 and Table 2.6 of this chapter.
12 See, H. Spalding, 'Labour and Populism: Argentina and Brazil' in Organized Labour in Latin America, 
ed. H. Spalding (London, 1977), pp 185-189, and M. Bordin, 'The Brazilian Industrial Relations System 
(1930-64): Unionism or Corporatism?', Labour and Society, (1986), 11,1, ppl26-30.
13 A classic work on this period is M. Benevides, O Govemo Kubitschek: Desenvolvimento Economico e 
Estabilidade Politica, (Rio de Janeiro, 1976).
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radical populist approach14. However, together with growing economic uncertainty and 
social upheaval, the poor level of workplace organisation contributed to the fact that 
protests following the announcement of a military coup in 1964 were very muted and 
ineffectual15.
The military regime (1964-84) did not hesitate to enforce strict adherence to the 
Labour Code16. In addition to curbs on strikes and wages, a new round of union re­
registrations was carried out and even deportations and killings were resorted to17. 
When a wave of worker protests broke out in the states of Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais 
in 1967-8, the state was quick to intervene18. This was a period when social welfare 
unionism was most dominant19. The year 1968 also marked the beginning of the 
economic ‘miracle’ (1968-74) when the economy grew at an average rate of around 
10% pa20.
However, the mid-1970s witnessed the re-emergence of serious structural 
constraints on growth. Two interrelated events helped to make the late 1970s a new 
period of social activism also. First, official recognition that average real industrial 
wages had dropped by at least 34% led to a resurgence of protests against the regime21. 
Secondly, these protests found new strength in the fact that the military appeared to be 
considering a relaxation of its policies of social control22.
14 See M. Bandeira, O Govemo Joao Goulart: As Lutas Sociais no Brasil. 1961-64. (Rio de Janeiro, 
1976) and Spalding, 'Labour and Populism...', pp 189-196.
15 See, Bordin, 'Brazilian Industrial Relations System', ppl32-135, and Erickson, Brazilian Corporative 
State.., Ch. 6.
16 See W. Baer, The Brazilian Economy: Growth and Development (3rd ed, New York, 1989) and P. 
Freire, Multinacionais e Trabalhadores no Brasil, (Sao Paulo, 3rd ed. 1980).
17 See Erickson, Brazilian Corporative State. Ch. 8; A. Figueiredo, 'Interven?5es Sindicais e o Novo 
Sindicalismo', Dados, (1978), 17, and Alves, 'Trade Unions in Brazil', p46.
18 See A. Almeida and M. Lowy, 'Union Structure and labor organization in the recent history o f Brazil', 
Latin American Perspectives. (1976), 8, 3 (1), pplOO-lOland Erickson, Brazilian Corporative State. 
ppl70-171.
19 See, H. Martins, O Estado e a Burocratizacao do Sindicato no Brasil (Sao Paulo, 1979) pi 84 and J. 
Moises, 'Current Issues in the Labor Movement in Brazil', Latin American Perspectives, (1979), 23, 6 
(4),p55.
20 See, FGV, Conjuntura Economica, for these years.
21 Almeida and Lowy, 'Union Structure', plOl, suggest 43% for the period while international figures 
noted 34% for the period 1973-4 alone.
22 As noted by M. Keck, 'The New Unionism in the Brazilian Transition' in Democratising Brazil: 
problems o f transition and consolidation, ed. A. Stepan (London, 1989) p252 and p266, the national 
security order was rescinded, some amnesties were granted and a limited form of two party system was 
to be established.
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A new form of labour opposition, with less strong ties to state corporatism or 
the Communist Party, began to emerge in this period23. Starting from a base within the 
Sao Bernardo metal workers, a growing number of unionists actively started to promote 
workers’ rights and workplace concerns. When this fledgling movement first turned to 
large-scale strikes (in the auto sector of the ABC region in 1978), the state and many 
employers were taken by surprise24. A new wave of disturbances by this union in 1979 
saw strikes spread to other parts of the southeast and to other occupational categories. 
Yet when large-scale strikes reoccurred in 1980, the Government acted swiftly to quell 
them with arrests and repression.
These experiences had an important impact on the complexion of Brazilian 
unionism in the early 1980s. They signalled an identifiable ‘new unionism’ - one with a 
new relation to the ‘rank and file’ and one which was increasingly prepared to 
challenge the state. However, the union movement as a whole was still composed of 
many divisions and shades of activism25.
During the early 1980s these different currents became expressed within 
attempts to form a (still illegal) union confederation and by attitudes towards political 
representation. The tenure of old style unionists (pelegos), who still held to a state- 
based model of unionism, began to become less tenable. However, the battle for 
ascendancy intensified between radical reformers (autenticos) and those who wanted 
change but not at the expense of union unity (unidade sindical)26.
These labour movement developments also led to lively debate about what 
‘new unionism’ meant for the future of worker representation. Some felt that a labour 
aristocracy thesis was supported by the fact that modem sector workers were less active
23 See on these developments, E. Sader, Quando novos personagens entraram em cena: experiencias, 
falas e lutas dos trabalhadores da Grande SSo Paulo (1970-80), (Rio de Janeiro, 1988).
24 The large-scale strikes o f 1977-80, their basis and the role of hew unionists’ are well documented in, 
R. Antunes, A Rebeldia do Trabalho. O Confronto Oper&rio no ABC Paulista: As greves de 1987-80. 
(Campinas, 1992), J. Humphrey, Capitalist Control and Workers’ Struggle in the Brazilian Auto Industry. 
(Princeton, 1982) and Alves, 'Trade Unions in Brazil..', (1989), pp49-56.
25 See, Keck, 'New Unionism', pp273-5, and Alves, 'Trade Unions in Brazil', pp58-59.
26 For example, in 1980 the autenticos helped to establish a new labour party (the PT) with Tula’, the 
former head of the S2o Bernardo metal workers, as its president. Moreover, due to disputes between the 
‘centrals’ in respect to the establishment o f a unifying structure (CONCLAT), the autenticos went ahead 
with the establishment of their own ‘central’ (CUT) in 1983.
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than other workers in attempting to challenge the authoritarian regime in the 1960s. 
The fact that metal unions spearheaded changes in the 1970s only meant that they still 
acted for a relatively privileged group of workers27.
However, a number of studies have strongly challenged this view. For example, 
some authors suggested that modem sector workers were involved in industrial 
disputes during the late 1960s-early 1970s but that this mainly took informal and 
unrecorded forms28. Secondly, a major study of the Sao Bernardo metals union and 
auto industry conditions between 1978-81 suggested that, while the industry was a key 
one in a concentrated industrial area, working conditions generally were such that the 
union acted as a ‘voice’ of all workers rather than just a representative of one group29.
Between the late 1970s and the early 1980s, therefore, labour aristocracy 
arguments concerning trade union representation appear to have had less of a basis in 
fact than in the past. However, the survival of the ‘two edged sword’ of labour code 
benefits and differences over political and industrial processes remain as ongoing 
sources of debate between rival labour movement factions. Factory modernisation 
developments may further complicate this situation for labour, one which has been 
based (subsection 2.2.3 below) on essentially Fordist systems of labour control.
2.2.3 Industrialisation, Labour Use and Workers’ Attitudes
A number of authors have argued that a particular form of Taylorism/Fordism 
accurately describes labour use in Brazil30. Late industrialisation, limited but protected 
mass markets and the strength of the state's role are said to distinguish the Brazilian 
context to that prevailing in the US and UK during their industrialisation process. 
Moreover, some have suggested that this picture exhibited a number of phases31.
27 A key exponent o f this view was, M. Almeida - see 'O sindicato no Brasil: novos problemas, velhas 
estructuras', Debate e Critlca. (1975), 6, pp49-74 and 'Tendencias Recentes da Negocia^ao Coletiva no 
Brasil', Dados, (1981), 24 ,2 , ppl61-90.
28 See Almeida and Lowy, 'Union Structures', p i08 and Alves, 'Trade Unions in Brazil', p51.
29 Humphrey, Capitalist Control as noted by Keck, ‘New Unionism’, pp264-267.
30 For example, E. Silva, Refazendo a F&brica Fordista, (Sao Paulo, 1991) and R. Carvalho and H. 
Schmitz, 'Fordism is alive and well in Brazil', IDS Bulletin, (1989), 20,4.
31 See, M. Vargas, 'Genese e DiffusSo do Taylorismo no Brasil', Revista Ciencas Sociais Hoie, (Sao 
Paulo, 1985).
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The first of these phases relates to the period when industrialisation remained 
limited and before the state took a clear stance to industrialisation (1930-1951). During 
this period, only Taylorist principles such as the importance of scientific methods and 
the need for discipline were promoted. For example, the creation of a public training 
institution (SENAI) in 1942 allowed employers to specify narrow occupational 
structures, solidify strict occupational hierarchies and train for punctuality, cleanliness 
and obedience32. Complementing this, the creation of a social welfare institution (SESI) 
in 1946 enabled employers to compete with unions and leftist political parties as a 
welfare provider and social educator.
A second phase emerged with the rapid ISI growth of the mid-1950s and the 
more open stance taken to the involvement of foreign capital. As a result, the methods 
of Taylorism and the structures of Fordism were more regularly applied. This 
subsection’s brief consideration of labour use trends and workers’ attitudes during this 
period provides important background for this study.
The rapid industrial expansion through the 1950s and early 1960s saw the more 
widespread use of the methods of Fordism/Taylorism33. The involvement of employers 
in the process was expanded by structures such as Kubitschek's sector based executive 
planning bodies. Also, the growing internationalisation of industry meant that worker 
socialisation and education were becoming more public in orientation. However, this 
process took time and still showed variation between sectors and regions.
For example, the metals industry case study of Lopes34 demonstrated that 
before 1957 the firm used a loose job structure with workers entering under a ‘general 
services’ classification on a minimum wage but with potential bonuses. These 
conditions changed in 1957 with the introduction of a five-stage job classification 
based on length of service (but without bonuses). Lopes reported that the removal of 
the output bonus improved product quality and the length of service factor helped to
32 See, B. Weinstein, 'The Industrialists, the State, and the Issues of Worker Training and Social Services 
in Brazil, 1930-50', Hispanic American Historical Review, (1990), 70, 3, pp387-402.
33 Vargas, 'Genese e Diffusao...'. See page 20 onwards of the earlier paper presented to ANPOCS, 10/84.
34 J. Lopes, Sociedade Industrial no Brasil. (Sao Paulo, 1964) - as discussed in Silva, 'Remaking the 
Fordist Factory', ppl2-17.
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reduce turnover.
In comparison, the relatively highly paid autoworkers in Rodriques’ study35 
were paid according to an average wage policy. His observation that workers felt that 
the strongest determinant of wages was effort, rather than skill, demonstrated the 
importance of attitudes to employers. It also suggested that, in this period, due to 
workers’ low skill levels, they were not being deskilled by the rationalisation of 
production.
These two studies also demonstrate the high levels of turnover evident during 
this period. Only the most skilled were staying long enough to obtain stability. Also, 
employers still didn't have very strong reasons to stabilise employment as the majority 
of jobs required no more than a few days on-the-job training.
A tightening labour market was another reason for high turnover. The changes 
introduced by the Lopes company thus reflected a growing desire by employers for a 
more stable workforce. On the basis of their analysis, both authors forecast a growing 
degree of sophistication and segmentation of employer's job, pay and labour use 
systems. They also predicted a growing role for unions in the negotiation of factory 
conditions.
However, rapid growth and the actions of the military regime between 1968- 
74 acted to fortify this difficult Fordist situation36. Many unskilled jobs began to be 
increasingly filled by female and young workers and semiskilled jobs grew in 
importance37. At the same time, of the high level of labour turnover in the 1970s, it has 
been suggested that 75% of it was instigated by employers38. Moreover, wage levels 
were kept low, wage growth was well below productivity growth and job security was 
less costly. Labour was very flexible.
35 L. Rodriques, Industrializacao e Attitudes Operdrias. Estudo de um Grupo de Trabalhadores, (S5o 
Paulo, 1970) and as detailed in Silva, Remaking the Fordist Factory’, ppl2-17.
36 See Vargas, 'Genese e diffusao', and B. Coriat, Regime de Acumulafao e Rela^ao Salarial no Brasil: 
Um processo de fordiza9ao fonpada e contrariada', Ensaios FEE, (1988), 9 ,2 .
37 Statistics supporting the following observations can be seen in, DIEESE, Estudos S6cio Economicos, 
no.2, 'Familia Assalariada: Padrao e Custo de Vida', Sao Paulo, 1/74, pp26-28.
38 Barelli, 'O Fundo de Garantia', as noted in Silva, Remaking the Fordist Factory.', p22.
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This high level of labour flexibility was bolstered by developments within 
employer ranks39. For example, employers began to set up more active working groups 
and internal management systems were ‘forced’ to become more bureaucratic. Detailed 
job classification schemes emerged and pay systems came to be a function of skill, job 
title and service factors. However, schemes typically provided for the overlap of job 
categories and overlapping grades between skill categories. This meant that workers 
could be assigned/reassigned without interfering with service or occupational grade.
Studies of labour use between the late 1970s-early 1980s confirm this difficult 
picture. For example, Humphrey's analysis of wage and job structures in auto firms 
(1978-81) confirms a view that complicated wage structures were more a device for 
labour process and wage bill control than a strategy based on training cost amortisation 
and employment stability40. The evolution of more complex, impersonal wage and job 
structures and reduced supervisory control were also observed in the machine tools 
sector in this period41.
Only minor changes to a relatively simple Fordist model of labour control thus 
appear to have emerged up to the early 1980s. The evidence does not support the 
evolution of ILMs or other more advanced organisational techniques during this period. 
While firms’ structures and processes sometimes became more bureaucratic, the 
context did not necessitate the use of ‘carrots’ such as training, stability, career 
development or involvement as means for securing efficiency and productivity.
In view of this very constraining situation, what effects might this have had on 
workers’ attitudes? An overwhelmingly difficult factory environment did not bode well 
for attitudes to work and the employer. In this context, the dominance of the corporatist 
system continued to be cited as a prime mechanism behind workers’ attitudes within 
studies carried out between the 1960s and early 1980s.
39 On those mentioned here see, Silva, ‘Remaking the Fordist Factory’, pp 19-20.
40 Humphrey, Capitalist Control, Ch.3.
41 G. Harrison, 'Trade Unions and Labour Management: A Brazilian Case Study ', (1986), PhD Thesis, 
Department of Sociology, University of Manchester.
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For example, the Rodriques' study of autoworkers (just prior to the coup) 
suggested that most workers were not interested in ‘politics’ of any sort42. To most 
workers, order suggested progress and future benefits and thus was preferred to 
contestation - even if it was based on state regulation. However, underlying this 
generally passive orientation was the hope of fairness of treatment by the state.
This strong, but conditional, belief in the state and distrust of ‘politics’ were 
also evident from studies of workers’ attitudes in the 1970s and early 1980s. For 
example, Erickson’s 1970s study suggested that even those unions desiring stronger 
worker-union ties faced an electorate of workers who were more inclined to have faith 
in the state model43. A good union was seen to represent what the state had defined 
them as - a social welfare provider - and thus was merely an extension of the state in 
workers' eyes. A Vargas style dictatorship was strongly linked to stability and growth 
and was therefore seen in a more positive light than a democratic system.
An early 1980s study confirmed these general findings but added that this did 
not mean that workers were totally against strikes44. However, a belief in strikes only 
extended to ‘non-political’ wage issues and the enforcement of statutory conditions. 
The state's corporatist framework was still overwhelmingly favoured as the best model 
for achieving better living standards.
In summary, many workers do appear to have been persuaded to consent to 
many of the state’s structures and principles even after the end of the economic 
‘miracle’. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, after another period of economic uncertainty 
and instability some groups saw more space to express alternative views and their more 
open opposition to non-democratic, corporatist processes and authoritarian, Fordist 
factory management.
42 Rodriques, Industrializagao.
43 Erickson, Brazilian Corporative State. This study, that by Rodriques (ibid.) and others are reviewed as 
background for the study by Y. Cohen, The Manipulation o f Consent: The State and Working Class 
Consciousness in Brazil, (Pittsburgh, 1989), Ch.3.
44 Cohen, The Manipulation o f Consent. Chs. 3-5 in particular.
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The principles extolled by ‘new unionists’, and the degree of worker support 
they obtained for actions against employers and the state after the late 1970s, suggested 
that there was a limit to worker passivity. Yet a militant worker response is not fixed 
either - it cannot be assumed. In this regard, section 2.4 of this chapter analyses what 
effects recent modernisation developments appear to be having, not only on tasks but 
on workers’ attitudes and the probability of resistance by Brazilian workers and their 
unions in the present period.
The next section of this chapter (2.3) paves the way for this analyses through a 
discussion of the impact of recent political and economic developments on workers and 
unions. This discussion illustrates the fact that important macro level changes have 
occurred during the case study period. However, the discussion also highlights the 
continuing role played by the institutional and political factors discussed above.
2.3 THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF 1980 - 1994
2.3.1 The Impact of Economic and Political Developments on Labour
The 1980s to early 1990s was marked by very oscillating growth - large 
depressions and brief periods of recovery (Table 2.1 below). Overall, growth was 
below the 1950s and considerably less than during the 1968-74 ‘miracle’. As shown in 
Table 2.2, inflation re-emerged as a very serious issue and the opening-up of the 
economy in the early 1990s posed serious challenges to a previously highly protected 
manufacturing sector.
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Table 2.1: Gross Domestic Product (GDP), % change p.a. and Industrial Output 
Index (1980=100); Brazil; 1980 -1993
Year GDP, % change p.a. Industrial Output Index
1980 9.2 100.0
1981 -4.3 89.6
1982 0.8 89.5
1983 -2.9 84.2
1984 5.4 89.4
1985 7.9 96.9
1986 7.5 107.8
1987 3.5 108.9
1988 -0.1 105.1
1989 3.2 108.2
1990 -4.4 97.9
1991 0.2 95.6
1992 -0.8 91.7
1993 4.1 99.0
Sources: DIEESE, Anuario dos Trabalhadores. 1994, pp 133-4 and Institute) Brasileiro 
de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE), Industrial Survey. 1980-94
Table 2.2: Inflation and Real Incomes, Brazil and Sao Paulo, 1985 - 94
Year Inflation -  National Estimate, 
% change p.a.
Real Incomes -  Sao Paulo Index, 
1985 =100
1985 235.1 100
1986 65.0 106
1987 415.8 79
1988 1037.6 78
1989 1782.9 82
1990 1476.6 67
1991 480.2 59
1992 1158.0 58
1993 2708.6 63
1994 1093.8 59
Sources: Funda9ao Getulio Vargas (FGV) . General Indice of Prices,
and DIEESE/SEADE, Anuario dos Trabalhadores. 1994, income of Sao 
Paulo private sector employees deflated by the DIEESE, Cost of Living Index, 
covering families with between 1-30 minimum salaries in ‘Greater Sao Paulo’.
Politically, the transition to democracy took considerable time. A civilian 
President was elected in 1985. However, social concerns and instability reached new 
heights. Dissatisfaction with the Government's inability to deliver basic expectations of 
the populace saw another climax with the virtual impeachment of the second civilian 
President (Collor) in 1992.
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The period thus encapsulated a number of important changes -  to the economy 
and to the intended direction of politics. More open economic and industrial policies 
were to be a spur to competitiveness. Democracy represented a more open and 
inclusive way of resolving societal demands.
However, these changes also exposed inherent weaknesses in the structure of 
the economy and in the political process. This unstable situation had negative effects on 
most workers. Real wages declined and labour turnover and unemployment remained 
at very high levels. This subsection traces these developments.
By 1982, the economy had entered a serious recession which lasted until 1984. 
The combined effects of the oil shocks, deficit financing and the subsequent drying-up 
of foreign investment (following the Mexican debt moratorium) hit the Brazilian 
economy very hard. The actions of the regime to meet the 1982 IMF criteria helped to 
provoke massive unemployment. Unemployment stood at between 15-20% in 198345.
Wage growth was a key variable to be affected by Government policy and 
inflation in this period46. The nine separate wage decrees between 1979-83 were 
intended to control wage pressures and they did result in wage losses for many 
workers. However, many workers also benefited monetarily from the ‘miracle’ and first 
two years of the 1980s47. On the other hand, by 1983 lagged salary adjustments came to 
be tied to a figure much less than actual inflation and inflation began to escalate, 
breaking through the 200% p.a. barrier in 1984-85 (Table 2.2). This led to much more 
widespread wage losses48 and further industrial disruption (again starting in Sao
45 M. Keck, 'Update on the Brazilian Labour Movement', Latin American Perspectives. (1984), 40, 11 
(1), p30.
46 Discussed in, DIEESE, Decretos e Leis da Politica Salarial do Govemo desde 1979. Sao Paulo, 1985, 
and M. Marques, 'A acelera?ao inflationaria no Brasil: 1973-83', Revista Brasileiro de Economia, (1985), 
39,4.
47 J. Morais, 'New Unionism and Union Politics in Pernambuco (Brazil) in the 1980s’, (1992), Phd 
Thesis, LSE, University of London, pp61-62/Table 1.2 using data from E. Amadeo and J. Camargo, 
'Politica Salarial e negotiates: perspectives para o futuro', Ministry of Labour, Discussion Text 11, 
Brasilia, (1989) p l8, notes that wages in total rose between 1970-79. Yet some workers gained (the 
skilled) and some lost (the unskilled) - see E. Taieb and O. Barros, Economie et societe bresiliennes: 
croissances ou development?, (Paris, 1989).
48 As noted by J. Chadad, 'Emprego e salarios na administrafao publica brasileira: evidencias da decada 
de 80', Revista Brasileira de Economia, (1990),44,4, p555. See also Table 2.4 of this chapter.
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Bernardo) in 198349. Many arrests and union interventions ensued.
The election of a civilian President in 1985 raised expectations that many of the 
difficulties of the past might be corrected. However, the policies of the former military 
politician (Samey) and Presidential-designate (after the sudden death of the President) 
were without an overall direction. President Samey did not appease social expectations 
and nor did he effectively control the inflationary spiral. During his administration four 
stabilisation plans were attempted50. Only one of these (the Cruzado Plan, 1986) had 
even a temporary positive effect on inflation and the general economic situation.
The resumption of growth after 1984 was given a boost by the heterodox 
measures of the Cruzado Plan. The currency was changed, prices were frozen and 
wages and pensions were increased on a one-off basis. As is evident from Tables 2.1- 
2.4, the plan had a strong, short-term effect on growth, inflation and the labour market. 
However, later in 1986 the price freeze was lifted and inflation returned at high and 
accelerating rates, reaching a level of nearly l,800%p.a. by the end of Samey's mandate 
in 1989-90 (Table 2.2).
A relatively low but positive growth rate was experienced between 1987 and 
the end of 1989 (Table 2.1). However, a strike wave (unparalleled in Brazilian history) 
also took place in this period. This represented a reaction to many factors. First, as 
suggested by Table 2.2, each of the plans after Cruzado had negative effects on real 
wages. Secondly, workplace conditions had become a more open area of contestation.
The level of dissatisfaction with political processes and economic policy was also
rising. Social activism against this situation rose up to, and went beyond, the highly 
awaited revision to the Constitution in 198851.
The 1989 Presidential election witnessed a contest between a seasoned political 
activist (Brizola), a new right candidate representing traditional power blocs (Collor) 
and the high profile ex-President of the Sao Bernardo metalworkers (‘Lula’), now 
President of the Workers’ Party (the PT). However, the hopes of the left were dashed
49 As noted in subsection 2.3.2 and listed in Table 2. 7.
50 See Morais, *New Unionism and Union Politics, pp65-69 for a summary.
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by Collor's victory over ‘Lula’ in the second round. Collor, relatively unknown until 
that point, projected a charismatic image of a leader keen to assert Brazil's role in a 
more open international setting.
Nonetheless, international and national factors led Brazil back into recession 
between 1990-92. During these years the economy shrunk at a rate of nearly 2% per 
annum (Table 2.1). Domestically, orthodox policies were generally followed52. The 
continuation of lagged and partial wage adjustments underpinned a slump in domestic 
demand.
The economy was also opened up to foreign competition to a greater extent 
during these years53. Tariff changes sought to reduce the average nominal tariff from 
37% in 1990 to 20% in 199454. The progressive removal of export and input subsidies 
and the introduction of a market based exchange rate regime also started to make trade 
more transparent and open.
Domestic producers, therefore, had to search more intensely for efficiency gains 
and new markets. However, the Government sought to ease the pressures that this 
created through a series of ‘positive’ incentives. One of these, the ‘Brazilian 
Programme for Quality and Productivity’ (PBQP), sought to encourage Brazilian firms 
to improve their quality, productivity and efficiency levels. Echoing the modernisation 
schema, the programme is focused on enhancing the awareness and motivation for 
quality and productivity, the encouragement of new management methods and the 
promotion of better human resources policies55.
Nevertheless, the combined effects of international recession, domestic 
readjustment and inflation resulted in further losses for workers. As can be seen from a
51 See section 2.3.2 and Table 2. 7.
52 The major exception to this was Collor's 1990 freeze on bank deposits. However, this ‘shock’ had only 
a temporary effect on price expectations and led to massive real wealth losses and social discontent.
53 As noted in A. Fleury and J. Humphrey, 'Human Resources and the Diffusion and Adaptation o f New 
Quality Methods in Brazil', IDS Research Report. (1993), no. 24, p i based on figures from, Industrial 
Development Board, Economic and Social Progress in Latin America -  1992 Report. Washington D.C., 
1992, Inter American Development Bank, p230,248.
54 Fleury and Humphrey, Human Resources’, p i.
55 Ibid., p2. See also, Minist^rio da Justi?a/Minist6rio da Economia, Fazenda e Planejamento/ Secretaria
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comparison of Tables 2.3 and 2.4, while productivity rose, this was primarily because 
employment was declining faster than output. Most sectors saw declining real incomes, 
massive retrenchments and a serious lack of employment stability.
Table 2.3: Manufacturing Productivity, % change p.a.;Industrial Output,
Indexes, Metalurgical and Mechanical Sectors, (1980=100); Brazil; 1986 - 93
Year Manufacturing 
Productivity,% change p.a.
Output Index 
Metalurgy, 1980 = 100
Output Index 
Mechanical, 1980 = 100
1986 -1.8 106.5 92.1
1987 -0.9 106.9 95.8
1988 0.5 103.4 87.5
1989 5.7 108.6 91.9
1990 -2.9 94.9 76.5
1991 8.4 89.5 68.6
1992 5.5 88.9 62.0
1993 10.5 95.7 72.7
Sources: DIEESE. Anuario dos Trabalhadores. 1994. pp 142-4, 
and IBGE, Industrial Survey. 1980-1994
For example, in Sao Paulo alone, the industrial unemployment rate nearly 
doubled between 1989 and 1992 (Table 2.6). In manufacturing, employment was less 
in 1992 than in 1985 (Table 2.4). Secondly, by 1992 the index of the real minimum 
wage reached a low of 26 compared to its 1985 level of 53 (Table 2.5). More 
specifically, as shown in Table 2.4, in manufacturing the index of real wages of 
production employees fell to just over 69 by 1992 compared to a base of 100 in 1985. 
Inflation of around 2,000% p.a. was eroding real incomes (Table 2.2) and average 
turnover levels of over 30% (Table 2.6) underscored the uncertainty of this situation for 
most workers.
de Ciencia e Tecnologia, Pro gram a Brasileiro da Oualidade e Produtividade. (Brasilia, 1990).
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Table 2.4: Real Wages and Employment in Brazilian Manufacturing, 
Indexes for Production Employees, (1985 = 100); 1985-93
Year Real Wage Index Employment Index
1985 100.0 100.0
1986 110.7 113.2
1987 88.9 109.7
1988 94.2 108.4
1989 88.7 111.8
1990 35.1 103.7
1991 62.1 95.5
1992 69.2 85.1
1993 69.9 84.2
Source: IBGE, Monthly Industrial Survey. 1985-94.
Note: Nominal wage indexes deflated by yearly inflation estimate (Table 2.2)
Table 2.5: Real Minimum Wage Index, (1940=100); Brazil; 1940 -  94
Year Real Minimum Wage Index
1940 98
1949 42
1959 119
1970 69
1980 62
1983/84 56
1986 50
1988/89 41
1992 26
1993 29
1994 22
Source: DIEESE, Anuario dos Trabalhadores. 1994, p35.
Table 2.6: Total and Industrial Unemployment Rates, Sao Paulo; Labour 
Turnover Rate in Manufacturing, Brazil, 1985-93
Year Total Unemployment 
Rate, Sao Paulo
Industrial Unemployment 
Rate, Sao Paulo
Labour Turnover, 
Brazilian Manufacturing
1985 12.2% 11.0% 35.2%
1986 9.6% 8.5% 47.6%
1987 9.2% 10.0% 47.4%
1988 9.7% 10.3% 45.2%
1989 8.7% 9.2% 38.9%
1990 10.3% 11.5% -
1991 11.7% 14.2% 27.3%
1992 15.2% 18.0% 32.5%
1993 14.6% 17.8% 34.4%
Sources: DIEESE, Anuario dos Trabalhadores. 1994, p85; DESEP, Indicadores 
DESEP, 1994, pi 10; and (turnover) calculations based on -  Ministry of Labour, 
Cadastro Geral de Empregos e Desemnragados. (Lei 4923/65), 1985-95.
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Politically, the social euphoria of 1985-86 was rapidly diluted by the experience 
of Brazil's first two civilian presidencies. When earlier allegations of massive 
presidential corruption became more substantiated in 1992, this was the last straw56. 
Massive public protests were added to by a parliamentary enquiry which led to 
President Collor’s resignation in the face of an impeachment vote later that year.
In comparison, the year 1993 witnessed a recovery in growth and higher levels 
of industrial production and productivity (Tables 2.1 and 2.3 respectively). However, 
inflation broke the 2,000% p.a. mark (Table 2.2), unemployment remained high (Table 
2.6) and real wages stayed low (Table 2.4). The effects of a collapse in social policy 
and low levels of confidence dominated most areas of Brazilian society.
Economically, inflation was considered to be the main political problem. After 
a number of changes in Economy Minister, Femardo Henrique Cardoso was appointed 
and given a free reign to develop a plan for controlling inflation. The ‘Real Plan’ 
(Plano Real) proposed a transitional currency unit (indexed on a daily basis to the 
dollar, as were wages) in preparation for a new and more complicated currency change. 
The initial, very positive effects of Cardoso's plan were undoubtedly an important 
reason for his first round win against ‘Lula’ (PT) in the 1994 Presidential election.
In summary, the case study period was marked by important moves to make 
Brazil a more open and inclusive society -  economically and politically. However, 
continuing political, institutional and structural frailties and the difficulties of the 
adjustment process spelt further losses for workers. Real wages declined and turnover 
and unemployment remained unacceptably high. As illustrated in the next subsection, 
this situation was also echoed in the fortunes of the union movement during this period.
56 Well illustrated in Veja. 30/9/92, pp20-24. Economic aspects of the 1980s and the Collor period are 
well-covered in, DESEP, Crise Brasileira-Anos iotenta e Govemo Collor, (Sao Paulo, 1993).
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2.3.2 Political and Industrial Relations Change and the Labour Movement
Despite large protests in 198357, industrial disputes did not begin to escalate 
appreciably until the period of the Cruzado Plan (1986). As shown in Table 2.7 below, 
strike indicators after this date suggest a level of disquiet (up to 1992) dwarfing the 
strike wave of the late 1970s. Behind these actions lay concerns over shopfloor issues, 
wage losses, political processes and the impending review of the industrial relations 
system. However, the union centrals differed in their attitudes and approach to these 
issues. The following discussion illustrates not only these changes but also how they 
signify some continuity with older themes in Brazilian industrial relations.
Table 2.7: Strikes in Brazil, average number and average 
number of hours lost, 1978-93
Year Average Number of Strikes, 
per Month in Year
Average Number of Hours 
Lost, in 000’s
1978 10 14.6
1979 21 166.3
1980 12 111.3
1981 13 55.8
1982 12 41.3
1983 33 105.7
1984 52 112.4
1985 77 612.5
1986 139 424.7
1987 182 1058.4
1988 178 708.5
1989 329 1971.4
1990 196 1498.2
1991 117 1810.2
1992 52 180.6
1993 61 46.2
Source: 3IEESE. Anuario dos Trabalhadores. 1994. p i24-5
During the early 1980s recession ‘new unionists’ concentrated on building 
better shopfloor relations and direct forms of dialogue with employers58. However, after 
the 1985 presidential election the confidence of the union movement was given a
57 This was the year o f the first and major general strike (CONCLAT organised) since 1963.
58 See W. Mangabeira, 'Union Politics and Workplace Militancy: a case study of Brazilian Steelworkers 
in the 1980’s', (1991), PhD Thesis, LSE, University o f London, pl53, 158. Keck, ‘New Unionism', p268 
suggests that their earlier strategies paid off.
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further boost due to a distinct change in the approach of the Government to industrial 
relations59. A former union lawyer was made Minister of Labour, interventions and 
strike breaking fell dramatically, union centrals were formally allowed and amnesties 
were given to many banned and gaoled unionists.
With the lifting of the price freeze in the latter part of the Cruzado period, the 
union centrals (CUT, CGT, USI) co-ordinated a massive, quite successful, general 
strike in 198660. However, its coverage beyond large industrialised areas such as the 
ABC was scattered. Moreover, the relative failure of another general strike in 1987 
highlighted the fragility of union power and the many differences between these union 
centrals61.
In fact the Cruzado plan itself helped to highlight differences in the attitudes of 
the union centrals. For example, the USI took a line fairly solidly behind the state 
corporatist model. The CGT, while against many of the normative powers of the 
Ministry of Labour, also advocated union unity62. Both these centrals had welcomed the 
Cruzado plan. However, CUT was more cautious, highlighting the need to challenge 
the Government and capitalist forces more fundamentally. They also noted that, under 
the plan, workers did not recover past wage losses to the degree they should have.
The years 1988 and 1989 saw the emergence of further splits within the labour 
movement. For example, the union movement took great interest in the 1988-89 
changes to the Constitution as these would override the Labour Code63. The key issues 
in debate were job security, the right to strike and to shopfloor representation and the 
degree to which the labour movement had autonomy from the state. In the end, 
important changes were to occur. However, centre-right forces in politics and the 
labour movement won the day. More significantly, even CUT supported the retention
59 Keck, 'New Unionism', p252.
60 DIEESE, Boletim DIEESE, 2/87.
61 Using DIEESE statistics, Alves, 'Trade Unions in Brazil’ p53 and p67, notes how much less well 
attended the 1987 strike was compared to the general strike in 1979.
62 See, for example, DIEESE, Boletim DIEESE, 'Estatutos da CGT, 4/86, ppll-15, and ibid., 'CGTs 
Plano de Lutas', 5/86, pp25-26.
63 On this see, Morais, New Unionism and Union Politics’, pp58-59, DESEP-CUT, 'A Nova Constitugao 
Sindical', Debate Sindical no 9, 10/88 and E. Passos, 'Os diretos sindicais na nova Constitu^ao', 
Cademos da CUT, 1/89.
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of key aspects of the Labour Code.
The Constitutional revision reduced the normative role of the state in industrial 
relations64. The changes included - the relaxation of the Ministry of Labour's control of 
union formation, recognition and conduct and a less restrained right to strike. 
Provisions were also made for shopfloor representation and the formal working week 
was reduced from 48 to 44 hours.
However, strikes were limited to ‘non-abusive’ actions and the labour courts 
retained a right to arbitrate over any dispute which reached an impasse. Secondly, 
collective negotiation between unions and employers was limited by area and sector. 
Thirdly, a job security suggestion was rejected in favour of a percentage increase in 
employer payout (from 8% to 40%) if an employee was unjustly dismissed. Most 
importantly, the principle of monopoly of representation was retained as was the 
compulsory union tax (IS). While the Ministry of Labour's part of the tax was to be 
given to unions, the retention of these regulations meant that existing unions were 
secure and that unions still did not have to develop strong ties to workers to secure 
funding.
While the CUT and the CGT had many differences, both groups recognised that 
if total pluralism was introduced and the IS was removed unions would have little hope 
of immediate survival65. Unionism was very low, economic conditions were precarious 
and the majority of the workforce was considered to be unprepared to support more 
active unionism. This situation was underscored by the fact that, while CUT was 
confirming its credentials in areas such as the ABC industrial region, this type of 
union-worker model was much less common in other regions and sectors.
However, as CUT grew, new divisions occurred within the CGT during 1989. 
For the next two years two CGTs existed. When one of their leaders (Magri) was made 
Minister of Labour in the Collor Government, this group's new leader (and President of 
the Sao Paulo Metal Workers) gave the body a new name (in 1991) and fortified the
64 Morais, 'New Unionism and Union Politics’, pp58-59.
65 Keck, 'New Unionism', pp260-61, quoting from an interview with Lula.
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organisation’s non-political rhetoric. The phrase ‘unionism of results’ became 
synonymous with L. Medeiros and the Forga Sindical66.
What therefore had emerged by the early 1990s were two very visible and 
distinctive organisations of labour -  CUT and Forga Sindical. Each has the desire to be 
strongly involved in the co-ordination of the labour movement. Yet the economic and 
institutional situation made it difficult for either to clearly dominate the political scene. 
However, what distinguishes them most are their interests, agendas and forms of 
representation. As noted below, nowhere is this better illustrated than in their approach 
to industrial modernisation.
For example, by the early 1990s the CUT was defining its role in a number of 
key areas. Principal amongst these were - the notion of a system of collective 
contracts (Contratos Coletivos), industry level accords {Camaras Setoriais) and 
increased worker education in respect to the negative potential of industrial 
modernisation67 This last issue, in particular, represented a new and important thread 
to CUT's policies and strategy.
In the early 1990s Forga Sindical also increased its profile and made its 
strategic orientation more explicit. Yet, building links within national and regional 
labour federations and important unions became a clear priority. For example, in 
1993 they solidified their control of the Sao Paulo metal workers and that state's 
metals confederation.
The visible political stance of Forga Sindical's President (Medeiros) and the 
publication of ‘Urn Projeto Para O Brasil (A Project for Brazil)’ also confirmed that 
they too were far from a-political. However, that document suggests that they
66 For a view on this group’s programme and founding conference see, DIEESE, Boletim DIEESE, 4/91, 
pi 1 and M. Martins, Sindicalismo e Relagoes Trabalhistas, (Sao Paulo, 1991), pl54.
67 For example, between 1991-93 the CUT set up three regional union training schools. The sessions on 
labour process themes held at the schools echo the high importance these issues hold for the CUT. 
Articles on these themes form the core of publications such as - Central Unica dos Trabalhadores (CUT), 
Revista da Secretaria National de F orm a y - Forma e Conteudo, no. 4, 9/91.; CUT, Plano Nacional de 
Form a y  da CUT 1992, April, 1992.; Confederacy National dos Metalurgicos da CUT (CNM/CUT), 
Revista dos Metalurgicos, ano 1, no.l, 12/93.
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represent a continuation of ‘top down’ Brazilian unionism68 The ‘Project for Brazil’ 
document presented a detailed treatment of the group's preferences for political, 
scientific, social and labour relations change, including a more neo-liberal 
endorsement of the need for unions to be more flexible and support industrial 
modernisation. Yet, in addition to its much less critical treatment of modernisation 
compared to CUT, the document was based on little discussion with workers.
Despite the enhanced public profile of the labour movement, and these two 
factions in particular, by the 1990s unionisation in Brazil still stood at low levels. 
Following the Constitutional changes the number of union entities grew rapidly (17% 
between 1988-90 for example)69. However, total unionisation declined slightly from 
27% to 24% between 1988 and 199070.
Furthermore, on an overall basis, it does not appear that CUT stood out. For 
example, overall unionisation to CUT unions was only 28% in 199071. As with their 
previous reactions to unions, workers still seem to have a (low) level of attachment to 
unionism reminiscent of the past. However, an important caveat to the above picture 
can be seen in the high levels of CUT union coverage in key sectors72 and the 
sophisticated, well supported efforts key CUT unions are making to confront 
modernisation in some parts of the auto sector73.
Nevertheless, low overall unionisation, high concentrations of CUT militancy 
and strong union-political links have led some writers to suggest that little has changed 
within the Brazilian labour movement74. Despite their greater commitment to 
workplace representation and the installation of factory level structures in many plants,
68 See Um Projeto Para Brasil - A Proposta da Forga Sindical, ed. L. Emediato (Sao Paulo, 2nd ed., 1993)
69 DESEP, Indicadores DESEP, 1994, pl7.
70 Ibid., p21.
71 As discussed in CUT, Retrato da CUT. 1990, Sao Paulo, and M. Rands, 'Brazilian Industrial Relations: 
alternative proposals of the new unionism', (1992), M. Sc. Dissertation, Oxford University, p21.
72 For example, in 1990, 75% of oil workers, 90% of educational workers, 64% of metalworkers and 
54% of chemicals workers were covered by unions affiliated to CUT. In comparison, the coverage of 
Forga Sindical, the CGT and the USI is more narrowly based -  Rands, ‘ Brazilian Industrial Relations’, 
p22 and CUT, Retrato da CUT, 1990, pp45-58.
73 Discussed in section 2.4.2.
14 A restatement of a labour aristocracy view (for CUT) is most strongly put by, A. Boito, O Sindicalismo 
de Estado no Brasil, (Sao Paulo, 1991).
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even CUT has been portrayed as simply a new, legalistic form of union populism and 
labour aristocracy. Sector level accords (Camaras Setoriais) between metals unions, 
employers and the Government - developed for the auto industry in the early 1990s - 
might be seen in this light.
The above type of argument was suggested, but disproved, for this very same 
region and group little more than a decade earlier. While the passing of the 1980s may 
have changed this prognosis, it should also be of little surprise that elements of older 
processes may simply reappear in new forms. Forga Sindical may be a good example 
of this. On the other hand, it is uncertain whether ‘new unionism’ may become the 
norm.
In summary, this subsection has illustrated how political and regulatory 
changes, during the case study period, affected the Brazilian labour movement. A more 
open environment for contestation led to an explosion in strikes and more visible 
attempts by some unions to reach out to workers and articulate their workplace 
concerns. Some efforts were also been made to build co-ordinating structures and 
policy agendas across the labour movement, albeit by a number of union factions.
However, the process of change is slow and ambiguous. For example, as 
evidenced by the continuation of low wages and high levels of turnover noted in 
subsection 2.3.1, it is by no means certain whether ‘older’, authoritarian managerial 
attitudes have changed. Just as importantly, the rules for workplace representation, 
strikes, arbitration, union finances, union coverage, wage negotiations and job security 
still do not promote a clear and positive environment for unions, either at the workplace 
or the macro level.
Modernisation developments in the most recent period may make the task of 
even representative forms of unionism all the more complex. Comprehensive forms of 
modernisation and greater institutional support for them may act to change work and 
attitudes in more radical ways than in the past. Accordingly, the last section of this 
chapter surveys modernisation trends across Brazilian industry and the specific issues 
these raise for work and industrial relations in Brazil.
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2.4 MODERNISATION TRENDS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR 
WORKERS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
The 1980-94 period saw a discernible process of modernisation under way 
within Brazilian industry. However, the process was tentative and piecemeal up to the 
late 1980s. The major problem for Brazilian industry was that, while Brazil had the 
second fastest growth in exports among Latin American countries between 1970-89, 
this had been primarily based on protective policies and subsidies75. Quality and 
efficiency levels were still very low relative to international standards76.
As noted above, by the early 1990s new economic and trade policies were 
being pursued. Competitiveness was to be promoted through greater exposure to 
overseas competition. Companies increasingly needed to raise their quality and 
efficiency levels if they were to secure local markets and beat foreign competitors in 
other markets.
Despite the recession of the early 1990s, clearer signs emerged that Brazilian 
industry was experimenting with more comprehensive modernisation strategies in this 
period. However, examples were still limited to large and TNC dominated firms. 
Moreover, fundamental questions remain in respect to the degree of change.
The ways in which the Brazilian debates about modernisation have influenced 
the structure of this study are summarised in subsection 2.4.2. The following subsection 
(2.4.1) provides a sub-periodisation of how the modernisation process changed between 
1980-94. It also notes that this process appears to have had some impact on industrial 
efficiency, quality levels and labour turnover rates by the mid-1990s.
75 Fleury and Humphrey, 'Human Resources’ p i.
76 Ibid., ppl-2
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2.4.1 Modernisation Trends between 1980 and 199477
Studies up to the mid-1980s noted a limited take up of new technologies and 
organisational techniques. The overriding interpretation of what was occurring was 
negative. While key sectors saw more substantial change as the decade came to a close, 
most developments were more technological than organisational.
This slow process of modernisation was most marked in the early 1980s. First, 
(Table 2.8 below) available statistics suggest that the rate of diffusion of new 
technologies was very limited prior to 1985. Market protection and low labour costs 
meant that it was not until the mini-boom of 1985-86 that indicators of advanced 
technology showed any real change78.
Table 2.8: Indicators of Technological Modernisation in Brazilian 
Industry; 1981-92
Equipment/Period 1981-1984 1985-1988 1989-92*
CN/CNC:
-units installed 592 3006 3371
-total stock by end 764 3770 7141
ROBOTS:
-units installed - 99 246
-total stock by end - 99 345
CAD:
-units installed - 1543 121
-total stock by end - 1543 1664
Sources: Sociedade Brasileira de Comanc o Numerico (SOBRACON),
Retrospectiva da Decada de 80 do Setor da Automatizacao Industrial. (1989) 
and, Automatizacao Industrial e Computacao Grafica -  guia brasileira de 
automatizacao Industrial. (1992), Sao Paulo.
Notes*: 1)NC/CNC figures for 1989-92 are an underestimate as they do not 
include imports. 2) Robot numbers for 1992 are as estimated by ASEA-Brown 
Boveri do Brasil.
77 A large number o f authors are referred to in this subsection, many o f which are particularly well 
treated in, M. Leite, ‘Reestructuragao Produtiva, Novos Tecnologias e Novas Formas de Gestao da Mao- 
de-Obra’, in O Mundo do Trabalho. orgs. C. J. Mattoso et al, CESIT, (Sao Paulo, 1994)
78 Leite, ‘Reestructuragao... ’, p567.
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Secondly, the limited way in which modernisation techniques were applied 
simply served as a recipe for failure. For example, studies of Quality Circles (QCs) up 
to 1985 highlighted that they were applied mainly to skilled workers79. Others noted an 
emphasis on discipline within QCs, the lack of real adjustments in employee relations 
and that, when pushed, QCs met with considerable opposition from supervisory and 
technical staff60. Many unions also reacted to this ‘unbalanced’ form of modernisation.
Quality circles seemed to represent simply a new strategy for heading off a rise in
* * 81 unionism .
Confirming these trends, a large early 1980s survey82 of over 5,000 industrial 
enterprises suggested that only 25% were using any type of advanced technique to 
manage production and product control. Only 10% of the sample was using what were 
then considered to be modem stock control and evaluation systems. Those firms that 
did appear to be modernising used new techniques in a non-integrated way and users 
were principally confined to large, foreign controlled enterprises.
Consequently, a particularly tough picture of labour use in Brazilian industry 
remained a relatively undisputed ‘norm’ up until the mid-1980s. ‘Routinisation’ - 
which included narrowly divided tasks, extensive labour substitution, low salaries and 
high turnover -  was the term used to describe this83. While unions were often more 
vocal, most workers could only see negatives within this authoritarian and limited 
modernisation context84. The ‘indignity’ which provoked many of the late 1970s-early
79 H. Hirate, ‘Recitas Japonesas, realidade Brasileira’, Novos Estudos-CEBRAP, (1983), 2, pp61-65.
80 M. Salerno, ‘Prodi^ao, trabalho e participa?ao: CCQ e Kanban numa nova imigrafao japonesa’ in, 
Processo e Relacoes do Trabalho. orgs. A. Fleury and R. Fisher, (S2o Paulo, 1985) and M. Fleury, 
‘Organizapao do Trabalho na Industrial Recolocando a questao nos anos 80’, also in, Processo e 
Relacoes. orgs. Fleury and Fisher.
81 M. Leite, ‘Innovation Tecnoldgica, Organizacidn del Trabajo y Relaciones Industriales en el Brasil’, 
Revista Nueva Sociedad, (1993), 124, March-April.
82 Industrial Development Council, Ministry of Industry and Commerce - H. Braga, 'Tecnologia e 
Producao da Industria Brasileira: uma analise exploratoria', mimeo, Rio de Janeiro, (1987), also noted in 
J. Ferraz et al, Development Technology and Flexibility: Brazil Faces the Industrial Divide. ( London, 
1992), p93.
83 A term used by, A. Fleury, ‘Rotinizafao do Trabalho: O Caso das Industrias Mecanicas’, in 
Organizacao do Trabalho. eds. A. Fleury and N. Vargas, (Sao Paulo, 1982). See also, Humphrey, 
Capitalist Control
84L. Abramo, 'A Subjectividade do Trabalhador Frente d Automafao' in Automacao e Movimento 
Sindical no Brasil. R. Neder et al, (S2o Paulo, 1988).
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80s conflicts w as probably still fresh in the m inds o f  m any85.
In comparison, between 1985-89 the literature confirms a more mixed picture 
of the modernisation process. For example, case studies in the mid-1980s highlighted 
some growth in the use of technologies in the informatics and consumer durables 
sectors86. However, this was mainly limited to post-production inspection rather than 
functions which involved workers in the achievement of quality at source. The main 
exception to these trends was in sectors which were directly feeling the effects of 
competition (e.g. autoparts and autos). Confirming this, case studies in this key sector 
of manufacturing identified continuing growth in the use of new technologies87.
Studies of the engineering and capital goods sectors also gave some indication 
of change. For instance, while 25% of such firms in Fleury's late 1980s study were not 
integrating any automated equipment,88 this author also reported that many larger firms 
were taking a more systematic (less ‘routinised’) approach to modernisation89. New 
techniques, in particular, were seen as holding the most potential to change work. 
Nevertheless, the average ‘moderniser’ was not integrating equipment changes and 
organisational techniques. Cost minimisation remained the principal driving force 
behind employer decisions.
These partial modernisation examples suggested to some that Fordism and 
Taylorism were simply being reinforced90. Such studies complemented the conclusions 
of Silva's 1986 comparison of Ford in Brazil and the UK, in which it appeared clear 
that a key Brazilian auto employer was still using explicit and simple forms of labour 
control91. Workers appeared to be labouring under more onerous conditions within
85 As noted by L. Abramo, ‘O Resgate da Dignidade (A Greve de 1978 em SSo Bernardo)’, (1986), 
Masters Dissertation, University of Sao Paulo.
86 For example, see Fundacao Vanzollini, 'Qualidade Industrial: Andlise e Proposi?5es', mimeo, (Sao 
Paulo, 1986) - also noted in Ferraz et al, BraziLIndustrial Divide, p94.
87 For example, see R. Carvalho, Tecnologia e Trabalho Industrial, (Porto Alegre, 1987)
88 A. Fleury, Flexible Automation in Brazil’, in Microelectronics in 3rd World Countries: Quality, 
Competition, International Development of Labour and Employment, eds. Watanabe (Geneva, 1991) - 
also noted in Ferraz et al, Brazil...Industrial Divide, p97.
89 See, A. Fleury, Microeletronica e Organiza9ao da Produ^ao e do Trabalho na Empressa” Sao Paulo 
em Perspectiva, (1988), 2, 3, July-Sept.
90 Carvalho and Schmitz, 'Fordism is alive’.
91 E. Silva, Refazenda a F&brica Fordista, (Sao Paulo, 1991).
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Brazilian plants than in their British counterparts. A study of electrical equipment firms 
in the mid-1980s also noted the continuation of ‘older’ methods of labour control, this 
time involving the segmentation of women workers and the fear of economic failure92.
This mixed picture of the modernisation process is also well illustrated in 
reviews of the use of new organisational techniques. Many commentators noted that as 
the decade progressed employers were using techniques such as internal JIT, Kanban, 
SPC and cells to a greater degree93. However, within JIT systems, participation 
remained limited94, work speed had increased95 and there appeared to be little 
improvement to the previously observed separation of conception and execution 
functions (e.g. between programming and machine operation)96.
To some, the phrase ‘Taylorised JIT’ seemed an appropriate label for the 
processes involved97. New tasks were required and much greater use was being made of 
automated technologies. However, workers were still tied to a machine(s) and the 
greater transparency of workplace systems permitted more intense evaluation. The 
weakness of unions at the workplace, and the great ‘flexibility’ that firms already had 
to deploy workers were two key reasons behind this view that more comprehensive 
versions of the ‘Japanese’ model would not be seen.
Moreover, Brazilian firms were still very hierarchical and continued to use 
complicated wage and occupational structures and large salary differentials98, much as
92 E. Leidke , ‘Inova^ao Tecnologica e A?ao Sindical nas Industrias Metal-mecanica e Eletro-Eletronica 
no Rio Grande do Sul’, Revista Educacao e Sociedade. (1992), 41, reiterates these points as made in her 
Phd thesis (Department of Sociology, Brown University, 1990 ).
93 Based on the author's review of, DIEESE, Boletim DIEESE, (Sao Paulo, 1981-89) all articles on 
'Linha de Produ9ao'. In particular, 8/89- 'Mudanfas Tecnoldgico-Organizacionais em Alguns Setores da 
Industria Metal-Mecanica' and 7/89 ' Organiza9ao do Trabalho e Automa9ao Microeletronica na 
Industria Metalurgica Brasileira'. Points also noted in Leite, ‘Reestructura9ao...’pp568-569 and the 
authors noted in this same paragraph.
94 M. Salerno, ‘Produ9ao, trabalho e participa9ao..’ (1985) and ‘Modelo Japones, Trabalho Brasileiro’ in 
Sobre o Modelo Japones, org. H. Hirate, (Sao Paulo, 1993)
95 Carvalho and Schmitz, 'Fordism is alive..’.
96 Noted for the early 1980s by R. Tauile, ‘Microelectronics, Automation and Economic Development’, 
(1984), Phd thesis, SSR, New York University. For the late 1980s see -  M. Leite, O futuro do Trabalho: 
Novas Tecnologias e subiectividade operdria, (Sao Paulo. 1994)
97 As suggested by J. Humphrey, ‘Adaptando o “Modelo Japones” ao Brasil’ in Sobre o Modelo Japones, 
org. H. Hirate, (Sao Paulo, 1993), p255-256
98 Noted by J. Ferro, ‘A produ95o enxuta no Brasil’, in A Maquina que Modou o Mundo, eds, J. 
Womack et al, (Rio de Janeiro, 1992), p337 and confirmed by Leite, ‘Reestructura9ao... ’, p572.
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they did in the 1970s. Older style management policies were continuing for all but the 
most key skill groups. Workers do appear to have been concerned about changes to 
their work and the lack of compensation for their new tasks, despite their fascination in 
new technologies". The absense of worker involvement, few recognised skill changes 
and rising turnover rates characterised the process100.
Surveys of performance outcomes across industry confirmed this partial picture 
of modernisation. For example, in a late 1980s survey of 220 firms Sequera101 reported 
that high levels of defects, low customer satisfaction, high stock levels and long lead 
times characterised Brazilian industry. Even the auto industry, a key Brazilian user of 
technology, still had low levels of quality and productivity relative to international 
standards102.
On the other hand, a degree optimism was being fuelled by other studies. For 
example, a study of leading firms by Lima103 found that the more integrated use of JIT, 
SPC, Kanban and cells was having significant effects on stock, lead times, scrap and 
reworking/quality104. The large oscillations in economic activity which were occurring 
probably made turnover a hard factor to stabilise. Economic uncertainty may have also 
worked against the modest increases to firm level training that a number of authors 
were noting at this time105.
Moreover, the progressive use of modernisation techniques beyond process 
sectors to some discrete product sectors suggested that a less negative assessment of
99 Leite, O Futuro
100 Noted in BOLETIM DIEESE. ‘Estudos e Pesquisas-Rotatividade: Conceito e Determinantes (Primeira 
Parte), 12/88, pp7-10. This was still the case for industry in general and even for key industries such as 
autos up to 1989 -R. Carvalho, “Projeto do Primeiro Mundo com conhecimento e Trabalho de 
Terceiro?”, paper presented to the seminar, Trabalho e Educacao’, Sao Paulo: Fundacao Carlos Chagas,
(1992). See also, Leite, ‘Reestructuracao... ’, p571 and Table 2.
101 Reported in Ferraz et a l , Brazil..Industrial Divide, p95.
102 Ferro, ‘A producao enxuta no Brasil’, pp321-323 and as noted in Leite, ‘Reestructuracao... ’, p573 and 
Table 3.
103 I. Lima, ‘Andlise das consequencias da utilizacao das filosofias e tecnicas japonesas de gestao da 
producao sobre o rendimento das empressas’, (1989), MA dissertation, Federal University o f Rio Grande 
do Sul.
104 As noted by J. Humphrey, “Japanese” Methods and the Changing Position of Direct Production 
Workers: Evidence from Brazil’, in Global Japanization -  The Transnational Transformation o f the 
Labour Process, eds. T. Elgar and C. Smith, (London, 1994), p334.
105 See, for example, L. Gitahy and F. Rabelo, Educacao e Desenvolvimento Tecnoldgico: O caso da
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modernisation and its effects may become warranted106. This same study noted that 
direct production workers in autos, while loosing some tasks, were taking on new 
conceptual skills and indirect evaluative tasks. Others also argued that the effects of 
modernisation on skills and employment could be positive, at least on already skilled 
workers in capital goods production107.
In this regard, one of the most optimistic industry wide surveys of the late 
1980s was that carried out on behalf of SENAI by Ferraz, Rush and Miles108. While the 
study is selective due to its attempt to illustrate ‘best practice’, an impressive 80%-90% 
of the 132 sample firms had integrated some form of flexible automation (FA) and 
organisational technique (OT) by 1989109. The use of these methods was particularly 
high at the shop floor and the managerial respondents were even more optimistic about 
the degree of use of FA and OT in the future (the year 2000).
However, as with much of the international experience, within the sample the 
actual intensity of use of OT and FA was low110. Secondly, a considerable degree of 
naivety (or rigidness) was noticed in respect to firms’ lack of preparedness to invest in 
worker training and make more fundamental changes across their operations. Thirdly, 
while strikes were high at the time of the research, economic activity was at reasonable 
levels. It is then significant to note that most firms identified cost and economic- 
political uncertainty as the key constraints to modernisation111. More strikingly, it is 
highly significant that 70% of the sample did not see labour use constraints or union 
power as relevant determinants of the use of organisational techniques112.
Nevertheless, the difficulty that arose for industry in the early 1990s was that a 
severe recession occurred at the same time as the economy was starting to feel the 
effects of liberalisation, reduced protection and increased foreign competition.
industria de auto-pecas’ Textos Para Discussao, 11,1991, UNICAMP-Campinas, DPCT/IG.
106 See R. Carvalho, 'Programmable Automation and Employment Practices in Brazilian Industry',
(1993), DPhil, University of Sussex.
107 See E. Leite, Tnovafao Tecnologica, Emprego e Qualifica9ao na Industria Mecanica’, in Anais do 
Seminario eds. Fischer et al, pp760-785.
108 Ferraz et al, Brazil.. .Industrial Divide, See in particular Chs. 4-8.
109 Ibid., Ch. 6.1, ppl55-183.
110 Ibid., ppl44-151.
111 Ibid.
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Ominously, surveys of Brazilian management in 1990 suggested that they were still ill 
prepared to confront the challenges of a more open export market113. Yet, even within 
this difficult setting a number of early 1990s studies suggested greater optimism about 
the modernisation process. For example, a late 1991 study by Fleury and Humphrey of 
18 (not necessarily leading) metals employers in the industrialised southeast (Sao Paulo 
and Rio Grande do Sul) highlighted more optimist changes within industry than they 
had reported in earlier periods114. The phrase ‘Taylorised JIT’ seemed to be less 
applicable in the face of the growing number of examples of comprehensive 
modernisation115.
In particular, despite political-economic constraints and (maybe also because 
of) dissatisfaction with Government policy, some employers appeared very advanced in 
their use and integration of new quality techniques116. Furthermore, while their 
approach had been piecemeal at first, some employers had embarked on a more 
integrated, firm level approach and were making considerable investments in training, 
education and motivation117. Workers were more involved in processes, with employer 
initiatives including new occupational structures, new work responsibilities and 
significant changes to company hierarchies, particularly in terms of reduced overt 
supervision118.
A 1994 study of management and workplace techniques within just one of 
those more industrialised states (Rio Grande do Sul), but across all sectors, confirmed 
the guarded but more optimistic message of the above-mentioned study119. In the same 
year a study of 10 firms in various segments of the metals sector also noted a more
112 Ibid.
113 Noted in a study by J. Lobos, Consultores Associados - for Exame magazine, Exame, 4/9/91, pp70- 
72.
114 Fleury and Humphrey, 'Human Resources...', (1993). Greater optimism is also expressed in, R. Ruas, 
J. Antunes and M. Roese, ‘ Avanfos e Impasses do Modelo Japones no Brasil: Observafoes acerca de 
Casos Empiricos’ in Sobre O Modelo Japones. org. H. Hirate, (Sao Paulo, 1993), ppl03-123. Yet, failure 
due to economic downturn, remains an ever present issue.
115 Noted by Humphrey, ‘Japanese Methods: Evidence from Brasil’, p334.
116 Fleury and Humphrey, Human Resources..’, pp8-10. Detailed in Chs 2-3.
1.7 Ibid., pp33-52
1.8 Ibid.
119 R. Ruas, Tsfovos Princlpios Gerenciais e a Organiza^ao e GestSo do Trabalho', in, Cademos Tgcnico, 
22, 1995, CNI/SESI, ppl9-31.
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comprehensive modernisation approach by employers120. The application of TQM/JIT 
systems had clearly begun to go beyond rhetoric and piecemeal application.
Even still, while these changes were significant, firms of this type were still the 
minority, large scale and often subsidiaries of TNCs. Secondly, changes to occupations, 
career opportunities, pay structures and levels of involvement were still fairly 
minimal121. Even in the most comprehensive cases, further such changes (especially to 
stability) still remained largely expectational. Part of the reason for this may have been 
employer ‘reticence’ to share productivity gains and decision making. Accordingly, pay 
did not always reflect new tasks and upskilling opportunities (for example for 
maintenance tasks) did not always accrue to direct production workers122.
Moreover, other early 1990s studies noted that much of the new training that is 
provided by such firms is linked to the promotion of more positive attitudes to the 
firm123. In addition, it is not certain whether changes to occupational structures 
represent anything more than just a relabelling of existing schemes -  ones based on 
extreme salary divisions and maximum employer prerogative to reallocate workers and 
adjust pay rates124. Still further, some authors have suggested that the differential 
treatment of women workers continued to be a part of such ‘strategies’125. The 
employment of younger, inexperienced workers would also appear to fit within this 
sceptical modernisation perspective126. While some employers may have begun to take 
a more long term ‘skilling’ approach to their employees 127, critical observations such 
as these conflict with the views of others who suggest that modernisation could lead to 
more democratic and participatory workplaces128.
120 R. Carvalho, ‘Coping with Change in the Economy: New Technologies, Organisational Innovation 
and Economies of Scale and Scope in the Brazilian Engineering Industry’, Texto Para Discussao. (1995), 
378, IPEA, Brasilia.
121 Fleury and Humphrey, ‘Human Resources’ Ch 4.
122 Ibid., pp39-40 and p35.
123 Noted in Leite, Reestructuragao... p577.
124 See for example, N. Franzoi and M. Rodrigues, Beyond Quality’ in IDS Bulletin. ‘Quality and 
Productivity in Industry: New Strategies in Developing Countries’, (1993), 24 ,2 , pp53-57.
125 See A. Abreu, ‘Mudanga Tecnoldgica e genero no Brasil’, Novos Estudos Cebrap. (1993), 5 and 
Leidke, op. cit.
126 Noted for the late 1980s in Leite, O futuro. Ch. 5 in respect of the more ‘modernised’ case study.
127 Argued by M. Fleury, The Culture of Quality and the Management o f Human Resources’, in IDS 
Bulletin. - Quality and Productivity in Industry: New Strategies, (1993), 24 ,2 , pp34-41.
128 Ideas suggested by authors such as, L. Gitahy and F. Rabelo, Rducagao e Desenvolvimento...’ and E.
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It should also be noted that the positive trends noted in many of these early 
1990s studies relate principally to firms concentrated in more industrially developed 
regions and, the Fleury and Humphrey research129 (like most others) was not based on 
any direct evidence from workers. The effects on workers may have been positive as 
more training was being given, education levels were rising and turnover rates were 
lower than those of the late 1980s130. However, that unions were not being involved 
continued to signal a more complex situation for worker representation in the future.
In this regard, issues such as outsourcing had been causing divisions amongst 
academic and union researchers ever since the late 1980s. Some felt that outsourcing 
would expand the use of technology to smaller employers and that workers in such 
firms would therefore be given upskilling and responsibility improvements131. In 
contrast, union researchers expressed concern about the possible effects of outsourcing 
on benefits, salaries, health and safety and work speed and skills - both in outsourcing 
and supplier firms132.
As the 1990s progressed many unions saw the need to devote greater attention 
to a broader range of modernisation issues, both within their factory strategies and 
(when relevant) more broadly133. In addition, such strategies often became more 
nuanced and pro-active134. This was for two reasons. First, most employers still took a 
very anti-union stance. Yet workers, while sceptical, noted that they felt that they 
could benefit from the modernisation process -  particularly in terms of key issues such 
as workplace conditions, stability and training135.
Leite, Trabalho e Qualificafao: a classe operaria vai a escola, I Reuniao do GT, Cambio Tecnologico, 
Calificacion v Capacitacib. (1993), Red Latinomericana de Education y Trabajo.
129 Fleury and Humphrey, Human Resources’
130 Ibid., pp38-39.
131 See F. Rabelo, ‘Automa^ao, estructura industrial e gestao da Mao-de-obra: O caso de introdu^ao das 
maquinas ferramentas com comando numtiico na industria metal-mecanica’, (1989), Masters 
dissertation, UNICAMP, Campinas and F. Rabelo, L. Gitahy and M. Costa, ‘ Inova^So Tecnologica, 
red o es  industrias e subcontrata9ao’, Textos Para Discussao, 10, (1991), DPCT/IG/UNICAMP, 
Campinas.
132 DIESSE, ‘Os Trabalhadores frente a Terceiriza9ao’, Pesquisa DIEESE, 7, (Sao Paulo, 1993).
133 As noted in sections 2.3.2 and 2.4.2.
134 Notable examples are well discussed in L. Bresiani, “Restructura9ao Produtiva e Luta Sindical -  o 
trabalho na industria automobilistica brasileira (1980-95)”, paper for seminar, ‘ Estrategias de Lucha 
Sindical em America Latina’, El Colegio de Mexico, 4/95.
135 L. Bresiani and N. Oda, ‘Inova9ao Tecnoldgica, Mudan9a Organizacional e Negocia9So Coletiva: O 
Panorama Brasileiro e o Caso do Complexo Automotiva no ABC’, in Cademo Tecnico -  Restructuracao
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Despite these reservations about the nature of modernisation and the degree of 
union inclusion and worker involvement and reward, by 1994 further signs of change 
in industry were evident from studies by a variety of agencies. For example, in a review 
of 27 metals firms in the ABC region, the union research group (DIEESE) noted that 
30% of firms had or were quickly integrating new automation136. The other 70% were 
doing this slowly. Groups, cells and new skill structures had been introduced by well 
over half of those surveyed and Kanban/JIT systems were evident in 2/3 of firms. 
Furthermore, quality schemes or initiatives had been introduced by 30% of respondents 
and 59% were in the process of implementation. Quality and productivity levels were 
also rising and turnover rates falling, for key firms in this region.
Moreover, by the end of this period more promising indicators of the effects of 
industrial modernisation on firms’ competitiveness were being noted by management 
consultants such as Price Waterhouse137. This organisation reported significant 
reductions in lost production time, scrap levels, delivery times and stock levels in 
Brazilian industry between 1992 and 1994. They also suggested that 61% of large 
employers had introduced quality and productivity programmes by 1993. IMAN (a 
Japan inspired employer research group) also reported improvements in equipment set 
up times, scrap and time waste levels and company hierarchies138.
In summary, after the late 1980s there were signs that a growing number of key 
firms in a broadening range of sectors were beginning to pursue more comprehensive 
modernisation strategies. Quality and efficiency improvements, changes to work, 
supervision, training and reduced levels of labour turnover also seem to have 
eventuated. Yet the continuation of an uncertain institutional setting and authoritarian 
workplace and anti-union management practices still pervade this context. Many 
authors feel that these factors will act against further, more positive and comprehensive 
changes within industry. As noted below, the specifics of this debate provides the 
issues to be considered within this study.
Produtiva no Brasil. 22, (1995), CNI/SESI, Sao Paulo, p47.
136 See DIEESE, Politica Industrial, RestructuracSo Productiva e OrganizacSo do Trabalho- Indicadores e 
Informagoes Releventes, no. 1, 5/95 for the figures noted below.
137 Noted in DIEESE, Politica Industrial..., (1995), p i 1.
138 Noted in Leite, 'Reestructura^ao p576.
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o2.4.2 Implications for Work and Industrial Relations -  specific issues for this 
study
There is clearly a great level of interest in modernisation strategies (such as 
JIT/TQM) in Brazil. However, an overriding question which emerges from the 
literature is, will Brazilian employers continuing efforts to modernise be based on an 
‘easy’ or a ‘hard’ route139? As noted above, many authors believe that the ‘easy’ or 
‘conservative’ form will eventuate and that this is primarily due to contextual factors. 
Within this view, while companies may embark on company wide changes, minimal 
adjustments will be made to work and, by implication, worker consent will be the best 
that can be expected.
However, an alternative interpretation of the ‘easy’ route may be as follows. 
Due to these same contextual factors, Brazilian management may need to do very little 
to obtain high levels of work satisfaction, motivation and company allegiance140. In 
either case it appears that, while firms are putting greater effort into persuading workers 
to be more dedicated and quality conscious, they are just as keen to keep unions out of 
the workplace. Yet these workplace themes, as with the consideration of union 
responses, need a much greater degree of analysis.
In pursuit of better answers to this question, authors have also sought to 
categorise the process by which workplace conditions have changed during 
modernisation141. For example, following the continuum of capital-labour negotiation 
outlined by Coriat, Humphrey has suggested that many modernising Brazilian 
employers may be ‘offering’ workers a new but ‘implicit bargain’ of improved 
conditions (such as stability, training and labour management relations) in ‘exchange’ 
for higher levels of efficiency, quality and productivity142. This effort bargain is 
stimulated (rather than imposed) and it is implicit as no explicit offer takes place.
139 A phrase used by many authors including Humphrey and Leite, op. cit..
140 As suggested by Humphrey, ‘Japanese Management.. Brazilian Industry’, p773-4.
141 For example, N. Castro, ‘Modemizacao e Trabalho no complexo Automotivo Brasileiro -  
Restructura9ao Industrial ou Japanizafade Ocasiao?’, Novos Estudos Cebrap’, 1993, 37, p i62 & ppl72- 
3.
84
The nature of a firm’s effort-bargain, or even its very existence, will be affected 
by many factors, including who controls the firm, the state of the local labour market 
and union traditions143. In this regard, early work by Humphrey suggested that the fear 
of unions, specific skill shortages, poorly developed internal control mechanisms and 
the location of many of the early modernisation experiments in ‘brownfield’ sites, may 
help promote a relatively positive ‘implicit bargain’ outcome for Brazilian labour144. 
Yet recent work, which has noted the growth in the use of ‘greenfield’ sites and more 
sophisticated screening and evaluative processes within modernising firms, suggests 
that this likelihood may have diminished145.
Accordingly, studies must be clear about exactly what issues appear to be 
involved in the bargain and who is involved. Moreover, studies must evaluate not only 
the ‘objective’ links within the modernisation argument but also the types of attitudes 
(to work, the employer and the union) on which this ‘implicit bargain’ is based. In 
these respects, the Brazilian studies reviewed above provide much information on these 
(subjective and ‘objective’) links.
These links can be categorised under the headings, skills/tasks, employee 
relations, employment conditions, worker attitudes and trade union responses. A key 
way in which this study seeks to build on past Brazilian research about these links is 
that it compares these issues between partially and comprehensively modernised firms. 
Moreover, this study combines an examination of firm level modernisation with a 
depth of evidence from workers and unions not yet evident within the Brazilian 
literature. This should allow questions such as, is it a ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ approach, and 
subjective aspects of the ‘politics of modernisation’ (thus the bargain that it entails), to 
be fully explored for the industry and time period of this study. The specific themes for 
this research are summarised below.
142 Fleury and Humphrey, ‘Human Resources’, pp36-42.
143 Factors noted by most authors, e.g. Humphrey, ‘Japanese Management.. Brazilian Industry’, pp771- 
773.
144 As noted and argued in J. Humphrey, ‘Japanese Production Management and Labour Relations in 
Brazil’, Journal o f Development Studies. (1993), 30, 1.
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1) Skills and Tasks:
Up to the mid 1980s, the ‘routinisation’ of jobs and the precariousness of 
employment seemed to be the norm. On the other hand, as was noted above, more 
recent studies of modernisation have begun to observe rising skill levels and that 
production workers, in both process and discrete product sectors, are taking on 
mentally demanding process, evaluative and conceptual duties. These duties may make 
their work more skilled.
Yet while this could be good news for some workers, other jobs could be in 
relative decline. The pace and intensity of work, the continuation of high levels of 
worker substitution and the lack of compensation for new tasks may also be negatives 
for labour. Furthermore, only in some cases have direct production workers taken on 
new conceptual and evaluative skills. More generally, the continuation of a separation 
of programming and machine work or of maintenance and operational duties is not a 
positive sign. These observations raise the question, have firms really become more 
concerned about the level of tasks and skills across the shop floor?
What the recent literature has therefore added to the skill debate has been 
greater emphasis on how skills are combined, the growing use of process and mental 
skills, work and worker allocation developments and the evaluation and recognition 
(monetarily and otherwise) of new duties by management. Consequently, when 
examining factory wide data on work (Chapter 4) this study will concentrate on how 
skill levels overall have changed, how workers are allocated within the shopfloor and 
what these suggest about managerial attitudes to skills, jobs and labour allocation. 
Questions of workers (Chapter 5) will enquire more deeply into the nature of their new 
manual and conceptual tasks, who has been most affected and whether new skills have 
been adequately recognised.
145 Humphrey, ‘Japanese Management..Brazilian Industry’, p782.
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E m ployee Relations:
Driving supervision, rigid hierarchies and the absence of worker involvement 
have dominated the working lives of most factory workers. Nevertheless, as noted 
above, some authors have pointed to the use of less bureaucratic, more open structures 
within Brazilian firms. Some growth in the use of teams, cells, reduced supervision 
levels, and involvement and suggestion schemes have also been observed.
However, subsection 2.4.1 also suggested that these participatory initiatives 
may have limits. The scope and significance of issues over which workers have a say 
may be minimal and tied to the production objectives of the firm. The more optimistic 
proposition that firms will become more democratic has also been treated with 
scepticism. More pointedly, decentralised and participatory work systems (e.g. teams) 
and evaluative procedures tied to involvement may act as more onerous and effective 
means of controlling worker behaviour than past forms of workplace organisation.
Accordingly, the analysis of firms’ employee relations policies in this thesis 
(Chapter 4) will focus on whether they have adopted policies, structures and workplace 
practices which promote greater openness and participation. The seriousness and 
reasons behind such changes will also be investigated through an evaluation of any 
team concepts, supervisory models and involvement and participation initiatives which 
firms may have introduced. The analysis of workers (Chapter 5) will seek to show the 
effect of these changes on their level of responsibility, involvement and autonomy in 
their work. This will also help to shed light on the issue of whether firms have become 
more dependent on the behaviour of workers and how they have dealt with such 
‘reverse dependency’.
3) Employment Conditions:
The third link within the modernisation schema relates to the nature of 
employment conditions. These include non-wage ILM factors such as greater training, 
career opportunities and employment stability. Wage levels and wage structures are 
also important issues.
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Studies from the early 1980s noted that, even in higher skill industries, 
Brazilian firms did not need to offer ILM incentives to secure adequate levels of 
efficiency and productivity. Wages levels were still low in absolute terms, little internal 
training was offered and turnover rates remained high. Studies up to the mid-1980s 
confirmed that these and more traditional means of labour control (e.g. the use of 
women and the fear of unemployment) continued to serve as adequate ‘incentives’.
On the other hand, the recent literature reviewed in subsection 2.4.1 also noted 
that modernising firms are offering greater internal training. Some are even suggesting 
the prospect of employment security and career development opportunities. Turnover 
rates in such firms have fallen significantly. These factors suggest that modernising 
firms may now be offering many of the employment condition benefits of ILMs to 
members of their workforce.
However, real wages remain low and administrative regulations (at the least) 
mean that there may be no genuine moves to introduce pay systems linked to 
performance146. Locating in low wage, isolated areas may allow employers to pay 
wages above the local labour market average. In such situations, there may seem to be a 
premium being paid but the wage may still be below that paid by comparable firms147.
In terms of the ILM, new occupational and wage structures, while touted as 
being part of career and mobility initiatives, may (as many suggest) be just a new set of 
names for a system under which workers can continue to be flexibly deployed. 
Moreover, firms may continue to offer fewer opportunities to women. Alternatively, 
firms may use company supported training and the employment of young people to 
diminish the importance of higher skill groups148. Unionists, in particular, may bear the 
brunt of firms’ new ‘selection’ criteria.
146 Under Brazilian legislation, if  an additional payment is regularly made on a number o f occasions it 
must then be paid on a more permanent basis. This may deter the development o f most forms of 
performance pay.
147 Noted for firm ‘B ’ in Leite’s study, O futuro, Ch 5
148 Ibid.
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It also remains to be seen whether firms can keep to their implicit promises of 
career development and job security. More significantly, it has been suggested that the 
linking together of training, career development and worker evaluation with greater 
worker involvement may help to provide the decentralised, control based employee 
relations systems noted above. The observation of a number of authors that training 
appears to be taking on a more firm specific and motivational emphasis may support 
this sceptical view.
In view of these debates about employment conditions, the analysis of firms 
within this thesis (Chapter 4) documents the new types of training and education that 
companies are ‘offering’ their workers. Selection and job allocation criteria, career 
schemes and wages, are also considered. Data on the worker sample (Chapter 5) are 
used to more deeply evaluate the nature of modernising firms ILMs and ‘implicit 
bargain’ with workers.
4) Workers’ Attitudes:
A key aspect of the modernisation schema relates to the effect of the firm’s 
policies on workers’ attitudes. As discussed in Chapter 1, there are three areas for 
which these are important. First, improved attitudes to work itself may, at the least, 
reduce turnover and absenteeism. Secondly, improved attitudes to the firm may 
promote allegiance and behaviour which helps firms be more productive, efficient and 
reach new levels of quality. Thirdly, unless dual allegiance to both the firm and the 
union eventuates, the union’s ‘electorate’ may have shifted its needs and 
representational priorities in favour of the firm.
As noted briefly in section 2.4.1, studies of workers’ attitudes during the post 
1980 modernisation period suggest a number of ambiguities in relation to workers’ 
attitudes to work, the employer and their union. These important studies are 
considered in more detail below. First, during the early to mid-1980s so-called 
‘routinisation’ period, one study suggested that workers were divided about the
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benefits of new technologies in the workplace149 While labourers were often 
fascinated by the prospect of working with new machines there was a general fear of 
substitution, powerlessness and competition150. This, however, remained a function of 
how machines were introduced and union traditions.
More specific responses showed even greater variability. For example, the 
overriding opinion was that work speed was increasing, worker autonomy was 
declining and supervisory relations were deteriorating151. Workers were often 
exhausted. However, the fear of substitution was less in auto firms and where unions 
were more active152. Secondly, nearly half of the auto workers were positive about 
skill/qualification, pay and supervisory relations effects, especially as heavy, 
hazardous tasks had been removed153. Yet these opinions mainly applied to the more 
skilled workers and those who had factory commissions.
On the other hand, there was general concern that skills would not be 
recognised, high skilled tasks would be outsourced and that, through the employment 
of younger workers, there would be less recognition and opposition to these changes 
than there should have been154. Moreover, there was suspicion that employers were 
making productivity gains at the expense of workers and that worker autonomy and 
liberty (i.e. ‘space’ to socialise, relax and relate) were being sacrificed in the name of 
profit155. Supervisory relations and work conditions had deteriorated for line workers 
in particular156. However, skilled workers also resented the interference and poor 
treatment they received from more qualified but less experienced technical staff457.
A more recent study (during the so-called ‘Taylorised JIT’ phase) confirmed 
many of these findings158. However, through a detailed two firm comparison the 
author was able to highlight ambiguities within workers’ reactions in even more
149 Abramo, 'A Subjectividade do Trabalhador’.
150 Ibid., pp l61-164.
151 Ibid., ppl35-138.
,52 Ibid., pl38.
153 Ibid., p l4 1-144.
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid., pp 145-152
156 Ibid., pp 146-148 and ppl52-157.
157 Ibid., p!49.
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specific ways. One of the firms (factory ‘B’159), was a key and large employer in a 
small, fairly isolated area. The firm was a very paternal, visible, local reference point. 
Yet it had integrated an extensive array of automated technologies and organisational 
techniques, in part helped by a quite passive local union. On the other hand, the other 
firm (factory ‘A’160) was a less modernised entity in a ‘brownfield’ site. The active 
role of the union there was a key reason why the firm was less progressed in the 
modernisation strategy that it had wished to be.
Both contexts aroused feelings of fear and fascination from workers161. The 
overall impression was of control and domination162. Organisational techniques were 
seen in a more negative light as they permitted a more encompassing form of control 
over the production process and workers. Technologies, on the other hand, were 
mainly feared because of how they had been applied.
In terms of specific themes, the effects of these different contexts were 
illustrated in a number of ways. First, most workers felt that the use of new 
technologies in their workplace acted to increase work speed, stress and 
responsibility163. However, factory ‘B’ workers found older machines more 
interesting to work with while factory ‘A’ workers initially thought that new 
machines were more challenging. As discussed below, this may be explained by the 
different abilities of workers in the two factories to shape the way in which 
technologies were introduced and applied.
Secondly, due to worker/union agitation, workers at firm ‘A’ were able to 
gain both salary and skill improvements due to the introduction of new technologies. 
As a result, workers were more positive in general164. In comparison, workers at firm 
‘B’ were less happy as young workers had been employed to work with the new
158 Leite, O Futoro.
159 Analysed in detail in ibid., Ch 5.
160 Ibid., Ch 4.
161 General and comparative aspects of the two factory situations are discussed in ibid., Ch 3.
162 Ibid., pp 166-179.
163 Ibid., pp 184-192.
164 Ibid., ppl79-184 on the comparison and for factory ‘A ’-pp229-235, pp248-252.
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technologies165. The pay on these machines was no better than on traditional 
machines in this factory. Yet claims about pay by either group of workers met with 
the response that they should be content as wages were above the local labour market 
average.
Thirdly, neither group of workers believed in the ‘message’ that their interests 
were now one and the same as the firm’s. The way in which supervisors abused the 
promotional evaluation process and the system of salary scales made factory ‘A’ 
workers very sceptical of the employer166. Workers at factory ‘B’ were also 
sceptical167. However, they were less prepared or able to prevent the introduction of a 
more formalised evaluative process. Moreover, even fewer promises were made to 
them that promotion and stability might eventuate than had been made at factory ‘A’.
Finally, workers at both factories were fascinated with the possibilities that 
new systems offered but felt that the employer would gain most. They deserved more 
from the process168. However, an important difference in their attitudes was that 
workers at the more strongly unionised factory ‘A’ were more confident that they 
could and should change matters169.
The observations these two studies make provide vital issues on which this 
study builds. However, without detailed studies which go beyond the 1980s partial 
modernisation period, a growing degree of comprehensive modernisation may 
prompt some to suggest that ‘false consciousness’ has a new form. Workers may now 
be dupes to the quality and participatory strategies of modernising employers.
Consequently, this thesis provides data on subjectivity (in the early to mid- 
1990s) through the use of detailed interviews with workers in respect to their 
attitudes to their jobs/tasks (Chapter 5), their employer and their union (Chapter 6). 
The modernisation debate suggests that workers should be asked questions around
165 Ibid., pp275-288 and pp294-298.
166 Ibid., pp235-247.
167 Ibid., pp288-292
168 Ibid., pp 198-202 on the comparison; for factory ‘A ’ pp253-259; for factory ‘B’ pp299-301.
169 Ibid., pp314-315.
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themes such as - are they labouring harder and smarter and what effects are new 
technologies and techniques having on their attitudes? Secondly, do they believe the 
‘message’ of the modem employer and that their company’s ‘implicit bargain’ is fair 
and good? Thirdly, why are they involved with the union and what do they expect of 
the union now that their firm is modernising?
5) Union Responses:
The analysis of the recent period suggested that Brazilian unions still have to 
deal with a very anti-union management class. Thus, if workers have been persuaded 
to put more confidence in their firm, how have unions responded and have they been 
successful? In accordance with the union literature in Chapter 1 and as elaborated in 
this chapter, the challenges of modernisation have simply added to the difficult 
position that Brazilian unions already face, at the workplace and more broadly.
A number of key union bodies have attempted to respond to these workplace 
and broader political pressures. For example, within the Camara Setorial process a 
mixture of state assistance and various types of employer and union promises have 
been used to build an explicit process of change for the auto industry. While this 
process has met with mixed success170 many of these same union organisations have 
also pushed for the inclusion of modernisation issues within a system of collective 
contracts (Contratos Coletivos).
Developments such as these may provide an important ‘umbrella’ for the 
many, smaller local unions that exist in Brazil. However, until that is the case, less 
well resourced local unions may have to find other means to respond to 
modernisation. Yet, while most studies note the difficulties that local unions face and 
the experience of the Sao Bernardo Metalworkers, there are as yet few sufficiently 
detailed studies of Brazilian unionism at a local level which test union responses to 
modernisation.
170 Well summarised in Castro, ‘Modem izagao e Trabalho’, pl72-173. See also Bresiani, “Restructurasao 
Produtiva e Luta Sindical’
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Two detailed 1990s studies that have been made suggest that ‘new unions’ 
are often adjusting their agendas in response to modernisation171 These studies also 
argue that ‘new unionist’ groups are acting in a more representative way. Yet, these 
studies are either weak on the analysis of the companies172 or do not adequately 
integrate workers' views within their analysis173 This last mentioned study may also 
not be very representative as it relates to a large CUT union within a key and highly 
unionised industrial (steel) establishment in a highly industrialised part of Rio de 
Janeiro state.
Nevertheless, the situation in most other parts of Brazilian industry is very 
different than that in Sao Bernardo or industrial centres in Rio. Non-negotiated 
industrial relations are still very much the norm. Thus, while some changes are 
occurring in a few areas, whether this type of identity will or can be emulated 
remains unclear. More pointedly, it is not even certain whether key unions (e.g. the 
Sao Bernardo metal workers) can deliver similar results across other industries (e.g. 
white goods) or even in other auto firms.
More broadly, as modernisation does not seem to signal a change in 
companies’ attitudes to unions, most authors agree that unions must continue to push 
and find new strategies which will make the bargain a fairer one for workers. Yet the 
literature remains divided as to the probability of this occurring174. After all, greater 
sophistication in union policy may simply lead to more refined ‘modernisation’
• 1 7 cstrategies .
In an attempt to throw more light on these debates, this study of the white 
goods industry encompasses a number of different types of unionism, factory 
location and degrees of modernisation176. Moreover, the research compares workers’
171 See, Mangabeira, 'Union Politics’ and Morais, 'New Unionism and Union Politics’
172 Morais, ‘New Unionism and Union Politics’.
173 Ibid. Also, Mangabeira, “Union Politics’ does use some primary data but this is limited to a few 
workers and union activists.
174 Authors such as Humphrey (eg. ‘Japanese Methods: Evidence from Brazil5) and Leite 
(‘Reestructurafao..’) are more sceptical whereas others (e.g. Silva, Refazendo) have been more 
optimistic.
175 As suggested by Humphrey, ‘Japanese Management ..Brazilian Industry’, p782
176 As detailed in Chapter 3 and 4.
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views of their union (Chapter 6) with an analysis of how these unions’ agendas, 
interests and systems of representation have changed due to modernisation (Chapter 
7). This should give a more balanced picture of the responses and success rate of 
Brazilian unions that that provided by key union and key sector studies.
2.5 CONCLUSION
This chapters’ review of the Brazilian modernisation context has highlighted 
both continuity and change. Many longstanding rules, procedures and norms of 
industrial relations continue to influence the behaviour of employers and the fortunes 
of unions and workers. This is particularly so as the relaxation of political control and 
organisational regulations have been slow, partial and ambiguous.
Despite a more open political and economic environment, the 1980s and early 
1990s has been very difficult for workers and unions. Real wages declined and unstable 
employment only served to add to a decade of uncertainty and crises. This situation did 
not help the further development of an independent and unified union movement either.
Within this context it does not seem surprising that the modernisation of 
Brazilian industry occurred slowly and in a piecemeal fashion. While specifics of the 
process may differ, this has also been the case in more stable environments. Moreover, 
the interpretation of the effects of this partial process has been overwhelmingly 
negative and sceptical, in large part due to the legacy of past workforce conditions, 
attitudes and regulations.
However, with the evolution of more comprehensive examples of 
modernisation, commentators have been forced to look more carefully at the linkages 
assumed to operate between modernisation techniques and firms’ achievement of 
higher levels of quality, productivity and efficiency. This chapter’s review of Brazilian 
studies of these links (i.e. hypothesised changes to -  skills/tasks, employee relations, 
employment conditions, worker attitudes and union responses) broadly confirms the 
scepticism noted in Chapter 1. Yet there is also the possibility that the Brazilian context
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may provide a unique and relatively ‘easy’ modernisation path for Brazilian employers.
That is, even ‘easy’ of modernisation may allow employers to secure a new and 
profitable ‘implicit bargain’ from workers. The continuation of high levels of 
managerial prerogative and an unsatisfactory facilitative environment may mean that 
Brazilian employers have to do very little to gain the levels of behaviour, and maybe 
even the attitudes, which they require for enhanced quality and efficiency. 
Nevertheless, this situation, particularly the attitudinal dimension, cannot be adequately 
explained without detailed evidence from workers.
The combination of firm based analysis (Chapter 4), worker interviews 
(Chapters 5/6) and the study of union identity developments (Chapter 7) provide the 
necessary data for such a study. This data will allow the theses’ hypotheses to be tested 
in a very detailed way. A comparison of comprehensive and partially modernising 
firms, on each of the specific issues identified in this chapter, will give this study an 
empirically grounded and verifiable dimension. Chapter 4 starts the analysis of this 
data.
However, as with the industrial relations framework, local and international 
factors have also been shown to affect the form and outcomes of modernisation. Thus 
Chapter 4’s analysis of the case study firms is preceded by a brief description (Chapter 
3) of defining aspects of the case study industry, firms and their local environments. In 
particular, TNCs have played a key role in the white goods industry. It is important to 
understand this prior to the more specific evaluation of the case study firms.
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CHAPTER 3:
THE BRAZILIAN WHITE GOODS INDUSTRY AND THE CASE STUDIES
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter has two aims. The first is to summarise key development and 
modernisation features of the industry (white goods) into which the case study factories 
fit. The second objective is to familiarise the reader with the case studies and their 
specific local environments in preparation for the detailed analysis of the factories and 
their workers and unions in the following chapters.
The first main finding of this chapter is that the Brazilian white goods industry 
has developed in a particular form due to its development context. Income distribution 
constraints skewed earlier growth and TNCs continue to play a determining role in the 
product, market and production focus of the industry. These factors may have a 
significant effect on the nature of modernisation at the case study sites.
Secondly, as noted in Chapter 2, the Brazilian context is more likely to lead to 
partial examples of modernisation. Yet, a number of firms in the white goods industry 
have introduced what appear to be very comprehensive modernisation experiments. 
Thirdly, even in those comprehensive examples, the nature of the modernisation 
experience may vary due to the role played by factors specific to each case study 
location.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief history of the 
Brazilian white goods industry. It traces this line of production from its inception and 
through the case study period. The links between local firms and the international 
market, and the domestic market crises of the 1980s, receive special attention within 
this review.
Section 3.3 (ss 3.3.1) isolates key features of work in ‘traditional’ white goods 
firms and notes the important (but mainly partial) nature of modernisation which
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occurred in most firms up to the late 1980s. Having isolated what appear to be partial 
and comprehensive examples of modernisation for examination as case studies, 
subsection 3.3.2 provides some brief historical details about each company. Subsection 
3.3.3 sets out a number of characteristics of each case study location which may help to 
explain aspects of the ‘politics of modernisation’ in later parts of the study. Section 3.4 
concludes the chapter.
3.2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE BRAZILIAN WHITE GOODS INDUSTRY
3.2.1 Origins, Development and Consolidation
The electro-domestic category can be divided into three groups of products. The 
first includes small-scale items such as mixers, kettles and toasters. The second 
encompasses products such as televisions, radios and stereos. The third group - often 
called ‘white goods’ - covers larger scale goods such as refrigerators, stoves, washing 
machines, dryers and dish washers. It is the production of this third group of products 
that the firms and workers of this research are overwhelmingly involved1.
Internationally, many of the basic aspects of white goods technology were 
developed between the wars2. The post-war boom saw rapid growth in sales and in the 
market penetration of basic white goods products. In Brazil, up to the late 1940s most 
production was artisanal, fridges were of the kerosene variety and stoves were (and still 
are) simple structures utilising bottled gas3.
However, during the 1950s the importance of this new industry began to be 
more widely recognised and this quickly began to be mirrored in rising output and
1 As a Brazilian industrial subgroup, white goods presently fit in the metallurgical (stoves) and 
mechanical (fridges, washers, dryers, and air conditioners) categories o f the IBGE. Alternatively, they 
are often considered as one part o f a more vertical industrial grouping (electrical/electronics -
eletro/eletronico).
2 H. F. Lima, 'Industrias Novas no Brasil: Fabricafao de Aparelhos Dom6sticos', Revista Observador 
Economico Financeiro, 23, 270, 8/58, p33.
3 Ibid., for the following summary.
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sales4. For example, between 1954-55 fridge production grew from 91,000 to 125,000 
units and by 1955 22,000 clothes dryers and 471,000 stoves were produced5. Moreover, 
between 1956-58 investment in washing machine productive capacity rose by 50%6.
Yet income distribution constraints limited the degree of penetration of most of 
these products, particularly dish washers and clothes dryers. Other reasons considered 
to limit growth in the market included the style of the products available (generally 
large American designs) and the related issue of TNC involvement in the industry. 
While stove production was firmly in the hands of small-medium sized Brazilian firms, 
at least 50% of the markets for fridges, clothes washers and washing machines were 
held by TNCs or their subsidiaries7. Yet firms that were to become key local producers 
(Brastemp, Climax and Consul) were also visible refrigeration producers by the late 
1950s.
This strong growth in the white goods market was due to a number of factors. 
First, post-war growth in industry and incomes prompted higher demand amongst a 
more urbanising population. This process was assisted by the identification of 
constraints on growth by a number of national and international commissions and by 
some of Vargas's development policies during the final years of his second presidency. 
However, Kubitschek's more organised and consistent policies (1956-61) generated 
particularly strong growth8.
Kubitschek launched his quest for ‘50 years of progress in five’ with decree no. 
38.744 in February 1956. With his development plan (the Plano de Metas) and by 
gathering the support of a rural party (the PSD), Vargas's urban labour party (the PTB) 
and much of the military he was able to push a credible nation building industrialisation 
process. The plan made use of international capital and it assisted state industry. The 
effects of development assistance (particularly of Meta 29 for the mechanical and 
electrical sectors) had a substantial effect on production by the Brazilian white goods
4 See Table A l, Appendix A for an early view o f the industry.
5 Ibid., pp34-36.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 See, M. Benevides, O Govemo Kubitschek: Desenvolvimento Economico e Estabilidade Politica.
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industry.
The Kubitschek presidency and the Plano de Metas were quite successful. Total 
GNP grew at an average annual rate of 7.6% between 1958 and 1962, industrial output 
grew at an average rate of 11.2% over the same years and industry rapidly surpassed 
agriculture as the leading sector in GNP in the late 1950s9. This growth was particularly 
pronounced for new and leading sectors, including white goods10. However, debt, 
inflation and capital stock constraints and social discontent became clear during the 
final year of the Kubitschek presidency and into the years 1962-64.
Yet between 1967 and 1975 the Brazilian economy grew rapidly again and 
inflation was kept under better control. Similarly, capital formation and foreign 
investment levels rose sharply and the economy continued to grow quickly from 1975- 
1980. For example, industrial output grew by 2.9% p.a. between 1963-67, a massive 
12.2% p.a. between 1968-74 and 7.3% p.a. between 1975 and 198011.
Output growth for electrodomestics stayed above that achieved for 
manufacturing overall between the late 1960s and 1980. For example, electrodomestic 
sales grew by an average annual rate just over 18% between 1968-7412 and around 14% 
p.a. between 1975-8013. Over the decade of the 1970s, refrigerator sales alone grew by 
an average annual rate of 14.3%14.
Despite this bullish image there were a number of caveats to this picture. First, 
much of this growth was achieved because of the protection given to the internal 
market. Secondly, in the later part of the 1970s and the early 1980s competition
(Rio de Janeiro, 1976), Ch. 5.
9 FGV, Conjuntura Economica, various years.
10 Between 1949-63 metal products gross value added proportion grew from 9% to 12% and that for 
electrical equipment grew from 2% to 6% - IBGE, Industrial Censuses, various years.
11 FGV, Conjuntura Economica, various years, and W. Suzigan, Industria Brasileira: Origen e 
Desenvolvimento, (Sao Paulo, 1986).
12 Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social (BNDES), Informa^o sobre o setor de 
fogoes / eletrodomesticos’, (1975), p9.
13 Instituto Brasileiro de Mercado de Capitais (IBMEC), Caracteristicas Atuais e Perspectivas da 
Industria de Eletro-Eletronica no Brasil, vol. 1, Rio de Janeiro, 10/81, pp56-57.
14 B. Neto et al, 'A Industria de electrodomesticos de linha branca: tendencias intemacionais e situa?ao 
no Brasil', (1992) Instituto de Economia, University o f Campinas, pi 07.
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declined considerably. This signalled an attempt by firms to consolidate their market 
shares for what were fairly mature industrial products.
Market consolidation had a number of characteristics15. First, a number of firms 
(e.g. General Electric and Frigidaire) simply withdrew from the market. In other cases, 
large and medium size Brazilian firms purchased other local producers. For example, in 
1976 Brasmotor purchased Consul and in 1982 a smaller company (Refripar) 
purchased the Climax facility. These changes signalled the division of the Brazilian 
white goods market between two large groups - Brasmotor and Refripar. This duopoly 
remained unchallenged until the mid-1980s.
Two other important developments concerned input control and market 
strategy16. With their recent purchases both major Brazilian groups began to attempt to 
more effectively target socio-economic segments of the market during the early 1980s. 
Secondly, as firms started to reduce the degree to which they produced inputs internally 
this led to a greater preoccupation with input supply, price and quality. Most 
importantly, each group managed to achieve control of a large producer of the most 
vital refrigeration input - compressors. This issue also prompted greater direct 
involvement of a number of TNCs within the Brazilian white goods market. This is a 
key theme dealt with in the next subsection.
3.2.2 International Perspectives and Brazilian Linkages
Between the late 1950s and the late 1970s, one reason local firms came to 
secure their space in the white goods market was due to the decision of some TNCs to
leave this market segment and/or due to a switch in direct foreign investment
/
preferences for faster growth sectors such as autos. However, by the 1980s the 
international white goods industry had changed considerably and TNCs re-established 
their financial control of key players in Brazil. This subsection retraces these 
developments - developments which hold much significance for the market and 
modernisation focus of ‘Brazilian’ white goods firms.
15 Ibid., pp95-l 11.
16 Ibid., ppl 17-120.
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Internationally, white goods producers emerged from three principal areas of 
industry. Manufacturers of electrical and energy systems (e.g. General Electric, 
Electrolux), auto makers (e.g. General Motors, American Motors) and producers of 
other electrodomestic products (e.g. Philips, Whirlpool) all came to produce white 
goods17. The post-war boom allowed this type of expansion.
However, less favourable global economic conditions in the late 1970s helped 
to dampen the earlier bullish market and produced a number of different strategies by 
major white goods firms. Reduced domestic demand and a high level of saturation of 
developed country markets forced some companies to try and segment and secure their 
existing markets. Other firms left the white goods market and a few combined their 
market segmentation efforts with a greater degree of internationalisation. These trends, 
and the financial misfortunes of a number of key firms (e.g. General Electric), left the 
international side of the white goods market in the hands of two key corporations 
(Whirlpool and Electrolux) by the early 1990s18.
Electrolux made its market expansion intentions clear quite early. It broadened 
its scope in Europe with the purchase of 49% of the Italian producer Zanussi in 1984 
and, in a direct challenge to US producers, it purchased White Consolidated Industries 
in 198619. Whirlpool turned out to be the only US producer able and prepared to 
respond to these developments. They continued to invest considerable resources in the 
North American market, attempting to integrate Canada-US-Mexican operations in the 
late 1980s20. They also combined with and eventually took over (1989) the white goods 
operations of Philips in Europe21. However they, like Techmesh (a major actor in 
Refripar and controller of SICOM compressors in Brazil by 1983), also decided to 
pursue a more active role in developing markets such as Brazil.
17 Ibid., pp20-33.
18 Ibid., pp33-35.
19 Ibid., p39.
20 Noted in, Appliance Manufacturer, 'Dedicated to Majors', vol.42 (5), 5/94, pp4-10.
21 Neto et al, 'Industria..linha branca', pp45-49.
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Whirlpool and an associate (Sears-Roebuck) had a passive relationship with 
Brasmotor as early as the 1950s22. However, by the early 1980s Whirlpool had a direct 
ownership of 20% of Brasmotor and 20% of Brasmotor's principal white goods 
producer Brastemp (60% of which is owned by Brasmotor). By the mid-1980s 
Whirlpool had increased their direct role in the Brasmotor group with the purchase of 
another 20% of Brastemp. This growing involvement by Whirlpool undoubtedly 
allowed the Brasmotor group to purchase Consul in the late 1970s and wrestle control 
of Embraco (a key compressor facility) from an earlier alliance between Refripar, 
Springer and Consul.
Both Whirlpool and Electrolux have continued to compete for international 
market ascendancy into the 1990s23. Each company has opened new facilities and 
purchased others in Europe and the US. For example, in 1991 Electrolux opened a 
facility in Hungary24 and in 1992 they started their move towards eventual ownership 
of AEG in Germany (1994)25. Whirlpool opened a number of high technology, non­
union sites in the central and southern parts of the US during the early 1990s26. 
Whirlpool also made use of their low cost compressor capacity to buy (along with 
Embraco) a compressor facility in Italy in 199327.
However, developing country market advantages seem to represent the most 
promising area for expansion for these international white goods giants. Besides their 
interest in Eastern Europe, both have made considerable efforts to mark their presence 
in Asia28. They have also continued to expand their interests in Latin America and 
Brazil29. For example, Whirlpool purchased the white goods operations of Philips-
22 Ibid., pp45-49, summarises the pre-1990s history o f Whirlpool in the Brazilian white goods market.
23 On their globalisation strategies see, J. Joncsurak, 'Big Plans for Europe's Big 3', Appliance 
Manufacturer, vol. 43 (4), 4/95, pp26-30.
24 Industrial Engineering. Tirst Fibre to the Factory creates competitive advantage’, vol. 26 (11),
11/94, pp24-25.
25 P. Shearlock, 'Kings o f the Big Deal', Banker, vol. 44, 2/94, pp20-24.
26 Personnel Review, 'Managing Without Supervisors', vol. 23 (2), 1994, pp26-28.
27 First hinted at in, Estado de S3o Paulo, 12/8/93, p i4.
28 See, N. McGrath, 'New Broom Sweeps into Asia', Asian Business, vol. 32 (3), 3/96, p22, and J. 
Palmer, 'Oh boy what a washer', Barron's, vol 74, 26/9/94, ppl7-18.
29 On events described below see, P. Oster and J. Rossant, 'Call it Whirlpool', Business Week. Issue 
3401, 28/11/94, pp98-99 and J. Jancsurak, Appliance Manufacturer, vol 43 (2), 2/95 - 'Addressing 
Diversity' (p42), 'Customers for Life' (pp36-37) and 'South American Sales Co. - Linking the 
America's and Europe' (pp38-39).
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Argentina in 1991. In 1993 they established Latin American wide sales and service 
companies to co-ordinate Whirlpool/Brasmotor strategies in the region. The role of 
Whirlpool in the Brazilian market is even clearer when it is noted that, in 1992, 
Whirlpool controlled 52% of Brastemp on a combined direct/indirect basis. Similar 
calculations for Consul and Embraco are 71% and 81%, respectively30.
Electrolux, while slower to move in this market, has not ignored its potential. In 
a very recent move, the Swedish giant bought control of the second largest part of the 
Brazilian white goods market (for fridges, freezers, air conditioners and microwaves) 
via its purchase of the Refripar group31. This move also gave Electrolux a major part of 
the other large Brazilian compressor producer (SICOM).
The Brazilian white goods market thus appears to be dominated by two major 
international producers. This has a number of important implications for the focus of 
white goods production in Brazil. First, Brazil has become a major base for the 
production of compressors32. For example, between 1976 and 1981 Embraco increased 
production from around 500,000 to approximately 5 million units. In 1986 Embraco 
exported 67% of their output and SICOM 30%. Both operate at close to 100% capacity 
and in 1993 Embraco (now the world’s second largest producer) exported nearly 80% 
of its output, most of which continues to go to Whirlpool in the US.
Secondly, it appears that these TNCs have also gained control of important final 
product growth areas, leaving less promising products (such as stoves and kerosene 
fridges) to local producers. The two ‘Brazilian’ groups and their international ‘partners’ 
appear to be concentrating on two final product strategies - microwaves for export to all 
markets (through their assembly facilities in the Brazilian free trade zone - Manaus) 
and the potential of Latin America as a place to produce and sell their fridges, washers 
and dryers. After all, if growth resumes (particularly on a more equal basis) Brazil 
alone represents a very strong potential market. Even in the late 1980s, 40% of
30 Neto, 'Industria..linha branca', p i 17.
31 Appliance Manufacturer, 'Electrolux buys controlling stake in Brazil's second largest OEM', vol 44 
(3), 3/96, pl4.
32 Embraco and SICOM are well discussed in, Neto, 'Industria ... linha branca', Gazetta Mercantile. 
23/3/92, and A. Neto, 'Appliances: Hermetic Compressors for the World', Institutional Investor, vol.
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Brazilian homes did not possess a fridge, this figure being even higher for the other 
products33.
In summary, the modernisation of Brazilian white goods production will be 
strongly determined by the two TNCs’ market strategies and reasons for locating in 
Brazil. This may have both positive and negative implications for work/labour 
processes and industrial relations in the Brazilian facilities - themes which are dealt 
with in detail in Chapters 4-7. The next subsection looks at how the crises and 
uncertainty of the 1980-92 period affected white goods production and the key white 
goods producers. This helps to explain the nature of modernisation in this industry 
during the case study period.
3.2.3 Uncertainty and Crisis: The Brazilian White Goods Industry in the 1980s 
and 1990s
The metals industry, particularly the mechanical sector, was very seriously 
affected by the two recessions (1981-83; 1991-92) to occur between 1980 and 1994. 
Overall, the years 1984-86 saw high industrial output growth rates. Nevertheless, the 
serious recession which hit the economy in 1991-92 reversed the recovery which had 
been made in these years. For example, while industrial product rose from an index of 
89.6 to 107.8 between 1981-86 it fell from a high of 108.9 in 1987 to a low of 91.7 in 
199234. As noted in Table 3.1 below, the metallurgical, electric equipment and 
mechanical sectors closely followed (or dipped below) this overall trend.
29 (10), 10/95.
33IBGE, Household Survey, 1986. - noted in J. Toledo, 'Automa9ao microeletronica na industria de 
bens durdveis: O setor de linha branca', DIEESE/FINEP, (1989), p9. A point still recognised by the 
companies in their recent plans - Joncsurak, 'Big Plans..', pp26-30.
34 See Chapter 2, Table 2.1.
105
Table 3.1: Industrial Output Indexes, (1980=100); 1980 -92
Year Metalurgy Mechanical Electrical
1980 100.0 100.0 100.0
1983 77.9 57.6 77.4
1986 106.6 92.1 115.1
1989 108.6 91.9 113.7
1992 88.9 62.0 87.6
Source: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e !Sstatlstica (IBGE),
Industrial Survey. 1980-94
Sales for most white goods products reflected these cycles in economic 
activity35. Overall, white good sales declined by 20% between 1981-84, they increased 
by about 11% during 1985-86 but fell again thereafter36. The years 1991-92 witnessed a 
30% decline in overall white goods sales37and even greater losses for the main products 
in question (Table 3.2 below).
Table 3.2: Selected Electrodomestic Sales; 1991-92
Electrodomestic Product Sales - '000's Units 
Jan.-July, 1992
% Change in Sales 
Jan. -  July ;1991-1992
Clothes Dryers 59 -80
Dishwashers 49 -57
Freezers 146 -50
Refrigerators 720 -46
Clothes Washers 197 -43
Stoves 1000 -22
Microwave Ovens - 0
Source: Neto et al, 'Industria..linha branca..', pl31.
For fridges, a major product of this sector, sales fluctuated wildly. Over the 
decade as a whole, sales declined by an average of 0.6% p.a.38. The period 1991-92 
represented the largest fall in demand ever experienced39. Consequently, using 
refrigeration as the example, installed production capacity (see Table 3.3 below) was in
35 See Appendix A, Table A2 (sales/demand) and A3 (market structure) for a detailed view o f this 
industry over 1985-93.
36 Neto, 'Industria..linha branca', pl02.
37 Ibid., p i00 and 107.
38 Ibid., p98
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excess of two times 1992 market demand (1.7 million units) by 199340. A similar 
situation existed in respect to other products such as washing machines41.
Table 3.3: Refrigeration Production Capacity, units p.a; 1992-3
Company / Factory Productive Capacity -  Units
Consul -  factory II 1,290,000
Consul -  factory III - July 1993 450,000
Brastemp 810,000
SUB-TOTAL -  Brasmotor Group 2,550,000
Reffipar 850,000
Climax 500,000
SUB-TOTAL -  Refripar Group 1,350,000
GRAND TOTAL: 3,900,000
Source: Neto et al, 'Industria..linhabranca..',pl44.
The severity of this recession left most producers with major over capacity 
problems and led to major employment losses across their operations42. This was in 
spite of the fact that the uncertain demand since the mid-1980s had already encouraged 
producers to take other steps to hold up flagging sales. These steps included the 
introduction of more energy efficient products, the greater use of plastic inputs, 
massive advertising campaigns and smaller products43.
However, the largest single factor which threatened Brazil's largest producer 
(Brasmotor) was the entrance of a small Brazilian producer (Enxuta) into the market44. 
In 1981 Enxuta launched a very simple, vent clothes dryer. In 1984 and 1985 they 
started producing compact dishwashers and the more complex (but still small and 
cheap) clothes washer. Starting from nothing in 1980 the company managed to gain 
28% of the clothes washer market, 48% of the dish washer market and 67% of the
39 See ibid., p i00 and Table 3.2.
40 Ibid., ppl39-145.
41 Ibid., pl36.
42 See ibid., pp 127-134.
43 For examples see, ibid., pp 149-159.
44 For background on Enxuta see ibid., p i59 and pp 105-106, and subsection 3.3.2.
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clothes dryer market by 1989 (Table 3.4 below). Prior to this Brasmotor had supplied 
80% of the clothes washer market and the lion's share of dishwashers and clothes 
dryers45. Brasmotor also lost an important share of the refrigeration market to other 
producers during this period46.
Table 3.4: Market Shares, Washers and Diyers, Brasmotor and Enxuta; 1989/92
FIRM / Product 1989 1992
BRASMOTOR
- Clothes washers 60.2% 55.3%
Dishwashers 46.7% 39.9%
Clothes dryers 23.1% 14.5%
ENXUTA
Clothes washers 28.1% 32.7%
Dishwashers 47.7% 45.4%
Clothes dryers 67.0% 57.6%
Source: Derived from, Neto et al Tndustria...linha Branca’, Table 11.11.a, pl05, Table 
II ll.b , p 106 and Table II 11. C, pl06.
It was not until Brasmotor seriously began to modernise their products and 
operations and reach further down into lower income segments of the market that they 
arrested this situation. Their principal moves involved the establishment of an ultra­
modern (Whirlpool inspired and assisted) facility for the production of compact clothes 
washers, dryers and dish washers in the interior of Sao Paulo state (Brastemp-Rio 
Claro, 1989-90) and the opening of a state-of-the-art refrigeration factory at Consul 
(1992). However, 1992 also saw the company embark on the gradual modernisation of 
their old refrigeration factory (factory II) in Sao Bernardo and the articulation of a new 
human resource policy - the ‘Vision’. Ironically, they were only able to recover some 
of their earlier domestic market share within the reduced market of 1993.
Nevertheless, these developments represented more positive and offensive 
responses compared to a traditional ‘downsizing’ approach. The case studies chosen for 
this study seek to compare such apparently comprehensive examples with more 
partially modernised firms. Accordingly, the next section highlights specific 
modernisation trends across the white goods industry between 1980-92 and how this 
has helped to determine the selection of case studies. It finishes with a description of
45 Market shares for 1984-89 are shown in ibid., p i87.
46 By 1990 the Brasmotor group also lost 14% of its fridge market and 6% of its freezer market to
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these case study firms and a discussion of regional factors which might also influence 
the nature of modernisation at each location.
3.3 WHITE GOODS MODERNISATION AND THE CASE STUDIES
3.3.1 Modernising White Goods Production
As noted for industry overall in Chapter 2, prior to the late 1980s the process of 
modernisation in the white goods industry was also very piecemeal and slow. 
Technologies remained fairly basic and the penetration of new technique use was so 
slow that few changes to work were made. However, some firms embarked on more 
methodical projects of change by the 1990s.
For example, studies of pre-1989 developments across the white goods industry 
suggest limited changes in the use of new techniques and automated technologies in the 
production process47. Reduced stock levels and the assurance of a given level of quality 
appeared to have been the principal imperatives of producers. Thus stock and scrap 
control were important functions, as was quality at source for key processes such as 
plastics forming and painting.
Within the traditional white goods production process, plastic injection (and 
then painting) were the first areas to be considered for microprocessor based 
modernisation. Cutting and piece preparation were manual and electromechanical and 
did not appear to warrant major changes to their rigid processes. Production lines began 
to become more automated and firms were starting to experiment with NC/CNC 
machines in tool rooms and think about CAD in design. However, the use of these 
technologies remained limited, phosphating/oxidising operations remained noisy, dirty 
and hazardous (like most paint areas) and few integrated lines were installed within the 
production process.
Refripar, a group who produced cheaper, smaller products -  ibid., p i08 and 151.
47 Made clear at interviews. See also, DIEESE, 'Brastemp: produtos modemos, arcaicas r e la te s  de 
trabalho, Trocando em Miudos - Informativo Sdcio-Economico, no. 7, 7/88, pp31-38, and Toledo, 'O 
setor de linha branca'.
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In addition, white goods firms traditionally employed many quality 
inspectors48. These workers spent their time checking samples of inputs and the final 
product. However, during the mid-1980s some of these functions began to become 
integrated into the tasks of direct production workers. This growing self-inspection 
process was facilitated by experimentation with JIT/Kanban systems by a number of 
firms. A few firms even tried to integrate statistical process control (SPC) and new (but 
basic) machine maintenance tasks into the jobs of some direct production workers. Yet, 
as with earlier quality circle experiments, firms did not expand these efforts to all 
possible areas and workers. Further, multiskilling did not appear to be an issue and 
teamwork, when it did emerge, was still based on the existing division of 
responsibilities.
In summary, during the 1980s a number of important (albeit partial and non­
integrated) efforts were made within this industry to improve efficiency, quality and 
productivity. However, almost all of the changes that occurred mixed old and new 
technological and organisational forms and no substantive company wide changes to 
structures or employee relations appeared to emerge. Like many other industries, cost 
control dominated this incipient process and workers appear to have been given limited 
skill and responsibility improvements.
However, after the late 1980s key white goods firms brought on stream a 
number of more integrated modernisation projects49. These included, Prosdocimo's new 
freezer facility (1991), the Brastemp-Rio Claro compact washer and dryer factory 
(1990), Consul's third refrigeration factory (1992/3), and the Brasmotor human 
resource ‘Vision’ (1992). Each of these projects are unique in form. However, each also 
represented a considerable advance on past practice.
In view of the need for comparability of product, production process 
requirements and firm size, the choice of case study factories came down to the 
following. On a product and firm size basis, the comparison is made between
48 Ibid.
49 Clear from J. Gonsalves and C. Dreyfus (coords.), Reengenharia das Empressas -Passando a limpo, 
(Sao Paulo, 1995), Appendix 1, company interviews (independently) and with Neto et al, 
‘Industria...linha branca’.
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Brastemp-Rio Claro and Enxuta (washing products) and between Brastemp-Sao 
Bernardo and Consul (refrigeration). Combining both product groups, the comparison 
is made between the two more recent facilities (Brastemp-Rio Claro/Consul III) and the 
three older factories (Brastemp-Sao Bernardo, Consul II and Enxuta). This choice of 
factories also appears to fit the desire to compare comprehensively and partially 
modernised factories.
Furthermore, Brasmotor's human resource strategy is also analysed as the 
‘Vision’ is a unique managerial development and should be observable at three of the 
four case study firms - Brastemp-Rio Claro, Brastemp-Sao Bernardo and Consul - as 
they are all part of the Brasmotor group. However, specific local characteristics of each 
region and factory may modify the ‘Visions’ application between sites, a point noted by 
Brasmotor itself. In preparation for the detailed case study part of this research, the last 
parts of this chapter present a brief outline of the history of each company and of the 
regions where each factory is located.
3.3.2 The Case Study Firms
i) Washing Products
Enxuta50:
Enxuta was founded and began operations as a metal products producer in 1952 
under the name ‘Metalurgica Triches Ltda.’. Under the direction of the founder and 
principle share holder, P.Triches, the company purchased (1982) a local two man 
operation who were trying to assemble air vent clothes dryers and it was from here that 
the company began its entrance into the white goods market. In July 1984 the company 
secured limited liability under the name of ‘Triches S/A’ and in 1991 it became simply 
‘Enxuta S/A’.
While Triches family interests include a wide range of other enterprises it was 
the success of its three principal white goods products (vent clothes dryers, dish and
50 Summary below based on interviews, the company's response to the management questionnaire and 
a BNDES evaluation o f Enxuta, 13/7/90.
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clothes washers) that set it apart as an innovator. With the national success of its 
football team - ‘Enxuta’- the change in company name made wise commercial sense. 
On the basis of its meteoric growth between 1983 and 1985 the company invested in a 
large (25,000 square metre) complex in the new industrial zone on the outskirts of the 
city of Caxias and this was opened in 1986.
Brastemp-Rio Claro51:
Brastemp-Rio Claro formally began operations in 1990 and is 100% owned by 
the Brasmotor holding company. Brastemp's factory I in Sao Bernardo had produced 
large, more expensive models of washers and dryers plus stoves. However, with the 
dramatic entrance of Enxuta, the obvious market premiums put on space and price and 
then the market collapse (plus union ‘difficulties’ in Sao Bernardo) the company 
swiftly shifted production to a ‘greenfields’ site in Rio Claro.
The first product to be produced was the clothes washer (1990) and in 1992 
they began producing dryers and dishwashers. Compared to the former Sao Bernardo 
plant, Brastemp-Rio Claro is ultra modem, orderly and planned in its organisation and 
layout. It is located on 27,000 square metres of land in the new Rio Claro industrial 
district, just on the outskirts of town.
ii) Refrigeration
Brastemp-Sao Bernardo52:
The present Brastemp-Sao Bernardo operations were founded under the 
Brasmotor name in 1945. Between that year and 1949 the company principally 
distributed Chrysler vehicles and Philco electronic products. In 1949 this single factory 
(factory 1) commenced assembling Chrysler tmck chassis and cars and in 1951 the 
assembly of Volkswagen vehicles. The year 1951 also saw the company start the 
assembly of large American style refrigerators. In 1954, with the imminent market 
entrance and preferential treatment of automobile TNCs, the company left the auto
51 Summary below based on interviews, the management questionnaire response and Brastemp, 
Lavadora Brastemp Mondial, (Rio Claro, 1992).
52 Summary below based on, interviews, management questionnaire, Neto, 'Industria...linha branca', 
pp 134-137, and DIEESE, 'Brastemp: Produtos modemos..'.
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industry and began expanding refrigerator production, later moving onto washing 
machines, dryers and stoves - all in that same facility.
In 1975, with the opening of a ‘state of the art’ refrigeration factory (factory II), 
the company began expanding production considerably, separating refrigeration and 
washing products between the two plants. Yet until they began revamping this plant (in 
1992) the factory had become very old, crowded and obsolete by the 1990s. This 
factory, which sits on 33,000 square metres of the Sao Bernardo complex, is the one 
which is being compared with Consul in this thesis.
However, the complexity of Brastemp's total operations (and Brasmotor's role) 
go beyond this factory. First, the Sao Bernardo site also includes a separate tooling 
room/advanced engineering product development centre (ADC). This centre works not 
only for the Sao Bernardo facility but also for other Brasmotor operations (e.g. 
Brastemp-Rio Claro). A central Brastemp Administration Centre (CAB) and Brasmotor 
operations in Sao Paulo also have some importance to operations at this and other 
Brasmotor plants.
Consul53:
In 1947 a Santa Catarina inventor (Rudolfo Stutzer) joined with a number of 
friends to improve and fabricate the model of kerosene fridge he had designed. In 1950 
Consul was formed, producing 22 (kerosene and absorption) fridges in that same year, 
using artisanal techniques in their small Joinville workshop. With the financial and 
research backing of local government and prominent local figures, within 10 years they 
were producing 20,000 fridges p.a. from what is now the old factory I in the centre of 
Joinville. In 1963 they acquired 220,000 square metres of land in the industrial district 
just outside of town for the construction of the site upon which factory II, III and all 
present administrative, research and operational activities are now centred.
In 1970 the (still independent) Consul company inaugurated factory II on an 
initial area of 13,600 metres and with a capacity to produce 1200 fridges per day. In
53 Summary below based on, interviews, the management questionnaire, Consul, 'A Historia da 
Consul' (internal company document), Folha de Sao Paulo. 'Informe Publicit&rio/Consul', 25/12/92,
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1971 they started producing air conditioners and with the continuing assistance of 
Danish advisors they decided to tackle their dependence on imported compressors via 
the construction of a compressor factory (Embraco). Difficulties experienced with this 
project were alleviated when Brasmotor took over Consul in 1976.
The late 1970s and 1980s saw a new surge in product, production and process 
improvements plus a revitalised export drive, already started in the early 1970s via 
kerosene and compact models. In 1993 the old factory I was closed and the compact 
model integrated into factory II. Building on their now more direct links with 
Whirlpool, in July of the same year factory III was opened on 30,000 square metres of 
the same industrial site. The factory is quiet, clean, fully automated and streamlined for 
production and quality efficiencies. Many of its new product and process technologies 
cannot be seen in any of the other white goods producers in Brazil.
3.3.3 Comparing the Case Study Locations
The four case study firms, while all in the industrialised south-east, are in four 
very different locations in Brazil (see Map at the end of chapter). The following 
discussion (and Table 3.5) isolates the case study sites on the basis of three key 
features isolated by the literature -  the level of TNC involvement, local economic 
structure and the regions’ union history. These factors may prove to be important to 
the form of modernisation attempted in each location.
ppl-8 and Consul, Informativo, Edi<?ao Especial - Fdbrica III, 1993, no. 80, summer.
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Table 3.5: Regional Characteristics of the Case Studies
Firm/
(Place)
Locational
Type
TNC Links Local
Economic
Structure
Metals
Unionisation/ 
Union History
More
Modernised:
l)Brastemp 
(Rio Claro):
‘Greenfield’ Strong / direct Minimal
industry/some
traditional
manufacturing
35% in metals 
Minimal 
militant history/ 
some1980s 
resurgence
2)Consul III 
(Joinville):
‘Brownfield’ 
but separate
Strong / direct Moderately
important
manufacturing
area
45% in metals. 
Minimal 
militant 
history/1980s 
militancy/1990s 
moderated
Less
Modernised:
l)Enxuta
(Caxias):
New location in 
old area
None Regionally 
important 
industrial base
30% in metals. 
Traditional 
conflict of 
conservative 
and communist 
groups in union
2)Brastemp- 
(Sao Bernardo):
‘Brownfield’ Strong/indirect Key
concentrated 
industrial base
50% in metals. 
Long history of 
militancy and 
co-ordinating 
role
3)Consul II 
(Joinville):
‘Brownfield’ Strong/indirect Moderately
important
manufacturing
base
45% in metals. 
Minimal 
militant history/ 
1980s
militancy/1990s 
moderated
Sources: Observation, interviews and Appendix B -  The Case Study Context.
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i) Location and TNC involvement:
The literature suggests that modernisation will be more comprehensive at 
‘greenfield’ sites and where TNC links are strong. As noted in Table 3.5, the 
preliminary categorisation of the case studies seems to bear these observations out. The 
firms that appear to be the most modernised do seem to have located in ‘new’ sites and 
their links with Whirlpool are strong.
However, these observations are not so clear cut. For example, the ultramodern 
Consul III may be separated but it is not in a ‘greenfields’ area and the ‘old’ Enxuta 
factory has used a new location for its present operations. Secondly, the more 
traditional factories of Brastemp-Sao Bernardo and Consul II also have strong TNC 
links.
ii) Location and local economic structure:
The case studies also appear to confirm the suggestion that modernisation will 
be most developed in areas with a minimal history of industry and lower average wage 
levels. In terms of the refrigeration producers, both regions experienced massive 
population and industrial growth between 1950 and 198054. Yet besides the obvious 
locational advantage of having Embraco across the road from Consul in Joinville, there 
are a number of important differences between the economies and labour markets of 
these two regions55.
First, while both are very important industrial regions in their areas, Sao 
Bernardo is the largest industrial region in the most industrialised Brazilian State (Sao 
Paulo). Secondly, Sao Bernardo has a stronger history of metals production than 
Joinville. Sao Bernardo also has a history of higher wage levels than does Joinville. 
While a smaller proportion of industrial activity is in the metals sector in Joinville,
54 The below 1980 comparison o f the regions is from Appendix B, Tables B1 and B2. Additional 
material on Joinville from - Joinville Prefeitura, Joinville - Vida e Negocios and FIESC, Expressao - 
Economia e Empressas, 1/3, 5/90. Additional material on Sao Bernardo from - DIEESE, ‘Industria 
Eletro-Eletronica’, (Sao Paulo), 21/2/91.
55 See on the following points, Appendix B, Tables B1 and B2.
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Consul and Embraco are very visible as two of the nine largest companies in the region. 
These factors may also help explain Joinville as a locational choice for a state-of- the- 
art plant.
In terms of the washing product producers, Caxias do Sul has a longer history 
of industrial development than Rio Claro56. Due partly to the effect of early railway 
developments, by the 1950s Caxias was already one of the most important 
manufacturing centres in Rio Grande do Sul. With the vehicles boom and strong 
growth through the 1960s, both local and TNC manufacturers located in the 
municipality.
Rio Claro, on the other hand, was an insignificant industrial centre up until the 
late 1950s. At this time the establishment of a number of agricultural machinery makers 
and food product manufacturers started a change in the area’s economic structure. 
General growth and improved transport and electricity systems gave this an added spur 
into the 1960s and 1970s.
In 1980 Caxias was not only a larger town than Rio Claro but it was also a 
much more significant industrial centre, especially in relation to its respective state57. 
For example, 46% of the Caxias workforce was engaged in manufacturing compared to 
17% in Rio Grande do Sul State. The corresponding figures for Rio Claro and Sao 
Paulo State are 26% and 30% respectively. Caxias continues to be a much larger 
industrial area with larger firms than Rio Claro. The above factors may have made 
Rio Claro a better choice for the location of an advanced production facility.
In addition, while wages in Rio Grande do Sul state are historically lower than 
in Sao Paulo state, earlier figures suggest that there may be little difference between 
average wage levels in these two regional towns58. Moreover, these two case studies
56 The summary below draws on Appendix B, Tables B1 and B3. Additional material on Caxias - 
CIC, Boletim Tecnica, 2/93, discussions with CIC staff (Sr. Bulla), CIC, Caxias do Sul- Perfil S6cio 
Economico, 12/92, J. Onzi, 'Risultati socio-economici e prospettive della regione di Caxias do Sul', 
Dimensioni dello sviluppo, 1992, 3, 4, pp234-252. Additional material on Rio Claro from discussions 
with FIESP/SESI staff (Sr. J. Pimental) at Rio Claro.
57 See on the following statistics, Appendix B, Tables B1 and B3.
58 Ibid.
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stand out in other respects. For example, Brastemp-Rio Claro is much larger than the 
average local metals firm and they offer a type of work ambience not previously seen 
in this region. In comparison, Enxuta is considerably smaller (and much less 
advanced) than a number of other conspicuous local metals firms.
iii) Location and unionisation:
On the other hand, there is not a great deal of difference in metals market 
unionisation rates within the regions covering the case study sites. For example, socio 
membership of the local metals union ranges from an estimated 35% - 45% in the 
regions where the case study firms are more modernised compared to an estimated 30% 
- 50% in the regions where the less modernised case studies are located. However, the 
level of militant unionism is (Brastemp-Sao Bernardo) or has been (Consul II/Enxuta) 
much greater at the older sites.
As with factors such as TNC involvement and local economic structure, a 
choice by firms to locate on this basis would appear to confirm a sceptical 
interpretation of modernisation in Brazilian industry. Yet an evaluation of precisely 
how any of these factors may have affected the specific form of modernisation at these 
sites is not possible on the basis of this overview. These issues are considered more 
fully in the following chapters.
3.4 CONCLUSION
From humble beginnings in the 1950s, by 1980 the Brazilian white goods 
industry had grown considerably, producing a wide range of products for an expanding 
market. However, despite its appearance of strength, a number of factors illustrated its 
fragility during the 1980s and early 1990s. First, the 1980s saw aggregate demand 
slump and two serious recessions - crises of a magnitude not experienced before. These 
slumps were accentuated by the relaxation of previous protective policies and by some 
opening of the economy to greater import competition. The lack of competitiveness of 
Brazilian industry began to become more openly obvious and white goods production
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was no exception.
Despite this context, during the late 1980s Brazilian industry slowly and 
cautiously began to modernise their operations by the integration of new automated 
technologies and organisational and management techniques. The white goods 
industry, while not a leader in change, was one of those discrete product industries to 
embark on this process. However, the dominance of cost considerations and traditional 
attitudes by most employers meant that modernisation policies were sporadically 
applied and not integrated. Moreover, employer strategies offered quite clear limits to 
the degree to which work/labour processes may change.
Despite the 1991-92 recession, a number of more comprehensive white goods 
modernisation projects came on stream at this time. Compared to the traditional 
operations of relatively recent domestic producers (Enxuta) and established factories 
(Brastemp-Sao Bernardo), tailor-made facilities at Brastemp-Rio Claro and Consul and 
the human resource strategy of the Brasmotor group (the ‘Vision’) appear to signify 
quantum changes to traditional Brazilian management techniques and workplace 
systems. On the surface these changes represent examples of industrial reorganisation 
much closer to the ideal type suggested by modernisation optimists.
Nevertheless, it is not yet sufficiently clear whether and how the TNC and local 
contexts may be affecting production strategies, work systems and industrial relations. 
For example, regional factors may act to limit change at one or a number of the case 
study plants. On the other hand, the dominance of TNCs within these case studies may 
hold both positive and negative implications for labour, organised or otherwise.
However, few studies of Brazilian industry have tested these themes using a 
mix of detailed production process analyses and primary data on work and industrial 
relations as is done in this thesis. No such study of this type has been carried out on the 
Brazilian white goods sector in any period. Part B of this thesis analyses the companies 
and the work experience of a sample of their labourers. Its first chapter (Chapter 4) 
begins this analysis through a detailed review of the modernisation which has occurred 
within the case study companies introduced in this chapter.
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PART B:
MANAGEMENT CHANGE AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE WORKPLACE
CHAPTER 4:
MANAGEMENT IN TRANSITION - NEW IMPERATIVES AND OUTCOMES
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The first aim of this chapter to analyse what modernisation looks like within the 
case study firms. In this regard, Chapter 1 noted that modernisation can be broken 
down into two areas -  management and workplace change. It also argued that, in the 
case of the ‘Japanese/lean production’ model, this involves the application of TQM, JIT 
and associated technologies and techniques, closer and more open employee relations 
and more generous employment conditions. When well developed and integrated, these 
policies will assist the achievement of smooth production flow, quality products and 
continuous improvement. This chapter’s analysis is guided by these observations and 
by the specific Brazilian themes noted in Chapter 2.
The second aim of this chapter is to document what effects the firms’ policies 
have had on performance outcomes. Optimists claim that comprehensive modernisation 
will lead to improvements in quality, productivity, turnover and absenteeism. For 
workers, higher overall skill levels and wages and reduced levels of supervision are 
expected to eventuate. The third aim of this chapter is to shed light on what this 
analysis suggests about managerial intent and the influence of external factors on their 
strategic decisions.
On the basis of an analysis of the case study firms’ processes and outcomes, 
this chapter confirms Chapter 3’s presumption that it is valid to group the case studies 
into a comprehensive and a partially modernised group. Accordingly, this same 
categorisation of the firms will be used in the rest of the thesis. Secondly, while 
requiring deeper consideration (Chapters 5/6), in the comprehensive side of this 
dichotomy there appears to be a new ‘implicit bargain’ between workers and their firm. 
This may be due to the greater degree to which these firms have to rely on the skills 
and motivation of their employees. Yet, as with the nature of modernisation, the 
components of this bargain differ between the two comprehensive modernisers.
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Thirdly, despite this dichotomy between the firms, local, industrial relations and 
TNC factors have had an effect on the form of modernisation and the balance of the 
‘implicit bargain’. Wages remain low, there are clear limits to the openness and 
generosity of workplace changes and most unions can and have been easily 
marginalised. Moreover, while the integration of Whirlpool’s management principles 
may improve Brazilian workers’ conditions compared to the past, their control of the 
international market may limit further developments by Brazilian firms, relative to the 
optimistic hypothesis.
In summary, the comprehensively modernising factories appear to be using an 
‘easy’ path to change. The theoretical possibility of employers’ greater dependence on 
workers has been averted by the way in which workplace changes have been applied 
and for whom they apply. Even when the overall form of the firm looks very 
comprehensive, managerial intent can be questioned and the influence of context is 
considerable.
Following the typology noted in Table 4.1 below, this chapter is structured as 
follows. Section 4.2 deals with management principles, organisational structures and 
market strategies. Section 4.3, on the other hand, evaluates the changes which have 
occurred at the workplace. The section first examines the traditional production process 
(4.3.1) and then the organisational and technological changes which have occurred at 
the case study firms (4.3.2).
The firms’ task, employee relations and employment condition policies are set 
out in subsection 4.3.3. Key themes reviewed are - new work requirements and 
structures, training and education, supervisory changes and career and participation 
opportunities. Wage levels, a key (but not sole) measure of reward are also considered.
Section 4.4 evaluates the (company wide) outcomes of these modernisation 
developments. Subsection 4.4.1 compares the different levels of productivity, 
efficiency and quality the firms have achieved. The polemical debate about the effect of
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modernisation on skills is also considered (4.4.2)1. The final part of the analysis (4.4.3) 
examines inter-firm differences in labour turnover and absenteeism. Section 4.5 
summarises and concludes the chapter.
Table 4.1: The Comprehensive/Partial Modernisation Dichotomy
COMPREHENSIVE MODERNISATION PARTIAL MODERNISATION
Management Change:
1) A mission statement emphasising 
quality, openness and participation
2) Structures and hierarchies which fulfil 
these objectives
3) HRM policies to promote these 
objectives
4) Product and external market relations 
based on these principles
Workplace Change:
1) Technologies and techniques which 
promote quality, flow and continuous 
improvement
2) Broader skilled jobs and work 
responsibilities; more autonomy
3) Teams, reduced supervision and 
participative initiatives
4) Increased education and training; 
career expectations and other 
initiatives which promote ILMs and 
greater employment stability
Firm Based Outcomes:
1) Enhanced quality and productivity
2) Higher skill structures/ fewer skill 
differences within workforce
3) Higher wages/ wage incentives
4) Reduced turnover/absenteeism
5) Reduced supervision proportions
Management Change:
1) Few changes beyond a mission
statement
2) Still hierarchical
3) Continuing paternalistic approach
4) Outsourcing which often leads to
deskilling within the firm
Workplace Change:
1) Mainly technological change to key 
bottleneck areas / few qualitative 
changes
2) New tasks and responsibilities within a 
rigid line process
3) Only minor participative initiatives.
4) Minor, mainly technical, training 
initiatives. Continued reliance on 
external labour market for labour.
Firm Based Outcomes:
1) Minor and uncertain improvements
2) Low skill reliance / high skill divisions 
within workforce
3) Low wages / large wage divisions
4) High/ oscillating turnover levels
5) Few changes in supervisor proportions
4.2 THE PRODUCTION OF MANAGEMENT
This section analyses three groups of indicators of managerial change for the 
case study factories -  in overall principles, in structures and in their market and product 
focus. Local and industry related factors make each of their experiences unique.
1 See Appendix C for a discussion o f the skill definitions used in this study.
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However, of greater importance is the fact the two most recent factories have 
demonstrated a more unequivocal commitment to a quality strategy and its 
implementation within the firm.
4.2.1 Management Principles - Features and Influences
Prior to the establishment of Brastemp-Rio Claro and Consul III, management 
principles at Brastemp and Consul were very Fordist in orientation. A more 
paternalistic version of this model was in operation at Enxuta. For example, production 
at the Brastemp-Sao Bernardo facility was originally based on large, standardised 
products produced by highly supervised, relatively well paid workers. These features 
combined with low skill levels, the tolerance of high turnover and adversarial industrial 
relations defined factory operations and management style as very Fordist2.
Consul's original operations share many of the Fordist production line features 
of Brastemp-Sao Bernardo. However, there are important differences which distinguish 
management policy at this location. For example, large Joinville companies such as 
Consul, with strong local identities and visibility, have put more emphasis on training3, 
labour retention and civic values. Nevertheless, their approach was not a very co­
ordinated one up to 1989. Nor was it explicitly tied to strategic objectives such as 
quality. Moreover, in contrast to their previous industrial relations stance, during the 
market uncertainties of the late 1980s the company showed little concern for labour 
stability by sacking many employees and re-employing others4.
In comparison, while Enxuta’s product launches shocked the market dominance 
of the major white goods producers5, in terms of management style their approach was 
even more traditional than that at Brastemp-Sao Bernardo and Consul. For instance, 
management was very hierarchical, being located almost solely in the hands of the local 
entrepreneur who started the idea. Like many local Caxias business people, his interests
2 See, DIEESE -  ‘Brastemp: produtos modemos, arcaicas r e d o e s  de trabalho’, Trocando em Miudos 
-  Informativo Socio-Economico, no. 7, 7/88.
3 Discussed in section 4.3.3.
4 This appears to explain the much higher turnover figure recorded at Consul in 1989/90, (Table 4.14). 
These strikes are discussed in Chapter 7.
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spanned many sectors and he was very visible as the head of the company.
While Enxuta's meteoric growth necessitated the formation of a management 
directorate6, the above-mentioned features continued into the late 1980s. For example, 
supervision remained a very visible affair. Supervisors held power for more than just 
technical issues, they had the authority to make decisions affecting almost every aspect 
of work life7. Paternalistic practices such as a well-resourced creche also emerged (in 
1988). Quality, continuous improvement and participative principles were not of great 
importance to the firm's strategy. Sufficient durability for a cheap, simple but timely 
product characterised the principles behind Enxuta's management strategy8. Low cost, 
low skilled and disposable labour fitted this approach9.
However, the 1991-92 recession and a more open economic environment made 
it clear to all of these producers that fundamental changes were required to their 
operations. For Enxuta, this was reinforced by the managerial change requirements of a 
Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econdmico e Social (BNDES) financial rescue 
package10. Accordingly, in 1993 Enxuta launched their quest for international quality 
certification (ISO 9000). This involved a firm level mission statement which promoted 
continuous improvement, conceptual training and greater commitment to, and 
collaboration with, employees11.
In contrast, an important impetus for management change at the Brasmotor 
companies came from their links with Whirlpool. While it was not until 1992-93 that 
Brasmotor publicised its ‘Vision’, an increasingly close relationship was developing 
between these companies during the 1980s12. An important corollary of this 
involvement was to be the development of Brasmotor product, process and human 
resource policies. These policies closely mirror the Whirlpool approach, as is shown
5 See, Exame, ‘O Futoro e dos Baixinos’, 13/12/89, pp60-62.
6 Discussed in the next subsection.
7 Details in interviews with researchers from the University o f Caxias and a former Enxuta social 
services worker.
bNoted in interview with Sr. Triches, 12/92 and in the company's questionnaire response.
9 As lamented by Sr. Conte, (former) human resources director o f Enxuta, 12/92.
10 Confirmed in meetings, and from records, at the BNDES in 1994.
11 See Enxuta, Por dentro da ISO 9000, 1993.
12 As noted in Chapter 3.
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below.
The principles upon which Whirlpool founded their new vision had a number of 
elements. In terms of products, the company worked towards developing universal 
inputs but with final product specifications tailored to particular markets' consumer 
demands13. In terms of the generation of a strategic global vision, Whirlpool began a 
process of dialogue with management in all of its affiliates14. With the belief that the 
creation of trust and a common vision would take time, these executives met and 
formulated a series of study groups and projects15. The leaders of these groups were 
responsible for involving colleagues in the development and implementation of the 
‘emerging consensus’.
In terms of human resource development, the Whirlpool vision came to have a 
number of principles - communication, participation and compensation16. Under no 
illusions as to the low skill, low pay nature of their workers, the company sought to 
promote policies which ‘leveraged’ more commitment and productivity from their 
factory employees17. To generate workers who laboured with a greater desire for 
continuous improvement, Whirlpool executives decided that there was a need to make 
workers feel like they had a greater stake in the organisation. To achieve this, greater 
communication was advocated as were less overt systems of supervision, teamwork 
concepts and pay systems which rewarded team-based performance and quality 
advances and suggestions18.
Brastemp, Consul and Embraco have been part of this strategic development 
process. As shown in Figure 4.1 below, the Brasmotor ‘Vision’ reflects very similar 
principles. All three companies actively publicise their new total quality mission in 
their publications and workplace banners. In terms of products and processes, more 
emphasis on product quality, but with greater attention to the smaller, cheaper model
13 R. Maruca, 'The Right Way to Go Global: An Interview with Whirlpool CEO David Whitham', 
Harvard Business Review, March-April, 1994, pl36.
14 Ibid., pp 140-142.
15 See, G. Kesler, 'A Model and Process for Redesigning the HRM Role, Competencies and Work in a 
Major Multi-National Corporation', Human Resource Management, 34/2, 1995, pp229-252.
16 Maruca, 'Way to go Global...', p l40.
17 Ibid., and S. Greengard, 'Leveraging a Low-wage Work Force', Personnel Journal, 1/95, plOO.
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demands of consumers, is evident19. Universal parts, simplified processes and common 
products (vis-a-vis Whirlpool) also characterise their new approach.
Figure 4.1: The Brasmotor ‘Vision’ - principles and objectives.
MARKET
OBJECTIVES
1. Satisfying the consumer.
2. Total quality -  continuous improvement.
3. Growth through a global approach and collaboration by all.
4. To project a coherent, unified image of a top quality 
organisation.
PRODUCTION
IMPERATIVES
1. A high quality, non-insular, orientation.
2. Concern for productivity / efficiency.
3. Flexible and modem structures, processes and technologies.
4. Close/collaborative relations with workers, suppliers and 
clients.
HUMAN
RESOURCE
PRINCIPLES
1. To value and promote the needs and contribution (creativity) 
of all employees.
2. Participative leadership.
3. The cultivation of the spirit of motivation, co-operation and 
commitment.
4. Communication / information- open, clear, honest and two 
way.
Sources: Derived :fom, Brasmotor-Assessoria Corporativa de Communica9ao Social,
Visao - Obiectivos. Valores e Mudanca. 1992; and from discussions with Brasmotor 
personnel involved in the strategy.
In terms of human resources, Brasmotor workers are being encouraged to use 
new techniques such as JIT/Kanban and statistical process control (SPC). Furthermore, 
managers and technicians are being trained in a detailed understanding of the ‘Vision’ - 
in terms of communication, perception, feedback and leadership. Key employees from 
this group act as ‘change masters’, with particular responsibility for observing how well 
these concepts are being accepted amongst the hourly workforce20.
Yet, while the principles upon which hourly workers are treated differ little to 
the Whirlpool norm, in practice the Brazilian group has lagged far behind the practices 
used by Whirlpool in developed countries. For example, since 1989 hourly workers in a 
number of US Whirlpool plants have been involved in layout design, business plans
18 Maruca, 'Way to go Global'..., p l40.
19 See subsections 4.2.3 and 4.3.2 of this chapter.
20 These employees wear a special badge to signify their training and role.
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and some operational decisions21. Also, pay structures have changed as a result of the 
rewards given to workers for their suggestions and productivity improvements.
Brasmotor firms may be working towards these forms of participation. 
However, changing attitudes will be difficult. Most managers have been used to an 
environment where relations with hourly workers do not require discussion and 
compromise. Moreover, most workers will be very aware of the real wage reductions 
which have occurred between 1989 and 199222. The scepticism of workers at the older 
sites may be heightened when they observe that new quality and allegiance campaigns 
have been launched alongside massive employment reductions (Tables 4.2-4.3 below) 
and thus rising levels of employment insecurity, particularly since 1989.
Table 4.2: Total Employment and Hourly Worker Proportions - The Re­
frigeration Producers (Brastemp-Sao Bernardo and Consul); 1985-93
YEAR BRASTEMP 
Total % Hourly
CONSUL 
Total % Hourly
1985 5234 77.5% 6160 79.0%
1986 6125 79.0% - -
1987 6971 79.5% 7560 79.0%
1988 5712 75.0% 5846 77.0%
1989 6459 77.0% 7157 80.5%
1990 4935 72.0% 6670 81.0%
1991 3695 80.0% 5912 82.0%
1992 3043 67.0% 4722 81.0%
1993 2749 66.5% 5135 83.0%
Source: Company archives and interviews.
21 See Greengard,' Leveraging p 100; Personnel Review, 23/2, 1994, pp26-28 on a scheme 
operating since 1988 in the US; and E. Sandelands, 'Managing without Supervisors', Management 
Decision, 32/5, 1994, pp50-51.
22 See the regional data on wages in Appendix B, Tables B6 and B7, the data on real wages in Chapter 
2 (Table 2.4) and subsection 4.3.3 of this chapter.
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Table 4.3: Total Employment and Hourly Worker Proportions - The Washing 
Product Producers (Brastemp-Rio Claro and Enxuta); 1985-93
YEAR BRASTEMP-RIO CLARO 
Total % Hourly
ENXUTA 
Total % Hourly
1985 - - 916 74.0%
1989 - - 2208 74.0%
1990 449 74.0% 1516 72.5%
1991 554 77.0% 1301 72.0%
1992 587 74.0% 759 68.0%
1993 596 76.0% 670 67.0%
Source: Company archives and interviews.
In comparison, the Brastemp-Rio Claro and Consul III factories offer a much 
better platform for the application of these new policies. While operating at low 
capacity levels, employment in each factory is steadily rising23. The next subsection 
illustrates how their organisational structures also demonstrate their more 
comprehensive application of a management vision than is evident at the three older 
factories.
4.2.2 Organisational Structures and Systems
The recession forced many firms to ‘downsize’. However, ‘downsizing’ has not 
necessarily made firms leaner or more efficient. This is evident from the experiences of 
the more traditional case study factories. Structural changes which are both leaner and 
more efficient may require a conscious effort to make more fundamental organisational 
and participative adjustments.
For instance, at their height Enxuta used a very vertical structure - a presidency, 
directory and six divisions24. Each division had a number of managers and each of the 
production areas under their responsibility was overseen by numerous supervisory 
staff. However, as of 1993 there are no directors within the Enxuta structure and the 
heads of the divisions work directly with supervisory and technical staff. Rather than
23 Shown for Brastemp-Rio Claro in Table 4.3. Consul III figures are included in the Consul total in 
Table 4.2.
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being separated within the large administrative block these divisional heads and their 
staff now share an open-plan office. Yet even with the ‘downsizing’ which has 
occurred Enxuta is still administratively ‘top heavy’. It still has a lower proportion of 
hourly workers (Table 4.3) relative to the more modernised firms.
On the other hand, the sheer size of Brastemp-Sao Bernardo and Consul has 
meant that they are still very bureaucratic and hierarchical. However, both firms made 
two important changes to their organisational structures and reporting systems after 
199025. These changes are not necessarily linked to a reduction in scale and may allow 
the firms to generate greater productivity from their workforces.
First, by 1993 each firm had created a clearer functional and geographical 
separation of their skilled workers from the rest of the manufacturing labour force. At 
Consul this was done through making skilled tooling and most maintenance workers 
responsible to a different directorate and by building a separate area for these workers 
(for both factories) within factory II. Brastemp-Sao Bernardo, on the other hand, 
established a separate facility for skilled tooling, most maintenance and engineering 
workers at the Sao Bernardo site. Work conditions at this Advanced Development 
Centre (ADC) contrast sharply with the main Brastemp-Sao Bernardo factory
The second important change at Consul and Brastemp-Sao Bernardo concerns 
reporting structures and the nature of interaction promoted amongst factory employees. 
In both factories, prior to 1990, the head of each section was separated from production 
workers by three levels of reporting - chiefs, masters and leaders. In 1993, Brastemp- 
Sao Bernardo cut out the positions of master and leader and planned to base production 
on cells. At Consul, such changes were earlier and more radical. For instance, in 1992 
the leader position was removed and in many cases master's functions were melded 
with the section chiefs role within a new cell-based workplace structure.
By differentiating skill groups and flattening reporting structures the Brasmotor 
firms appear to be trying to ‘leverage’ more motivation and productivity from each
24 Highlighted by the company's response to the questionnaire (26/4/93) and in interviews.
25 Noted by HRM staff, questionnaire replies and expanded upon in discussions with plant
131
group of workers. However, while flatter structures may be good for workers, the 
separation of skill groups may offer no more than a better basis for management to 
control workers. Nonetheless, the use of these concepts at their new factories has made 
production and workplace relations at these two sites even leaner and, possibly, more 
participative.
For example, Consul overall has the largest proportion of hourly production 
workers (83%; Table 4.2). This figure is even higher (97%) in factory III. Moreover, 
with small numbers in production in factory III, work relations are very close and 
personal - there is one plant manager, five subcells each with one chief and an hourly 
worker captain and the subcells are very small (5-8 workers)26.
Brastemp-Rio Claro, on the other hand, fits within the operations directory of 
the newly created Multibras (Brasmotor white goods) company structure27. The 
provision of many group wide administrative functions in Sao Paulo and the use of the 
ADC in Sao Bernardo for complicated engineering services means that a large 
proportion (76%, Table 4.3) of the workforce at Brastemp-Rio Claro are hourly 
workers. As analysed in subsection 4.3.3, cells and participative subcell relations have, 
like at Consul III, been used from the factory's inception.
A final important feature with respect to management/organisational systems 
relates back to Brasmotor's connection to Whirlpool. While Consul and Embraco were 
being brought closer within the Whirlpool/Brasmotor system, the former American 
head of Whirlpool Brazil took on strategic positions within the Brasmotor and Embraco 
directories (in the early 1990s) and as head of Consul in 1993. The creation of the 
Multibras white goods ‘umbrella’ company in 1994 saw him as its director general28.
A trend towards a more co-ordinated approach (especially at the Brasmotor 
factories) can also be seen in management’s product, outsourcing and market strategies. 
The following subsection highlights these issues and how they vary between the more
management (Srs. Sergio and Jair, Consul; Sr. Romboli, Brastemp- Sao Bernardo).
26 Interview with Consul factory III management, 5/5/94.
27 As shown in, Brasmotor Global, ‘Edifao Especial’, no. 26, 4-5/94.
28 Ibid., pp3-5.
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modem and the more traditional firms. However, the discussion also suggests that the 
overriding control of the market by Whirlpool may be constraining the chances of any 
Brazilian firm expanding too far beyond the domestic market.
4.2.3 Products, Markets and External Market Relations
A firm's products and relation with suppliers also highlight their modernisation 
strategy. These issues will have implications for factory work. Higher quality products 
imply that the firm may have the potential to capture space in new markets. These 
products may require new and/or greater production skills. On the other hand, 
modernised productive processes are often observed to include enhanced relations with 
input suppliers. Phenomena such as outsourcing may have both positive and negative 
effects on work.
The case studies offer mixed results in these respects. For example, product 
quality has risen and greater outsourcing is occurring at the most modernised firms. 
However, products are becoming simpler and the market focus is still very much 
limited to Brazil. These features may put a limit on how far skills may be enriched and 
on the possibility of employment expanding or being made more secure through the 
firm tapping new markets.
The washing product producers clearly illustrate these issues. The principal 
products of Brastemp-Rio Claro (the ‘World Washer’ and the ‘Baby World Washer’) 
are of a much higher quality than that of their competitor, Enxuta29. For example, the 
agitation process is more stable and the product is a more efficient user of energy and 
water. However, the production strategies for this ‘joint venture’(the ‘World Washer’)30 
and the scaled down version of a Whirlpool design (the ‘Baby World Washer’)31 are
29 Clear from an inspection of the products and due to the large number of consumer complaints of the 
Enxuta product, as recognised by the BNDES and the company itself. The Brastemp-Rio Claro 
‘World Washer’ won top awards from a US based appliance magazine (Appliance Manufacturer -The 
Magazine of Design for Manufacturing Solutions, 1/91).
30 Almost every facet of the ‘World Washer’ was designed by Whirlpool or its US/European 
contractors (see, Brastemp, Lavadora Brastemp Mondial. Rio Claro, 1991, p2) and then assembled at 
Brastemp-Rio Claro.
31 As noted by technical staff at Brastemp-Rio Claro, the Baby World Washer’ is simply a scaled 
down version of the original Whirlpool product.
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based on high volumes of a low cost, high quality product, not model variety or export 
potential for Brastemp32.
The Brazilian market intentions of Brasmotor/Whirlpool are even clearer when 
it is noted that Brastemp-Rio Claro's new product ‘X’ is a totally manual washer 
(basically a durable plastic bucket with an agitator). This product, ‘the beauty’, is 
assembled at the plant and sold under another Brasmotor company name at a price 
much below the Enxuta product33. Conversely, Enxuta's new product is expected to be 
a simpler, cheaper, portable version of the Consul air conditioner34. However, despite 
these innovations, neither of these new products is expected to give the companies any 
greater market presence beyond Brazil and existing markets. The skills needed to 
produce them are also less than for other products.
In terms of outsourcing, while both companies’ principal product (the washing 
machine) is simpler to produce than past Brazilian washers, the Brastemp-Rio Claro 
product is based on a higher degree of outsourcing than Enxuta's35. For example, 
electrical controls, wiring and motors are all imported to the factory. Most of the 
(Whirlpool designed) subsystem is produced internally and it is assembled there. 
However, in contrast to Enxuta, the Brastemp-Rio Claro factory has no oxidising, 
coating or painting functions as the steel sheets are brought in pre-painted and the metal 
for the internal bowl is pre-treated. This situation has reduced some traditional 
functions and skills but it has also increased the need for technical personnel to have a 
more active role with suppliers.
A similar situation is emerging with respect to the product and supplier 
relations of the refrigeration producers36. Brastemp-Sao Bernardo has reduced the size 
of its product, increased the use of plastic components, improved the efficiency of the 
product's operating system and expanded outsourcing. Such developments are even
32 As noted in publicity (ibid., p2), the ‘World Washers’ are ‘designed for the Brazilian market’.
33 It is sold under the ‘Semer’ name at about 40% of the price of the standard Enxuta washer.
34 Noted by executives and designers at Enxuta (14/6/94).
35 Based on discussions with the companies, factory visits and responses to questionnaires (9/3/93 and 
26/4/93).
36 Observations based on factory visits, discussions and the companies written responses to 
questionnaires.
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more distinct at Consul, particularly at factory III37. Brastemp-Sao Bernardo is also 
moving in the product development direction of the Brastemp-Rio. For example, in 
1993 a prototype of an Enxuta style air-vent clothes dryer was observed at the ADC in 
Sao Bernardo. This would put Brastemp more directly in competition with Enxuta for 
this simple, low skill based, domestically orientated product, but at a higher level of 
quality.
On the surface, these product and process developments might suggest that 
these firms have a better chance of capturing new markets. However, as with 
hypotheses about rising skill levels, the above discussion has shown that this is far from 
certain. A combination of Whirlpool’s market control and the domestic orientation of 
Brazilian management appears to be limiting these possibilities. Further support for this 
view can be seen in the fact that (at least up to 1994) the export focus of these 
companies does not appear to have changed38.
For example, Brastemp-Rio Claro does not expect to be a significant exporter 
outside of a few sales to Mercosul partners and the small number of products which 
leave the factory under the Whirlpool name39. Enxuta only exports about 9% of total 
output and almost all of this is to destinations in Latin America40. Even the largest and 
most well known producer, Brastemp-Sao Bernardo, only exports between 5-9% of 
total output (also within Latin America)41. On the other hand, while Consul exports 
have grown to around 20% of total output42, this is mainly due to the continuing 
success of their bar fridge in existing LDC markets.
37 Noted in Consul's response to the production questionnaire and via observation/interviews at the 
factories, compared to Brastemp-Sao Bernardo's operations/responses.
38 In fact, while company publicity often alludes to the hope of new export markets, senior marketing 
staff made much more low key predictions.
39 Information provided in a written response and in discussions with Brastemp technical and sales 
staff at Rio Claro and Sao Paulo.
40 Based on written responses by the company.
41 Calculated from export/production figures provided by the company.
42 As for footnote 41.
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4.3 THE MANAGEMENT OF PRODUCTION
This section describes how production has been organised and the conditions 
under which workers labour. After a brief sketch of the requirements of refrigeration 
and washing product production and the traditional white goods production process 
(4.3.1), the section describes how plant layouts, technologies and techniques have been 
modified at the case study factories (4.3.2). This leads into a consideration of the 
approach of each firm to task allocation, employee relations and employment 
conditions (4.3.3).
The more modernised Brastemp-Rio Claro and Consul III differ in aspects of 
their production and workplace systems. Product specifications, local labour market 
factors, industrial relations conditions and local managerial attitudes appear to explain 
many of these differences. However, the section demonstrates that, compared to the 
other firms, both these two firms have integrated their visions of modernisation quite 
profoundly within their workplaces.
4.3.1 The Traditional White Goods Production Process43
White goods output is based on the labour intensive production line assembly 
of products by predominantly low skilled workers. Labour costs make up around 10% 
of total production costs for both groups of products. The stages which were common 
to the white goods production process (up to the mid-1980s) are shown in Figure 4.2 
below. Within these stages, while firms tried to allow the product to develop in a 
logical way, plastic and metal parts production and assembly stood apart from the line 
and often quickly became less integrated within the process. Only the final assembly 
stage came to be automated (via a conveyor belt). Input and component movement 
between all other stages was manual and, in view of the importance of ensuring 
adequate quality and minimal stock levels, numerous quality control workers were 
employed throughout the process. Testing was not integrated into the process and the 
co-ordination of supplier relations between stages did not yet exist.
43 The below description is based on factory visits (1992-93), interview responses, DIEESE, 
'Brastemp’: Produtos Modemos1, pp35-40; and J. Toledo, 'Automa?ao microeletrdnica na industria de
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Figure 4.2: Broad Stages of the Traditional White Goods Production Process
STAGE 1) Material receipt/organisation/preparation
STAGE 2) Stamping, shaping and soldering
STAGE 3) Cleaning, coating and painting (of metal)
STAGE 4) Plastic injection (separate section)
STAGE 5) Metal component fabrication ("  ")
STAGE 6) Component assembly ("  " )
STAGE 7) Final assembly
STAGE 8) Packing, storage and distribution
Source: Derived:Tom, DIEESE, 'Brastemp: produtos modemos..',
After material receipt, stage 2 of the process is where the casing (or doors and 
cabinet) are cut to size and shaped to form using presses, cutters and standard industrial 
soldering irons. Stage 3 is the dirtiest and most dangerous stage of production. 
However, it is the most critical in terms of quality and production time. It is here that 
metal pieces are oxidised, dried and sent to the painting chambers. In the paint area 
employees using paint guns, or electrostatic disk systems, paint the pieces. Workers 
then check the quality of the metal sections before they are moved to high temperature 
drying rooms.
While the washing and refrigeration products differ in their components and 
while refrigeration is a more complex process, both products have plastic, metal and 
electro-mechanical components which need to be produced or assembled prior to 
insertion into the process. Components specific to the washer are the internal bowl, 
motor, pump, agitator and electrical consul. A refrigeration product is unique as it 
requires the production/assembly of a refrigeration system (compressor, tubing, grate, 
condenser and evaporator) and a system of insulation between the inner and outer 
casing and in the door. The traditional Brazilian refrigerator stood out as it still used 
fibreglass rather than polyurethane for insulation.
bens duraveis1: O Sector de Linha Branca, (1989), DIEESE/FINEP.
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The production and/or assembly of these inputs (in stages 2-6) largely 
determined the nature of skills involved in production. Also, the separation of these 
tasks from line work meant that production line tasks were of the lowest skill level, 
confined to placing parts within the evolving product. Further, the checking of the 
product by separate quality control workers accentuated the monotonous and simple 
nature of direct production line work, the stage where most workers are employed. 
Finally, this heterogeneity of skill groups was even more marked as skilled workers 
shared the same workspace.
4.3.2 Changes to Layouts, Technologies and Production Flow
Between the late 1980s and 1994 Enxuta made few changes to the traditional 
model of production whereas Brastemp-Sao Bernardo and Consul II partially 
modernised. At the two most recent factories (Brastemp-Rio Claro, Consul III) radical 
new layouts, production technologies and production flow methods were installed. This 
subsection reviews these developments, starting first with a consideration of washing 
product production44.
Of all the firms, Enxuta most closely fits the traditional model of production. 
Most equipment is universal, part movement is manual, stock levels are high and the 
level of co-ordination between stages of production is low within what is a dirty, noisy 
work space. The largest investments the company has made in new technology (in the 
late 1980s) have been the purchase of plastic injectors and the acquisition of more up- 
to-date metal pressers, cutters and tool room equipment. However, crucial processes 
such as the production of the cabinet/internal metal bowl and general production flow 
remain antiquated. For instance, the cabinet is manually cut, shaped, soldered and 
moved. It then goes through the crucial oxidation, painting and drying process - one 
which is slow, manually intensive and hazardous.
44 The general description noted in this subsection comes from interviews carried out in the process of 
the project, B. Neto et al, 'A industria de electrodom^sticos de linha branca: tendencias intemacionais 
e situacao no Brasil', (1992), Instituto de Economia, University of Campinas, see pp 166-213. Other 
more specific data on technologies and processes were provided by the companies and by extensive 
factory observation and discussions by die author.
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The washing machine's internal metal bowl is a key determinant of product 
quality. At Enxuta, metal sheets for this input are cut, holed and shaped through a 
process involving five workers and seven manual processes. After the quality of the 
bowl is verified it then has to go through the galvanising process. As a consequence of 
such production features, wage costs at Enxuta make up a high proportion of total 
production costs (11-12%).
Brastemp-Rio Claro, in comparison, is highly organised. Inputs arrive close to 
where they are needed in the largely automated line, one in which some assembly (e.g. 
the subassembly) and testing functions (i.e. for electrical efficiency and water use) are 
included. This clean, tidy, quiet factory is the result of these factors, the low level of 
stocks and the absence of painting, oxidising, drying and galvanising functions. Key 
technological advances include - fast NC (and rapidly changed) metal input stampers, 
microprocessor controlled plastic injectors, four (soon to be operational) on-line testing 
robots and an overhead crane which facilitates fast mould changes for metals and 
plastics machines.
The two greatest technological advances that Brastemp-Rio Claro has over 
Enxuta are for the cabinet and the internal metal bowl. Metal sheets for the cabinet are 
pre-painted and these move by an automated (Italian) transfer line which mechanically 
folds, holes and solders the cabinet. Only four, but conceptually well trained, workers 
keep an eye on the process, one which is capable of producing a massive 110-120 
cabinets per hour. Metal bowl production is even more distinctive. Already galvanised 
sheets are fed through a NC machine which cuts, holes and shapes the bowl and 
temporarily solders a lid on one end. The piece is then moved into a NC chamber 
where it is automatically tested and final soldered. Only two workers (one semiskilled 
and the other unskilled) are used to manage this fast and clean process.
As a consequence, if workers fulfil the new expectations of them production is 
streamlined and very efficient. Space is minimised and workers move little while the 
product flows smoothly and quickly through the co-ordinated process. As a result of 
these technologies and the absence of most high skilled or labour intensive manual 
tasks, wages make up only just over 8% of total production costs at Brastemp-Rio
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Claro.
In terms of refrigeration, by the mid-1980s Brastemp-Sao Bernardo's lumpy, 
discrete approach to production change meant that it had become crowded and 
disorganised45. A new line was added in 1980, separate lines and areas had developed 
for subpart assembly and testing and there had been no changes in equipment since the 
mid-1970s. In response, between 1985 and 1990 the firm made a number of major 
changes to its operations. These included, faster velocity metal shapers, programmable 
door presses, new vacuum formers and micro-controlled refrigeration pumping. 
However, all that had really been done was the introduction of new equipment in a few 
key bottleneck areas. Labour costs still make up a high proportion (14.5%) of total 
production costs at this factory.
In 1992 Brastemp-Sao Bernardo began a five-year plan to change the factory in 
more extensive ways, changes which will have far greater effects on production 
integration and flow46. First, the present three lines are planned to be converted into two 
more automated ones which include on-line computer testing and automatic product 
swivelling. Secondly, refrigeration unit assembly will be integrated into the line and the 
technologies for stamping, shaping and welding will be further improved by machines 
which automatically bend, hole and weld the large pieces. However, there are limits on 
how much can be changed within a factory space which is crowded and will still 
involve many manual processes (e.g. product movement and painting related 
functions).
The Consul II factory, on the other hand, has gone through a more gradual 
process of modernisation47. Also, it uses fewer parts and has always had simpler 
products than Brastemp-Sao Bernardo. However, the factory's large mix of 
refrigeration products (all types), mixed use of inputs (e.g. sometimes fibre glass, 
sometimes polyurethane), partial reliance on manual methods (e.g. for paint tint and
45 See, DIEESE, 'Brastemp: Produtos modemos1, pp31-43.
46 These changes cost US$ 7M in 1992 and a planned USS 30 between 1992-97 - Brastemp, Bras- 
Noticias, no 8, 14/8/92.
47 This smoother process is illustrated by the introduction of - cabinet presses (1975), polyurethane 
insulation (1983), electrostatic painting (1986), automatic door injectors (1985), and paint area
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mould changing and insulation injection) and the recent addition of the bar fridge, left it 
a crowded and hard to co-ordinate factory space by the early 1990s.
The company has tried to work around these constraints. For example, during 
the late 1980s factory II began to use many new computer technologies (e.g. CNC 
machines, bar coding and a network data bank)48. As a result, despite the labour 
intensive nature of production, labour costs as a proportion of total production costs sit 
just below the industry average at 9%.
Between 1994-98 Consul plans to carry out a more comprehensive 
modernisation programme in factory II49. The factory space will be expanded, 
production lines will be separated and fully automated, NC test beds will be introduced, 
new paint and polyurethane technologies introduced and refrigeration unit assembly 
will be integrated into the line. While these changes will make factory II more like their 
new factory, they are still partial adjustments. It is doubtful whether this old factory 
space could ever match the efficiency of Consul III.
Consul III is based on a new, simplified product, one which the company feels 
will meet new quality standards and market potential50. Every stage of production is 
automated, computer linked and tested. Only polyurethane is used for insulation and 
this, like refrigeration components, is integrated within the stop-go production line. 
Plastic production, vacuum forming, cabinet and door formation and painting functions 
are based on the most up-to-date technology and parts are produced very close to where 
they are needed. Work positions (between the overhead receipt of painted doors and 
cabinets and the computerised final testing, packing and storage area) are in ergonomic 
based trenches. The product moves and swivels automatically so that workstations are 
fixed, safe and comfortable. This new layout is shown in Figure 4.3 below51.
transfer lines (1987).
48 Lists and descriptions of Consul's recent acquisitions of technologies were provided by Sr. Marcio, 
Consul Engineering Department, 1994.
49 Preparation for these changes could be observed in early 1994. Technical staff also supplied 
diagrams of what the factory would look like.
50 Features of the factory were fully elaborated in interviews and from inspection. See also - Consul, 
Informativo, Edipao Especial - Fabrica III, no. 80, Verao 1993.
51 No photos could be taken in this factory. Figure 4.3 and the following description were recreated 
after numerous visits, discussions and from written responses.
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FIGURE 4.3: THE MODERNISED FACTORY LAYOUT FOR REFRIGERATION - CONSUL FACTORY III, 1993
The Consul III production process starts with (factory II cut) metal sheets which 
are loaded onto an automatic line which presses and folds them into cabinet and door 
panels. Still moving on this line, these pieces are holed (in an automatic carousel) then 
welded and tested before being lifted on an overhead line into oxidation, painting and 
drying chambers. Painting and tint changing are fully computerised, rapid and 
automatically tested. After final quality observation the doors and cabinets move by 
overhead lines to the production line.
On arrival, the door and cabinet separate onto either side of the line. On the 
door side, rubber sealing is attached and then insulation is mechanically inserted into an 
automatically tilted door. On the cabinet side, tubes and wires are put in place and then 
the pre-made internal tub is inserted. The cabinet then tilts back for the automatic 
insulation process. Prior to the cabinet mechanically tilting back up for further work the 
components and insulation are computer checked for efficiency.
With the door and cabinet back in positions where labourers can easily work, 
parts are inserted, features are checked and the compressor is attached. The two parts 
merge and are joined at the end of this line. From here the fridge moves on a line to an 
overhead station where the gas is inserted and the insulation and electrical system 
receive a final computer check. The final stage of production also occurs on this 
platform. Trays, shelves and outside emblems are attached and then the product moves 
through an automatic packing and bar coding process prior to storage, or placement in 
(JIT) trucks awaiting their preplanned delivery load.
With almost all functions put within the line, Consul III represents the most 
precise, rapid and integrated model of production. Labour costs represent a low of 
around 5% of total production costs. Also, while both Consul III and Brastemp-Rio 
Claro are much more co-ordinated and integrated than the other factories, they vary in 
their modernisation approach.
For example, Consul III has chosen to rely more intensively on technology to 
facilitate production efficiencies. At Brastemp-Rio Claro production techniques and 
new forms of employee relations and employment conditions dominate their approach
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to a greater degree. This is partly due to differences in the product and the greater 
complexity of the refrigeration process. This difference in approach may also bear 
some relation to where each originally gained much of their inspiration for 
modernisation (i.e. Consul -  Continental Europe; Brastemp -  the US).
However, for both these highly modernised factories to function as planned 
workers need to be trained in new tasks. The efficiency by which workers carry out 
these tasks also depends heavily on their motivation to achieve the new expectations 
put on them. Consequently, the workplace policies, structures and incentives all these 
companies use to try and make their systems work efficiently are considered below.
4.3.3 Tasks, Employee Relations and Employment Conditions - Principles and 
Policies
Chapter 1 highlighted the optimistic argument that modernisation will be based 
on broader tasks/jobs, closer and more participative employee relations and ILM type 
employment conditions. These are expected to foster a happier, more productive and 
committed workforce. While subjective aspects of this process are considered in 
following chapters, this subsection compares the case study firms on the basis of 1) 
workers’ tasks and employee relations and 2) their conditions of employment.
Confirming the specific Brazilian literature (Chapter 2), the analysis of these 
issues in this subsection suggests that local managerial attitudes and industrial relations 
traditions have helped to create a distinct, low wage, anti-union and less open and 
generous modernisation process at the case studies relative to the optimistic model. 
However, within this context, the two most recent firms have still applied 
modernisation techniques in a most comprehensive way.
Tasks and Employee Relations:
Due to the management decisions and technical features discussed above, 
Brastemp-Rio Claro and Consul III do not have a large number of the most skilled 
manual group in their factories. They also do not have (Brastemp-Rio Claro) or have
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vastly changed (Consul III) dirty, labour intensive tasks such as painting, oxidation and 
galvanising. However, many semiskilled machine operators and ‘unskilled’ line 
operators have a larger and different range of tasks to perform than in a traditional 
white goods factory52. For example, machine operators use Kanban/internal JIT 
methods and rely upon external JIT systems for their materials. They are also 
responsible for minor machine maintenance and for checking the quality of the finished 
input. Line operators have new input insertion responsibilities (e.g. insulation; 
subsystems) and carry out visual and mechanical checks of the product. While these 
checking duties are generally limited to the observation of an electronically controlled 
process, these workers must know what to do in case of a problem.
The layouts and technologies of these two factories make the use of these 
techniques and new tasks more possible. However, in an effort to maximise the 
effectiveness of these systems, both factories have organised production workers into 
cells (see Figure 4.4 below). The idea seems to be that smaller work groups, greater 
delegated responsibility and more involvement will increase motivation and workers’ 
identification with quality and productivity objectives of the firm.
52 Based on factory visits, discussions and written responses - both factories.
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Figure 4.4: Cellular Production - the examples of Brastemp-Rio Claro and 
Consul, key features and outcomes
FACTORY KEY FEATURES AND OUTCOMES
Brastemp- 
Rio Claro
1. Five production cells - metals, plastics, assembly line, 
manufacture and engineering.
2. Each cell has a manager (an engineer) and cells divided into 
subcells of 4-8 workers.
3. Subcells co-ordinated by a high skilled worker; subcells have an 
elected (unpaid) captain (monthly) who gains points for this.
4. Cells and subcells discuss production issues and targets as well 
as evaluation and training needs of members.
5. Cells and subcells responsible for product flow, quality, JIT / 
Kanban, basic maintenance and co-ordination between cells.
Consul 1. More traditional production sections. Factory III is a separate 
cell.
2. Sections divided into sub-cells of workers.
3. For unskilled and semiskilled workers in sub-cells -  team 
captains (per 30 employees) elected. Subcells still co-ordinated 
by a white-collar chief.
4. Workers, while using new techniques intensively, have very 
limited decision/input responsibility.
5. Factory III cell divided into 5 subcells -  assembly, plastics, 
polyurethane, painting and maintenance. Subcells are smaller 
than Consul II but factory also has one manager, one white 
collar chief per subcell and subcell captains.
Source: Brastemp-Rio Claro and Consul interviews, 1992-3.
The structure of the cells of each plant are similar - both factories involve 
team captains in the co-ordination of activities and hierarchies have been minimised. 
However, the cellular system at Brastemp-Rio Claro is more radical. For example, 
subcells are co-ordinated by skilled hourly workers whereas at Consul III engineers 
co-ordinate activities. Secondly, at Brastemp-Rio Claro subcells are used more 
intensively for the discussion of not just production but evaluative and training 
issues. These issues are dealt with on a more individual basis at Consul III.
Brastemp-Sao Bernardo and Consul II have also been attempting to make use 
of new techniques and forms of employee relations. At Brastemp-Sao Bernardo, their 
early 1990s total quality push came to include the integration of Kanban/JIT and 
preventative maintenance tasks at some work posts by 199253. Check lists, input
53 These efforts were given a push by a 1992 state Government (FINEP) assistance package.
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inventories, fault evaluation graphs and maintenance reminders are now evident in 
some operational areas. While the Advanced Development Centre (ADC) has 
removed most of the skilled from the shop floor, those left in this factory will be 
more responsible for checking, maintenance and process flow than they were in the 
past54.
Consul II has a longer history with new techniques of production than 
Brastemp-Sao Bernardo55. The late 1980s saw management trying to implement new 
methods and examples mirroring Brastemp's post-92 techniques have been evident 
since 199056. However, the crowded, mixed and manual nature of operations here 
mean that these organisational changes may not be as effective as they could be. 
Cells and subcells already operate in this factory. Yet, as with Consul III, the most 
skilled are not part of the teams and subcells are managed by white collar workers 
who take an individual approach to members of the group.
The smaller scale of operations at Brastemp-Rio Claro and Consul III 
suggests that any benefits from closer, more integrated employee relations will be 
greater there than at the two larger factories. However, the other small-scale producer 
- Enxuta - has done even less to rearrange workplace relations. During the late 1980s 
management did attempt to introduce JIT/Kanban and SPC to many parts of 
operations and plans prior to the market crash were for these to be expanded and cells 
introduced57. Yet original attempts were partial and could never achieve much 
success in this less organised firm. Moreover, changes to tasks at this factory have 
occurred mainly for the skilled (e.g. faster, more complex mould changing58) whereas 
the semi/unskilled simply appear to have been put under greater pressure59.
Another employee relation change introduced by the two most advanced 
firms has been the introduction of new forums for discussion and involvement. For
54 Interview with Sr. Romboli, Manager, Industrial Engineering, Brastemp-Sao Bernardo, 11/1/94.
55 For instance, since 1982 Consul has been offering courses in JIT/ Kanban and Quality Control.
56 For example, after 1989 the firm began training for, ‘Set-up’ techniques, MPT (preventative 
maintenance), OFD (production evaluation) and FMEA (a new communication process).
57 Interviews with Sr. Triches (12/92) and Srs. Fonseca and Pavianni (3/93).
58 Interviews with HRM staff and written HRM response (27/1/93).
59 These task effects were evident from observation and confirmed by HRM staff at Enxuta.
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example, at both factories subcells are used for the discussion of work allocation and 
the work environment. Brastemp-Rio Claro goes beyond this to the use of other 
forums60, subcell structures and the ‘carrot’ of career progression to entice workers to 
identify and report areas of waste and make suggestions for efficiency 
improvement61. However, Consul is also concerned with attitudes and motivation as 
seen by the fact that employees must also attend a discussion group on family and 
community values.
More recently, Brastemp-Sao Bernardo is trying to follow this lead. However, 
their industrial history and present lack of cell structures and incentives for such 
initiatives hamper their level of success. The most traditional employer, Enxuta, has 
also experimented with participation and discussion forums62. While the management 
of Brastemp-Rio Claro is disappointed with the response to their schemes, Enxuta 
managers report very negative results. Most schemes at Enxuta have been disbanded. 
Supervisors note that workers are very reticent to talk openly. They also note that 
when workers are offered incentives for ‘no fault’ production and one achieves it, 
other workers are even more reticent to try and replicate the example63.
In summary, this discussion suggests that the most modernisation firms have 
removed many manual and skilled tasks from their operations. However, many new 
conceptual, organisational and evaluative responsibilities and new forms of employee 
relations have been introduced. Beginning with the issue of training, the following 
discussion examines how new employment conditions may be helping to fortify 
these developments at the most modernised factories.
60 e.g. Participation and Assistance Groups - GAP. These are tied to the cells. Another Brasmotor 
group wide programme (‘Operation Red Flag5), was also extensively promoted throughout these 
companies between 1993-94. Its aim was to encourage workers to spot and report areas of waste and 
make recommendations for improvements - Journal Brastemp, ‘Extra Edition’, 4/93.
61 For example, in 1993 the ‘Participate - give a suggestion’ programme was introduced.
62 For example, discussion groups called ‘improvement groups’; - noted in Enxuta HRM responses.
63 As stressed by the Enxuta HRM manager (Pavianni) and production manager (Fonseca).
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Employment Conditions:
At the two advanced firms a much greater degree of in-house training is made 
use of than in the more traditional firms (Table 4.4 below). Also, technical training is 
tailored to the specific technologies and processes used in these factories. More 
significantly, Brastemp-Rio Claro and Consul III employees are intensively tutored 
in not only manual but also conceptual and attitudinal issues - ones which connect 
new workplace tasks with the promotion of a pro-active attitude64. As suggested by 
the critical literature, the attitude being promoted is one which links a workers' 
progress with the success of the firm65.
Table 4.4: Training at the Case Study Companies - average hours per hourly 
worker per month (1993) and focus of company training policy (1985-94)
FACTORY TYPE Hrs./worker Training policy -  General Features, 1985-94
TRADITIONAL: 
-Brastemp 
Sao Bernardo
-Enxuta
1.0-1.2 
<1.0
Mainly manual, specific and workplace based. 
Post-91 has changed to be more conceptual, 
attitudinal and regular.
Up to 1989 included in-house and on- the-job. 
Massive drop in training after 1990; now is 
minimal, specific and on-the-job. With new 
quality policy, conceptual courses may arise.
INTERMEDIATE: 
-Consul II 1.3-2.1
Traditionally -  much specific and general, but 
centralised, training emphasis. Specific 
emphasis continues but now more company 
level conceptual modules are made use of and 
specific training is now more factory based.
ADVANCED: 
-Brastemp 
Rio Claro
-Consul III
4 -5 .2
2-3.5
Specific training via in-house/SENAI 
subcontracts for conceptual and attitudinal 
modules.
Compared to factory II - greater use of factory 
specific training, general attitudinal and 
conceptual courses.
Source: Company statistical publications/graphics and interviews.
64 Examples for Brastemp-Rio Claro are - 1) Segmento Comportamental - Percepcao (Perception 
training); 2) Trabalho em Equipe (Working in Groups); 3) Segmento Analitico - Graficos (Analysing 
graphs).
65 Noted by psychologists/administrative staff at the plants and evident from their training manuals.
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Courses common to both Brastemp-Rio Claro and Consul include 
autocontrole (self-motivation), quality control, cellular production, Kanban, ISO 
9000, preventative maintenance and numerous modules on operational skills and 
technologies. There are also courses at each factory concerning ‘what is quality’, 
‘what is the firm’ and ‘participative negotiation’. At Brastemp-Rio Claro these 
courses are well organised and advertised. Workers are also given an idea of the 
minimum amount of training they are expected to undertake and how long modules 
should take to complete. Consul is also co-ordinating their training programme and 
its delivery, to a degree not evident in the past66.
However, the two advanced firms differ in respect to one major aspect of this 
new training focus. Brastemp-Rio Claro management believes that they need 
polyvalent workers and that all of the workforce should be involved in preventative 
maintenance, continuous improvement and quality control67. In comparison, Consul 
takes a less ambitious approach to the labour process of their workers. In contrast to 
the optimistic hypothesis, they do not believe that production requires such high 
expectations and thus dismissed the idea of polyvalent workers and a career plan at 
an early stage68.
Consul II is moving in a similar direction in respect to training as factory III. 
However, training uptake is lower. Brastemp-Sao Bernardo and Enxuta, on the other 
hand, have more divergent training histories. Traditionally, Brastemp-Sao Bernardo 
acquired most of its skilled workers in the market. Beyond basic induction for all 
new entrants few courses were offered. Supervisory staff demonstrated tasks or, if 
training was needed, this was provided on-the-job69. However, in 1992 Brastemp-Sao 
Bernardo began to introduce a more comprehensive training programme70. A wider
66 See, Consul, ‘Catalogo de Educa?ao e Treinamento’, 1994, in which over 80 courses are listed. In 
addition to courses which are required for all, factory supervisors select other courses for workers 
from the manual, as required.
67 Noted by Sr. Villella, Director Human Resources and in written responses to the HRM 
questionnaire (25/3/93 and 20/5/93).
68 For example, a pilot test of polyvalency and a career plan was carried out in their Manuas 
microwave assembly facility (Consul Industrial da Amazonia, ‘Programa Operador Multifunctional’, 
3/94). While higher skilled Embraco operations may warrant these, the company decided against them 
for factories II and III in Joinville and eventually also in Manuas.
69 Interviews at Brastemp-Sao Bernardo HRM department, 26/10/93.
70 See, Brastemp, Journal Brastemp. TVIais Productividade, mais qualidade’, no 9, 1992 p4 and
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group of workers will have training options and these courses will impart a greater 
range of conceptual, organisational and ‘attitudinal’ skills.
In comparison, during the mid-1980s Enxuta quickly saw the need to provide 
greater worker training. Its meteoric growth, low skill levels in the local labour 
market and the unique nature of its products prompted them to establish an internal 
training school71. While the most skilled had received the bulk of their training 
outside the firm, they and the other skill groups were often required to undertake 
general and specific courses. The market collapse led to the closure of this facility 
and a more market-sourced approach to training. However, the recent promotion of a 
quality programme suggests that conceptual, organisational and ‘attitudinal’ modules 
may be offered in the future.
In line with optimistic modernisation theory, the greater level of 
responsibility and higher level of training at the advanced factories would suggest 
that their workers will be appropriately compensated. However, a comparison of 
wages does not support this view. First, starting from the most general level, no work 
category in any of these regions received wages which matched inflation over the 
period72. In fact, even in the highest average wage area in Brazil (Sao Bernardo) the 
real industrial wage index for metal workers nearly halved between 1989 and 199373.
In terms of the two higher wage factories in this study, it is instructive to note 
that in 1993 over 60% of hourly workers at Consul and just over 50% of hourly 
workers at Brastemp-Sao Bernardo earned between 3-7 minimum salaries per 
month74. In comparison, it was estimated (in late 1992) that basic subsistence for an 
average family required around 6 minimum wages75. This confirms the low level of
Brastemp, Journal Brastemp, no. 11, 1992 for a discussion of their new industrial training programme. 
Courses include modules on perception, communication, KAIZEN, autocontrole and times and 
methods’.
71 Discussed in depth with Sr. Conte (former) HMR director of Enxuta (22/1/93).
72 For Brazil and Sao Paulo see Chapter 2, Tables 2.2 & 2.4. For Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do 
Sul see Appendix B, Table B7.
73 DIEESE, ‘O Plano FHC e os Metalurgicos do ABC’, 2/94, Table 12B. This is based on amounts 
awarded in Sao Paulo Employer Federation (FIESP) accords.
74 Consul S. A., ‘Estatistica de Recursos Humanos’, 12/93. Brastemp, ‘Recursos Humanos - Controle 
dos dados salarias e readjustes salarias’, 1993.
75 As reported in DIEESE, ‘Salarios e Distribui^ao de Renda no Brasil’, 10/92, reporting DIEESE
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wages being paid.
Table 4.5: Hourly Worker Wages - Refrigeration, average wages per 
(200 hour) month, in $ US, 1989 and 1993
FACTORY / WORKER GROUP 1989 1993 Average % change 
p.a.
BRASTEMP-SAO BERNARDO: 
a) Production Category:
$182 $341- unskilled 22%
- semiskilled $234 $503 29%
- skilled $507 $807 15%
b) Average Wages:
$308 $573 21%- salary scale based
- skill weighted $221 $430 24%
CONSUL:
a) Production Category:
- unskilled $147 $305 27%
- semiskilled $196 $401 26%
- skilled $301 $617 26%
b) Average Wages:
- salary scale based $215 $441 26%
* - skill weighted $169 $344/365 26%/29%
WAGE DIFFERENTIALS: 
(Brastemp over Consul) 
a) Production Category:
- unskilled 24% 12%
- semiskilled 19% 25%
- skilled 68% 31%
b) Average Wages:
- salary scale based 43% 30%
* - skill weighted 31% 25%/18%
Source: Calculated from wage statisltics archives at each company and from
responses to the company questionnaires.
Note: * Shows skill weighted salaries for Consul II and III.
statistics since tabulated and aggregated in DIEESE, Anudrio Dos Trabalhadores, 1993/4.
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Table 4.6: Hourly Worker Wages - Washing Products, average wages per 
(200 hour) month, in $US, 1990 and 1992
FACTORY/WORKER 
GROUP
1990 1992 Average % 
change p.a.
BRASTEMP-RIO CLARO:
a) Production Category:
- unskilled $165 $229 19%
- semiskilled $256 $355 19%
- skilled $389 $512 16%
b) Average Wages:
- salary scale based $270 $365 18%
- skill weighted $190 $253 17%
ENXUTA:
a) Production Category: 
- unskilled $178 $248 20%
- semiskilled $270 $375 19%
- skilled $383 $531 19%
b) Average Wages:
- salary scale based $277 $384 19%
- skill weighted $215 $292 18%
WAGE DIFFERENTIALS: 
(Enxuta over Brastemp)
a) Production Category:
- unskilled
- semiskilled
- skilled
b) Average Wages:
- salary scale based
- skill weighted
8.0%
5.0%
-1.5%
2.6%
13.0%
8.0%
6.0%
4.0%
5.0%
15.0%
Source: Calculated from wage statistics archives at each company and
from responses to the company questionnaires.
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 above present detailed, standardised wage statistics for 
hourly workers at the case study firms. Part A of the first two rows of each table 
shows the mean of the salary scale for the three skill categories. Part B of the first 
two rows of each table displays average wages - firstly on a salary scale basis and 
then weighted by the skill structures of each factory. The third row of each table
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shows wage differentials (in percent) between these factories, for those same wage 
aggregates. A number of very telling points emerge from these statistics.
First, comparing producers of the same product type (something firms say 
they do when setting wages) it can be seen that wages at the traditional firms are 
higher than at the more modem ones. Brastemp-Sao Bernardo wages are between 
18%-30% higher than at Consul and wages at,Enxuta are between 5%-15% above 
those at Brastemp-Rio Claro. These differences are not at all explained by cost of 
living differences in the case of Consul and only partially made up for in the case of 
Brastemp-Rio Claro76.
However, workers at the most modernised firms appear to have lost a little 
less real purchasing power between 1989-92 than workers at the more traditional 
firms77. Moreover, average monthly overtime at Brastemp-Rio Claro in 1992 (19 
hours) was much higher that that at the other three firms (Consul: 1 hour/Brastemp- 
Sao Bernardo: 8 hours)78. Yet by 1993 average monthly overtime at Brastemp-Rio 
Claro had fallen to about the same level (9 hours) as at Brastemp-Sao Bernardo (with 
Consul a bit behind at 6 hours).
Secondly, local labour market conditions and relative union power appear to 
be the strongest influences on wage levels. Sao Bernardo has a large concentration of 
industrial activity and the metal workers union is very combative there. Wage levels 
are thus lower outside of Sao Bernardo. However, while Consul and Brastemp-Rio 
Claro workers receive wages which are low relative to workers at comparable firms, 
their wage levels are equal to or above average metals wages in their local labour 
markets79.
76 See, Appendix B, Table B9.
77 See Appendix B, Table BIO. Metal workers real purchasing power loss between 1989-1992 in Rio 
Claro (15.4%) and Joinville (18.8%) was slightly less than that for the same category in Caxias (19%) 
and Sao Bernardo (19.4%)
78 Figures obtained from (untitled) Brastemp statistical material/graphs, Central Administration Centre 
- CAB (Brastemp), Sao Paulo, 1993; and Consul SA, ‘Estatistica de Recursos Humanos’, 1991-1993.
79 At Brastemp-Rio Claro in 1992, when pay is standardised for hours, over 80% of occupations 
(particularly skilled ones) were above the local labour market average - Brastemp-Rio Claro,
‘Pesquisa Salarial’, 9/92. Consul wages, while held back between 1989-1991, have regained a level
154
The opposite is the case at Brastemp-Sao Bernardo and Enxuta. Wages at 
Enxuta are below the Caxias metalworkers average80 and, while wages at Brastemp- 
Sao Bernardo are high in an absolute sense, many are paid at or below the local 
labour market average81. Yet, with high local labour market wage standards in Sao 
Bernardo, it still made great sense for Brastemp to relocate washing product 
production to a ‘greenfields’ site in the relatively unindustrialised town of Rio Claro.
What stands out in terms of Consul is that they pay broad job categories at 
both factory II and III the same amount for very different levels and types of 
responsibility. Any negative effects of this disparity may have been eased by the fact 
that in 1989 Consul promoted the removal of the existing union (the Mecanicos) 
from coverage of their workers and its replacement with a more compliant one 
(Sindithermef2. The price that the company has paid for a compliant union appears to 
have been automatic, full inflation wage adjustments (since 1992). This may explain 
the recent higher level of average wage growth at Consul.
Consul's concern with union agitation may also be a reason behind the fact 
that higher skilled (and more militant) Consul workers have gained more in 
percentage terms than their Sao Bernardo counterparts over the 1989-93 period (see 
Table 4.5, column 4). However, skilled Consul workers (very few of whom are in 
factory III) have gained about the same rate of salary growth (thus a great deal more 
extra income in money terms) as their unskilled and semiskilled colleagues in factory 
III - just the ones who are being expected to perform the new tasks of production. In 
stark contrast, unskilled and semiskilled workers at Brastemp-Sao Bernardo have 
gained considerably more salary growth (in percentage terms) than skilled Brastemp- 
Sao Bernardo workers over the 1989-93 period.
Nevertheless, a relatively good local labour market wage at Brastemp-Rio 
Claro does not necessarily mean that workers will be motivated to perform ‘beyond
close to other major local metals factories in 1992-93 - Consul, ‘Pesquisa Salarial’, various years.
80 Almost 30% lower than comparable sized local metals firms such as Eberle and Marco Polo - 
Caxias Metal workers unions records, 1993.
81 Nearly 2/3 of the occupations researched received less than the local labour market average - 
Brastemp, ‘Pesquisa Salarial, Horista Analise’, Departamento Planejemento Recursos Humanos, 9/92.
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contract’, after all their wages are still very low. In terms of Consul III, the lack of 
wage disparities between factories might be expected to lead to a less than 
enthusiastic workforce in that factory. In an apparent attempt to counteract these 
potentially negative characteristics and promote a highly motivated workforce, the 
two most modem factories have introduced other types of employment conditions for 
the workers who remain in the factory.
At Brastemp-Rio Claro, in addition to a clean, quiet factory space, workers 
only work around 180 hours per month compared to a more standard 200 hours. 
Most importantly, as discussed below, a unique career development scheme has been 
introduced. Consul III workers also experience a clean, quiet ambient and 
particularly well designed ergonomical workstations. However, more in keeping with 
the critical literature, rather than developing schemes such as those at Brastemp-Rio 
Claro it relies more intensively on the careful screening of employees wishing to 
work at factory III.
Brastemp-Rio Claro's ‘Development Plan for Hourly Workers’ was 
introduced very soon after the factory opened (1990). As shown in Figure 4.5, it 
replaced a traditional task and wage structure with five new worker categories. Each 
of the new four ‘operator’ and the ‘innovator’ category has three wage and 
responsibility stages. Operators 1-2 are basically unskilled, operator 3 covers largely 
semiskilled tasks and operator 4 relates most closely to the skilled group. The 
‘innovator’ is the most unique part of the scheme. While no ‘innovators’ were 
employed up to 1994, a person carrying out such a position will be expected to be 
able to carry out any task and takes on many of the organisational, production co­
ordination and labour relations tasks previously confined to white collar staff.
82 This is fully discussed in Chapter 7.
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Figure 4.5: The Brastemp-Rio Claro Career Development Scheme - structure, 
work expectations and evaluation
STRUCTURE 1. Four ‘operator’ and one ‘innovator’ occupational scheme 
replaces traditional skill based task and wage structure.
2. Each operator level has three stages with clear 
expectations of how long progression should take and 
what achievements are expected of workers.
3. All skilled, semiskilled and unskilled hourly employees 
covered by scheme.
4. Scheme and courses well advertised, explained and 
resourced.
WORK
EXPECTATION
1. Operator One -  all trainees and most new entrants; 
material movement, service assistant, cleaning and 
lubrification.
2. Operator Two -  basic production line, forklift/utility 
driver, stock assistants and SPC assistants.
3. Operator Three -  parts production, basic machine 
maintenance, auto mechanics, tool room assistants.
4. Operator Four -  electrical and mechanical maintenance 
and tool room workers.
5. The ‘innovator’ - any task ; overview and organisational 
role for SPC, QC, stock flow/efficiency and subcell co­
ordination. Input to worker evaluation and work 
assignment. Expected to be an important motivator of co­
workers.
EVALUATION 1. Workers have regular evaluations based on a points 
scheme which determines promotion, employment 
prospects or even dismissal.
2. Points are based on an equal weighting given to -  training 
courses completed, development of operational skills and 
attitude and behaviour.
3. Sub-cell leaders, innovators and supervisors provide input 
to work evaluation and training centre awards training 
credits.
4. Firm considering allowing teams to decide on whether an 
employee joins their group, whether poorly performing 
workers should be dismissed or re-assigned and to provide 
input on co-workers attitudinal assessment.
Source: Brastemp-Rio Claro, ‘Poupan9a Evolu9ao - Plano de Desenvolvimento de 
Horistas’, (Rio Claro 1990); and discussions with human resource staff at the factory,
1993-94.
The ‘Development Plan’ ties together cellular production, new process 
techniques and the training system into a unique motivational scheme. Workers are 
given a clear expectation that if they perform they can expect promotion, perhaps
eventually to the prestigious level of ‘innovator’. Workers are regularly evaluated on 
a point system which includes equal components for training courses, the 
development of operational skills and attitude and behaviour. While the training 
centre allocates training credits and team captains automatically get points, cells and 
subcells are responsible for the allocation of points for practical and attitudinal 
‘skills’. Cell leaders, ‘innovators’ and supervisors are responsible for this process.
The most radical part of this scheme relates to the evaluation system itself. 
For example, in 1993 the firm was considering making teams more responsible for 
allocating points for practical skills and behaviour - thus pitting one worker against 
another. Teams were also being considered as a vehicle for deciding whether a 
worker joined their group or whether they should leave it (or even the firm!). 
However, as a result of worker discontent over the amount of internal training and its 
equal weighting relative to workplace aptitude, in late 1993 there was talk that the 
prominence of training would be reduced and that the career scheme would be split 
so that the possibility of an unskilled worker rising to the top level would be 
lessened. Men had also complained that women (not trained in traditional skills but 
who were making extensive use of internal courses) were gaining ‘unfairly’83. These 
aspects of the scheme suggests that the Brastemp-Rio Claro experience may also fit 
sceptical interpretations of modernisation.
Minimum educational entry levels are another element that the two most 
modem firms are using most intensively at their factories. Educational levels are very 
low in Brazil84. This is seen as a constraint, even on the performance of relatively low 
skilled factory work, and all of the case study firms professed a desire for more 
highly educated workers. However, Brastemp-Rio Claro has always used formal 
academic (but not technical) schooling as part of their entrance criteria and is now 
stipulating that all future entrants must have completed secondary school85. Those 
existing workers who have not completed secondary school must take classes at the
83 In fact these changes were made in 1994 - Brastemp-Rio Claro, ‘Plano de Desenvolvimento de 
Horistas’, 1st Revision, 2/94.
84 For example, 37% of 20-24 year old Brazilians have less than or up to primary level education - 
DESEP, Indicators DESEP, (Sao Paulo, 1994), p87.
85 As noted by Brastemp-Rio Claro HRM staff (Villella and Adriana).
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site to obtain this level. If not successful, a worker's future with the firm is far from 
certain.
In 1993 Consul also decided that all new entrants will require primary and 
some secondary education to have any chance of working there86. At Consul III a 
more strict application of the secondary schooling requirement has been applied since 
the factory's inception87. The factory had originally expressed a policy that none of 
the factory III employees should come from factory II88. However, as this came to be 
unfeasible selectors used educational levels, attitude tests and past ‘work’ histories to 
vet out any factory II applicant who might not be ‘appropriate’ for factory III89.
In this regard, Table 4.7 below demonstrates that the two most modem 
factories do employ a more educated workforce. However, there may be reasons to 
question this policy. This is because all semiskilled and unskilled workers at both 
factories start at the bottom level90. Even some skilled employees do not start at the 
same level they held at their previous employer91. Secondly, it is not clear that many 
of the skills demanded at these two factories require secondary academic education92. 
Technical training after the primary level may be more than adequate. Formal 
academic education entry standards may thus act more like a screen than a cognitive 
requirement.
86 Interview with Sr. Shamada, HRM Department, Consul, 13/5/93.
87 As for footnote 86.
88 As for footnote 86.
89 Interview, Sr. Sergio, Consul factory III, 5/5/94.
90 This is a condition of the Brastemp-Rio Claro Development plan. This also operates for Consul 
factory III for entrants from outside Consul.
91 This was particularly pronounced at Brastemp-Rio Claro, as noted by HRM staff.
92 A point freely admitted to by HRM staff at both plants, particularly by Sra. Adriana, 
Physiologist/Selection Officer, Brastemp-Rio Claro. This also became clear in an interview with Sr. 
Villella, Director Human Resources, Brastemp-Rio Claro, 9/6/93.
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Table 4.7: Educational Profile - Brasmotor White Goods Factories, hourly 
workers, formal educational levels attained, 1993-4
LEVEL/FIRM Brastemp 
S. Bernardo
Brastemp 
Rio Claro
Consul 
- Total
Consul III
PRIMARY:
Incomplete 67.0% 33.0% 42.0%
Complete 14.0% 23.0% 21.0% 28.0%
SECONDARY: 
- some or all. 17.0% 42.0% 36.0% 69.0%
TERTIARY: 
- some or all. 2.0% 2.0% 1.0% 3.0%
Sources: Statistics provided by HRM departments in each factory.
It is also revealing to note that workers at the modem factories are 
considerably younger than at the older factories (25-26 years vs 32-37 years)93. This 
is only partially explained by the argument that younger people are more educated 
and thus more capable94. Young workers may be seen as more flexible and less likely 
to share a sceptical and combative approach to industrial relations that many older, 
more experienced workers may possess95. Thus at the modem firms a combination of 
youth and formal educational qualifications appear to be policies which the 
companies are using to more closely regulate their ILMs.
Despite also professing a desire to raise educational levels and entry 
standards96, Brastemp-Sao Bernardo and Enxuta had done little about this up to 1994. 
Driving supervision and high turnover policies are much more evident at these 
factories. However, at Enxuta, an additional form of labour use continues to be 
evident. As shown in Table 4.8 below, the firm employs a much larger proportion of
93 Internal HRM statistics, all firms.
94 For example, at the highly simplified production line for the Brastemp-Rio Claro beauty’ product, 
workers are very young, they are all on the lowest ‘operator’ level and they are the most highly 
educated - Tables displaying these statistics for all areas of Brastemp-Rio Claro provided by Sra. 
Adriana, Psychologist / Selection Officer, Brastemp-Rio Claro, 1994.
95 As noted by Sr. Villella, Director Human Resources, Brastemp-Rio Claro and HRM and factory 
staff at Consul III.
96 For example, a 1993 Brastemp-Sao Bernardo study (Brastemp, ‘Projecto Descoberta de Novos 
Talentos’, 1993) identified the levels of schooling of present workers. The report’s objectives (pi) 
were to provide information which would help in the generation of more favourable motivational 
outcomes for the company and educational/work development opportunities for workers.
160
women than Brastemp-Rio Claro (or than at the other factories). Task difficulty97 and 
local labour supply do not explain this98. It appears to be a deliberate policy.
These observations may be explained by the union’s adamant claim that 
women workers at Enxuta are paid around 13% less than men for work of the same 
type99. There are also claims that, when business was booming, women were used on 
night shifts (illegal) and that a lot of abuse occurred by lowly educated but very 
powerful supervisors100. Many of these supervisors were otherwise unemployed 
football players who had helped the Enxuta team win the national indoor football 
competition in the mid 1980s.
Table 4.8: Hourly Workers by Sex - Enxuta and Brastemp Rio Claro, in % 
terms, 1985-93
YEAR ENXUTA 
% Female % Male
BRASTEMP -  RIO CLARO 
% Female % Male
1985 52% 48% - -
1989 55% 45% - -
1990 56% 44% 14% 86%
1991 55% 45% 23% 77%
1992 49% 51% 30% 70%
1993 50% 50% 22% 78%
Source: Company records and interviews.
In conclusion on these issues, Enxuta and Brastemp-Sao Bernardo are still 
relying on fairly traditional job structures, employee relations and employment 
conditions. Wages are reasonable by sector standards but low in relation to local 
labour markets. Few serious concerns about turnover and training emerged until quite 
recently and workers are given little opportunity for more involvement. When 
vehicles for greater participation do emerge workers remain very sceptical. The
97 The Enxuta products are much smaller and lighter than the other firms and women are more evenly 
distributed amongst sections and skill levels at Enxuta that at the other firms.
98 Labour market statistics (O. Conte, ‘Caracteristicas da Mao-de-obra em Caxias do Sul’ Destaques do 
Mes, CIC-Caxias, 5/92) for the region show a slight rise in the proportion of women in the local 
labour market in the late 1980s but this is little different to other areas. Rising family income 
constraints in the 1980s may be the major reason for this.
99 As demonstrated by the women’s officer for the Caxias Metal Workers Union, 6/93.
100 Noted by the union and a former social services officer of Enxuta.
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situation at the other partially modernised factory, Consul II, is slightly different due 
to the firm’s different training history and factory II’s connection to more 
modernised parts of Consul operations.
In contrast, the two advanced firms appear to be offering their workers 
superior task structures, employee relations and employment conditions. However, 
beyond the wage issue, a number of other caveats still remain to an analysis which is 
still based on firm wide data. Skill opportunities and improvements to employee 
relations and employment conditions do not appear to be as open or generous as 
many might predict. These points serve to confirm the scepticism noted within recent 
Brazilian literature on modernisation.
First, the nature of the ‘voice’ workers have been given has clear limits. Its 
focus is the firm and quality and it appears to leave little real opportunity for dissent, 
particularly in relation to an independent role of unionism. Secondly, questions 
remain as to the level of worker input and over how much supervision has really 
changed. For example, supervision is less overt at Brastemp-Rio Claro and Consul 
III. However, the decentralisation of responsibility (and related sanctions) within 
teams and the career scheme at Brastemp-Rio Claro may put greater pressure on 
workers and lead to division and competition within their ranks.
Thirdly, both of these ‘flagship’ factories appear to be offering employment 
conditions which are improvements on the past but which more rigorously select out 
a particular type of employee. For example, skill groups are separated to a larger 
degree, training has a strong ideological flavour, selection criteria are highly geared 
to younger, higher educated but inexperienced workers and the education levels 
being asked for do not appear to match cognitive job requirements. This may be 
efficient for the firm. However, in terms of managerial intent it suggests both little 
altruism and an anti-union stance.
Fourthly, while the situation at Brastemp-Rio Claro looks more like an ILM 
than any of the other firms, the price of being part of this is strict conformity and 
great effort. While these characteristics are being traded for employee benefits, many
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of these benefits (i.e. stability/career progression) remain expectational. A final point, 
which further highlights the ambiguous nature of Brastemp-Rio Claro's 
modernisation model, is that while women are paid the same wage as men for the 
same work they are strictly concentrated in the unskilled operator category and in 
areas of operations which offer fewer prospects of progression101. Despite its 
enlightened appearance relative to Enxuta, the most sought after and promising 
avenue of career progression for women at Brastemp-Rio Claro is if they win the 
internal beauty contest102. The prize is a white-collar job as a marketing 
representative for Brastemp.
4.4 COMPANY LEVEL MODERNISATION INDICATORS
Even if firm level outcomes are not based on attitudes such as allegiance, 
comprehensive modernisation may still lead to better levels of quality, productivity 
and efficiency, higher skill levels and reduced turnover and absenteeism. This section 
deals with each of these themes in turn. These indicators do highlight some 
ambiguous aspects of the modernisation process. However, overall, the analysis 
confirms this chapter’s growing view that the sample can be divided on a 
comprehensive/partial basis.
4.4.1 Productivity, Efficiency and Quality
The two most modernised firms have been very successful. Indicators of 
productivity and efficiency support the efforts they have made. For example, Consul 
(both factories) gained ISO certification in early 1994. However, while Consul II has 
gained from the advances made within Consul generally, by the early 1990s it was a 
less efficient factory than its more Fordist competitor - Brastemp-Sao Bernardo.
As shown in Table 4.9 below, during the 1980s Consul usually produced at a 
higher level of productivity than Brastemp-Sao Bernardo. However, by 1993
101 An issue clear from observation.
102 Interviews bore this out. See for example, Brastemp, Bras-noticias. no. 80, 9/93, entitled "II
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Brastemp-Sao Bernardo produced at a level 35% higher than their Joinville 
counterpart. Despite Consul's technological superiority, crowding and product 
heterogeneity meant that over the 1985-93 period Brastemp-Sao Bernardo 
productivity grew by 116% compared to 38% at Consul. The other factor which may 
explain this result is that high unemployment and industrial turmoil in Sao Bernardo 
made workers work harder. The greater reliance on overt supervision at that site may 
have also helped to make this possible.
Table 4.9: Productivity in Refrigeration Production - Products per Hourly 
Worker per day, Brastemp-Sao Bernardo and Consul, 1985-93
YEAR BRASTEMP - 
FACTORIES I+II
CONSUL 
FACTORIES I+II
CONSUL - 
FACTORY III
1985 0.769 0.892 -
1986 0.978 0.990 -
1987 0.923 0.968 -
1988 0.982 0.956 -
1989 0.582 0.997 -
1990 1.059 1.115 -
1991 1.595 1.296 -
1992 1.448 1.106 -
1993 1.663 1.232 2.601
Source: Calculations based on data from company records and interviews.
In comparison, by 1993 Consul III was already producing refrigeration 
products at a level 56% higher than Brastemp-Sao Bernardo and over double that of 
Consul II. The differences between these three factories suggest that technologies, 
techniques and layout combine to improve productivity. One of these features on its 
own is not enough.
The actual productivity result at Consul III is probably greater than that noted 
in Table 4.9 as the factory produces many of Consul II's internal refrigeration ‘shells’ 
and some of their plastic inputs. Also, as many Consul III workers have come from
Concurso Garota Brastemp" (the second Brastemp beauty contest).
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Consul II, for these workers productivity has risen by a massive 192% between 1985- 
93. Furthermore, in terms of the expansion of capacity at factory III, management 
expected that by 1997 a 1000 strong workforce will be producing 4.5 products per 
day per worker103.
Other indicators strengthen this picture of modernisation outcomes at the 
refrigeration producers. For example, accident rates (per 100 days) have fallen in all 
factories. However, Brastemp-Sao Bernardo rates are now higher than those at 
Consul (18.35 vs 12.44)104. The slower rate of modernisation at Brastemp-Sao 
Bernardo is also confirmed by the fact that scrap and stock levels there remain high 
whereas at Consul scrap is only 1.7% of raw materials and stocks of inputs have 
fallen to 2 days in reserve105. Consul III, on the other hand, has achieved accident 
rates and scrap and stock levels much better than at Consul II. Stock of inputs 
represent about a days production needs and scrap levels sit at around 1.5% of raw 
material106.
At the traditional washing product factory (Enxuta) efficiency has also 
improved over the period. Stock levels have declined from 20 to 4 days, moulds are 
changed faster, plastics produced more quickly and product movement has been sped 
up107. However, despite the recent promotion of new quality systems, productivity 
indicators remain far inferior to Brastemp-Rio Claro. Even after standardising work 
hours and adding all of Enxuta's (simpler and smaller) products to the equation, 
Brastemp-Rio Claro still has a productivity rate over two times Enxuta's (Table 
4.10).
103 Consul, Informativo, Edifao Especial - Fabrica III, no. 80, venlo 1993, p4 and 11.
104 Consul, ‘Estatisticas de Recursos Humanos’, monthly, 1989-93. Brastemp, ‘Indicators de Recursos 
Humanos’, 1991-93 and from graphical material supplied by the Brastemp Central Administration 
Centre (CAB), (Sao Paulo, 1993).
105 Interviews with Srs. Marcio and Medeiros, Consul Engineering, and factory managers, 1993-94.
106 According to Sr. Sergio, Consul factory III, 5/5/94.
107 Interview with Sr. Fonseca, Production Manager, Enxuta, 14/6/94.
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Table 4.10: Washing Product Productivity, Products per Hourly Worker per 
day, 1992
INDICATOR BRASTEMP- 
RIO CLARO
ENXUTA
PRODUCTS/WORKER/DAY: 3.1 1.5
Source: Company interviews and derived company statistics.
4.4.2 Skills and Occupational Structures
This study's estimates of skill levels in the factories (Tables 4.11-4.13 below) 
suggests conflicting outcomes in relation to the skills-modemisation debate. For 
example, the two older factories (Enxuta and Brastemp-Sao Bernardo) have higher 
formal (job classification based) skill levels than their more modem competitors, 
Brastemp-Rio Claro and Consul II (Tables 4.11 & 4.13). On the other hand, the most 
technologically advanced factory (Consul III) has the largest proportion of 
semiskilled workers and the lowest unskilled proportion of all the factories (Table 
4.12).
However, these observations must be strongly qualified. First, Brastemp’s 
decision to undertake most of their group wide tooling functions in Sao Bernardo 
explains much of why Brastemp-Rio Claro has a low skill proportion and only 
maintenance workers within its high skilled group. It also helps to explain Brastemp- 
Sao Bernardo's high and rising skill proportion. Secondly, while Consul Ill's high 
skill group would be higher if tooling was done there, the reason for the factory's 
high semiskilled and indirect proportion is because of their (higher skilled) net input 
trade with factory II. In fact, management recognises that when capacity utilisation 
rises above its present level (20%) the proportion of repetitive, direct production jobs 
will rise dramatically108.
Nevertheless, other features of these estimates stand out. These appear to 
confirm the view that modernisation is putting new tasks and responsibilities in the 
hands of unskilled and semiskilled workers. For example, Consul overall has reduced
108 Consul, Informativo - Fdbrica III, (1993), plO-11.
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its indirect worker (and also the semiskilled) category between 1989-93 (Table 4.11). 
Much of this may be due to the fact that direct production workers are carrying out 
the checks previously done by quality control workers. The integration of other 
semiskilled tasks into direct, unskilled jobs may also be behind this. Accordingly, the 
unskilled proportion and the direct production category have risen.
In terms of hierarchies, Consul and Brastemp-Sao Bernardo have very similar 
white-collar proportions (Table 4.11). However, Consul uses a slightly leaner 
administrative structure. They also make greater relative use of engineers (in spite of 
Brastemp's ADC). Comparing the three factories, the effects of Consul's decision to 
reduce supervision and promote greater worker responsibility appears evident 
(Tables 4.11 & 4.12). Supervision proportions are very low in Consul III and they 
have fallen in Consul II. These trends may also suggest that, while some skilled 
workers may have lost some of their maintenance tasks to the semiskilled, they are 
more responsible for organisational tasks than in the past. In stark contrast, 
supervision levels are high and have risen at Brastemp-Sao Bernardo.
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Table 4.11: Occupational Distributions - Refrigeration, Brastemp-Sao Bernardo
(BT) and Consul total (CN), 1989 and 1993
WORKER CATEGORY . 1989 1993
BT CN BT CN
WHITE COLLAR TOTAL: 1474 1395 921 868
- % engineers / technicians 25% 21% 23% 30%
- % management / admin. 68% 67% 65% 60%
- % factory supervisors 7% 12% 12% 10%
HOURLY WORKER TOTAL: 5021 5762 1828 4267
1) Direct Production % * 72% 65% 71% 78%
2) Indirect Production % * 14% 21% 13% 11%
3) Maintenance/tooling % 9% 8% 12% 9%
3) Other Hourly % 5% 6% 4% 2%
SKILL ESTIMATES:
1) Skilled % 10% 9% 13% 9%
2) Semiskilled % 13% 16% 12% 11%
3) Unskilled % 77% 75% 75% 80%
SUPERVISORS AS A % OF TOTAL 2.2% 3.1% 6.3% 2.1%
FACTORY WORKFORCE -
Sources: Company records, verified in interviews with human resource staff, factory 
supervisors and from factory observation.
Notes: * Direct production includes mainly unskilled occupations. Indirect 
production includes mainly unskilled occupations.
Table 4.12: Occupational Distribution - Consul Factory III, 1993
WORKER CATEGORY CONSUL FACTORY III
HOURLY WORKER TOTAL: 363
1) Direct Production % * 66%
2) Indirect Production % * 23%
3) Maintenance and/or tool room % 9%
4) Other hourly worker % 2%
SKILL ESTIMATE:
1) Skilled % 10%
2) Semiskilled % 30%
3) Unskilled % 60%
SUPERVISORS AS A % OF TOTAL FACTORY 
WORKFORCE:
1.4%
Sources/Notes: As for Table 4.11
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Turning to the washing product producers, Enxuta's more traditional 
production process and Brastemp-Rio Claro's links with Brastemp-Sao Bernardo are 
evident from their skill structures (Table 4.13). First, Enxuta has a lower unskilled 
and higher semiskilled and skilled proportions than Brastemp-Rio Claro. Due to the 
Brasmotor link, Brastemp-Rio Claro employs almost solely maintenance workers 
whereas Enxuta has both tooling and maintenance operations.
Another reason for Brastemp-Rio Claro's lower skill proportions is that some 
maintenance functions may be carried out by semiskilled machine operators. 
Outsourcing is also greater at this factory and some testing/quality functions may 
now be carried out by the semi/unskilled. However, despite these differences 
between the two companies, the higher skill categories have declined and the 
unskilled proportion has risen at both factories over the period.
In terms of hierarchies, the large proportion of administrators (and low 
proportion of engineers) employed at Enxuta stand out. Like Consul, Brastemp-Rio 
Claro's operations are strongly linked to the prominent role played by engineers. 
Finally, as with the refrigeration comparison, Brastemp-Rio Claro employs few and 
fewer supervisors relative to the more traditional Enxuta whose supervisor proportion 
is rising. This appears to confirm the fact that higher skilled workers at Brastemp-Rio 
Claro may have taken on some of these co-ordinating tasks and that the company's 
training focus and cellular system are effective.
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Table 4.13: Occupational Distributions - Washing Products, Brastemp-Rio
Claro (RCL) and Enxuta (EN), 1990 and 1992
WORKER CATEGORY 1990
RCL EN
1992 
RCL EN
WHITE COLLAR TOTAL: 108 568 141 241
- % engineers / technicians
- % management / admin.
- % factory supervisors
57%
37%
6%
17%
75%
8%
47%
48%
5%
13%
79%
8%
HOURLY WORKER TOTAL: 332 1597 414 500
1) Production Workers:
- semiskilled %
- unskilled %
82%
3%
79%
85%
11%
74%
91%
3%
88%
87%
10%
77%
2) Skilled Maintenance / tool room % 10% 13% 7% 11%
3) Other Hourly % 8% 2% 2% 2%
SUPERVISORS AS A % OF TOTAL 
FACTORY WORKFORCE -
1.8% 2.7% 1.7% 3.8%
Sources/Notes: As for Tables 4.11 and 4.12.
In summary, based on this firm level analysis, comprehensive modernisation 
does appear to have given all three skill groups new tasks and responsibilities. In 
addition, both factories have reduced supervision levels and occupational hierarchies 
to a much greater extent than the other firms. However, administrative decisions 
appear to explain much of the firm level differences in overall skill levels. Moreover, 
as with workers’ attitudes to new responsibilities, the degree to which workers are 
more skilled and whether they have been compensated for these new skills must 
await the more detailed sample analysis in Chapter 5.
4.4.3. Labour Turnover and Absenteeism
Modernisation policies are expected to include a desire by management to 
reduce labour turnover109. This is because of the investments the firm has made in 
training and the assumption that if the employer demonstrates more commitment to
109 Turnover is defined as follows. A 50% annual turnover rate means that the average post has a new 
externally contracted worker once every 2 years. Alternatively, 50% of posts were replaced by 
workers from the external labour market during that year.
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workers they will be more motivated to go ‘beyond contract’. Turnover, when 
instigated by workers, is thus a measure of a worker's attachment to the firm and/or 
of a worker’s impression of one employer relative to another. This too is expected to 
be lower the more modernised a firm.
Turnover rates continue to be very high in Brazil110. Yet the case studies 
support the view that the modernisation policies of these firms have brought about 
and been based on reduced turnover (Table 4.14 below). All firms’ turnover rates 
declined over the period111. However, Consul III has obtained the lowest rate and the 
rate at Brastemp-Rio Claro is also low and well below its more traditional competitor 
(Enxuta). A conscious policy to retain workers appears to have been made by firms 
as they modernise.
Table 4.14: Labour Turnover - all case study factories, average for all hourly 
workers, annual % rates, 1989/90 and 1992/93
FACTORY / YEAR 1989 /1990 1992 /1993
BRASTEMP-SAO BERNARDO 20.4% / / 8.4%
CONSUL
- total 23.0%/ / 5.7%
- factory III / / 1.5%
BRASTEMP-RIO CLARO /13.6% 2.4%/12.5%
ENXUTA / 68.0% 61.2%/51.6%
Sources: Calculated from monthly and yearly employment data from each firm 
and/or provided by company staff in response to the questionnaire.
A close look at related statistics for the firms shows other important trends. 
For example, despite a lower level of modernisation, by 1993 Brastemp-Sao 
Bernardo had less absenteeism (1.9% of total hours vs. 2.25%) than Consul II112. In
110 See Chapter 2, Table 2.6 and Appendix B, Table B8.
111 This has even led to lower turnover rates at Brastemp-Sao Bernardo than the average for their local 
labour market e.g. rates in the Sao Bernardo metals labour market were over 20% in 1992 - DIEESE, 
A Categoria em Numeros, 9/92, Table 10, pl9. A comparison o f Table 4.14 with Appendix B, Table 
B8 also shows that in all firms, except Enxuta, labour turnover at the case study firms is now 
appreciably lower than the manufacturing sector averages for their respective states.
112 Consul, ‘Estatistics Recursos Humanos’, monthly, 1991-94. Brastemp, ‘Indicatores de Recursos 
Humanos’, 1991-94, CAB, Sao Paulo.
1989 this figure was higher at Brastemp-Sao Bernardo. The rise in absenteeism at 
Consul might indicate worker dissatisfaction with something there, since 1989. On 
the other hand, lower absenteeism at Brastemp-Sao Bernardo may be a risk averse 
worker response to a particularly depressed local labour market, one in which the 
employer in question closed parts of its operations (transferring them to Rio Claro) in 
1989/90.
In summary, the most modem firms are generally achieving what they now 
seem to prefer, a more stable and apparently motivated workforce. For example, the 
turnover result at Consul III is most clearly like what optimistic modernisation 
hypotheses would suggest. Absenteeism (1.32%) is below both other refrigeration 
factories and worker instigated turnover is, up to now, zero113. However, this has only 
come about after the company no longer had to deal with a militant union and after 
many of that union’s supporters had been ‘purged’ from Consul. Brastemp-Rio Claro 
also has a conscious policy to minimise company and worker instigated turnover114. 
Yet, dissatisfaction appears to be emerging from somewhere as their turnover rate 
rose to a level higher than either Consul or Brastemp-Sao Bernardo in 1993 (12.5%). 
Factors responsible may include aspects of the career and evaluation scheme but also 
the large drop in available overtime in 1993115.
4.5 CONCLUSION - A NEW BRAZILIAN MODEL FOR PRODUCTION?
As summarised in Tables 4.15-4.16, this chapter’s detailed analysis of 
modernisation in these firms has confirmed many aspects of an optimistic view of 
modernisation. First, as in other areas of Brazilian industry, there are clear signs that 
companies are following a path being pursued in other countries. New management 
strategies, technologies, techniques and layouts are being combined to great effect for 
quality and productivity. Furthermore, those factories which take a comprehensive 
approach (Brastemp-Rio Claro and Consul III) are performing much better than 
partial modernises (Brastemp-Sao Bernardo, Consul II and Enxuta).
113 Interview, Sr. Sergio, Factory III, 5/5/94.
114 A point stressed by Brastemp-Rio Claro HRM staff.
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Table 4.15: Factory Typologies and Outcomes - Summary Table: Refrigeration,
1994
Indicator / Factory Brastemp- 
S. Bernardo
Consul -  II C onsul-III
1) Management style and 
structures
Relatively 
hierarchical and 
closed
Some reduction 
in hierarchies; 
more
participative
Flat structures, 
open relations; 
quite
participative
2) Technology, 
techniques and layout
Older and not 
integrated
mixed / not 
integrated
New and 
integrated
3) Workplace and 
human resources policies
Mainly a wage 
based relation / 
recent changes
Some new 
tasks/training
New tasks, 
training and 
workplace 
ambient
4) Supervision old / overt newer style New and open
OUTCOMES:
1) Productivity = 
products p. worker p. 
day
1.7 1.2 2.6
2) Turnover = % 8.4% 6.0% 1.5%
per annum
3) Wages = US$ per 
month; skill weighted
SUS 430 $US 344 $US 365
4) Supervision = % of 
factory employment
6.3% 2.1% 1.4%
5) Skill level:
- % skilled
- % semiskilled
- % unskilled
13%
12%
75%
9%
11%
80%
10%
30%
60%
115 As noted in subsection 4.3.3
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Table 4.16: Factory Typologies and Outcomes - Summary Table: Washing
Products, 1993
Indicator / Factory Brastemp-Rio Claro Enxuta
1) Management style and Open and participative Closed, hierarchical
structures paternal / recent changes
2) Technology, techniques New, automated and Older/less automated /
and layout integrated not integrated
3) Workplace and human New tasks, benefits and Few concerns for work
resource policies opportunities pressure or conditions
4) Supervision Open /less overt Old style/ overt
OUTCOMES*:
1) Productivity 3.1 1.5
2) Turnover 2.4% (12.5% 1993) 61.2%
3) Wages $US 253 $US 292
4) Supervision 1.7% 3.8%
5) Skill Levels:
- % skilled 7 11
- % semiskilled 3 10
- % unskilled 90 79
* Outcome measures as shown in Table 4.15.
Secondly, by offering conditions and relational opportunities such as more 
participation, less supervision, more agreeable workspaces and the prospect of career 
progression/employment stability, workers are labouring more efficiently at these 
firms. They are also less prepared to leave the firm and are delivering lower absentee 
levels, greater productivity, less scrap and fault levels and are often involved in 
production improvements.
Relatedly, training and cell structures are helping to provide the link between 
the new physical environment of production and the behaviour needed to make it 
work as planned. While Brastemp-Rio Claro relies more on techniques and Consul 
more on process technologies in their modernisation approach, both are training 
workers very intensively. Tying career development to these attitudes within a 
decentralised cell model has been used most intensively at Brastemp-Rio Claro
whereas Consul relies on the close vetting of new employees to achieve their result.
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Both firms, however, have integrated many new tasks into the production line and 
the work of the semiskilled and unskilled.
While this situation still needs to be explored more deeply (especially on a 
subjective basis), this appears to signal a new and implicit effort bargain between 
modernised firms and their workers. While components of this bargain differ 
between the two factories, it appears that workers are being ‘offered’ new benefits as 
the firm becomes more reliant on their skills and motivation. However, there are a 
number of caveats to this picture.
First, in terms of an overall model, it appears as if technology and techniques 
are not enough in themselves. Brastemp-Sao Bernardo's more consistent Fordist 
model and Consul II’s poor layout mean that the more traditional employer 
(Brastemp-Sao Bernardo) is appreciably more productive. Secondly, many of these 
employee relations and employment condition benefits are not as generous, open or 
democratic as they might seem or as has been predicted by optimistic theory. 
Modernising firms appear to have reacted to their increased reliance on workers with 
new policies of ‘persuasion’ and control.
For example, training and participatory initiatives are strongly tied to a firm 
based perspective. On the other hand, as with tighter selection criteria, teams and 
career schemes appear to offer better opportunities to evaluate and control workers. 
The segregation of women to particular occupations and the vast growth in young 
workers in these factories may assist these ‘policies’ and act to hold down potential 
opposition.
In respect to this last issue, where wage growth has been relatively good 
(Consul) this policy seems to be more related to the continuation of an old objective 
of keeping unions out of the workplace (and quelling potential skilled worker 
militancy) than because of new skills and responsibilities. Locating in a low wage, 
low unionism, ‘greenfields site is the way this has been done at the other 
comprehensively modernised factory (Brastemp-Rio Claro).
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In terms of skills, the most modem firms have removed many tasks from their 
operations. New tasks appear to have been added to workers’ jobs but here too 
management does not appear to have recognised this in pay structures. One firm 
(Brastemp-Rio Claro) has made some allowance for these changes in their 
occupational structure. However, even within this scheme new skills are still not well 
remunerated or functionally recognised to any appreciable degree as yet. Due to these 
issues and Brasmotor's and Consul's decision to remove higher skilled workers from 
the actual factory space, the debate about skills and modernisation remains 
inconclusive.
In terms of external factors, despite the advances made by the most modem 
firms, any expectation of a greater export market presence appears to be constrained 
by the role of TNCs in this sector in Brazil. While Whirlpool has had an arguably 
positive effect on the process and management policies of the three Brasmotor firms, 
the product and market focus ‘imposed’ on them may act to limit skill and 
employment advances in this industry in Brazil.
Consequently, while two of the firms are comprehensively modernised, 
managerial intent must be questioned. They have chosen an ‘easy’ modernisation 
path. Past industrial traditions and other contextual factors have minimised how far 
Brazilian employers have to go in respect to the balance, explicitness and who is 
included within the new effort bargain. Similarly, labour use and allocation 
developments question the emergence of an enlightened firm keen on introducing 
either greater democracy or a long term ‘skilling’ approach. More broadly, these 
points confirm the sceptical literature’s suggestion that local factors, industrial 
relations traditions and the role of foreign capital are important, real and active forces 
within the ‘politics of modernisation’.
Finally, while a new implicit bargain may have emerged, the above caveats 
and the bargain’s (still) expectational features may mean that workers are less than 
wholly attached to their work and/or the modernised firm. On the other hand, even 
the limited changes to tasks, employee relations and employment conditions which 
have been introduced have produced what appears to be a large change in work
176
behaviour, if not attitudes. This highlights the large degree of flexibility Brazilian 
workers already ‘possess’ and suggests that work conditions in the past have been 
quite poor. However, it is impossible to make sufficiently definitive conclusions on 
these issues without detailed primary data about work and attitudes. Accordingly, the 
next chapter takes a closer look at these debates about work and modernisation using 
the responses of a sample of workers from the (comprehensive and partially 
modernised) factories analysed in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 5:
THE CHANGING NATURE OF WORK
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter suggested that, while mediated by contextual factors, 
comprehensive modernisers have instigated many changes and achieved results which 
support the optimistic hypothesis. Yet it was also clear that these firms were not keen to 
involve unions in the process. Moreover, support for the optimistic hypothesis within 
the workplace was not conclusive as it was not based on primary data about workers’ 
experiences and attitudes.
Accordingly, this chapter uses worker responses to look at the first main 
attitudinal link implicit to the optimistic modernisation hypothesis1. That is, what type 
of work attitudes connect modernisation policies and their final outcomes for the firm? 
The chapter thus addresses two questions - how has work changed for the sample and 
how have these changes affected attitudes to work?
On the basis of this chapter’s review of evidence on the specific work themes 
noted in Chapter 2, this chapter argues as follows. On the one hand, some of the 
evidence about changes to work appears to support optimistic theory and that a new 
implicit bargain has been established with workers at the comprehensively modernised 
factories, particularly the semiskilled. This conclusion is amply illustrated by the view 
of a highly motivated semiskilled operator of a very advanced, Italian metal shaping 
system at Brastemp-Rio Claro. He consistently replied, when asked about work there, 
‘It’s great like this, isn’t it!2
1 The original interview schedule is included as Appendix D. Due to sample size and the depth o f  
analysis in other parts of this research, no multivariate analysis was carried out. However, Chi-squared 
tests were carried out on many of the cross tabulations used in this chapter. The significance level was 
taken as 5% and results which meet this criterion are reported within the discussion or in tables within 
the text.
2 Interview with Brastemp-Rio Claro worker, RCL 12, 9/93.
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On the other hand, each of the skill groups have particular preferences, 
problems and experiences. On a firm basis, the example of the partially modernised 
Consul II adds to this uncertainty about the modernisation proposition. The firm is less 
productive than the comprehensive modernisers and the older Brastemp-Sao Bernardo 
and it uses many older style work systems. However, it generates many attitudinal 
results much better than the comprehensive modernisers, particularly its ultra-modem 
sister factory, Consul III. The comments of a semiskilled worker from Consul II 
highlights the attitudes of many of their number -  ‘no I don’t want to work in Consul 
III. They don’t have my occupation there, work is more intense... and the pay is no 
better!’3 Finally, just as striking is the fact that many workers at the two most 
modernised firms question the nature of their new task and development opportunities 
and how they are evaluated, often to a much greater degree than is the case at the 
partially modernised plants.
These observations serve to question managerial intent. Even comprehensive 
forms of modernisation seem ‘conservative’. Employers have responded to the risk that 
they may be more dependent on workers’ skills and motivation with ‘benefits’ which 
are either minimal or which are built within new structures of surveillance. These 
results also suggest that any new bargain is neither fixed nor certain. While needing 
corroboration with evidence about attitudes to the employer (Chapter 6), responses 
suggest that allegiance has not replaced control as the attitudinal ‘glue’ behind the 
much more productive experiences of the comprehensive modernisers.
This chapter has three substantive sections. Section 5.2 sets the scene for the 
detailed analysis of workers' responses through a presentation of the sample’s overall 
preferences and problems in work and with a restatement of the specific themes about 
work discussed in Chapter 2. Section 5.3 considers workers’ responses to questions 
about specific changes to their tasks, employee relations and conditions of 
employment. Section 5.4 considers how they feel about these changes. Section 5.5 
summarises and concludes the chapter.
3 Interview with Consul II worker, CII10, 11/93.
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5.2 ANALYSING THE EXPERIENCE OF WORK
5.2.1 Preferences about Work — An Overview of the Sample
As desired, the sample is quite representative. All workers had at least 2 years 
experience at the firm, all sections of factory operations are represented and sex, age 
and overall unionisation distributions closely fit the situation at each firm4. Skill levels 
are slightly higher than reality. However, this was necessary so as to get a statistically 
significant number of skilled workers within the analysis5.
Based on this sample, responses to general questions about work preferences 
and problems provide a useful overview of the sample. These results provide clues as 
to the types of work characteristics which could be ‘exchanged’ for enhanced firm 
performance within any new bargain. These general responses are also important to 
keep in mind because, as noted in Chapter 4, modernisation included different issues 
and mechanisms at each of the two comprehensive sites.
First, in terms of preferences, all workers were requested to rank a list of eight 
work features6. These characteristics were salary, stability, training, ambience, 
mobility, career opportunity, involvement and an ‘other’ category to capture any other 
issue they felt might be missed by this list. Another question asked was if and to what 
degree any of these issues were a problem in their current job. As can be seen from 
Table 5.1 below, for the sample overall the three most important characteristics of 
work were salary, stability and career opportunity. On the other hand, the three most 
mentioned problems at work were the system of evaluation, remuneration and career
4 The structure o f the sample is shown in Appendix D, Table D 1. This last issue is shown in Chapter 
7, Table 7.1.
5 For example, the skill structure o f each firm's sample was fairly even - i.e. 22%-28% skilled, 24-36% 
semiskilled and 36%-52% unskilled. However, the overall skill structure of the sample (25% skilled, 
29% semi-skilled and 46% unskilled) is considerably higher than that reported for the population in 
Chapter 4 (Tables 4.10-4.12). While this may temper the degree to which some skill sensitive issues can 
be compared with Chapter 4 ’s general observations, it allows the skill division to also be used in this 
analysis. On the other hand, unionisation by firm is so skewed that this disaggregation cannot be used on 
its own.
6 Composite indicators were constructed by aggregating the number o f first and second preferences 
each indicator received, by group.
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opportunity
Table 5.1: Work Preferences and Problems, sample and firm rankings
FIRM /S N Work Preferences Problems at Work
SAMPLE TOTAL: 93 Salary
Stability
Career
Evaluation
Salary
Career
COMPREHENSIVE
MODERNISERS: 31
Brastemp-Rio Claro Salary/Stability
Career
Ambient
Evaluation
Career
Salary
Consul III Salary
Stability
T raining/involvement
Salary
Evaluation
PARTIAL
MODERNISERS: 62
Enxuta Salary
Career
Ambient
Salary
Evaluation/ Career 
Training
Brastemp 
Sao Bernardo
Stability
Salary
Involvement
Salary
Career
Stability /Evaluation
Consul II
Salary/Stability
Training/Career
Involvement
Evaluation
Stability
Source: Worker interviews.
Despite the separation of these questions and the non-disclosure of the 
following question, these results suggest that there will be a positive correlation 
between what a worker sees as important and what is a problem. However, as noted 
in many studies, these responses also highlight the importance of reward and 
employment stability to workers. In this regard, while Brazilian wages continue to be 
low, Chapter 4 noted that comprehensive modernisers often ‘suggest’ that workers 
can expect greater employment stability.
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Moreover, the system of evaluation stands out as a particularly important 
response across all firms. This suggests that many workers are concerned about 
fairness within their firms’ reward systems. As shown in Chapter 4, within the 
comprehensively modernised firm in particular, this reward system is based on more 
that just wages. It thus appears that, if well managed and applied, non-wage issues 
could be effectively traded off by firms wishing to improve quality, efficiency and 
productivity.
Within these general responses there is some evidence to suggest that this is 
happening. For example, differences in feelings of stability of employment show 
support for the proposition that modernisation policies include or lead to greater 
stability (Table 5.1). Most respondents from the two more traditional firms said 
stability of employment was a problem compared to less than half of those from the 
other firms (Pr = 0.003).
Secondly, one of the comprehensively modernised firms (Brastemp-Rio 
Claro) may have more successfully traded off wages for other aspects of their bargain 
(Table 5.1). For example, pay registers as the greatest problem at Brastemp-Sao 
Bernardo and Enxuta whereas workers at Brastemp-Rio Claro and Consul II are 
happier with remuneration. In terms of Brastemp-Rio Claro, this conflicts with actual 
salary data while at Consul III it suggests that the firm needs to adjust some aspect of 
its bargain if they wish worker satisfaction to improve. These results also suggest that 
regional factors are central to wage determination in Brazil.
There are, however, other responses which question the nature and success of 
the effort bargain at the comprehensively modernised firms. For example, while 
many fewer responses were made to the ‘problem’ question, the system of evaluation 
is of greater relative concern to workers at the most modem firms (Table 5.1, final 
column). This is surprising and conflicts with a vision that the most modem firms 
have both more objective and better systems of reward.
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Moreover, that involvement is of little importance to Enxuta and Brastemp- 
Rio Claro workers (Pr = 0.042), relative to the other firms, may suggest that their 
level of involvement has not changed. Yet, if Brastemp-Rio Claro workers are 
comparing their present and past employer this seems surprising. However, it is not 
possible to determine whether they like or dislike the form of involvement at their 
factory based on these general questions.
On a skill basis (Table 5.2 below), it appears that all groups value salary and 
stability very highly and that evaluative issues are a concern. However, the ambience 
of the workplace is relatively more important to the skilled than to the other two 
groups (Pr = 0.010). On the other hand, the unskilled and semiskilled are more alike, 
placing much higher importance on career opportunity than their more skilled 
counterparts (Pr = 0.037). Thus, this disaggregation of the data may also be important 
to consider.
Table 5.2: Work Preferences and Problems, by skill group
Skill Groups N Work Preference Problem at Work
Skilled 23 Stability Evaluation
Ambient Salary
Salary Ambient
Semiskilled 27 Salary Evaluation
Stability Salary
Career Career
Unskilled 43 Salary/Career Salary
Stability Evaluation
Career
Source: Worker interviews.
In summary, general responses of the sample point to the possibility of a new 
implicit bargain at the most modernised firms. However, the evaluation of certain 
work issues appears to be concerning workers at those same locations. The data also 
suggests that skill specific responses may add to the analysis of this bargain. The 
next subsection notes the specific themes which the rest of this chapter uses for a 
more detailed analyses of the work experiences of these workers.
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5.2.2 Specific Themes for an Analysis of Changes to Work and Work Attitudes
The themes which are hypothesised to be ‘better’ within the modernised firm, 
and which must be analysed, are -  skills/tasks, employee relations, employment 
conditions and the attitudes associated with these changes. In this regard, the literature 
noted a number of important debates on each of these areas. First, in terms of tasks, 
more sceptical writers suggest that even if work is more varied it may become more 
difficult, demanding, faster and intense. Questions have also been raised about who 
takes on new tasks and whether such skills are adequately compensated. Accordingly, 
this chapter asks the sample -  what new tasks, who takes them on, are they recognised 
as skills and are labourers working smarter, rather than harder, and with more interest 
and satisfaction?
Secondly, in terms of employee relations, the literature questions how much 
greater say workers have, what they have say over and whether they are more 
responsible and autonomous. The chapter seeks to explore work specific aspects of 
these themes by analysing workers’ responses to questions about supervision and how 
it has changed. The nature of their involvement in work and workplace issues is also 
considered. Together with the analysis of workers’ attitudes to the firm (Chapter 6), 
these responses will provide a clearer picture of whether employee relations in the 
modernised firm offer a more democratic environment or just a more onerous system of 
control.
Thirdly, while the literature’s scepticism about wages levels has been 
confirmed, other indicators have shown that the most modernised firms are making 
suggestions of stability and career development reminiscent of employment conditions 
within an ILM. Nevertheless, debate remains centred around the degree to which new 
training, education and career initiatives represent a good thing or just a more subtle 
web of control. Consequently, questions asked about work aspects of these themes in 
this chapter concern the nature of training and education received and the types of 
promotions workers have had. In a more subjective vein, workers’ responses to 
questions about their perceptions of progress and opportunity are considered. As with
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employee relations issues, combined with the analysis of Chapter 6 these responses will 
allow a much clearer view of the attitudinal basis of the implicit bargain.
The following two sections of this chapter analyse workers’ responses to these 
specific questions about work. The comprehensive/partial split of the sample provides 
the key test of the modernisation hypothesis. Section 5.4 works through questions 
about attitudes to work while section 5.3 lays the ground for this through a discussion 
of more factual task/skill, employee relations and employment condition changes 
experienced by the sample.
5.3 CHANGES TO WORK
5.3.1 Skills and Tasks
This subsection looks at ‘skills’ in both a broad and a narrow sense. The first 
group of questions provide information about overall skill changes, their complexity, 
degree of conceptual emphasis and the relationship between skills and their 
recognition. These themes also provide insights into debates about ILMs.
The subsection then analyses more specific responses. For example, what tasks 
are workers from the most modernised firms taking on? Furthermore, which workers 
are most affected and how? What stands out from the analysis is that most responses to 
these questions about ‘The New Factory Worker’ and ‘New Skills and their 
Recognition’ either support or do not conflict with an optimistic view of change.
New Skills and their Recognition
As shown in Table 5.3 below, three indicators of skill change show support for 
the view that the policies of the comprehensively modernising firms are having the 
effects theory would suggest. For example, the skills used by their workers are more 
complex than at the other firms (Table 5.3, column 2). Secondly, those same workers
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are using conceptual and mixed manual/conceptual skills to a significantly greater 
extent than traditional factory workers (Table 5.3, column 3)7. Relatedly, it is important 
to note that the semi/unskilled are using conceptual, evaluative skills to a greater degree 
than the skilled (Pr=0.077). These results suggest that conception and execution skills 
are being recombined to some degree as modernisation progresses.
Thirdly, it appears that labourers at the most modem firms (and Consul II) have 
had to accept a greater degree of occupational downgrading on entering the firm than 
have those at the more traditional firms (Table 5.3, column 4). This may be hard for 
these workers to accept. However, it may indicate that skill requirements have changed 
most in the more modernised factories and that a ‘floor’ level entry requirement, 
characteristic of an ILM, operates at those plants.
Table 5.3: New Skills and Skill Recognition, by firm type
Firm Type/ Issue Skill Complexity Mix of New Skills Occupational 
Downgrading *
COMPREHENSIVE
MODERNISERS:
More complex 
(Pr = 0.094)
Manual and 
conceptual 
(Pr = 0.090) or 
solely conceptual 
(Pr = 0.004)
Moderate to 
high degree; 
20% to 33%
PARTIAL
MODERNISERS:
Simpler Less mixed and 
more solely 
manual
Negative to
moderate
degree;
10% to 23%
Source: Worker interviews.
* Responses from workers at the comprehensive modernisers includes Consul II
On the other hand, a comparison of skill upgrading for the sample during their 
tenure at the firm adds ambiguity to this picture (Table 5.4 below). For example, 
changes in the sample’s skill structure have occurred almost solely by a movement 
from the unskilled to the semiskilled category (Table 5.4, row 1). However, the Consul
7 Separating tasks and qualifications (and training) into manual, conceptual, simple, complex etc 
involved the following steps. First, all interviewees were asked to list courses undertaken (wherever), 
certification gained or being worked towards and the tasks they carried out in the course of their job. 
Secondly, the companies' training modules (and external courses referred to) were examined and divided
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group saw the largest skill upgrading, not only to semiskilled positions but also to the 
skilled category (Table 5.4, last row). All efforts were made to employ a consistent 
judgement about skill classifications in the research8 and greater length of tenure may 
explain why the probability of skill upgrading is so much better at Consul than for 
workers at Brastemp-Rio Claro9. However, it does not explain the better skill upgrading 
result for Consul II workers relative to the other partially modernised firms, particularly 
as these workers also use simple and manual skills in similar proportions to the two 
most traditional firms (Table 5.3).
Table 5.4: Skill Structure, first and present job, sample and by firm
First Job -  Skill Level Present Job -  Skill Level
Sample 21% skilled 
6% semiskilled 
73% unskilled
25% skilled 
29% semiskilled 
46% unskilled
First Job-% skilled/ 
semiskilled
Present Job- % skilled/ 
semiskilled
FIRM:
Brastemp-Rio Claro
Enxuta
Brastemp- 
Sao Bernardo
Consul Total
Consul II
32% skilled/semiskilled 
30% skilled/semiskilled
40% skilled/semiskilled 
8% skilled/semiskilled 
12% skilled/semiskilled
48% skilled/semiskilled 
50% skilled/semiskilled
64% skilled/semiskilled 
52% skilled/semiskilled 
53% skilled/semiskilled
Source: Worker interviews.
In summary, these results confirm that new factory regimes are changing the 
types of skills that jobs require to those with a more conceptual and complex emphasis. 
After entering the firm, skill upgrading and the recombination of manual and 
conceptual skills appear to be occurring. The two most modernised firms are doing this 
to a significant degree with workers using complex groupings of conceptual, but also
on this basis.
8 See explanatory note in Appendix D.
9 Appendix D, Table D l.
187
manual/conceptual, skills. The older the firm the more it appears to rely on manual 
skills.
In this regard, the complex and more conceptual nature of modernising firms' 
new skill needs may be a reason why many workers have had to accept a downgrading 
in occupational status upon entering these firms. Consul workers are doing relatively 
better (in terms of the probability of progress) than are workers at the other firms. 
However, Consul II workers use manual and simple skills much like the other partially 
modernised firms.
The New Factory Worker
More specific questions about tasks broadly confirm that the ‘new factory 
worker’ (i.e. those with the greatest change in their responsibilities) are predominantly 
semiskilled labourers and employees of the most modernised factories. However, there 
are also task changes which are better explained by company specific decisions and the 
requirements of the particular product or process. These issues are reviewed below.
First, as summarised in Table 5.5 (column 2) below, workers at the most 
modernised factories appear to have taken on new (informally allocated) tasks to a 
significantly greater degree (87% vs a 67% sample average) than have workers at the 
partially modernised plants. These responsibilities were noted as being - monitoring, 
testing, filling in for others and minor maintenance. Being allocated informally they are 
less likely to be reflected in wages/promotion and are therefore a better indicator of 
skill change due to modernisation (than formal ones). Within these categories, testing 
and quality duties were more prevalent at Brastemp-Rio Claro and the two Consuls (Pr 
= 0.04). This confirms the analysis of skills in Chapter 4.
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Table 5.5: The Prominence of New Tasks, by firm type
New (informally 
allocated) tasks
New Technology 
use
New Technique use
COMPREHENSIVE
MODERNISERS
Large number of 
new quality tasks 
(Pr = 0.012)
High level of 
integration 
(53% - 75%)
High level of
integration
(66%-72%)
PARTIAL
MODERNISERS
Fewer tasks; less 
quality related
Low level of 
integration
Low level of 
integration
Source: Worker interviews
Secondly, sample results confirm a view that comprehensively modernised firm 
workers are being increasingly asked to use new technologies (Table 5.5, column 3). In 
this regard, the vast majority (77%) of the sample replied that new technologies were 
now being used in their work. However, this must be tempered by the fact that many 
respondents considered their older systems to be ‘new technologies’10. More 
significantly, at Brastemp-Rio Claro a high 53% of respondents used CNCs and 
robotics and these aggregates were similarly high (50% and 25%) at Consul III. These 
observations also fit Chapter 4’s vision of workers' new tasks at these factories.
Thirdly, the greater application of new techniques to production in the most 
modernised firms is also made clear by the sample's responses (Table 5.5, column 4). 
Nearly half of the sample (46%) confirmed that they used new organisational 
techniques such as JIT/Kanban, preventative maintenance and Statistical Process 
Control (SPC). However, of a total 45 positive responses a disproportionately large 
number were from Brastemp-Rio Claro (18) and Consul (12), particularly Consul III 
(two thirds of their number).
In addition, it appears that the semiskilled have been the principal skill group to 
have been required to take on new tasks and responsibilities. As noted in Table 5.6 
below, while all skill groups have new informal responsibilities, the response of the 
semiskilled was particularly high (78%; Table 5.6, row 1). In terms of technologies, the 
semiskilled had such responsibilities to almost the same overall level as the skilled ( 
Table 5.6, row 2). In terms of techniques (Table 5.6, row 3), the semiskilled again stand
10 The Enxuta sample recorded the highest score to new technologies (90%). However, this odd result is 
explained by the low level o f technology which originally existed there and the types o f changes
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out as the pivotal group, registering a significantly greater use of new techniques (59%) 
than is reflected by their proportion in the sample (25%).
Table 5.6: The Prominence of New Tasks, by skill group
New Task: Key Responses by Skill
New, informal responsibilities? All high (67% average), 
Semiskilled (78%) the highest.
New technology use? Highest -  skilled/semiskilled 
(100%-80%)
New technique use? Highest -  semiskilled (59%) 
closely followed by the unskilled 
(53%)
Source: Worker interviews
Despite these results, a number of other aspects of the sample’s responses 
nuance this picture of modernisation and the ‘new factory worker’. As suggested by 
Table 5.7 below, task allocation is often company, product or process specific rather 
than one based on the level of modernisation per se. Furthermore, as suggested in 
Chapter 3, external factors such as the origin of TNC influence may also have induced 
management to chose a more technological (rather than a technique based) approach to 
production. Such a choice will influence the nature of tasks in production.
Table 5.7: Specific New Tasks and Duties, by firm
Specific Tasks and Duties Key Responses by Firm
Quality/velocity monitoring (informal 
expectation)
Highest = Brastemp - Rio Claro/Sao 
Bernardo (50%-68%) (Pr=0.001)
Maintenance assistance (informal 
expectation)
Highest = Brastemp - Sao 
Bernardo/Consul (31%-38% vs 25 % 
average)
Filling in at other work stations 
(informal expectation)
Highest = Consul (67% vs 42 % 
average)
Source: Worker interviews
For example, responses suggest that workers at the two Brastemp factories (a 
traditional and modem firm) are more likely to have informally allocated quality and 
velocity monitoring functions (Table 5.7, row 1). In contrast, while the maintenance 
function is not very prevalent at any firm, it is an important high skill issue and appears 
to be more widespread in the more complex refrigeration process (both Consuls and
introduced over the case study period.
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Brastemp-Sao Bernardo) than in washing product manufacture (Table 5.7, row 2). 
Finally, Consul workers are more likely to be asked to fill in at other workstations than 
are workers at the other factories (Table 5.7, row 3). This observation reflects the 
greater degree to which Consul (especially Consul III) operations are dominated by the 
integrated line than at Brastemp-Rio Claro.
5.3.2 Employee Relations
In terms of employee relations within the modernised firm, optimists suggest 
that workers will be more free to make suggestions, that decision making will be more 
participative and that the issues involved may move beyond productivity considerations 
to matters of greater concern to workers’ well being. Moreover, modernisation is 
assumed to lead not only to less overt supervision but to better supervisory relations. 
These themes are reviewed below.
Supervisory Relations
It appears that the process of modernisation has had a positive effect not only 
on the proportion of supervisors within the modernised factory (Chapter 4) but also on 
the nature of relations between workers and their superiors. For example, a majority 
(56%) of the sample felt that supervisory relations had improved, 36% that they were 
the same and, 8% that relations had deteriorated (Table 5.8, row 1, column 3). Consul 
workers (both factories) responded most favourably to this question (for 74% relations 
had improved) with Brastemp-Rio Claro responses the next highest at 64% (Table 5.8, 
row 2, column 3). In comparison, only around half of Enxuta and Brastemp-Sao 
Bernardo respondents agreed, making the split between the two most modernised 
plants/Consul II and the two more traditional firms significant (Pr = 0.082).
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TABLE 5.8: Supervision Level and Degree of Change, by sample, firm and skill
Level of Supervision Supervision Change
Sample 57% = good/very good; 33% = 
OK; 10% = bad/poor
56% = improved; 36% = the same; 
8% = worse
By Firm:
1
2
3
4
Good -  Very Good:
Brastemp-Rio Claro (72%) 
Consul II (65%)
Enxuta/Consul III (50%) 
Brastemp-Sao Bernardo (40%)
Improved:
Consul II/III (74%) 
Brastemp-Rio Claro (64%)
Enxuta (50%)
Brastemp-Sao Bernardo (48%)
By skill: Highest = skilled/semiskilled vs 
unskilled (Pr = 0.023)
Highest = semiskilled (63% vs 56% 
unskilled and 48% skilled)
Source: Worker interviews.
Secondly, it also appears that, in general, the more modernised a firm the better 
will be supervisory relations. For example, while 57% of the sample said their relation 
with their supervisor was good to very good, 33% "OK" and, 10% bad to poor (Table 
5.8, row 1, column 2), Brastemp-Rio Claro recorded the highest positive response 
(72%) with Consul II close behind at 65% (Table 5.8, row 2, column 2). Brastemp-Sao 
Bernardo scored lowest on this measure (40%). In addition, Enxuta (15%) and 
Brastemp Sao Bernardo (20%) were the only firms where workers said relations were 
bad or poor. The higher the skill the more a worker was likely to enjoy good to very 
good supervisory relations but in this respect the semiskilled are being treated much 
more like the skilled than the unskilled (Table 5.8, row 3, column 2).
Yet, while Enxuta workers’ less favourable response (50%) about their present 
style of supervisory relations is as expected, what is surprising is that half (3) of the 
Consul III group felt much the same (Table 5.8, row 2, column 2). Thus, workers at 
Brastemp-Rio Claro and Consul overall feel well treated relative to those at the more 
traditional firms (Pr = 0.072). However, when responses at the two Consul factories are 
compared the results do not fit this picture. One might have expected that workers at 
Consul III were working under more, rather than less, favourable supervisory 
conditions than those at Consul II. Why this is not so may be explained by the 
consideration of other factors such as the small, transparent group structures within 
which Consul III labourers work or by other constraints on their autonomy.
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In summary, supervisory relations at Brastemp-Rio Claro and Consul overall 
are the most favourable and these have improved relatively more than at the two 
traditional factories. While questions remain about the reasons for Consul III workers’ 
less positive opinion of supervision at that plant, it still appears clear that supervisory 
relations at Brastemp-Sao Bernardo and Enxuta are poorer and have improved the least. 
Modernising firms are concentrating on re-modifying supervisory relations, based on 
this data.
Worker Involvement and Participation
Many of the sample’s responses to questions about the nature of their 
involvement also confirm a view that comprehensively modernising firms have 
changed work in the ways that optimistic theory would predict. For example, while 
most workers (93%) make some sort of positive suggestion, within this aggregate it 
appears that a larger number of workers’ colleagues are involved at the 
comprehensively modernising firms and Consul II than at the two older factories 
(Table 5.9, column 2, below). Workers from the traditional firms are more likely to talk 
only to their supervisor.
Table 5.9: Indicators of Involvement and Participation, by firm________________
Firm Suggestions to.... Suggestions involve 
employment issues?
Relative importance 
of product and 
production based 
suggestions ?
Brastemp-Rio Claro 
Consul II/III
Supervisor and 
work mates / team 
(Pr = 0.082)
Often -  on training 
and education 
(Pr = 0.003)
Product and major 
process related 
(Pr = 0.046)
Brastemp-Sao 
Bernardo / Enxuta
Supervisor only Rarely More minor process 
related (Pr = 0.004)
Source: Worker interviews.
Secondly, the more modernised a firm the more likely are workers to be 
involved in decisions affecting (certain) employment conditions (Table 5.9, column 3). 
For example, Brastemp-Rio Claro respondents are much more involved in decisions
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about training (79%; Pr = 0.006) and educational (88%; Pr = 0.019) opportunities than 
are respondents from the other firms. The Consul sample's response rate, while lower 
than at Brastemp-Rio Claro was sufficiently higher than at Enxuta and Brastemp-Sao 
Bernardo to again make the comprehensively modemised-Consul Il/traditional split 
significant (Pr = 0.003). This confirms the analysis of Chapter 4 and might, if 
corroborated by subjective evidence, vindicate the policies of the modernised firms, 
particularly Brastemp-Rio Claro.
Thirdly, almost all workers make suggestions for changes to the product and 
production process (88%; Table 5.10, row 1). These suggestions fall into three main 
types - minor product related (37%), minor process related (83%) and major (38%). 
Yet, once again (Table 5.9, column 4) workers at Brastemp-Rio Claro and both 
Consuls make a significantly greater proportion of their suggestions for major changes 
and traditional factory workers more than proportionately make suggestions for minor 
process improvements.
However, a number of other indicators temper the optimism implied by the 
above results. For instance, the making of such suggestions was quite uniform and 
proportionate within the sample and the most modernised firms did not stand out 
(Table 5.10, row 1). Moreover, 75% of workers wanted to make even more suggestions 
(Table 5.10, row 2). This large latent desire by workers to make more suggestions was 
also high and not significantly different at Brastemp-Rio Claro (69%) to what it was at 
the other factories.
Table 5.10: Suggestion Types and Desires, key responses.
Suggestion Indicator: Key Responses
Make suggestions for product and 
process improvements?
Sample = 88% yes
Little variance by firm (84% % - 96 %)
Want to make more suggestions? Sample = 75% yes
Range by firm -  (60% Enxuta -  69% Brastemp- 
Rio Claro - 88% Brastemp-Sao Bernardo)
Do you make ‘critical’ suggestions? Sample = 61% yes
By Firm = average of 61%, lowest at Brastemp- 
Rio Claro (24%), highest at Consul III (100%)
Source: Worker interviews
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Finally, before it is assumed that what is being observed represents a substantial 
upward shift in workers' participative opportunities as a result of employers greater 
openness, a number of qualifications must be made. First, the suggestion question for 
which modernised firm respondents replied more significantly (Table 5.9, column 4) 
applied only to suggestions which may enhance profitability. Secondly, as noted in 
Chapter 4, many workers in the most modernised firms have implicit or explicit 
‘incentives’ to make suggestions or sanctions when they don't do so.
These caveats are bome out by responses to a question about ‘critical’ 
suggestions (Table 5.10, last row). For example, a much smaller 61% of the sample 
spoke out critically about issues relating to production or employment conditions. 
However, Brastemp-Rio Claro stands out in this respect as very few (24%) of their 
number spoke out critically. While leaving the content of these critical suggestions 
until later, this either means that Brastemp-Rio Claro workers are happy or not 
prepared to speak out.
5.3.3 Employment Conditions and the Internal Labour Market (ILM)
Two key aspects of employment conditions which the literature identifies as 
important within modernisation are a greater emphasis on training/education and the 
provision of greater employment stability, such as is implied by career schemes. These 
are also key aspects of ILM’s. In this regard, Chapter 4 suggested that comprehensively 
modernising firms (particularly Brastemp-Rio Claro) appeared to be providing these 
benefits and structures for their workers.
This section subjects this firm level view to greater scrutiny. The analysis 
suggests that the training, education and job progression/continuity experiences of 
workers superficially support the modernisation schema. However, other indicators 
suggest that improved employment conditions are not as freely available as might be 
assumed. Managerial intent (beyond efficiency and enhanced control reasons) in 
introducing these policies is questioned on the basis of this evidence.
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Training and Education - A New Agenda?
As noted in Chapter 1, firms will be more inclined to invest in worker training 
the more confident they are that they can recoup such costs. Ways they can improve 
this probability is if they minimise labour turnover and if training imparted is less 
transferable within the general labour market (e.g. specific and/or conceptual training). 
Chapter 4 noted that the firms investing most heavily in new technologies have policies 
and conditions which have encouraged very low turnover. Further, they are also the 
ones investing most heavily in training and education. However, the most modernised 
firms are also switching formal training towards less accredited and possibly less 
transferable skills. The following paragraphs examine the sample evidence on these 
issues.
Three indicators about education and training provision appear to support the 
policies of these firms described in Chapter 4. First, while 83% of the sample has 
received some formal training at the firm, the level of training provision fit a 
comprehensive-Consul Il/traditional split of the sample (Table 5.11, column 2). At 
Enxuta this proportion was quite low (55%), at Consul it was 100%, Brastemp-Rio 
Claro 92% and at Brastemp-Sao Bernardo it was still a high 80% of respondents .
Table 5.11: Summary Indicators of Training Received, Educational Levels
and Educational U )grading, by firm
Firms Got Formal 
Training
Degree of
Conceptual
Training
Educational levels 
/ educational 
upgrading
Brastemp- 
Rio Claro 
Consul II/III
Highest degree 
(Pr = 0.002)
Higher 
(Pr = 0.039)
High / some 
upgrading
Brastemp- 
Sao Bernardo / 
Enxuta
Lower degree Lower Low / no real 
change
Source: Worker interviews.
Secondly, in terms of types of training, 77% of respondents attended conceptual 
courses, 64% also manual modules and 26% courses with both a manual and 
conceptual emphasis (Table 5.12, row 2). The majority (96%) of respondents attended 
simple courses but 70% also received more complex types of instruction. Most
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importantly (Table 5.11, column 3), as is indicated from responses about the use of 
skills, workers from the two most modem firms (and Consul II) are disproportionately 
represented in the conceptual module category.
Thirdly, the issues of educational levels and their improvement since entering 
the firm also show quite varied results. On entering the firm a majority of the sample 
(68%) had only up to and including primary education, 14% had some secondary 
schooling and 18% had secondary schooling and above (Table 5.13). Most importantly 
(Table 5.11, column 4), only at the more modernised Brastemp-Rio Claro and Consul 
has there been an appreciable rise in educational levels since entering the firm and this 
has brought the total sample average up to - 18% secondary but incomplete and 29% 
secondary and above (Table 5.13, rows 1 and 2).
These results appear to confirm the expectations of optimistic theory. Yet there 
are other aspects of workers’ experiences which are not so clear cut. For example, 
unlike the skill use responses reviewed earlier, workers at the more modem firms do 
not receive a greater amount of mixed (manual/conceptual) training and workers at the 
traditional firms do not predominately receive just formal manual training (Table 5.12, 
row 1). Manual skills still remain of great importance to the modernised firm. 
Furthermore, these firms do not engage in more complex formal training than the 
traditional firms to any significant degree (Table 5.12, row 2).
Table 5.12: Types of Training, by sample and firm
Type of Training Key Responses
Manual based
Mixed manual / conceptual
Sample = 64%; Range: 50% (Consul III) -  70% 
(Consul II)
Sample = 26%; Range: 17% (Brastemp-Rio 
Claro) -  50% (Consul III)
Simple
Complex
Sample = 96%; Range: 91%-100% by firm
Sample = 70%; Range: 60% (Brastemp-Sao 
Bernardo) -  approx. 70% (Brastemp-Rio 
Claro/Enxuta/Consul II) -  83% (Consul III)
Source: Worker interviews
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If the use of complex and mixed skills does in fact remain of greater importance 
at the modem firms, this (as the skill use results suggest) is probably more evident in 
the on-the-job receipt and demonstration of these attributes. Consequently, a continuing 
informality of skill development means that factory management may have 
considerable discretion over who is given the opportunity to perform these more 
responsible and complex skills. Supervisors, even at Brastemp-Rio Claro, still have a 
strong influence on who actually takes on formal training courses. Perceived flexibility, 
enthusiasm and acceptance of company policy may thus drive decisions over both 
actual skill acquisition and task allocation. Based on Chapter 4’s review of the 
comprehensive modernisers’ selection and monitoring policies, this would not bode 
well for the prospects of unionists.
Finally, a larger percentage of the unskilled (rather than the semiskilled) in this 
sample received further secondary education since being at their firm. In contrast, a 
larger proportion of the semiskilled have gained further primary education than have 
the unskilled. The result is that, whereas when they joined the firm the presently 
unskilled had the lowest education profile, the unskilled now have a higher education 
profile than the semiskilled (Table 5.13, last row).
Table 5.13: Education Levels, now and on entering firm, by sample, firm and skill
Grouping Education Level now (%): 
Some secondary / Secondary +
Education on Entrance (%): 
Some secondary / Secondary +
Sample 18% / 29% 14% / 18%
Comprehensive/ 
Consul II:
Partial
Modernisers:
13%-24% / 40%-43% 
5%-28% / 10%-20%
8% -22%  / 13%-32% 
5% -20%  / 10%-16%
Skill Level: 
Skilled -  
Semiskilled- 
Unskilled-
22% / 61% 
18% / 15% 
16% / 21%
30% / 35% 
11% / 15% 
7% / 12%
Source: Worker interviews
In summary, this evidence on training and education provision supports a view 
that modernising firms are more actively trying to structure and control their ILMs. 
Compared to the past, when the focus was almost solely on skilled worker turnover, the
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situation of semi/unskilled workers is now of great concern to firms. Firms are 
becoming much more active in the provision of the training and academic education for 
these workers, perhaps due to the failure of the public sector to provide an adequate 
level of general and specific skills.
However, the sample results also appear to confirm the view that education and 
training are being used on a basis which may not be in line with the requirements of 
jobs. Moreover, combined with the firm and attitudinal focus of training policies 
(Chapter 4), these results act to question whether the skills workers in modernising 
firms are receiving make them any more employable in other firms. Aspects of the 
corollary to this issue -  enhanced internal opportunities -  are considered below.
Career and Job Progression
Another element of modernised employment conditions relates to the 
propensity of such firms to offer greater employment stability. One way of doing this is 
via a career scheme. While Chapter 4 noted that Brastemp-Rio Claro was the only firm 
with an explicit career scheme, most of the sample (89%) had been promoted at least 
once since joining the firm and there was no significant difference between the firms on 
this level.
General responses in section 5.2 noted that the most modernised firms have 
made workers feel more stable than do workers at the partially modernised firms. This 
theme is investigated in greater detail in Chapter 6 on attitudes to the employer. 
However, what stands out in relation to work issues is -  when workers are given a 
greater feeling that their job is secure (through promotion) where are they being 
promoted to? Does this confirm the greater internal opportunities that theory suggests 
workers at modernising firms are receiving?
In this respect, for the sample overall, 76% are staying in the same section on 
promotion and 24% are moving section (Table 5.14, column 2). However, workers at 
the two most modernised firms are almost solely staying in the same section of their
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factory whereas significant minorities of respondents from the other factories (e.g. 
Consul II - 42% - and Brastemp-Sao Bernardo - 36%), have been promoted to other 
factory sections (Table 5.14, column 3). Furthermore, the probability of a 
semiskilled/skilled worker staying in the same section was considerably higher than for 
the unskilled (Table 5.14, column 4).
Table 5.14: Promotional Destination, by sample, firm and skill
Promotions Sample By Firm Type By Skill Level
To the same section 76% Comprehensive 
modernisers (Pr=0.010)
Skilled and Semiskilled 
(Pr = 0.084)
To another section 24% Partial modernisers Unskilled
Source: Worker interviews
If it can be assumed that working in a different section on promotion is an 
advantage (e.g. for skill development) it would appear that the unskilled are the greatest 
recipients of such opportunities. Even if their promotions only imply multitasking, 
these workers could be expected to have a considerable degree of task flexibility asked 
of them in the future. On the other hand, promotion within the same section may be a 
reward ‘given’ by modem firms to well performing workers. Conversely, therefore, 
what may be happening is that less favoured (but still adequate) employees are being 
more regularly shuffled between different but equally lowly skilled areas of operations.
In summary, as with the issue of training and education opportunities, there 
appears to be some evidence to support the optimistic hypothesis in respect to 
promotional decisions. The semiskilled continue to appear to have benefited, this time 
from continuity of work section, and the comprehensive modernisers are keeping their 
key workers at work stations in which they have already developed basic skills and 
familiarity. Yet it is the unskilled who are being required to shift more regularly to 
other parts of factory operations. This may not be helpful to their skill development. 
However, what still needs further analysis are the attitudes of these workers to the 
tasks, opportunities and relational environments outlined above.
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5.4 ATTITUDES TO WORK IN THE MODERNISED FACTORY
This section adds important subjective evidence to this analysis of the 
changing nature of work. Themes which still require exploration are -  are workers 
labouring smarter rather than harder? Secondly, even if work is considered to be 
more difficult, do workers have more interest in their new work tasks -  are they more 
satisfied? Thirdly, how do they see their opportunities for progress?
This analysis of these issues gives a more sceptical view of the effect of 
modernisation on workers. The division of the sample on a comprehensive/partial 
basis is becoming increasingly irrelevant as the analysis works down into a 
consideration of attitudes. The data which provides this impression on the three 
questions noted above comes from three groups of responses -  from those relating to 
progress and opportunity (5.4.3), from responses about the specific tasks of 
modernised firm workers (5.4.2) and from general questions about impressions of 
work overall (5.4.1).
5.4.1 Industrial Labour - Working Harder, Smarter and Happier?
In terms of work overall, the sample’s responses suggest that the more 
relevant issue is not whether workers are labouring smarter or harder but are workers 
labouring harder, smarter and happier. On this basis, responses continue to illustrate 
the growing prominence of the semiskilled category (Table 5.15 below, column 3.) 
However, it is also clear from Table 5.15 that the split of the sample on a 
comprehensive/partial basis does not support an optimistic view of attitudes.
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Table 5.15: Impressions of Work Overall, by firm and skill
Work is Highest ‘Yes’ response by firm Highest ‘Yes’ response by skill
Harder ? Brastemp-Rio Claro (56%) Skilled (Pr = 0.054)
More intense? Brastemp-Rio Claro/ Consul III/ 
Brastemp-Sao Bernardo;
(Pr = 0.025)
Semiskilled/Skilled 
(Pr = 0.034)
Faster? Enxuta (75%) Semiskilled / Unskilled 
(Pr = 0.034)
Less monitored? Brastemp-Rio Claro / Consul II; 
(84% - 88%)
Skilled / Semiskilled 
(Pr = 0.010)
More
responsible?
Consul II/III and Brastemp- 
Sao Bernardo; (83% - 84%)
Skilled / Semiskilled 
(Pr = 0.007)
More interesting? Consul II (94% vs 85% 
average)
All (> 80%), especially 
semiskilled (89%)
Source: Worker interviews.
For example, almost half of the sample (47%) felt that their job was now 
harder than in the past (Table 5.15, row 1). At Brastemp-Rio Claro this feeling was 
the most pronounced. This may be partly explained by the previous observation that 
they have taken on more complex new skills than are required at other firms and/or 
as a result of dissatisfaction at that workplace.
Secondly, the semiskilled/skilled and workers at Brastemp-Rio Claro, Consul 
III and Brastemp-Sao Bernardo (the two newest and oldest firm) were significantly 
more inclined to say that work had become more intense (Table 5.15, row 2). This is 
not surprising when the types of technologies and tasks introduced into the two most 
modem factories, and for these skill groups, are remembered. What stands out is the 
fact that Brastemp-Sao Bernardo workers responded similarly. The rise in perceived 
work intensity is probably related to other factors at this firm.
Thirdly (Table 5.15, row 3), 58% of the sample felt that work speed had 
increased and this was particularly pronounced at Enxuta (75%). This confirms what
202
was suggested about conditions at Enxuta in Chapter 4. Line operators (basically the 
unskilled group), but also the semiskilled, were more inclined (than the skilled) to 
say that work speed demands had increased (65%).
Fourthly (Table 5.15, row 4), while the two most modem factories and 
Consul II use lower levels of supervision than the other two firms, results to a 
question about monitoring show both expected and unexpected results. For example, 
most of Brastemp-Rio Claro (84%) and Consul II (88%) workers felt that work was 
now less monitored. However, 2 of the 6 Consul III workers felt that work was now 
more monitored, a result more like that of Brastemp-Sao Bernardo and Enxuta 
respondents (33%)".
As direct supervision proportions are very low at Consul III it may be that, 
due to the small number of workers in that factory, employees felt that work 
performance was more visible than at the factory they had come from (i.e. Consul II). 
Alternatively, more monitored may have meant new work pressures due to the 
requirements of the integrated and automated line technology being used. This may 
be supported by the fact that it is not them who operate the ‘stop-go’ conveyor 
system at that plant.
Furthermore, on the issue of monitoring, firms do seem to monitor skilled 
workers less than others. Feelings of being less monitored fall with rising skill level 
(Table 5.13, row 4, column 3). However, as suggested by modernisation theory, 
results from this sample confirm that this was most pronounced for the skilled and 
semiskilled compared to the unskilled (Pr =0.010).
Fifthly, a high 80% of the sample felt that work had increased in 
responsibility (Table 5.15, row 5). This was more so at Consul (83%) and, even more 
surprisingly, at Brastemp-Sao Bernardo (84%). The more skilled a worker the more 
likely they were to agree with this proposition (Pr = 0.018), particularly for the 
semiskilled/skilled relative to the unskilled.
11 Nevertheless, due to the small size of the Consul III sub-sample, tests only show up as significant
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Finally, to a question about more interest in their work, many workers 
responded positively (85%; Table 5.15, row 6). This response was highest at Consul 
II (94%) and lowest at Brastemp-Sao Bernardo (76%). Workers at the old Sao 
Bernardo plant do seem to be under a great deal of pressure to perform in their dirty, 
noisy and relatively disorganised workspace. Moreover, it is highly significant that 
work interest is insignificantly different at the comprehensively modernising firms 
than at the more traditional firms (Table 5.15, row 6, column 2). On the other hand, 
significant proportions (over 80%) of all skillgroups now had more interest in their 
work, especially the semiskilled (89%; Table 5.15, row 6, column 3).
Making an inter-question comparison leads to a number of important 
observations. For instance, the semiskilled (like the skilled) are more than 
proportionately taking on more difficult, intensive and responsible tasks and for this 
they are less monitored. One interpretation of this would be that the semiskilled are 
being entrusted with a level of work control more like what would generally only be 
attributed to the skilled. Furthermore, these greater responsibilities are not affecting 
workers' interest in their work. The existence of a new implicit bargain for 
semiskilled workers - one which involves a package of trade-offs - does seem to be 
behind these results.
However, there are two caveats to this picture when looked at on a factory 
basis. First, comparing the Consul factories, it is the less modernised Consul II where 
feelings of being monitored are lowest and where work interest is highest. Secondly, 
work at the ultra-modern Brastemp-Rio Claro is hard and intense. Also, while work 
is not highly monitored, workers there do not register a significant feeling of greater 
work responsibility and work interest. Thirdly, the old Brastemp-Sao Bernardo 
factory fits a (converse) optimistic modernisation view as monitoring and work 
intensity perceptions are high and work interest is relatively low. However, feelings 
of responsibility are high and this is the factory which produces at a higher level of 
productivity and with lower absenteeism levels than its more advanced counterpart,
when both Consuls and the Rio Claro factory are compared to the two traditional firms (Pr = 0.063).
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Consul II12
5.4.2 Opinions about New Responsibilities, Tasks and Skills
Section 5.3 noted how workers in modernising firms were taking on specific 
new responsibilities such as quality checks, monitoring, demonstration, reporting, 
maintenance and co-ordination. That analysis also confirmed earlier observations that 
workers in more modernised firms had different and more complex tasks due to the 
integration of more sophisticated technologies and techniques at those factories. 
However, this section suggests that when the sample are asked how they feel about 
these specific new responsibilities/tasks, beyond a general level workers’ attitudes 
are not affected in the ways that optimistic modernisation theory would suggest.
For example, as is evident from Table 5.16 (row 1) below, 89% of workers 
liked their new responsibilities and this was only slightly significantly greater for the 
skilled category (Pr = 0.095). Moreover, the vast majority of workers felt that then- 
new responsibilities were interesting things to do (89%; Table 5.16, row 2). 
However, the vast majority of workers (84%) did not find them easier. In this regard, 
the most significant result applied to the skilled. They registered the strongest view 
that responsibilities made work harder (Pr = 0.075). These results suggest that 
workers generally embrace and like new and more complex responsibilities and that 
the higher the skill level the more likely a worker finds these new tasks not only 
more difficult but also more interesting.
12 Chapter 4, section 4.4
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Table 5.16: New Task and Skill Impressions, by sample and skill
Key Responses
Like new tasks?
New tasks are more interesting? 
New tasks make work harder?
Sample = 89% yes; especially skilled (Pr = 0.095) 
Sample = 89% yes
Sample = 84% yes; especially skilled (Pr = 0.075)
Want more skill?
Feel more skilled now?
Sample = 85% yes
Sample = 89% yes; especially skilled/semiskilled (Pr 
= 0.032)
Source: Worker interviews
There were also a number of important results in respect to the use of new 
technologies and techniques which either confirm or do not conflict with an 
optimistic view of modernisation. For example, a comparison of Tables 5.17 and 
5.18 below suggests that overall positive responses to the effect of new techniques 
(71%) were higher than that for technologies (51%). Secondly, 51% of responses 
said the effect of technologies was to increase work velocity, 71% more 
responsibility, 20% more skill and 19% more interest (Table 5.17). In comparison, 
responses to the effect of new techniques were 33% more speed, 80% more 
responsibility, 9% more skill and 58% more interest (Table 5.18). Thus, the effect of 
technique use on attitudes was lower both on speed and skill effects but higher on 
interest, responsibility and overall satisfaction.
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Table 5.17: The Effect of New Technologies -  Neutral or Positive Responses
Effect of Technology Use Key Responses
Overall effect positive? Sample = 51% yes; highest yes = 
skilled/semiskilled (Pr = 0.001)
Increases work speed? Sample = 51% yes; highest yes = 
semiskilled/unskilled (Pr = 0.015)
Increases work responsibility? Sample = 71% yes; highest yes = 
skilled/semiskilled (Pr = 0.000)
Increases skills? Sample = 20% yes; lowest yes = 
semiskilled/unskilled (Pr = 0.002); highest 
yes = comprehensive modernisers (Pr = 
0.002)
Increases work interest? Sample = 19% yes
Source: Worker interviews
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Table 5.18: The Effect of New Techniques -  Neutral or Positive Responses
Effect of Technique Use Key Responses
Overall effect positive? Sample = 71% yes
Increases work speed? Sample = 33% yes; highest yes = two 
Brastemps (Pr = 0.063) and unskilled (Pr = 
0.056)
Increases work responsibility? Sample = 80% yes; highest yes = 
skilled/semiskilled (Pr = 0.062)
Increases skill level? Sample = 9% yes
Increases work interest? Sample = 58% yes; highest yes = 
skilled/semiskilled (Pr = 0.069)
Source: Worker interviews
More specifically, in terms of technologies (Table 5.17) what stands out is 
that the semiskilled responded much like the unskilled in terms of speed (high; 
Pr=0.015) and skill effects (low; Pr=0.002) but that they felt more responsible 
(Pr=0.000) and positive (Pr=0.001) about using the technology in much the same 
way as the skilled. Secondly, workers at the most modem firms were more likely to 
think that using the technology requires more skill (Pr=0.002). The first of these 
observations confirms greater work optimism and resilience on the part of the 
semiskilled. The second observation may, if these tasks are seen to be rewarded by 
the firm, confirm an optimistic modernisation hypothesis.
In terms of new production techniques (Table 5.18), workers at the two 
Brastemp factories (one old and one very modem) were more inclined to feel that 
their effect was to increase work speed than at the other firms (Pr=0.063). Secondly, 
the unskilled were more inclined to see techniques as having high speed (Pr = 0.056) 
but lower responsibility (Pr = 0.062) and interest (Pr = 0.069) effects than did the 
other two skill groups. The first of these observations may simply confirm a 
company wide (Brastemp) choice in the type of production technique used. The 
second observation may be partly explained by the greater simplicity of the jobs of 
the unskilled. Yet it also reflects, once again, the high levels of work enthusiasm of 
the semiskilled.
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However, in contrast, other responses caution whether the sample’s attitudes 
support an optimism scenario. For example, as shown below in Table 5.19 (row 1), 
Consul workers (93%) were most inclined to find their new tasks harder. This may 
reflect the greater level of work post mobility (i.e. filling in for others) at Consul, a 
characteristic which (as noted) workers do not particularly like.
In terms of Brastemp-Rio Claro, they find work overall harder (Table 5.15) 
but they do not find their new tasks as difficult as do workers at the other factories 
(Table 5.19, row 1). As most workplace changes there have existed since the firm’s 
inception and during these workers’ tenure, it is not surprising that tasks have not 
changed much. However, the intensity of their application, and maybe other work 
pressures, appear to have increased.
Table 5.19: Impressions of New Tasks, contradictory responses by firm
Task Indicator Key Responses
New tasks are harder? Highest (Consul, 93%);
Lowest (Brastemp-Rio Claro, 77%)
New tasks are more interesting? Lowest (Consul III, 60% vs 89% average)
Overall effect of technology use? Most Negative (Consul III, 25% positive)
Overall effect of technique use? Most Negative (Brastemp-Rio Claro, 50% vs 
11% sample average, Pr = 0.056)
Feel more skilled now? Least Positive (Consul III/Brastemp-Rio Claro, 
77% vs 89% average, Pr = 0.073)
Sources: Worker interviews.
Secondly (Table 5.19, row 2), it appears that workers from Consul III were 
the least positive about their new responsibilities (fewer found them interesting; 
60%). This result is of no statistical significance on the basis of the Consul III sample 
alone. However, combining this impression with what is known of workers'
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preferences, the nature of conditions at Consul III and the greater work post mobility 
of workers at that factory again suggests that work satisfaction levels at Consul III do 
not fit an optimistic view of modernisation. This is confirmed when workers’ 
attitudes to the use of new technology are compared (Table 5.19, row 3). Consul III 
workers again stand out as they had a relatively low positive response rate in their 
attitude to new technology use (25%).
Thirdly (Table 5.19, row 4), in terms of attitudes to the use of new 
techniques, 50% of Brastemp-Rio Claro workers responded negatively to the overall 
effect of new techniques while 89% of respondents at the other firms (including 
Brastemp-Sao Bernardo) said the effect was positive (Pr = 0.056). These observations 
suggest that Brastemp-Sao Bernardo workers are unusually resilient to work 
pressures and positive about change. This result may also have a relation to the 
greater use or manner in which new techniques have been introduced at Brastemp- 
Rio Claro and/or that some other factor relating to the effort bargain (e.g. pay or 
evaluation) is causing dissatisfaction with work there. The earlier analysis of work 
preferences and attitudes (s5.2) suggested that evaluation systems might be behind 
these contrasting results at the two Brastemp factories. The different level of union 
influence at the two plants may also be an important factor behind these results.
In summary, as with attitudes to work overall, these results for new 
responsibilities and tasks contradict many of the presumptions of an optimistic 
modernisation hypothesis about workers' attitudes. The semiskilled seem quite 
positive. However, evidence suggesting that workers at the two most modernised 
factories have serious concerns over the nature of work and the implicit bargain at 
their workplaces is growing.
This view is supported by other responses. For example, the questionnaire 
also revealed that a large proportion (85%) of the sample want more skills (Table 5. 
16, row 2). Also, most (87%) felt more skilled now than when they started work at 
their firm (Table 5.16, row 2). The semiskilled/skilled (Pr=0.032) were more inclined 
to believe this.
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However, workers at the two most modernised firms were less inclined to feel 
they are now more skilled as a result of employment at their firm (77%; Table 5.19, 
row 5)13 Consul II workers were the most inclined to feel more skilled (100%) and 
this was closely followed by workers at the two most traditional firms. Consequently, 
when looked at in greater detail, even if a new implicit bargain is in operation it does 
not appear to be based on the attitudinal changes optimistic theory would suggest.
5.4.3 Perceptions of Progress and Opportunity
The final attitudinal indicators about work considered in this chapter concern 
workers’ understanding of how, and on what basis, decisions about progress are 
made. Section 5.3 reviewed the nature of promotions in the firms. Yet when asked, 
‘have you been adequately compensated for your promotions’ less than half (46%) of 
respondents said yes (Table 5.20, row 1).
Furthermore, as noted earlier, the vast majority of Brastemp-Rio Claro and 
Consul (particularly Consul III) groups were unhappy with evaluation systems while 
the majority of Sao Bernardo and Enxuta workers were more content. In contrast to 
the previous view that workers at the most modernised firms felt more stable, this 
suggests that workers’ expectations (such as to a specific job or for a promotion) are 
being more adequately met at the two more traditional firms. As is shown below, 
these critical observations, combined with (more neutral) workers’ impressions about 
how and on what basis opportunities are decided, provide deeper insights into 
workers’ concerns about progress.
13 This is not explained by the skill structure o f the sample as Brastemp-Rio Claro's and Consul Ill's 
skill structures fit in the middle o f what is a fairly even the sample distribution by skill levels.
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Table 5.20: Impression of Basis of Decision Making, key responses
Indicator Key Responses
Adequate compensation 
for promotion?
Know what’s needed 
for promotion?
Sample = 46% yes
Sample = 68% yes; highest yes = Consul (96% vs 58% 
average; Pr = 0.006); highest no = skilled (Pr = 0.016)
What’s needed for 
promotion?
1. Sample -  59% skills & experience, 15% teamwork 
& personal relations/ 26% education & training.
2. Skill / experiential emphasis: Brastemp-Sao 
Bemardo/Enxuta
3. Qualification/relational emphasis: Brastemp-Rio 
Claro/Consul (Pr = 0.048)
Basis of task allocation 
decisions?
Sample = 62% formal basis
Basis of task allocation 
decisions?
1. Informal basis: Brastemp-Sao Bernardo /Enxuta 
(Pr = 0.039)
2. Formal basis: Brastemp-Rio Claro/Consul
Source: Worker interviews
For example, 68% of the sample felt they knew what was needed for 
promotion (Table 5.20, row 1). This was highest at Consul (96%) but considerably 
lower at all of the other firms (58% average; Pr = 0.006). Also, the skilled were much 
less likely than the semi/unskilled to know what was needed (Pr = 0.016). 
Information systems may be clearer at Consul and the lower response for the skilled 
may reflect the lack of career structure beyond their present skilled post.
What was seen as being required for promotion, on the other hand, fell into 
three groups of factors (Table 5.20, row 2). Over half (59%) emphasised 
‘demonstrated skills and experience’, 15% said ‘principally teamwork and personal 
relations’ and 26% emphasised ‘education and formal training’. However, as also 
noted in Table 5.20 (row 2), workers at the two most traditional firms were 
significantly more likely to believe that demonstrated work skills and experience 
were of overwhelming importance whereas respondents from the most modem firms 
and Consul II opted disproportionately for the formal qualification or relational 
explanation.
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In terms of task allocation, workers held different views over whether 
decisions were made formally or informally. The majority of workers at all firms felt 
that decisions on these opportunities were made on a formal basis (62%; Table 5.20, 
row 3). However, it is also clear that significantly larger proportions of workers at 
the two most traditional firms felt that solely an informal system was used (Table
5.20, row 4).
Thirdly, when asked whether they felt their work at the firm had made them 
more mobile to other firms, 60% said yes (Table 5.21, row 1). This response was 
significantly higher for the semiskilled than either the skilled or unskilled. In view of 
the debate about the effect of ILMs on employability and work motivation, it is 
significant that the semiskilled continue to register higher optimism than the other 
groups. However, this inference does not appear to apply on a modernisation basis as 
this split of the sample was not significant and, as previous indicators have noted 
(Table 5.19), workers at the most modernised firms do not feel more skilled as a 
result of their work experience.
Table 5.21: Perceptions of Improved Mobility, by firm and skill
Indicator Key Response by Firm Key Response by Skill
More mobile now? Yes (60%) Semiskilled in particular 
(Pr = 0.081 )
More mobile due to..? 1] Experiential only 
emphasis -  Brastemp- 
Sao Bernardo and Enxuta 
(Pr = 0.007)
2] Education/Training 
and experiential 
emphasis -  Brastemp- 
Rio Claro and Consul II / 
III (Pr = 0.004)
1] Experiential only 
emphasis -  semiskilled / 
unskilled (Pr = 0.096)
2] Education/Training 
and experiential 
emphasis -  skilled (Pr = 
0.081)
Source: Worker interviews
When mobility was improved, on the other hand, what was this due to (Table
5.21, row 2)? Similar to the above, a larger proportion of workers from the two 
modem firms and Consul II said ‘a combination of experience and education and 
training’ whereas a majority and larger proportion of workers at Brastemp-Sao
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Bernardo and Enxuta said ‘experience only’ was responsible for this. Less 
predictably, it was the semiskilled and unskilled who felt that solely work experience 
was responsible and the skilled who felt that training and experience explained their 
enhanced external mobility.
In summary, even the relatively neutral indicators of perceptions of progress 
and opportunity reviewed in this subsection do not necessarily support an optimistic 
view of modernisation’s effects on work attitudes. In fact, a more sceptical 
interpretation of modernisation is supported by combining workers’ views about 
progress and opportunity decisions with a number of earlier observations. For 
instance, comprehensively modernised firm workers do not register greater 
perceptions of employability or skill. Yet when workers do feel more mobile this has 
a stronger relation to education and training at the more modem firms than at the two 
most traditional firms. However, as noted in Chapter 4, many of the courses offered 
to workers at the most modem firms are very firm orientated and are thus less likely 
to increase employability.
Secondly, while most workers are unhappy with their lack of promotion, 
workers at the most modernised firms are particularly unhappy with their (formal, 
task and promotional) evaluation system. In contrast, workers at the more traditional 
firms are happier with their (informal, task and promotional) evaluative systems. As 
these themes are also strongly linked to the worker-employer relation, Chapter 6 
looks more closely at these issues through a consideration of workers’ attitudes to the 
employer.
5.5 CONCLUSION - A NEW AND IMPLICIT EFFORT BARGAIN?
This chapter’s review of changes to work found some evidence to support the 
optimistic hypothesis, particularly in relation to ‘objective’ work developments and in 
terms of the semiskilled. There was also support, in principle, for the view that firms 
can encourage better performance outcomes by offering changes to work which do not
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necessarily involve wages. Tradeoffs can be made and the implicit bargain represents a 
reasonable way to characterise modernising firms’ responses to their desire for higher 
levels of quality and efficiency.
However, the implicit bargain offered by one firm (Brastemp-Rio Claro) seems 
to be a more acceptable one than that at the other comprehensively modernised firm, 
Consul III. Moreover, while the semiskilled are gaining tasks and displaying attitudes 
much like theory would suggest, the other two skill groups have concerns about their 
work and their prospects. Furthermore, results on a comprehensive/partial 
modernisation basis raise more fundamental concerns about the nature of 
modernisation and the implicit bargain of even the most modernised firm. A few 
examples demonstrate how, when the study moves further from ‘objective’ changes to 
attitudes, the optimistic hypothesis does not stand up to scrutiny.
First, the semiskilled and workers at the comprehensively modernised firms are 
using more complex, conceptual skills and work quite intensively with new 
technologies and techniques. They are also getting more training, education and the 
chance to further develop their skills within parts of the firm in which they are 
accustomed. Supervision has also improved most for these workers and they speak out 
more (at least on production issues) with a wide range of co-workers.
However, beyond these areas other ‘objective’ indicators contradict optimistic 
theory. For instance, Consul II workers have received more upgrading that have those 
at most other firms. They also consider themselves to have a better supervisory 
situation than do their colleagues in Consul III. Brastemp-Rio Claro workers, on the 
other hand, want to make more suggestions but are less critical than others, whereas 
Consul III workers register the greatest desire (100%) to make more suggestions about 
issues which go beyond production efficiency. There are also question marks about the 
role of the firms’ education and training policies, particularly as the unskilled are now 
more educated than the semiskilled but do not gain the types of opportunities that seem 
to be on offer to the semiskilled.
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When attention turns to more subjective indicators the picture becomes even 
less like that provided by optimistic theory. Positive results included the semiskilled’s 
high level of work interest despite it being more difficult, intense and responsible. 
Workers like to be challenged in their work. The semiskilled also felt they were now 
more skilled and that they had expanded employment opportunities due to their work in 
the firm. However, contrary to other studies on Brazilian workers, workers liked to use 
new techniques more than they did new technologies. Neither modernisation ‘tool’ was 
seen as having significant skill effects. Yet techniques registered higher for interest and 
responsibility effects.
More pessimistically, in terms of assessments of work overall, the indicators 
did not support the view that modernised firm workers are labouring smarter or 
happier. What they did suggest was that Consul II workers felt less monitored and more 
satisfied with their work than did workers at Consul III. In terms of Brastemp-Rio 
Claro, workers found their work hard and intense but low on responsibility and interest.
These results were compounded by workers’ attitudes to their specific new 
tasks. For instance, Consul III workers were particularly unimpressed with their new 
tasks while Brastemp-Rio Claro workers were particularly negative about the pressures 
created by the new techniques they had to use. Workers at both of these 
comprehensively modernised firms were also quite sceptical about whether their new 
tasks had made them more skilled or employable. Finally, these same workers were 
unhappy with their evaluation systems. This provided a great contrast to the more 
optimistic views of workers at the partially modernised firms.
Overall, the evidence reviewed in this chapter seriously questions managerial 
intent. Even though two types of ‘implicit bargain’ appear to be evident, one (at Consul 
III) if not both of them are very fragile. They are also not based on the work attitudes 
that optimists suggest. The risk of becoming more dependent on workers’ skills and 
attitudes has resulted in firms offering minimum changes to the distribution of power 
and little difference to labour’s share in the benefits of modernisation. In terms of work, 
the modernised workplace seems to be acting as an even more powerful structure of
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control than past forms of industrial organisation. Chapter 6 seeks to investigate 
whether this is also the case in respect to workers’ attitudes to the employer and what 
effects this may have had on workers’ attitudes to the union.
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PART C:
MODERNISATION -  THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS DIMENSION
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CHAPTER 6:
THE EFFECT OF MODERNISATION ON WORKERS’ ATTACHMENT
TO EMPLOYERS AND UNIONS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
This is the first of two chapters dealing with the effects of modernisation on 
industrial relations. Chapter 7 analyses the responses of the case study unions to the 
‘modernisation’ policies of the firms. The aim of this chapter is to cast light on the 
second attitudinal link within the optimistic modernisation hypothesis. That is, what 
effects has modernisation had on workers’ attitudes to the firm and, by extension, on 
workers’ attitudes to their union1?
Chapter 4 showed that two of the case study factories were comprehensively 
modernised and that they had achieved positive performance outcomes. However, 
Chapter 5 confirmed that, while many features of work had changed as theory argues 
these outcomes did not have the relation to workers’ attitudes that optimists suggest. 
Thus if the optimistic hypothesis really holds it must be based on a new type of bond 
between the employee and the employer. Moreover, with ‘us and them’ attitudes 
removed, it is uncertain what effect this may have on workers’ attitudes to the union.
On the basis of a review of workers’ attitudes, this chapter argues as follows. 
First, in terms of the worker-employer relation, the concept of a new implicit bargain is 
again confirmed. Workers can be persuaded to think of the effort bargain in terms of a 
number of characteristics of employment. Workers (particularly the semiskilled) are 
also positive about this in principle and, consequently, those at the most modernised 
factories are taking a more inward looking firm-based approach. However, their degree 
of attachment to the firm is limited. Most workers are unhappy with their present gains
1 As in Chapter 5, no multivariate analysis was carried out due to the size o f the sample and the depth 
o f analysis in other parts o f this thesis. However, chi-squared tests were carried out on key issues and 
the results o f these (to a 5% significance level) are shown in the text. Disaggregations based on skill 
level did not hamper the analysis as the skill structure o f the sample, by firm, was quite even. Where 
greater caution had to be shown over unclear causal relationships related to unionisation by firm.
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while many have high hopes of future gains. Due to this uncertain situation, the 
probability that workers at the most modernised firms will voluntarily remain with their 
present firm is no greater than that for workers at the more traditional factories.
In terms of the worker-union relation, the cynicism of Brazilian workers to 
unions may have been heightened by the policies of the comprehensively modernised 
firm. The union’s ‘electorate’ remains very sceptical and may even have shifted its 
priorities. However, this view is strongly qualified. For example, part of this result has 
been due to the anti-union policies of these firms rather than due to the persuasive 
effect of internal policies per se. Moreover, despite low levels of unionisation at the 
more modernised firms, many workers are positive about unionism and strikes. Yet this 
is conditional on union policies being directed towards the promotion of workers’ key 
workplace concerns.
These results flow from the following empirical structure. First, based on 
responses to general questions, section 6.2 notes that workers are taking a more firm- 
centric view. The section then summarises the specific issues upon which the rest of the 
chapter’s analysis is based. Secondly, section 6.3 casts light on the issue of company 
allegiance through the use of a number of questions about the employer and its policies.
Finally, section 6.4 looks at the other side of this allegiance debate. If workers 
have been persuaded to see the ‘world of work’ with eyes which more closely match 
employers, what relevance does unionism hold for them? A variety of questions about 
the union and unionism help the discussion move towards this composite view of the 
effect of modernisation on workers’ attitudes. Section 6.5 summarises and concludes 
the analysis.
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6.2 ANALYSING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ATTITUDES
6.2.1 Employer and Union Attachment -  an overview of the sample
Chapter 2 suggested that many Brazilian workers have good historical reasons 
to question the intent behind employers’ policies. The unrepresentative and political 
behaviour of most unions may have also deterred stronger links between workers and 
unions. Moreover, a number of earlier writers have emphasised the powerful influence 
of the Brazilian State on industrial relations and workers' perceptions and preferences.
Based on the samples’ responses to a number of general questions, this 
subsection suggests that this situation may have changed. As modernisation theory 
suggests, the employer holds key significance in workers’ eyes. Yet the state has little 
credibility and unions, as they are presently configured, continue to be seen as 
irrelevant by most workers. These results (and caveats to them) are discussed below.
First, 52% of the sample see the power to determine their livelihood resting 
more with the firm compared to 38% who indicated the state (Table 6.1, row 1). This 
result was significant on a modernisation basis, with workers at the three more 
modernised firms believing more strongly in the firm (Pr = 0.006). However, while the 
semi/unskilled believed this, the skilled were strongly of the view that the state still 
held most influence.
Table 6.1: Impressions of Power/Indications of Confidence, key responses
Questions Key Responses
Who has most power to determine your 
conditions of employment / living?
a) Sample -  52% firm / 3 8% the state
b) Comprehensive moderniser and 
Consul II workers -  more emphasis 
on the firm (Pr = 0.006)
c) Skilled was only group to see state 
as more significant (56%).
In whom do you have most confidence to 
determine your conditions of employment 
/ living?
a) Sample -  78% firm, 16% other, 6% 
the state.
b) Unionists: non-members and passive 
members more emphasis on the firm 
compared to active member 
emphasis on the union (Pr = 0.004).
Source: Worker interviews.
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Taking this issue further, all workers were asked a number of general questions 
about their employer2. These questions were -  workers’ ranking of their firm on each of 
those work features noted in Chapter 5 (section 5.2.1) and, how their current firm rates 
on these issues compared to their previous firm3. Responses to these questions 
highlight a number of important aspects of employee attitudes.
For example, the highest rated characteristics of the current firm were 
ambience, stability, involvement and mobility and the most improved features of the 
present firm compared to past employment were ambience, training and salary/mobility 
(Table 6.2.). Within these results a number of themes stand out for the sample overall. 
First, ambience registers as an identifiable issue and a vast improvement on previous 
conditions. Secondly, that training and mobility stand out as improvements is also 
significant. However, none of these results by themselves prove or disprove the 
modernisation perspective.
2 As noted in Chapter 5, while following questions were not disclosed, there may be some correlation 
between how a worker rates the firm and conditions at previous employers.
3 Composite indicators constructed by aggregating the number o f first and second preferences (or top 
two improvement/problem scores) each indicator received, by group.
Table 6.2: Rating and Comparing the Firm, hierarchies for features of 
employment
FIRM (S) N Rating the Firm Comparing the Firm
SAMPLE
93
Ambient
Stability
Involvement/mobility
Ambient 
Training 
Salary / mobility
COMPREHENSIVE
MODERNISERS:
1] Brastemp-Rio Claro 25
Ambient /stability 
Involvement 
Mobility/ salary
Ambient
Training/mobility
Salary
2] Consul III 6
Ambient
Salary/training
Stability/Involvement
Training/ambient
Involvement
Salary/mobility
PARTIAL
MODERNISERS:
1] Enxuta 20
Ambient/mobility
Stability/involvement
Training
Ambient
Training
Career
2] Brastemp-Sao 
Bernardo
25
Ambient
Salary/mobility/
involvement
Stability
Ambient
Salary/training
Stability/mobility/
involvement
3] Consul II
17 Salary
Ambient/mobility
Involvement
Salary/mobility 
Training/involvement 
Stability/ambient
Source: Worker interviews.
On the other hand, the implicit bargain of the comprehensively modernising 
firms is supported by certain disaggregated results. For example, when comparing past 
and present employers, salaries rated more highly at the two most modernised firms 
(Pr=0.082)4. This was also the case for workers’ rating of their present firm in respect 
to salary (Pr = 0.006). That salary rates as an improvement (but also a significant 
problem) highlights the low level of industrial wages in Brazil. Secondly, responses 
confirm that ambience (Pr = 0.092), stability (Pr = 0.019) and training (Pr = 0.006) also 
received higher levels of approval at the most modem firms. Finally, mobility (Pr = 
0.009) and involvement (Pr = 0.027) were also more improved at the comprehensively
4 However, this result was even more significant when Consul II was added to the modem group 
(Pr=0.061).
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m odernised firms, w hen past and present em ployers were compared.
Yet, as with general attitudes to work (section 5.2.1), these positive impressions 
of the modernising employer were not so categoric. For instance, that ambience 
registers as an identifiable issue and a vast improvement on previous conditions, but 
not a very important feature of work, suggests that there are limits to the means by 
which employer policies may affect attitudes. This is confirmed by the fact that, while 
involvement rates highly as a factory characteristic (and was more improved for 
workers at the most modernised firms) it was also of more minor importance to 
workers.
Moreover, Chapter 5 (s5.2.1) also noted that work mobility rated relatively 
lowly within workers' preferences and experiences. The significance of the above 
mentioned mobility improvement rating for their current employer may, therefore, 
relate more to promotion and career development and workers' expectations and 
demands for these rather than due to mobility per se - particularly without promotion. 
In this regard, uncertainty about career development ‘promises’ is a key issue within 
the employer-employee relationship that the literature and this thesis have already 
highlighted. Thus, it was highly significant that most workers were unhappy with their 
rewards on promotion and that workers at the most modem firms were by far the most 
unhappy with their systems of evaluation. This may also have dampened the degree to 
which workers in modernised firms feel increased stability at their current employer 
compared to past employers.
Other responses appear to confirm this presumption about feelings of stability. 
When comparing present and past employers the important stability variable does not 
fit the comprehensive/partial split. What the figures suggest is that almost all Brastemp- 
Rio Claro workers feel more secure in their job, that over half Enxuta, Brastemp-Sao 
Bernardo and Consul II workers also feel this way, but that most Consul III workers 
feel that their stability of employment has declined (Pr = 0.03). As these workers come 
from Consul II, they are probably comparing the two factories.
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In terms of workers’ attitudes to unions, preliminary questions put to the 
sample indicate great scepticism (row 2, Table 6.1 above). For example, when asked 
whom they have more confidence in for the determination of their livelihood, the data 
suggests that the state is a much less credible institution than it may have been, that the 
firm inspires a great deal of trust but that the union was held up as a symbol by only a 
small minority of workers (up to 16%). A large 78% of the sample had most 
confidence in the firm and only 6% in the state.
These results were not significant on a modernisation basis or in terms of skill 
levels. Yet they were on the basis of unionisation (Table 6.1, row 2 b). Fairly 
expectedly, a much larger proportion of active unionists put more confidence in the 
union (nearly half) than did non and passive members (8%).
Nevertheless, due the distribution of unionists by firm (see Table 6.9), 
responses also suggest something about workers’ attitudes on a factory basis. For 
example, non-members (i.e. most Brastemp-Rio Claro and Enxuta workers and about 
half of Consul, particularly Consul III workers) most strongly supported a firm centric 
view. On the other hand, active members (i.e. mainly Brastemp-Sao Bernardo and 
Consul, particularly Consul II, workers) were the least prepared to believe this 
(Pr=0.004). Modernisation may explain part of these results.
In summary, these results suggest that the modernising firm has gained a 
greater level of attachment from workers. The results also suggest that unions are not 
very relevant to workers, outside of a small core of active unionists - most of who are 
not employed in the modernised firm anyway. Yet these observations require much 
deeper examination. The next subsection reiterates the specific themes which the rest of 
this chapter uses to explore the depth of workers’ new attachment to the modernised 
employer and the basis of workers’ guarded views of unionism.
6.2.2 Specific Themes for an Analysis of Industrial Relations Attitudes
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, if a union actively tries to contest employer 
policies this sometimes acts to deter or modify negative consequences of modernisation
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for workers. In some cases, Brazilian unions have helped workers gain wage premiums 
for new work or they have acted to deter some of the work and worker allocation 
policies that the employer was proposing. While resource constraints and internal 
workplace divisions could complicate union action, at workplaces where unions and/or 
factory committees were in operation workers were more prepared to speak out.
However, at a number of the case studies in this research these structures are 
not evident and unionisation is very low. Nevertheless, asking all sample members a 
series of questions which highlight why they are/are not union members and what they 
want/don’t want the local union to do should help to expose both real and latent 
preferences for unionism. In terms of the employer, while labourers may be positive 
about modernisation in principle, studies suggest three areas of worker uncertainty. 
These related to worker dignity, the distribution of benefits from change and whether 
the employer’s unitary ‘message’ could be believed? Beginning with the employ er- 
worker relation, the next two sections explore these questions in depth.
6.3 THE MODERN EMPLOYER - THE NATURE OF WORKER 
ALLEGIANCE
The first part of this section’s analysis (6.3.1) of employees’ attitudes confirms 
a presumption of this thesis that, while pay is important, it can be traded off by the 
employer for other conditions of employment. Yet, as noted in section 6.2, an improved 
ambience, higher levels of involvement and mobility (without promotion) may not be 
enough in themselves to do this.
Within this setting, the second subsection (6.3.2) explores workers’ key 
concerns about the employer. Respondents were asked if and why their employer had 
more interest and what aspects of the employers’ policies they are unhappy with. The 
analysis then turns more directly to the progress evaluation systems noted earlier. 
Looking more to the future, the final subsection (6.3.3) evaluates the sample's views of 
what they have gained, whether they will gain and how probable it is they will stay 
with their employer. These responses also highlight policies the firms may have to
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modify (or issues unions must better address) if they wish to improve their 
performance.
6.3.1 The Question of Remuneration -  Are the Tradeoffs Adequate?
All members of the sample were asked questions about remuneration and their 
feelings of overall reward. First, only 44% said that pay was adequate (Table 6.3, row
1). Yet in spite of their very low wages by industry standards, Brastemp-Rio Claro 
workers are by far the happiest with pay (Table 6.3, row 1, 1)). Consul II (47%), 
Consul III (33%), Enxuta (30%), and Brastemp-Sao Bernardo (40%) responses were 
much lower5. These differences in responses suggest that issues other than wages 
matter to workers. However, they also highlight how workers’ previous experience 
affects the minimum acceptable wage and that wage levels in Brazil are strongly 
regionally determined. Relative union bargaining power is an important factor behind 
this.
Table 6.3: Satisfaction with Pay and Overall, key responses
Question Key Responses
Are you adequately 
paid?
Sample = 44% yes
1) Highest positive response by firm -  Brastemp-Rio Claro 
(60%)
2) Lowest positive response by skill -  the unskilled (Pr = 
0.038)
Your work is well
compensated
overall?
Sample = 60% yes
1) Highest positive response by firm -  the two comprehensive 
modernisers (76%-83%; Pr = 0.056)
2) Lowest positive response by skill -  the unskilled (Pr = 
0.003)
Source: Worker interviews.
Considering responses on pay on an occupational basis (Table 6.3 row 1, 2) 
confirms previous divisions noted in the sample. Once again the semiskilled feel 
relatively adequately financially compensated (48%), to about the same degree as the 
skilled compared to the unskilled (Pr = 0.038). Less than a third of the unskilled 
thought that their pay was adequate.
5 The proportion o f Consul II workers who were satisfied with pay was higher than Consul III (47% 
vs. 33%). However, over half o f Consul II respondents (53%) were still unhappy with pay.
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Taking a broader view of compensation, workers were also asked - are they 
adequately compensated overall (Table 6.3, row 2)1 A majority (60%) answered in the 
affirmative to this question and this endorsement was highest at the two 
comprehensively modernised plants (Table 6.3 row 2, 1)). Workers at Enxuta (40%) 
and Consul II (53%) responded the least positively to this question whereas Brastemp- 
Sao Bernardo workers were quite positive (60%).
These results are surprising, particularly in view of the positive response rate 
Consul II workers made to other attitudinal questions. On the other hand, the nature of 
the selection process for workers for Consul III and the role of the union at Brastemp- 
Sao Bernardo may have influenced these outcomes. Finally, the continuing superiority 
of the employment package for the skilled is shown by their positive response to this 
question (78%). However, the semiskilled also responded very highly (70%), making 
the distinction between these two groups and the unskilled the most significant (Table
6.3, row 2,2)).
In summary, a number of points can be made about the implicit bargain based 
on these responses. First, while the semiskilled are quite content the unskilled feel 
unfairly treated by their employer both in terms of pay and other aspects of 
employment. Secondly, as far as factory management is concerned, Brastemp made a 
very wise choice moving to Rio Claro. However, career expectation concerns by all 
workers and evaluative concerns by workers at the comprehensive sites may require 
attention if firms such as Brastemp-Rio Claro are to continue with favourable turnover 
and productivity results.
In terms of Consul, workers at Consul II are most unhappy with non-wage 
issues. On the other hand, workers at Consul III rate pay very lowly. This is not 
surprising when it is remembered that the company has placed a group of highly 
motivated workers with high expectations in factory III. That less productive workers 
on the same job classification (but not performing the same tasks) in Consul II receive 
the same base wage as they do would not do much for factory III workers’ assessment 
of pay.
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In sharp contrast, the highly pressured Brastemp-Sao Bernardo workers feel 
quite satisfied with their overall employment package in spite of the disorganised state 
of the factory. Enxuta workers, on the other hand, are quite unhappy with both wages 
and with their overall employment package. This is not surprising in view of conditions 
there and the fact that wages lag behind other local metals firms.
6.3.2 Believing in the ‘New Employer’
While the most modernised firms have more successfully persuaded workers to 
go ‘beyond contract’, what does this suggest about workers' degree of belief in the 
‘new employer’? First, asked if the firm has more interest in workers than in the past, 
70% of the sample said yes, with this being highest at Brastemp-Rio Claro and Consul 
II (Table 6.4, row 1). However, once again, Consul III responses show no significant 
difference to the less modernised firms and this may be due to an intra-factory 
comparison (with Consul II scoring higher) on the part of Consul III workers.
Table 6.4: Belief in the Firm’s Interest in Workers, key responses
Question Key Responses
Firm has more interest in workers 
now?
Sample = 70% yes
1. Highest positive response by firm -  
Brastemp-Rio Claro and Consul II (76%)
Why does the firm have more 
interest?.... (profit or more altruistic 
emphasis)
Sample = 67% mainly due to profit 
1. Greatest belief in altruism by firm -  
Brastemp-Rio Claro and Consul II (Pr = 
0.029)
Source: Worker interviews
Furthermore, when asked why the firm has more interest, 67% of respondents 
said the reason had more to do with profit than could be assigned to altruism (Table
6.4, row 2). Significantly, a disproportionate number of Brastemp-Rio Claro and 
Consul II (not Consul III) workers felt that the reason was one predominantly driven by 
employer altruism (Table 6.4, row 2, 1)). Workers at the two oldest firms and the ultra 
modem Consul III were much more sceptical about their employer.
Responses to questions about the firms' reactions to workers' suggestions also 
confirm and contradict an optimistic scenario. A uniform percentage of workers (55%)
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from all firms felt that the firm responded positively to any suggestion made (Table 6.5, 
row 1). However, Brastemp respondents (a modem and an old firm) scored lowest 
(56%) on the question of whether critical suggestions had negative effects on career 
prospects (Table 6.5, row 1, 1)). In contrast, Consul III and Enxuta (a modem and an 
old firm) scored highest (i.e. the most pessimistically; 77%) to this question (Table 6.5, 
row 1, 2)). On a skill basis, the semiskilled stood way ahead of the other two skill 
groups in their optimism that all suggestions they make will be positively treated and 
the unskilled were significantly more of the view that all suggestions are treated in a 
negative way (Table 6.5, row 1, 3) & 4)).
Table 6.5: Firm’s Reactions to Suggestions and Workers’ Topics of Complaint, 
key responses
Question Key Responses
Firm’s reactions 
to workers’ 
suggestions?
Sample = 55% positive
1) Most optimistic workers by firm -  Brastemp-Rio Claro and Sao 
Bernardo
2) Most pessimistic workers by firm -  Consul III and Enxuta
3) Most optimistic workers by skill -  the semiskilled (Pr = 0.028)
4) Most pessimistic workers by skill -  the unskilled (Pr = 0.015)
What do you 
complain about?
Sample = 58% salary/benefits; 23% skills/training; 9% evaluation;
79% ambience; 32% mobility/career
1) On a firm level-
a) Few responses from Brastemp-Rio Claro.
b) Comprehensive moderniser workers rarely complain about 
evaluation
c) Consul III workers complain most about career opportunities 
and ambient
d) Most other responses reflect situation at each firm and that more 
traditional firm workers are more vocal
2) On a skill level -
a) Semiskilled complain most about evaluation and least about 
skills and training
b) Skilled complain most about skills and training and least about 
evaluation
Source: Worker interviews
Combining these results with earlier evidence on suggestions6 suggests that, 
while Consul workers are uncertain about reactions to their suggestions, they are
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prepared to speak out. Brastemp-Rio Claro workers may be happy overall with their 
conditions. Brastemp-Sao Bernardo workers, on the other hand, appear confident to 
make (and in the reaction to) their suggestions while Enxuta workers make critical 
suggestions in spite of anticipated negative effects on career prospects7. However, once 
again, the inference that the semiskilled are more optimistic and/or are being singled 
out due to their growing importance to company operations appears to be confirmed.
In an effort to pry further into what each group may feel most unhappy with 
within their employers' bargain, workers were also asked which of a list (the same as 
that used for the work preference ratings) of conditions did they complain about. 
Respondents listed these issues as follows - 58% salary and benefits/services, 23% 
skills and training, 9% evaluation concerns, 79% also about the ambience and 32% 
mobility and career issues (Table 6.5, row 2). However, response rates to this question 
varied considerably between firms.
For example, total Brastemp-Rio Claro responses to this question were very 
low (8) relative to their representation in the sample and responses at all other firms 
were well above their representation in the sample (Table 6.5, row 2, 1)). However, few 
responses from Brastemp-Rio Claro workers do not necessarily mean that workers 
there are happy with everything. In fact, while earlier sections noted that they are very 
unhappy with their firm's evaluation scheme it is striking than none felt prepared to 
more openly discuss this. The fact that the decentralised scheme used for evaluation is 
the same one which records a ‘black mark’ against a complaining employee may 
provide a more accurate view of why fewer workers complain at that workplace and 
not just that conditions are so idyllic.
Despite these very different response rates by firm, it is still instructive to 
consider what the more openly dissatisfied workers say they are prepared to complain 
about (Table 6.5, row 2, 1)). For example, workers at the ultra modem Consul III 
complain more than proportionately about the lack of career opportunities they feel 
they now have (4 respondents). Yet, as with Brastemp-Rio Claro workers, they are not
6 Chapter 5, subsection 5.3.2.
7 As noted earlier, Enxuta workers appear less concerned with stability o f employment, perhaps only
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prepared to explicitly condemn the system of evaluation used for decision making 
beyond a general recognition that it is a problem. Other firm level responses to these 
questions either confirm the situation at each factory or, more importantly, that workers 
at the more traditional firms are more confident to speak out (Table 6.5, row 2, Id).
On a skill basis (Table 6.5, row 2, 2)), the most skilled complain more than 
proportionately about skills and training (50%) and least about evaluation (0). The 
semiskilled, on the other hand, are complaining the least about skills and training (5%) 
and proportionately more about evaluation (21%). These contrary results for the 
semiskilled and skilled suggest that the skilled want new skills and that the semiskilled 
have high promotional expectations8. Consequently, firms’ desires to elicit maximum 
allegiance from each of these groups of workers may require more than just the 
separation of these workers from each other within the factory.
Another method used to gauge the degree of worker belief in the modernised 
employer was through questions about whether workers were happy with how 
decisions were made and why (Table 6.6 below). These questions related to 
training/education, task allocation and the issue which appears crucial at the most 
modernised firms - promotional evaluation. Responses to these questions showed that 
involvement is liked for some issues but not for others and that this is affecting 
workers' views of their firm.
For example, earlier analysis suggested that workers at the most modem 
factories were more involved in training and education decisions and that work 
allocation decisions were more formal and known at these firms. In this regard, 
workers at Brastemp-Rio Claro and the two Consuls were most happy with the way 
these task (Pr=0.0008), training (Pr=0.025) and educational (Pr=0.0360) decisions were 
made (row 1, Table 6.6). This suggests that greater input may also make workers 
happier with their employer.
because this has rarely been a feature o f employment there.
8 The unskilled's responses closely fit the sample distribution.
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Table 6.6: Satisfaction with Employer Decisions, key responses
Question Key Responses
Like way task/training/education 
decisions made?
1) Comprehensive moderniser and Consul II 
workers most happy.
Like the promotional evaluation 
system?
1) Workers from two most comprehensively 
modernised firms don’t like (80% and 
above); partial moderniser workers do like 
(55%-60%)-(Pr = 0.012)
Why like/don’t like promotional 
evaluation system?
1) Comprehensive moderniser workers who 
dislike -  as is biased to education/training 
credits (Pr = 0.003) and/or too subjective.
2) Partial moderniser workers who don’t like 
evaluation system -  is due to subjectivity 
(Pr = 0.000)
Source: Worker interviews
On the other hand, confirming earlier analysis, most Brastemp-Rio Claro and 
Consul III respondents did not like their promotional evaluation systems (Table 6.6 row
2)9. In sharp contrast, the majority of Brastemp-Sao Bernardo (69%) and Enxuta 
workers (55%) were happy with their evaluation systems10. However, why do workers 
like or dislike the promotional system?
The major reason Brastemp-Rio Claro and Consul workers did not like their 
system was because it was seen as ‘biased to formal education and training credits’ 
(Table 6.6 row 3, 1)). Yet another reason modem firm workers did not like their 
evaluation system were because it was ‘too subjective’ (22% of their responses). 
Furthermore, while the majority of workers at the traditional firms liked their system11, 
of those who didn't (18) 89% criticised the system for its level of subjectivity (Table 
6.6, row 3,2)).
Overall, this subsection does not contradict a view that the most modernised 
firms have ‘negotiated’ a new implicit bargain with their workers, particularly the 
semiskilled. However, the degree of worker belief in the employer is limited and 
contingent on further change. For example, Consul III workers are not very convinced 
of their firm's interest in them, the reasons for this or of what may happen if they make
9 The Consul system, while not a written plan like at Brastemp-Rio Claro, was a better understood 
(section 3.3) and clearer (re. training and participation based - Chapter 4) feature o f Consul operations 
than were systems at the more traditional firms.
10 Consul II workers were about equally divided on this issue.
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critical comments. Secondly, while offering few explicit criticisms of the firm, 
Brastemp-Rio Claro workers appear to be constrained to openly voice their concerns 
with their firm's evaluation system.
Thirdly, in terms of the skill groups, there is an inherent conflict which may 
cause problems for the implicit bargain that firms are trying to make as they modernise. 
The skilled appear to be concerned that their relative position may be threatened. In 
comparison, the other skill groups are making it clear that they expect career 
development ‘promises’ to be honoured.
Finally, it appears that workers like a firm which offers decision making of a 
more participatory nature. However, they don't like the idea of formalised, participatory 
decision making being extended to promotional/evaluative issues. This appears to 
confirm a ‘decentralised control’ interpretation, rather than ‘more open involvement’ 
assessment of schemes such as Brastemp-Rio Claro's career system. However, many 
workers are still concerned about bias or favouritism in whichever system is used.
6.3.3 Gains, Expected Gains and the Probability of Staying and Leaving
The analysis up to this point has suggested that workers are even less inclined 
to feel attached to their employer than to their work. Employer allegiance is far more 
limited than optimists suggest. Workers' assessment of what they have and may gain 
from being with their employer and their probability of staying or leaving provide 
additional evidence on this issue. This subsection considers these themes for the 
sample.
First, only 47% of the sample feel that they have gained significantly from 
their current situation and 53% said they have gained ‘little to nothing’ (Table 6.7, row 
1, 1)). When asked what they expected to gain the largest proportion said ‘much’ 
(35%), 21% said ‘little to nothing’ and 44% were ‘unsure’ (Table 6.7, row 2, 1)). It is 
important to note that these issues do not show any significant difference across firms 
or by firm sub-groupings. On a skill level, however, most skilled workers have a high
11 They saw their system as fair and just in its rewarding of work skills and qualifications.
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level of satisfaction with their employer (78%), a slight majority of the semiskilled feel 
they have made important gains (52%) but 72% of unskilled respondents were still 
awaiting a perceived, adequate level of reward (Table 6.7, row 1,2)).
Table 6.7: Impressions and Expectations of Gains, key responses
Question Key Responses
What have you gained from the 
firm?
1) Sample -  47% much, 53% little- nil
2) Skilled/semiskilled quite satisfied -  
unskilled very dissatisfied (Pr = 0.000)
What do you expect to gain from 
the firm?
1) Sample -  35% much, 21 % little to nothing.
2) Skilled/semiskilled have high expectations -  
unskilled have low expectations (Pr =
0.040)
Source: Worker interviews
The semiskilled, nevertheless, registered a high level of optimism, similar to the 
skilled, that they would gain in the future (Table 6.7, row 2, 2)). These responses 
confirm that the semiskilled are more optimistic about gains in the future but also that 
there will be considerable pressure on modernised firms to deliver the expectations of 
their workforce. This may be fortified by Chapter 5’s observations that workers at the 
most modernised firms are less certain if they are more skilled or more employable in 
the open labour market.
In view of these sceptical results about workers' expectations and prospects, do 
workers feel more prepared to stay at the most modem firms and what does this depend 
on? Do the semiskilled stand out in this regard? What is the probability of workers 
leaving voluntarily (within the next two years)?
First, confirming workers’ desires for stability, 79% of workers expect (hope) 
to still be at their firm in two years time (Table 6.8, row 1). Secondly, most workers 
expect to be working in the same section but at a higher level (55%) and 33% expected 
to be working in a different section and at a higher level (Table 6.8, row 2). Workers at 
the two most modernised firms responded disproportionately more that they expected a 
promotion, particularly to another section (Table 6.8, row 2, 1)). Workers at the three 
partially modernised firms more strongly expected to stay in their present section (often 
without promotion in the case of Brastemp-Sao Bernardo; Table 6.8, row 2, 2)). Thus
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workers at the most modernised firms do have higher internal mobility expectations, 
particularly when it comes to the issue of promotion.
This attitude may allow the employer to allocate labour more flexibly. Yet as 
noted in Chapter 5 (Table 5.14), this is the opposite of what is occurring at these 
factories. Workers at the most modernised firms are more likely to remain in the same 
section on promotion. If workers at the most modernised firms are happier with this 
then it would appear that they prefer a more literal form of stability rather than one 
involving too much movement between sections of the firm’s operations. On the other 
hand, if they are unhappy with this situation, the modernised employer may need to 
provide greater mobility (plus stability and promotion) in order to generate greater 
feelings of employer attachment.
Table 6.8: Expectations of Stability or Voluntary Turnover, key responses
Question Key Responses
Expect to be at firm in 2 years? 1) Sample -  79% yes
Expect to be working where? Sample = 55% same section/higher level; 33% 
different section/higher level.
1) Comprehensive modernised firm workers -  
a promotion, particularly to another section 
(Pr = 0.043).
2) Partial moderniser workers -  same section, 
often without promotion
Probability of this (voluntary) 
stability depends on...?
Sample = 84% conditions at firm; 27% outside 
opportunities also.
1) Comprehensive moderniser workers -  
greatest emphasis on developments at current 
firm
2) Partial moderniser workers -  less emphasis 
on developments at current firm (Pr = 0.082)
Expect to (voluntarily) leave firm 
in next 2 years?
1) Sample -  28% have reasonable probability 
of leaving.
2) Non-unionists (Enxuta, Brastemp-Rio Claro 
and 50% of Consul III workers) most likely 
to leave (Pr = 0.004)
Source: Worker interviews
Thirdly, the probability of staying at the firm (Table 6.8, row 3) was strongly
related to (improved) conditions at that workplace (84% of respondents) as opposed to
the lure of work at other firms (27% of respondents also suggested this reason). At
Brastemp-Rio Claro and Consul III this inward-looking perspective was highest, with
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93% of respondents saying a decision to stay or move was based on developments at 
the current firm (Table 6.8, row 3, 1)). Responses from workers at the other three 
factories were significantly less internally directed (Table 6.8, row 3, 2)). This is the 
type of response modernising employers would like to hear.
However, looking at this issue from another angle, 28% of the sample expected 
to leave the firm in the next two years (Table 6.8, row 4). This did not vary by firm and 
what might worry modernising firms is that non-unionists were much more likely to 
feel that they would not be working there in two years (Table 6.8, row 4, 2)). This is 
surprising as the non-unionist group falls in the middle of the skill distribution of the 
sample and applies more to the two most modernised firms and Enxuta. It thus appears 
that workers at the most modernised firms do not have any greater (possibly less) 
attachment to their employer than do workers at the partially modernised firms.
In summary, this subsection has suggested that the implicit bargain at the most 
modem firms has made workers there more company directed in perspective. It may 
also confirm the firm specific and less transferable focus of their new skills within 
these firms' ILMs. However, while modem firm workers and the semiskilled have high 
levels of work interest and hopes of a lot more from their employer, their expectations 
of progress and degree of company allegiance appear low and no greater than that 
expressed by workers at the older industrial establishments. The next section examines 
how this situation translates into workers’ attitudes to the union.
6.4 UNIONS AS A ‘VOICE’ - WORKERS’ VIEWS AND EXPECTATIONS
Unionisation is higher at the two older refrigeration factories (Table 6.9 below).
This is not surprising as previous parts of this thesis suggested that the more
modernised firms have the means (Brastemp-Rio Claro) and the clear intent (Consul
III) to exclude unionists from their operations. However, the opinions of workers at all
of the sites can be used to test the links between modernisation, subjectivity and
unionism. To achieve this, this section’s analysis of workers’ attachment to their union
is approached through questions which give insights into why workers do (or don’t)
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belong to a union (6.4.2) and in what workers want (and don't want) unions to become 
involved (6.4.3)12.
By way of background, the first subsection (6.4.1) gives a brief summary of the 
key unionisation characteristics of the sample. This also a provides a clearer idea of the 
attitudes of the firms to unionism and to the local unions. Overall, this analysis 
suggests that, despite the anti-active unionism policies of all firms, workers’ negative 
views of unionism could be partially offset if unions had more effective policies for 
dealing with negative aspects of workplace modernisation.
6.4.1 A Profile of Unionisation
Within the sample 47% of workers are union members and 53% are not (Table 
6.9). Also, only a minority of unionists (15%) is active beyond the use of union 
services13. However, there are a number of other aspects of the sample’s union 
distribution which stand out.
12 There is a sizeable body of literature dealing with the nature o f worker attachment (i.e. 
commitment, allegiance etc) to firms and unions. Such studies (e.g. D. Guest and P. Dewe, 'Company 
or Trade Union: Which wins worker allegiance?’ British Journal o f Industrial Relation. (1991), 29,1; 
D. Guest and P. Dewe, 'Why do workers belong to a trade union? British Journal o f Industrial 
Relations, (1988), 26,2) often use econometric and factor analysis and these sometimes include 
questions about reasons for joining a union. These are important methods for analysing worker 
‘attachment’. However, the depth and breadth o f analysis involved in other parts o f this work does not 
permit such an approach within this thesis.
13 The terms active and passive were largely worker defined. Passive represents using the social 
services o f the union but not viewing the union as more than this nor participation in political activity. 
Active, on the other hand, includes the latter functions for members and their union. However, at 
Consul active membership often represented a desire rather than a reality.
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Table 6.9: The Nature of Unionism, by sample, skill and firm
Union Type Non Member Passive Member Active Member
Sample: 53% 32% 15%
By Skill:
Skilled 52% 39% 9%
Semiskilled 41% 44% 15%
Unskilled 60% 21% 19%
By Firm:
Rio Claro 84% 16% -
Enxuta 70% 30% -
Sao Bernardo 12% 56% 32%
Consul II 47% 23% 30%
Consul III 50% 33% 17%
Consul Total 48% 26% 26%
Source: Interview cata -  Appendix D ,r"able Dl.
First, the semiskilled are the most unionised and the only skill group where a 
majority (59%) are union members (Table 6.9, row 2). This seems at odds with a 
pessimistic interpretation of unions and modernisation when it is remembered that the 
semiskilled are being singled out for better treatment. Yet it is here that a distinction 
between passive and active membership may explain this apparent contradiction. The 
semiskilled (44%), closely followed by the skilled (39%), are predominantly passive 
members. Thus it is not membership but passive involvement (i.e. for union social 
services) as opposed to active unionism (i.e. more political unionism) that divides the 
sample and company opinion.
Firms may even see passive union membership as a more positive indicator of 
interest and self-motivation. In this regard, the less optimistic situation of the unskilled 
may be partly explained by their unionisation level. The unskilled (Table 6.9, row 2) 
are most likely to be both non-members (60%) and active members (19%).
Secondly, the suggestion that modernising firms are not opening up factory 
relations to unions is confirmed (Table 6.9, row 3; Pr = 0.003 when the sample is 
divided on an partial/comprehensive basis). The Brastemp-Sao Bernardo union, not 
surprisingly, tops the sample for all types of unionisation. However, while unionisation 
is also high at both Consul factories (50%-53%), there is a large distinction between
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active membership in Consul II and the ultra-modem Consul III (30% vs 17%; Table
6.9, row 3)
On the one hand, this may confirm that passive unionisation is a proxy for 
workers’ interest in development - thus employment - in factory III. On the other hand, 
it might also confirm suggestions that, despite Sinditherme's (the moderate union) high 
level of unionisation, the company feels there is some validity to the Mecanico s (the 
militant union) claim that many Consul workers would prefer a more militant union. 
Whichever reasons apply, passive and active membership appears to be the line which 
divides labour mobility between Consul II and III.
Other statistics of importance to a consideration of unionisation are that 
unionists are older (33 years vs. 28) and have longer periods of service (6.5 years vs. 4) 
than non-members14. Unions may be a less attractive affiliation for the bulk of young 
people joining the labour market. These points have particular relevance as the 
comprehensively modernising firms have been shown to prefer to employ young, 
inexperienced workers. These factories’ more intense screening techniques and 
educational entrance barriers may be another method for achieving a young, less 
actively unionised workforce.
Finally, a number of important inferences can be made from the previous 
analysis of the data set. Active unionists (mainly Brastemp-Sao Bernardo and Consul, 
particularly Consul II workers) appear just as interested in their work, they felt they had 
gained many new skills and had been just as active in seeking out work skill and career 
improvement opportunities as workers not active in union affairs (basically workers at 
the more modernised factories and Enxuta)15. Active unionists also had strong desires 
for stability of tenure and greater involvement at work16. However, they were uncertain 
about key, informal processes at their workplace17. Nevertheless, it is very relevant to 
the modernisation focus of this thesis that their (low) expectations of future gains and 
probability of leaving their firm were not statistically different to the views of workers
14 Appendix D, Table D l, columns 5,6.
15 Chapter 5, sections 5.2 and 5.3.
16 Chapter 5, section 5.2.
17 This chapter, section 6.3.2.
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at the m ost modernised firms and Enxuta18.
6.4.2 Why do Workers belong to a Union?
This subsection builds on the above observations by exploring workers’ 
revealed preferences for belonging to a union. Responses generally confirm the union 
categories, as defined, and the division of unionisation by firm. However, the following 
observations also help to show those areas in which unions may have to improve or 
better explain their policies if they wish to be more successful and representative.
First, there was a strong level of awareness by the sample that the union had 
policies (80%; Table 6.10, row 1). Specific responses are important in this respect. For 
example, the more modem a firm the less aware are workers that the union has policies 
(Table 6.10, row 1, 2)). On a skill basis, the unskilled (the most non-unionised and 
actively unionised) are most likely to believe the union has a policy agenda (Table
6.10, row 1, 3)). However, the unskilled have shown the greatest reluctance to align 
themselves with a union (Table 6.9, row 2) whose policies they are quite aware.
Table 6.10: Awareness of Union Policy and Overall Assessment of the Union, key 
responses
Question Key Responses
Are you aware of your local 
unions’ policies?
1) Sample -  80% yes
2) By firm -  the more modernised the least 
aware (Pr = 0.001)
3) By skill -  unskilled the most aware
Is the local union good? 1) Sample -  71 % not good
2) Comprehensive modernisers -  the most 
negative (Pr = 0.000)
3) Consul II response (50/50) much different to 
Consul III (100% no).
Source: Worker interviews
Secondly, a significant 71% felt that the union was not a good organisation 
(Table 6.10, row 2, 1)). The more modem a firm the more likely are workers to think 
this way (Table 6.10, row 2,2)). Nearly 100% of workers at the two most modem firms 
felt such, while only just over 50% of Brastemp-Sao Bernardo and Consul II workers
18 Section 6.3.3.
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agreed with this. Most (80%) workers at Enxuta were also critical of the union.
These results suggest that modernising companies have had some success in 
gaining greater worker attachment and/or that these firms are creating the conditions 
whereby unionism is less relevant. However, in terms of Consul, it may merely confirm 
the selection criteria for movement from Consul II to Consul III and that a larger 
proportion of workers in Consul II look to the Mecdnicos as their model union referent. 
Similarly, the response of workers at Consul III may be a criticism of Sinditherme's 
moderate approach. In contrast, workers at both the modem Brastemp-Rio Claro and 
the more traditional Enxuta factory are not at all happy with their (militant) unions. 
More broadly, these results beg the question -  what do workers want of a union if they 
have such negative impressions of a number of different types of unionism?
Accordingly, when asked whether their union's policies were good (Table 6.11, 
row 1) this question elicited a slightly different set of responses to the previous 
question on whether the union was good. For instance, 62% of respondents said that 
some of the union's policies were good compared to 21% who said none and 17% who 
said all policies were good (Table 6.11, row 1, 1)). However, once again, the more 
modem a firm the less positively do workers see union policy (Table 6.11, row 1, 2)). 
Active members were most likely to be totally positive about union policy, non­
members the most categorically negative and passive members were by far the most 
likely to believe that only some of their union's policies were good (87%; Table 6.11, 
row 1, 3)). This last observation is probably explained by passive member's service 
demands of the union.
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Table 6.11: Impressions and Awareness of Union Policies, key responses
Question Key Responses
Local unions’ 
policies are good?
1) Sample -  62% some are good; 21% none are; 17% all are 
good
2) The more modernised a firm the least positive are workers 
(Pr = 0.003)
3) Passive Unionists more likely to like some of unions 
policies (Pr = 0.000)
Local unions’ 
policies are...? 1) Sample -  30% nothing; 19% workplace/labour process; 
51% traditional issues.
2) Passive unionists -  most aware of unions traditional 
orientation (Pr = 0.000)
3) Most skilled -  most likely to feel union does not have 
policies
4) By Firm:
a) Workers from two comprehensive modernised -  most 
likely to feel union does not have policies
b) Brastemp workers most aware of unions workplace/labour 
process orientation -  Consul workers most aware of unions 
traditional orientation (Pr = 0.000)
Source: Worker interviews
What then do workers think the union's policies are (Table 6.11, row 2)19? 
Almost 30% of respondents (91) to this question believed that the union does not have 
any real policies and only 19% felt that the union was concerned with workplace 
themes (Table 6.11, row 2, 1)). About 51% felt that the union was solely concerned 
with traditional issues not connected to the shop floor. On a firm basis, workers at the 
two more modernised plants most strongly felt that the union does not represent 
anything (Table 6.11, row 2, 4a).
On a skill level, it is the skilled workers who stand out from the rest (Table
6.11, row 2, 3)). They are most likely to feel the union does nothing and thus least 
inclined to say the union has either type of strategic orientation. On a unionisation 
basis, once again passive unionists are most aware of their union’s traditional (service) 
orientation (Table 6.11, row 2, 2)). The problems these differences in attitudes (by the 
various groups) raise for union policy are further underlined by these observations.
19 A list o f possible policies was used to gain workers’ responses. Traditional refers to wages, stability 
regulations and services.
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However, the split of the sample by firm for these two types of union 
orientation (traditional vs. workplace based) is the most illustrative result to emerge. At 
the Brastemp factories (a partial and a new plant) workers are most aware of union 
workplace strategies while at Consul (a partial and a new factory) workers are most 
aware of a traditional orientation of their union (Table 6.11, row 2, 4b). However, as 
noted above, Consul III workers were particularly unhappy with their union whereas 
this was less so for Consul II workers. This may support the contention that Consul III 
workers are very unhappy with Sinditherme's (lack of a) workplace approach and that 
the Mecanicos are still an important symbol for many workers at Consul II.
Combining the above responses - in respect to policy awareness, rating the 
union and its policies and the nature of union policy - confirms that the various skill 
groups have quite different impressions and demands of their union. This suggests that 
there are strong reasons for unions to develop specific policies for each skill group in 
addition to their general policy principles. These results also suggest that unions must 
continue with their service provision function. On a firm level, workers’ responses (at 
Consul) may offer some hope for the future of militant (but strategic) unionism. 
However, if unionisation is the sole measure of union effectiveness, it must be 
remembered that the militant Brastemp-Rio Claro (Limeira) union has not been very 
successful at that plant (16% unionisation; Table 6.9).
Finally, a cross check of these observations - about attitudes to the union and on 
the need for unions to have a workplace/labour process agenda - was carried out by 
cross tabulating responses on workers' rating of the union with their views on the nature 
of union policies (Table 6.12 below). Despite the negative impression of unions 
overall, these results confirm the importance of a union’s workplace/labour process 
policies for workers. Workers expect their affiliation with a union to be rewarded by 
active union involvement in workplace/labour process issues.
244
Table 6.12: Impressions of the Union based on its Policy Approach, key responses
Combined questions Key Responses
Local unions’ policies are / union is 
good?
1) Sample -  union is more likely to be 
judged as good if it is seen as having 
workplace/labour process policies 
(Pr = 0.000)
Local unions’ policies are / unions 
policies are good?
1) Sample -  union seen to have labour 
process policies is more likely have its 
policies liked uncategorically (Pr = 
0.000)
Source: Cross tabulated from responses noted in Tables 6.10 and 6.11.
For example, a positive view of the union was most evident for those workers 
who felt that the union had workplace/labour process policies (Table 6.12, row 1). A 
negative view of the union was more likely if a worker felt that the union did nothing 
or only concerned itself with traditional issues. Secondly, if a worker felt that union 
policies did not go beyond traditional issues, almost all respondents said that only some 
of the union's policies were good (Table 6.12, row 2). On the other hand, of the smaller 
number of workers who were aware of the union's labour process interests, more than 
half were happy with all of the union’s policies. The rest were happy with some of 
those policies.
6.4.3 What Workers want and don’t want of a Union
What then do workers (particularly at the most modem firms) think the union 
should do? There is obviously more that unions could do as only 12% said ‘nothing’, 
while 65% said workplace initiatives and 23% noted the need for union action on 
traditional issues (Table 6.13, row 1, 1)). On a firm basis, Brastemp-Rio Claro stood 
out as the only plant where a significant number of workers said ‘nothing’ (Table 6.13, 
row 1, 2)). Workers there also registered the lowest desire for their union to become 
involved in workplace issues.
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Table 6.13: Policy Expectations of the Union, key responses
Question Key Responses
What policies should the 
union have?
1) Sample -  65% workplace/labour process issues; 23% 
traditional issues; 12%‘nothing’
2) By Firm:
a) Brastemp-Rio Claro -  significant number said 
‘nothing’ (33%; Pr = 0.012)
b) Consul III -  100% said workplace/labour process 
issues.
c) Consul II -  70% workplace/ labour process, 30% 
traditional.
Source: Worker interviews
In comparison, future union policies on the labour process were of paramount 
concern (100%) to Consul III workers, with none of them saying ‘nothing’ or 
traditional themes (Table 6.13, row 1, 2b)). Combining these and previous results on 
attitudes to the union confirms that Consul III workers are unhappy with the union (and 
maybe thus less unionised) because it does not do enough for workers in the factory. 
On the other hand, many Brastemp-Rio Claro workers believe their union does not 
have any relevance for workers in their particular situation.
In contrast to workers at Consul III, Consul II workers registered a strong desire 
for their union to become involved in traditional areas (Table 6.13, row 1, 2c)). 
However, they also registered a strong desire for future union initiatives on their labour 
process concerns, equal to that noted by workers at the older establishments. These 
responses for Consul II suggest that both salaries and the work environment are 
important unfulfilled demands they have of their union.
Comparing workers' hopes for future union policy with workers' awareness of 
union policy provides further evidence of latent demand for union labour process 
initiatives (Table 6.14 below). First, 48% of respondents felt that the union should be, 
but was not as yet, involved in labour process issues (Table 6.14, row 2, column 2). 
This contrasts with only 6% of respondents who had unfulfilled traditional expectations 
of the union (Table 6.14, row 1, column 3). There are thus many reasons to support the 
view that many workers would like their union to challenge managerial ‘prerogative’ to 
adjust workplace conditions.
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Table 6.14: Impressions of what Union’s Policies are/should be
Question/Response Union policies should be 
based on the workplace.
Union should have 
traditional policies only.
Union policies are focussed 
on the workplace. 17.5 % of respondents 6% of respondents
Unions policies are focussed 
on traditional issues. 48% of respondents 16.5% of respondents
Source: Cross tabulated from responses noted in Tables 6.11 & 6.13.
However, there appear to be strong limits to the degree to which workers feel 
unions should take on a challenging identity. Union allegiance is also a very contingent 
and limited phenomena. The historical legacy of either radical, non-representative 
unionism or moderate, non-representative union corporatism appear to have left their 
mark on workers' attitudes to strikes, so-called political unionism and vertical union 
structures. While the emergence of the CUT and the Workers’ Party (PT) have 
challenged this view since 1980, responses to questions on these themes suggest that 
workers' views have not changed to the degree many commentators expected or 
desired.
For example, only 37% of interviewees felt that their union had an inclination 
to strike (Table 6.15, row 1). The spread of these responses between firms was very 
large with nearly all (92%) of Brastemp-Sao Bernardo workers saying yes compared to 
only 9% of Consul respondents (Table 6.15, row 1, 1)). One quarter of Brastemp-Rio 
Claro respondents recognised a strike inclination as did 15% of Enxuta workers. Union 
members and the semiskilled were more aware of their unions inclination to strike than 
non-members and the other two skill groups (Table 6.15, row 1,2)).
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Table 6.15: Assessing the Union on Strike Action, key responses
Questions Key Responses
Union has an inclination 
to strike?
Sample = 37% yes
1) Brastemp-Sao Bernardo highest yes (92%) -  Consul 
lowest (9%); by firm -  (Pr = 0.000)
2) Unionists (Pr = 0.000) and the semiskilled (Pr = 
0.050) highest yes responses.
When should a union 
consider striking?
1) Sample -  45% never, 31% over wages, 24% over any 
issue in dispute.
2) Two most traditional firms workers -  most 
unrestricted (Pr = 0.019)
3) Workers from comprehensively modernised Consul 
III evenly divided on three views and more strike 
positive than Consul II workers (65% said never)
4) Active unionists more militant than passive/non­
unionists (Pr = 0.000) but still split between the no 
strike (33%) and unlimited strike option (67%)
Union is good / when 
should strike?
1) Sample -  3 7% union not good/should consider strike 
action.
Source: Worker interviews and derived from responses in this table and Table 6.10.
Yet opinions on whether unions should strike varied significantly (Table 6.15, 
row 2). For example, the largest part (45%) of the sample felt that strikes should never 
be used, 31% that strikes should be restricted to the issue of wages and 24% felt that 
strikes should be employed for any issue in dispute (Table 6.15, row 2, 1)). Overall, 
workers at the two older firms were most unrestricted in their preference for the use of 
a strike (Table 6.15, row 2,2-3)).
However, Enxuta workers displayed the most even split between a preference 
for no strikes and the unrestricted use of a strike. In contrast, Consul III workers were 
completely evenly divided between the three preferences and were more strike positive 
than workers at Consul II. While these results may confirm a less militant attitude by 
workers at the modernised plants in general, Consul III workers do not seem to be as 
passive as the firm may be assuming. Yet they have no real avenue to express their 
preferences for union (or employer) policy on this or other matters.
Active members were unsurprisingly the most militant and passive members 
were just as non-militant as non-members (Table 6.15, row 2, 4)). However, over a 
third of active members were still against the use of a strike in any circumstance
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whereas none saw any logic to restricting strikes to solely wage issues. This suggests 
that even among active unionists a large spread of attitudes exists in relation to the 
appropriate form of resistance and its timing.
Nevertheless, the fact that 55% of the sample were in favour of some strike use 
(Table 6.15, row 2, 1)) whereas only 47% were union members (Table 6.9) suggests 
that unions could successfully employ the strike option if used more strategically. This 
is confirmed by tests comparing questions about strike use and workers' rating of the 
union. A significant 37% of the sample thought that their union was both not good and 
that some or unlimited strike action should be a real option (Table 6.15, row 3).
Turning to the issues of political unionism and vertical union relations, the 
results of this study provide little comfort for those groups with ambitions to build 
unions with both broad agendas and large vertical structures. For example, a significant 
proportion (52%) of respondents to the earlier union policy question also said that the 
union had policies ‘other’ than those listed (Table 6.16, row 1, 1)). The skilled and non- 
members showed statistically significant higher response rates to these questions than 
others (Table 6.16, row 1,3-4) respectively). What ‘other’ meant was overwhelmingly 
couched in negative terms, the two main responses being ‘themselves’ and ‘politics’.
Table 6.16: Alternative and Political Impressions of Unions, key responses
Questions Key Responses
Union policies are (other 
than listed)?
1) Sample -  52% yes
2) ‘Other’ -  always negative; Brastemp Rio Claro (16%), 
Consul III (100%).
3) By skill -  significant response by skilled (Pr = 0.054)
4) Non-unionists -  significant response (Pr = 0.091)
Do you support a union 
central/political party?
None; 9 supporters of CUT were all male, Brastemp-Sao 
Bernardo workers and for 9 the party was the PT 
(Workers’ Party)
Source: Worker interviews
The split of these comments by firm shows another important result (Table 
6.16, row 1, 2)). Very few Brastemp-Rio Claro workers said the union had policies 
other than those listed but all Consul III respondents criticised their union for being 
more preoccupied with itself than with workers' needs. If (as seems probable) this
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assessment relates to Sinditherme, this confirms the growing picture of Sinditherme as 
too moderate and as an unrepresentative body in Consul workers’ eyes. However, the 
Limeira (Brastemp-Rio Claro) union’s lack of focus on key policy issues does not seem 
to be the principal reason why workers there are not positive about the union.
Other questions on these themes elicited such low response rates (11%) that 
tests of significance show no differences within the sample (Table 6.16, row 2). Yet 9 
of the 11 workers who indicated they supported a peak union body (always the CUT) 
were from Brastemp-Sao Bernardo, all were male and 8 were active trade unionists. 
Only 2 of the 11 were from the ranks of the semiskilled. This same pattern was 
replicated for a question on whether workers supported a political party (Table 6.16, 
row 2). In this case the PT was the party mentioned by all but one of this small group 
(10) of workers. These results suggest that a broader view of unionism and its political 
links has not spread very widely, even in key bastions of ‘new unionism’ such as in Sao 
Bernardo.
6.5 CONCLUSION: WORKER SUBJECTIVITY - THE IMPLICIT BARGAIN 
AND THE ‘SHIFTING ELECTORATE’
This chapter has cast serious and consistent doubt on whether the new effort 
bargain has any relation to concepts such as ‘company allegiance’. The semiskilled are 
very positive about their situation. They are clearly more pivotal to company outcomes. 
Moreover, workers at the comprehensively modernised factories take a more firm- 
centred view. However, most workers appear to have a very sober impression of what 
the firm is offering and why. Within the context of ‘Brazilian’ modernisation, 
consenting would appear to be the most optimistic way to describe worker behaviour. 
Employer policy could best be described as a more subtly controlling.
Traditional anti-unionism and new forms of ‘persuasion’ have acted to keep
unions on the margin of industrial relations and workers’ consciousness. Yet, outside of
the most significant examples of modernisation (e.g. Brastemp-Rio Claro), it would
appear that unions still stand some chance of gaining workers’ ‘hearts and minds’ if
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they were to find some way to promote effective responses to the workplace policies of 
modernising firms. The following paragraphs summarise key aspects of this chapter’s 
findings on these two areas.
For example, despite feeling that the training, education and participation 
opportunities they have been given are important, workers at the most modernised 
factories stood out as they don’t like the way promotions are decided. In contrast, the 
majority of respondents from the less modernised firms did like their systems of 
evaluation. Nevertheless, workers at all factories are both unhappy with their 
promotions and concerned that bias and favouritism may be at work, whether or not 
their employer uses an informal or training credit-based system for evaluative purposes.
Secondly, many workers felt their employer has more interest in them than in 
the past and should give them more promotions or better conditions. However, workers 
at the comprehensive modernisers did not register a greater expectation of continuity at 
their firm than did workers at the older factories. Moreover, most workers said they had 
gained little as yet from their employment and, in contrast to Brastemp-Rio Claro 
responses, Consul III workers were just as sceptical of their employer's reasons and 
intentions as were workers at the more traditional firms.
In summary, those responsible for re-establishing Brastemp in Rio Claro made 
a very smart move. However, there are strong, latent expectational pressures on the 
company to deliver its implicit promises, particularly to semi/unskilled workers. At 
Consul, on the other hand, productivity is high yet there are clear indications that 
workers are negative about the company. Consul II workers are particularly unhappy 
about non-wage issues and Consul III workers are disgruntled about both wage equity 
and non-wage themes.
Nevertheless, these same workers (especially those at Brastemp-Rio Claro) 
were not inclined to speak out about such issues. In comparison, Brastemp-Sao 
Bernardo workers' attitudes were more open and cynical. They may feel very hard 
pressed but they are happier and more confident to openly criticise the employer on any 
issue. Enxuta workers, on the other hand, are both unhappy with conditions and very
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pessimistic that this can or will change.
An important reason for this variance in worker attitudes between factories is 
the different level and type of unionism which exists at each location. Chapter 7 will 
look in detail at this issue. However, this chapter has provided important background 
for this analysis. It has confirmed that employers' implicit bargain within the ‘politics 
of modernisation’ is neither fixed, static nor based on psychological bonds such as 
allegiance. ‘Us and them’ attitudes appear to remain, if only because the bargain is seen 
as being unfair. This implies that unions may have some chance of building and 
solidifying their ‘electorates’, if they can adjust their strategies.
However, this will be very difficult within the Brazilian context. This is 
because unions have to contend with two types anti-union policy from employers. On 
the one side, employers have subtly tried to weaken workers' desire for collective, 
outside representation by offering new benefits. In addition, they have located or used 
policies such as screening techniques and age and educational criteria to greatly reduce 
the chance that workers with strongly alternative views can gain access to employment 
within the factory. The fact that the industrial relations framework remains ambiguous 
may not have helped these unions either.
Nevertheless, despite this difficult context the degree of active worker 
allegiance to unions still varied considerably. For example, at the ‘greenfield’ case 
study firm unionism has never taken off to any degree. The passive views of Brastemp- 
Rio Claro workers suggest that, even if workers there think unions are good in 
principle, they have not been and are not expected to be of relevance to that particular 
workplace. On the other hand, a very different but equally complex situation arose at 
the Consul factories. Despite their high level of unionisation, the workforces of both 
Consul factories appear to be very dissatisfied with Sinditherme due to its inactive and 
unrepresentative approach on both wage and workplace concerns.
More generally, the workforces of Consul, Brastemp-Sao Bernardo and Enxuta
want and expect a union which is concerned with the workplace and labour process
changes taking place at their factories. However, their demands do not extend to what
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workers presently consider to be political-unionism or to the amalgamation of union 
policies and structures. There has - as yet - been little acceptance of the PT or of CUT's 
(or Forga Sindical's) policies or role by these workers.
Even still, the 1979-84 conjuncture suggested that when unions combine a 
genuine concern for workplace relations with an unstable political-economic situation 
workers have responded to collective calls by local and national organisations. In this 
regard, while the 1985-94 period was not as unstable as 1979-84, this research has also 
suggested that if union policies are more closely linked to workplace issues most 
unions should be able to encourage a more pro-union (if not collective) stance by 
workers. The next chapter puts this to the test through a consideration of union identity 
developments.
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CHAPTER 7:
UNION IDENTITY AND MODERNISATION
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is to analyse how the unions in each location have 
responded to previous chapters’ description of the ‘politics of modernisation’. Have 
unions chosen to pursue new strategies to enter factories and gain the ‘hearts and 
minds’ of workers and have they been successful? Secondly, when they have 
developed such an approach has this meant that they have had to dispense with a 
broader political role? The nature of these responses represents the third link within the 
modernisation schema.
Some optimists suggest that employers will provide a more positive, inclusive 
role for unions within the organisation. More sober assessments acknowledge that even 
if this is not the case unions will still have to adjust their approach to retain any 
relevance for workers. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the continuation of an 
ambiguous institutional and a harsh attitudinal climate already presents considerable 
behavioural constraints on Brazilian unions. In addition, Chapters 4-6 confirmed that 
modernising firms are controlling workers more and that unions can and are being 
more easily marginalised by the policies of the more advanced firms. Consequently, as 
suggested by the sceptical literature, both individual and collective opportunities for 
resistance have become even more problematic.
Nevertheless, Chapter 6 also noted that 88% of workers thought unions should 
do something and that this was particularly pronounced in terms of workplace/labour 
process issues1. However, these views were qualified in important respects at the two 
comprehensively modernised sites. For example, at Brastemp-Rio Claro, workers 
frequently reflected the view of one of their number who said, ‘Unions are
1 Table 6.13.
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important..they protect workers..but not here, they are not needed here’2.
At Consul, on the other hand, a number of those workers who were in favour of 
unionism also balked at the idea of unionism at that site, but from a different 
perspective. Their views are neatly summed up by one who said ‘Union?..we don't 
have a union here.. .if you complain to the union here you are out on the street the next 
day!’3. In comparison, many workers at Brastemp-Sao Bernardo expressed strongly felt 
views of unionism as an active, independent force in Brazilian society and at the 
factory floor.
Up to this point, therefore, this thesis suggests that the case studies are 
represented by quite different industrial relations environments. This chapter uses the 
dynamic model of union identity presented in Chapter 1 to unravel these complex local 
situations. Such a model allows the thesis to analyse whether these unions have both 
the desire and the capacity to effectively respond to the policies of modernisation.
On the basis of this analysis this chapter argues as follows. First, even the 
actions of a well organised, active and representative union (e.g. at Brastemp-Rio 
Claro) may not be enough to combat the policies of a comprehensively modernising 
firm, particularly one which locates in a ‘greenfields’ site. Theoretically, low wages, 
low education levels and macro instability could be used to the advantage of either the 
employer or the union. However, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition to the union 
building on these features is that it already has a strong foothold in that factory.
On the other hand, the policies of comprehensively modernising firms may not 
always be enough (e.g. at Consul) to negate a union’s ability to gain worker support. 
This is particularly so in cases where active unionism has a history but in which a 
moderate union has emerged as a competitor. As long as unionism has a base, what is 
required is that the union has an engaged relation with workers. However, the 
circumstances in which the modernisation process acts to create both new workplace 
concerns and greater real opportunities for action by unions may be rare.
2 Brastemp, Rio Claro worker interview, RCL 18, 9/93.
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Thirdly, an additional problem for unions is that modernisation may act to 
heighten an existing conflict within union policy. That conflict concerns balancing their 
resources and agenda between firm specific issues and broader political themes. The 
task of being representative while not becoming merely a social welfare agency or 
some detached political movement is becoming more difficult.
After introducing the unions and restating the specific themes and concepts 
used in the analysis (section 7.2), this chapter analyses union identity at each of the 
case study sites. Section 7.3 briefly reviews the identities of the unions at the locations 
where modernisation is the least advanced (Brastemp-Sao Bernardo and Enxuta). 
However, the union identity-modemisation relationship can be more deeply 
investigated through the analysis of the two locations where modernisation is 
comprehensive. This is done in section 7.4.
Subsection 7.4.1 looks at the experiences of all three groups (now the CUT 
unions in Rio Claro and Joinville and the moderate union in Joinville) in their early 
campaigns to gain control of the union. Using official records and statutes, an initial 
attempt is also made to describe differences in their identities. Subsections 7.4.2 and 
7.4.3, on the other hand, use the more dynamic identity model to compare the unions' 
strategies during the incipient (1985-90) and more comprehensive (1990-94) 
modernisation periods. Section 7.5 summarises and concludes this analysis.
7.2 THE CASE STUDY UNIONS AND IDENTITY ANALYSIS
7.2.1 The Case Study Unions
The case study union contexts differ greatly (Figure 7.1). For example, the Sao 
Bernardo metal workers situation contrasts with the other union contexts as they are a 
large, well resourced, organised and influential organisation in the major industrial hub 
of Brazil. As noted in Chapter 2, this union played a key role in the development of a
3 Consul worker interview, Con I I 14, 11/93.
256
more representative union movement, in the formation of the Workers’ Party (the PT) 
and in the 1980s transition to democracy. However, the case study firm they represent 
(Brastemp-Sao Bernardo) is less modernised than many of the other firms within their 
ambit.
Figure 7.1: Identifying Features of the Case Study Unions
Plant Place Union
Name
Broad
Union
Type
Union's
political
links
Union
central
Links
BRASTEMP Sao
Bernardo
Sao
Bernardo
Metal
Workers
Militant Workers’
Party
CUT
CONSUL Joinville ( -  1989) 
Mecanicos
(1989-) 
Sinditherme
Militant
Moderate
Workers’
Party
"none"
CUT
Close
to
FOR£A
SIND.
BRASTEMP Rio Claro Limeira and 
Region 
Metal 
Workers
Militant Workers’
Party
CUT
ENXUTA Caxias do 
Sul
Caxias
Metal
Workers
Militant Workers’ 
Party/PC 
do B
CUT/
CGT
Notes: For9a Sind. = For?a Sindical; CUT = Central Unica dos Trabalhadores; CGT = 
Confedera^o Geral dos Trabalhadores; PC do B = Communist Party of Brazil.
In stark contrast, the unions at the other three locations are small, regional 
entities in much less industrialised locations. The CUT and the PT are also very 
important to the union covering one of the comprehensively modernised locations 
(Brastemp-Rio Claro). Yet CUT/PT groups only share power with Communist groups 
at Enxuta’s union. In addition, while the CUT is important to the Joinville Mecanicos, 
this union has formally lost coverage for workers at the other comprehensively 
modernised site (Consul III) and the other partially modernised site (Consul II). The
present union at these two sites {Sinditherme) claims to take a neutral political stance. 
Yet there are indications that it has aligned itself with Forga Sindical.
The case studies also offer a vivid, but inconclusive, picture of union identity 
when looked at using unionisation statistics (Table 7.1). For example, militant 
unionism at the two most advanced sites (Brastemp-Rio Claro, Consul III) and Consul 
II face difficulties either due to ‘greenfield’ conditions or because of the installation of 
a moderate union. However, unionisation is much higher (50% vs 16%) at the firm 
(Consul) covered by the moderate union {Sinditherme). In comparison, while CUT and 
radical groups dominate the unions of the two least modernised factories, unionisation 
also differs significantly between them. Brastemp-Sao Bernardo has an unionisation 
rate of 79% and Enxuta 25%.
Table 7.1: Unionisation: Population and Sample, 1993-94
UNIONISATION POPULATION SAMPLE
TOTAL: 46% 47%
FIRM:
Brastemp-Sao Bernardo 79% 88%
Consul II 55% 53%
Consul III 45% 50%
Consul Total 50% 52%
Brastemp-Rio Claro 16% 16%
Enxuta 25% 30%
Source: Company and union records and interview data.
Thus, if unionisation is the sole measure used, it is clear that militant unionism 
is not enough to ensure the union has a large ‘electoral’ base. Yet, whether this means 
that moderate unionism does any better in reality also requires more in-depth analysis. 
In preparation for this analysis the next subsection summarises the key themes and 
concepts used within this chapter’s analysis of union identity.
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7.2.2 Themes and Concepts for an Analysis of Union Identity
Chapters 1 and 2 noted that many unions are concerned about the possible 
consequences of modernisation for workers and for their role as workplace and political 
representatives. Moreover, section 2.4 noted a number of instances when Brazilian 
unions have been able to make positive gains for workers, such as wage premiums, 
greater worker input and the modification of plans to reallocate workers into cells. In 
these cases, the worker-union relation appears to have been strengthened. Some of the 
more powerful and organised union groups have also sought to give modernisation 
issues a key place within their broader political strategies.
However, for the majority of unions the rules and structures of Brazilian 
industrial relations still act as a powerful constraint on their ability to have any real 
influence. As detailed in Chapter 2, there are still a number of competing ‘centrals’ and 
the monopoly of representation law and the compulsory union tax (the Imposto 
Sindical -IS) still apply. In consequence, the broader union movement remains divided. 
At the local level, the continuation of the monopoly of representation rule means that 
the prospect of union competition and co-ordination are minimised. On the other hand, 
the retention of the IS allows existing unions to continue to be funded without great 
pressure on them to be responsive to workers’ needs.
Moreover, ambiguities still exist over union representatives' recognition and 
stability at the workplace, leaving these issues open to the attitude of the particular 
employer. These difficulties for union-worker relations and trade union identity are 
made all the harder as workers in general experience a great deal of job insecurity. 
Brazilian labour legislation still does not prevent employers from modifying job and 
wage classifications quite freely so as to maximise their flexibility to deploy workers. 
This also acts as a hindrance to policies such as occupational wage standards.
Within such an ambiguous and divided environment, unions will have difficulty 
competing with the more subtle, persuasive strategies of modernising employers. In 
addition, resource constraints may make it all the more difficult for a union to develop
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separate policies for different groups of workers. The demands of these groups may, as 
this and other studies suggest, have become increasingly divergent from each other. 
The probability of success of any Brazilian union who wants to take on a militant and 
representative identity thus remains very slim - possibly more difficult than the past.
Through the application of an identity model to the case study situations 
outlined above, this chapter provides an alternative and more detailed perspective on 
unions’ fortunes to those provided by current studies of key unions in key sectors. 
Moreover, while unionisation rates and structural indicators of union democracy 
provide a useful part of an evaluation of a union and its success, this identity model is 
dynamic and more sensitive to contextual constraints. It looks at the relationship 
between a union’s interests, agenda and level of participant representation and the 
environment in which it finds itself.
For example, are unions responding to the specific concerns of particular skill 
groups? In terms of their agendas, how are they dealing with the training issue, 
stability/career concerns and the ILM policies of modernising firms? In terms of 
representation, are they pursuing more effective avenues for dialogue with workers and 
do their political campaigns have any relevance to workers? Moreover, how has each 
union’s particular setting affected strategies and outcomes?
In this regard, Figure 7.2 below stylises four possible scenarios for unions. This 
provides a convenient reference point for the analysis to follow. For example, quadrant 
‘A l’ represents optimist’s preferred option wherein unions find a new role at the 
workplace and for worker relations. Quadrant ‘A2’ is their other option. Yet, as 
mentioned, this would mean unions have little role at the workplace. Quadrant ‘B l’, on 
the other hand, represents the best option that could be achieved in the view of sceptics. 
They see the potential for management ‘abuse’ as far too likely (i.e. quadrant ‘B2’). 
Starting with the unions at the partially modernised sites, the next sections examine the 
union identity-modernisation relationship at the case study locations.
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Figure 7.2: Union Identity and Potential Union Workplace Outcomes
Moderate Identity
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Militant Identity
(A2)
Union is marginalised 
from the workplace
(Bl)
Union finds new ways to 
actively counter the 
influence of 
modernisation policies
7.3 PARTIAL MODERNISATION AND UNION IDENTITY
7.3.1 The Sao Bernardo Metal Workers Union
As noted in Chapter 2, this key CUT union has developed a series of policies 
and structures for confronting the challenges of modernisation4. At the factory level 
these include the installation of factory committees and factory union directors at many 
local firms5. Unionisation rates are very high in these firms6. At the policy level, the 
union has shown its recognition that workers may like many aspects of modernisation 
through its more supportive but active analysis of modernisation proposals7. The results 
they have achieved at Mercedes Benz (in respect to outsourcing, cells and teams) 
suggest that the union is capable of forcing a more balanced and explicit bargain with 
companies within its ambit8.
At the broader level, the union’s role in promoting the importance of 
modernisation issues within the Camaras Setoriais framework and the Contrato
4 For a review see; 1) DIEESE. 'The Brazilian Metalworkers and the New Factory's Challenge: A 
Negotiated Change at Mercedes-Benz', paper presented to the International IR/HR Network on Autos, 
IIRA 10th World Congress Washington D.C., May 1995; and 2) L. P. Bresciani, “Restructurafao 
Productiva e Luta Sindical - O Trabalho na Industria Automobilistica Brasileira - (1980-1995)”, paper 
prepared for the project 'Estrategias de Lucha Sindical en America Latina', Centro de Estudos 
Sociologicos, El Colegio de Mexico, 1995.
5 Bresiani ‘Restructurafao Productiva’, p24.
6 Ibid., p24
7 Ibid., p66-74
8 See DIEESE. 'The Brazilian Metalworkers', Ch 3-5.
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Coletivo debate demonstrates both their intentions and their influence9. However, these 
are clearly best case examples. As is noted below, in respect to Brastemp-Sao 
Bernardo, the union faces significant problems in other firms, particularly those in non­
key sectors such as white goods.
At Brastemp-Sao Bernardo the union has pushed three principle mechanisms 
for building links with workers10. While congresses and assemblies are used for 
deliberation, much effort has been put into establishing factory directors, a CIPA 
(Internal Committee for the Prevention of Accidents) and a factory committee. Factory 
directors (unionists responsible for reporting on factory developments) exist for this 
like many other local factories. However, for much of the case study period Brastemp- 
Sao Bernardo factory delegates have had to play a clandestine role as they have 
frequently been under severe pressure from supervisors and management.
The CIPA has also been an issue in dispute between the union and the 
company. The union has used the CIPA to highlight much more than just health and 
safety issues. Salaries, benefits, production process and political developments have 
also been central to the Sao Bernardo union's CIPA strategy and the Brastemp-Sao 
Bernardo union journal.
Since 1981 the union has put principle emphasis on the importance of a (union 
based) factory committee. Buoyant economic conditions and a large-scale strike at this 
factory in 1985 helped the union to secure agreement for a committee in that year. 
Much argument then ensued over its composition and role. However, after just six 
months’ operation and another strike (in 1986) the company disbanded the committee, 
the CIPA and made most members of these bodies, and other activists, redundant.
9 Bresiani ‘Restructurafao Productiva’, pp88-100.
10 The following analysis is based on a great deal o f research. First, 12 intensive interviews were held 
with Brastemp-Sao Bernardo union directors and factory representatives. Secondly, senior union staff 
was interviewed on 4 occasions so as to put the Brastemp-Sao Bernardo situation within the broader 
metal worker and CUT context. Thirdly, the researcher was often based at the DIEESE office in Sao 
Bernardo. At these times numerous discussions were held and materials reviewed in relation to the 
union. Finally, an intensive analysis was carried out o f the union's journals and leaflets (1-2 per week) 
between 1985-94.
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Despite a reduced ability to gain wage rises and the escalating level of 
demissions at the company, the union continued to poll its members and push the 
company to reinstate a factory committee. In fact, a new agreement looked likely after 
a strike in 1991. However, the company had already also begun its planned closure of 
one of the two Sao Bernardo factories (factory I) and its re-opening in Rio Claro. The 
confrontational nature of this demission process illustrated the company's non- 
negotiable style of industrial relations. Nevertheless, the hiatus caused by the closure 
and the subsequent factory invasion evoked widespread condemnation. With the 
company's new ‘Vision’ and modernisation plan, 1994 saw the union regain their 
factory committee - one which is largely under the terms they desired11.
The majority of the union's members at Brastemp-Sao Bernardo are unskilled 
workers. The union has therefore put particular emphasis on raising their wages to 
levels comparable to production workers in local auto firms. They have had some 
success in this regard12. However, those skilled workers who are active members play 
an important role and the union has also had some success in gaining the involvement 
of many lower paid white collar workers, despite their very different labour process 
situation.
Aside from the issues of wages, employment levels and factory mechanisms, 
the union's interests have spanned a broad range of issues. For example, the demand for 
the reinstatement of transport benefits (for all workers) formed a key theme behind 
strikes in 1988 and 1989. Thirdly, the plight of women and broader social and political 
concerns are also important to the union.
More subtle workplace issues, such as the pace and structure of work, have 
been approached using other tactics. For instance, go-slow campaigns {operagao 
taratuga/operation turtle) are frequently used. The union has also had success in 
selective stoppages {operagao a6e//<z/operation bee) in sensitive areas of operations 
which are starting to rely on JIT/Kanban.
11 Brastemp, Regimento Intemo da ComissSo de Fabrica, Unidade de S2o Bernardo do Campo, 1994.
12 As noted in Chapter 4, these workers have gained more, relative to their skilled colleagues, than have 
lower skilled workers at Consul in the 1989-93 period (Table 4.5)
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Other aspects of the company's recent attempts to modernise have not missed 
the union's attention either. For example, expanded internal training, while welcomed 
in principle, is criticised as not being linked to promotion or recognised skills 
upgrading. New training modules are ridiculed as being psychologically subversive and 
the lack of recognition of new tasks conflicts with the union's desire for a professional 
wage policy.
Another example relates to the reduction in reporting hierarchies. The company 
says these demonstrate its more open stance and has used their development to argue 
against the need for a factory committee. However, the union vigorously condemns 
these changes as cosmetic, cost-cutting measures which will increase responsibility, 
allow easier monitoring and make union action more visible to a still very anti-union 
management.
At a broader level, the union and many of their members are very aware of the 
company's plans. Journal analysis and discussions suggest that there is a high level of 
cynicism about the outsourcing, product and strategic approach of Brastemp, the 
Brasmotor group and its Whirlpool partnership. There is also an awareness that 
company strategy includes a decentralised human resources approach, one which seeks 
to make the most of weaknesses in union organisation in other areas of the groups 
operations (i.e. at Rio Claro and Joinville).
In summary, most other unions face a seemingly insurmountable task of 
gaining the degree of influence that this metals union has at Brastemp-Sao Bernardo. 
Even still, the Sao Bernardo union has not been able to make the same headway at 
Brastemp-Sao Bernardo that it has at other local firms. At the macro level there are 
constraints also. For example, since 1992 the union has expressed a desire to push the 
Camaras Setoriais process into the white goods industry. However, employer 
intransigence and union weakness in other locations of white goods production 
constrain these objectives. As is discussed below, this is vividly illustrated by the 
experience of the Caxias metal workers at Enxuta.
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7.3.2 The Caxias Metal Workers Union
In comparison to CUT’s stronghold in Sao Bernardo, the Caxias metal workers 
union13 is made up of an uneasy amalgam of communist, traditional and CUT leaders. 
A labour court intervention of the union took place during the fieldwork as a result of 
these clashes. The case study company Enxuta, whose members it represents, is not as 
old as Brastemp-Sao Bernardo but its processes have been the most traditional and 
familial.
Up to the 1987 a moderate group controlled the Caxias metal workers. While 
the incumbents espoused interest in issues beyond wages (e.g. women and a strike 
fund), wage discussions were fairly conciliatory and the union was happy to remain 
within the formal structure of industrial relations. The politically mixed directorate, 
which (aside from the six-month intervention in 1993) has held power since 1987, has 
been more radical and broad in its rhetoric. However, in practice they have also been 
more active. For instance, a CIPA has been installed, workplace surveys have been 
carried out and anti-extra hours and young person’s campaigns have been held. 
Furthermore, the union has supported strategic actions (e.g. go-slows) around 
workplace themes and CUT policy on most issues (e.g. labour process change) has 
been emulated, at least in theory.
Yet even prior to the 1990s market crash the union faced an uphill battle to 
involve Enxuta workers in the union. The company was very anti-union, it used a high 
turnover ‘policy’ and workers had little education. Moreover, workers (women in 
particular) were often caught in a trap. Wages were low but if union action was pursued 
they were either sacked or would lose creche and transport facilities. However, there 
were some issues which the union did try to make use of in their efforts to raise 
unionisation. For instance, the accident rate was high, promotions were haphazard, 
discrimination was rampant and supervision was onerous and overt.
13 The following summary is based on a great deal o f research. First, 10 interviews were held with 
union operatives both before, during and after the 1993 intervention of the union. Research papers 
from the University o f Caxias were also referenced in an effort to expand the questionnaire-based 
discussions. The other source developed by the researcher was a review o f the union's pamphlets (1-2
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A large scale, largely uncontrolled, strike broke out at Enxuta in 1990. 
Workplace conditions and employment uncertainty had reached intolerable levels. Yet 
the end result was that most unionists were sacked. Volatile market conditions and the 
employer's anti-union stance meant that between 1990 and 1993 unionisation at the 
plant fell from 40% to 25% and only one CIPA representative remains in employment 
there.
Consequently, since 1990 the union has mixed its radical rhetoric with a more 
pragmatic approach to negotiation. One of the reasons for this was that many other 
local employers had modernised. While Enxuta was slow and piecemeal in this regard, 
it seemed clear to the union directorate that new strategies were required. More 
practical proposals dealing with health and safety, workplace processes and worker- 
union information exchange began to be pursued from this time.
Factory committees seemed out of the question in view of local employer 
history and the lack of support for this ‘utopia’ by most workers. Yet the union was 
able to gain greater access to many workplaces, courses on modernisation began to be 
provided and the union tried to build greater union support through pushing their 
services and by handing back the IS to socio members. Also, in 1994 the union 
expanded its directorate and appointed activist-directors to discuss the union's recent 
policies (supportive but guarded) on modernisation with factory workers.
However, Enxuta remained an enigma. Unionists had been largely routed from 
the factory and the company still used many women, supervisory staff and paternalistic 
processes. Yet signs were emerging that the company was making efforts to offer 
workers a ‘softer’ (implicit) bargain. This created something of a dilemma for the union 
as, with a very weak base in the factory, they now have even less chance of gaining the 
‘ear’ of workers.
In summary, this discussion has highlighted the very contingent and fragile 
nature of union identity. What appears to be a necessary (but not sufficient) condition
per week) between 1985-94.
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for union influence -  an existing role in the factory -  no longer exists at Enxuta. 
Despite a revised and probably more representative identity, the Caxias metal workers 
face an uphill battle to have any real, future role at Enxuta. The union falls squarely 
within the ‘marginalised’ quadrant of union outcomes noted in Figure 7.2.
The important outstanding issue for this chapter is, therefore, to analyse the 
relationship between union identity and modernisation at the two most advanced sites 
(Consul-Joinville and Brastemp-Rio Claro). How has each type of unionism responded 
to modernisation and have they been successful? Subsections 7.4.2 - 7.4.3 do this 
through a detailed review of the unions' identities over two sub-periods, 1985-90 and 
1991-94. However, subsection 7.4.1 provides important background on these unions 
through a discussion of the struggles which emerged to control the union and via a 
number of structural indicators of union identity.
7.4 COMPREHENSIVE MODERNISATION AND UNION IDENTITY
7.4.1 Establishing Control of and Administering the Union
Like elsewhere in Brazil, combative unionist groups in Rio Claro and Joinville 
have faced many political and legal barriers in their attempts to gain control of their 
metals union. In both locations the local labour court became closely involved in 
electoral and jurisdictional disputes. The nature of these struggles is analysed below.
A militant group contested the election of the Limeira and Region (e.g. Rio 
Claro) metal workers union in 1984. After a second vote and then a dispute over voting 
procedures, the local labour court appointed an intervenor (interventor) to manage the 
union14. During the period up to the next election the intervenor appointed members of 
the moderate pre-1984 group to help run the union15. Yet despite claims of irregularities
14 See, Oposi^ao Sindical Metalurgico de Limeira e RegiSo, 7/84, and Oposi?ao Sindical Metalurgico 
de Limeira e RegiSo, Boletim. no 1, 5-20/8/85.
15 The bulletins distributed between 1984-86 took a very aggressive, radical stance. See, ibid., 5- 
20/8/85 to 12/86.
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and the presence of military police, the opposition (now linked to CUT) won a new 
election in October 198616.
Once in office the new directorate faced many pressures - from hostile 
employers, due to difficulties created by Government wage policies and as some local 
employers began to use more sophisticated management and workplace systems. The 
union was able to raise overall unionisation from 20% to 35% between 1987-9217. 
However, union membership at Brastemp-Rio Claro sits at 16% (1993)18. In 
comparison, the CUT group who won control of the Mecanicos in Joinville (in 1989) 
won with a high and still rising unionisation rate of 53% and a rate at Consul of around 
60%19.
The pre-1989 Mecanicos directorate supported recent changes in the 
Constitution for workers’ rights20. Yet they also praised the establishment of a 
union/employer run municipal industrial training centre and defended the continuation 
of the IS21. In comparison, the group which won the election in 1989 (with 70% of the 
vote) espoused radical politics, representative factory relations and a better deal for 
workers22. This opposition group began from a core of discontented, skilled unionists 
from Consul and Embraco23.
However, prior to taking office the Mecanicos had the coverage of Consul, 
Embraco and Kavo (a dental implement maker) removed from them. During February 
1989 an application was made to the local labour court to set up a union exclusively for 
the three companies {Sinditherme - a union of refrigeration, air conditioning,
,6 Ibid., 'Diretoria Eleita', 20/10/86.
17 Figures from, Sindicato dos Metalurgicos de Limeira e Regiao, Boletim, no 3, 1987; and Sindicato 
dos Metalurgicos e Ourives de Limeira e Regiao, Meta Luta, no 137, 23/10/91.
18 The unionisation figures used in this chapter come from both union records and company statistics. 
As the companies have to know the number o f socio members for whom deductions are made, their 
closeness to union figures serves to confirm the reliability o f these figures.
19 See footnote 18.
20 Sindicato dos Trabalhadores em Oficinas Mecanicas de Joinville, O Mecanico, ano II, no 3, 5/88.
21 Ibid., p i
22 See, Oposicao - Forca Oper&ria, Sindicato e Forte -'Descubra 20 Bons Motivos Para Votar Na 
Chapa 3', 1989.
23 Detail gained from interviews with Joao Batista, Union Secretary (Mecanicos) and Wilson Vieira, 
Union President (Mecanicos), (11/93). Corroboration o f this history was made in Consul worker
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refrigeration inputs and dental implement workers). A sufficient number of workers 
were transported to the state capital (Florianopolis) to make the application valid. 
Sinditherme's President was to be the recently retired training director of Consul24.
Despite legal applications and local mobilisation the Mecanicos have not been 
able to reverse this decision. In fact, the situation worsened. The most recent twist in 
this story was a 1993 legal decision that, while affirming the legality of Sinditherme, 
suggested that a clearer reading of the law would put Consul back with the Mecanicos 
and leave Embraco and Kavo with Sinditherme25. In view of the importance of Consul 
to Brasmotor/Whirlpool this interpretation is being tested up to the national level26.
The end result of this is that, left with a disparate group of smaller employers, 
the Joinville Mecanicos now have a much lower unionisation rate (40%)27. However, a 
more illustrative view of these changes is gained by looking at unionisation at Consul 
pre and post the 1989 union election. Compared to Consul Mecanico membership in 
February 1989 (over 60%), with Sinditherme this figure had fallen to 28% by May 
1989 and it has taken nearly 5 years to bring unionisation at Consul (and overall 
Sinditherme unionisation) up to about 50% in 199428. These observations suggest that 
Sinditherme may be less effective and representative than the Mecanicos might have 
been.
In summary, the above description of each unions’ efforts to gain power 
suggests differences in their identities. At a formal level there are a number of other 
indicators (from statutes and about union elections) which can be used to shed more 
light on the identities of these unions. This subsection concludes with a consideration
interviews and from an interview with the Mecanicos lawyer (11/93).
24 The only aspect o f this account which is disputed is who encouraged the original application for a 
new union. An interview with Evacir Meier, Sinditherme President, (5/93), suggested that worker 
pressure led to the establishment o f the union and his presidency. The views o f the Mecanicos and 
many Consul staff question this. Research into pay records at Consul (12/93) confirmed that Consul 
was still paying the Sinditherme president a (considerable) salary.
25 See, Estado de Santa Catarina, Tribunal de Justi?a, pasta 984, DJ no. 8962, 3/3/94, pp 107-135.
26 An interview with the Mecanicos lawyer, (11/94), confirmed that the case was being appealed to 
Brasilia and that he was already dealing with representatives o f Brasmotor and Whirlpool in Joinville.
27 See footnote 18.
28 Ibid.
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of such formal indicators.
First, the statutes of the Mecanicos and the Limeira metal workers are similar in 
many respects29. For example, both have a three year mandate and both stress the 
importance of solidarity, factory level representation, democracy, independence and 
struggle explicitly within their statutes. Non office holding socios have opportunities to 
voice their opinions and to call assemblies (10-20% of socios needed) in both unions. 
Each of these unions also makes use of a directorate structure made up of delegates 
from across the union’s ambit.
In stark contrast, the Sinditherme statute stresses individualism and a non­
political orientation30. Rather than encouraging voluntary participation, voting rights 
and benefits are removed for those who miss more than 30% of general assemblies. 
Elections are possible only every five years. Moreover, if one member of the 
directorate retires, dies or leaves prior to the end of this five year period an election is 
held for that post and the mandate of the others continues for another five years31.
Sinditherme as an organisation is made up of four full time administrators and 
seven (white-collar) union officers. It is also claimed that there are 15 factory 
representatives in the three factories32. However, no provision is made for these 
representatives in the statute, neither is there any mention of the importance of factory 
level representation in that document.
To be eligible for a Sinditherme position a worker requires at least 2 years 
consecutive employment in the same employer of the industrial category (i.e. one of the
29 See, Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Industrias e Oficinas Mecanicas de Joinville (the Mecanicos), 
'Estatuto', Joinville, 1991; and Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Industrias Metalurgicas, Mecanicas e 
Ourives de Limeira e Regiao, (the Limeira Metals Union) 'Estatuto', Limeira, 1993.
30 See, O Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Industrias de RefrigerafSo, Aquecimento e Tratamento de 
Ar, Industrias de Compressores Hermeticos para Refrigerafao e Industrias de Artigos e Equipamentos 
Odontoldgicos, Medicos e Hospitalares de Joinville (Sinditherme), 'Estatutos', Joinville, 1/8/92 and as 
revised 1/3/93.
31 Ibid., (1992), p2 and (1993), p l3.
32 Noted in interviews with Evacir Meier, Union President, Sinditherme, Joinville, (5/93), and Jos6 
Negerherbow, Union Secretary, Sinditherme, Joinville, (11/93).
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three firms)33. For the Mecanicos, on the other hand, a worker merely needs to be a 
socio for 3 months, something that a member retains for a period of six months when 
unemployed34. Voting requirements and a socio's power to call assemblies further 
highlight these formal representational differences. For example, to call a Sinditherme 
general assembly requires at least 50% of socios and to win a decision requires at least 
a 70% majority35. In comparison, only 5-10% of Mecanico socios are required to call a 
general assembly and after this only arithmetic majorities are required to make a 
decision (as long as a minimum number of delegates are present)36.
In terms of electoral indicators, these suggest that Sinditherme is far from 
representative. For example, no public records could be located announcing a 1994 
election. A local labour lawyer confirmed that the partial automatic re-election 
regulation had been made use of four times since 198937. Furthermore, the existence of 
any real opposition faces great difficulties due to Sinditherme regulations, such as the 
two-year continuous employment criteria clause noted above.
However, the probability of opposition groups mounting a challenge to the 
Mecanicos and the Limeira union also looks increasingly less probable post-1989. For 
example, the Limeira group easily held off an opposition challenge in 1989, cleverly 
using the union journal and campaign tactics to greatly denigrate the second slate38. In 
terms of the Mecanicos, 1992 saw a local group challenge the incumbents. The existing 
CUT directorate comfortably retained office. However, this was not before the 
challengers made a number of well-publicised criticisms of the union's political stance, 
degree of worker concern and election procedures39.
In summary, this discussion has suggested a number of differences between the 
unions. First, the Mecanicos and the Limeira union seem to have a clear desire to build
33 Sinditherme, 'Estatutos', (1992), p2.
34 Mecanicos, 'Estatuto', (1991), p7.
35 Sinditherme, 'Estatutos', (1991), p5.
36 Mecanicos, 'Estatuto', (1991), p9.
37 Interview with Mecanicos lawyer, Joinville, 11/94.
38 For example, see Sindicato dos Metalurgicas de Limeira e Regiao (Limeira Metals Union), Boletim, 
nos. 57, 61, Limeira, 1989.
39 See, A Noticia, Joinville, 26/1/92 p i 1 and 4/2/92 p5.
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a union on a more representative basis than past traditions. They also exhibit a more 
independent, conflictual, broad and political modus operandi. Secondly, Sinditherme 
uses a more hierarchical, bureaucratic and closed structure. Its identity is best summed 
up as politically passive, service orientated and narrow.
This discussion also confirms a tendency for unions to solidify their hold on 
power. However, whether this is due to greater efficiency as a representative body or 
due to unfairness and oligarchy can not be consistently argued one way or the other 
using such data. Unionisation figures, administrative structures, statutes and electoral 
themes leave the consideration of how well these unions represent their ‘electorates’ 
insufficiently clear. Statements about factory floor involvement and structural features 
to mirror this do not in themselves confirm an active or effective involvement of the 
union in the (work) lives of their members. Secondly, services remain a central part of 
all unions in Brazil, in spite of any statements otherwise. Finally, all unions benefit 
from and make use of state structures and regulations.
Consequently, due to these uncertainties, the next two subsections take a more 
dynamic and informal approach to the consideration of the identities of these unions. 
As the process of modernisation (in general and in respect of these factories) has been 
shown to have gathered most pace after 1990, the analysis is divided between 1985-90 
(ss 7.4.2) and 1991-94 (ss 7.4.3). This second period also covers the more severe 
political-economic crises.
7.4.2 Union Identity in the Early Democratic Period (1985-90)
An important difference in the experiences of the Limeira union and the 
Mecanicos between 1985-90 was that they gained control of the union in very different 
circumstances. The Limeira group began their tenure in relatively strong economic 
times (1986) while the Mecdnico group entered office on the eve (1989) of a very 
unstable period. This had a strong effect on their identities.
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By late 1990 the Mecanicos were having great difficulty resolving conflicting 
pulls on their identity whereas the Limeira union emerged with a more consistent and 
broad identity. However, it is not certain that the Mecanicos would have evolved in a 
similar way even if they had retained coverage of Consul, Embraco and Kavo. 
Nevertheless, even the Limeira union had trouble maintaining such an identity in the 
face of the comprehensive modernisation that had begun at Brastemp-Rio Claro. These 
identity developments are reviewed below.
a) ‘New Unionism’-New Pressures: The Limeira (Rio Claro) Metal Workers
Between 1984-86 the then Limeira opposition adopted a radical approach. 
Politically they emphasised - the injustices of the intervention, agrarian reform, foreign 
debt non-payment, and the importance of CUT40. Industrially, the group promoted itself 
as a champion of independent representative relations and collectivism. Many local 
employers were criticised for mistreating and sacking unionists41 and for pressuring 
workers to work extra hours, hours for which workers were frequently incorrectly 
compensated42.
In fact, due to high unemployment, from an early period the union took a 
negative stance to extra hours, whatever the remuneration43. Another example of the 
breadth of their industrial identity was their promotion of the need for minimum 
acceptable pay standards per occupation44. However, the union's interests did not 
extend beyond the industrial category to other groups or social issues.
In contrast, between winning office (1986) and the end of 1989, the union's 
identity changed. It started to put greater emphasis on its medical and social services45. 
Secondly, the union's agenda became more regularised with wage campaigns taking top
40 This is shown in union bulletins between 1984-86 (OposifSo Sindical Metalurgica de Limeira e 
Regiao, Boletim, 7/84 - 10/86, Limeira).
41 Ibid., 11/10/85.
42 Ibid., 10/85.
43 Ibid., no. 8, 1/86.
44 Ibid., no. 8, 1/86.
45 e.g. unionist education courses were expanded. See Sindicato dos Metalurgicas de Limeira e Regiao 
(hereafter the Limeira Metals Union), Boletim. 20/10/86.
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billing in most union bulletins. This shift in emphasis of the union's identity seemed to 
reflect their increasing recognition of local realities and worker preferences.
Two examples illustrate the diverse pulls on the union's identity over this 
period. First, real wage losses had become very serious. Yet the union also began to 
take a less negative attitude to the role of the state in this issue. Increasingly, the union 
promoted the need for employer conformance to (albeit not ideal) Government wage 
rules or labour court decisions46. The Camaras Setoriais was another issue which 
challenged the union. While the directorate favoured co-ordinated strategies, this plan 
was seen by many as ‘top down’ and abstract47. It seemed clear to the union directorate 
that more practical campaigns were needed.
A major catalyst for this change in union identity appears to have been low 
turnout rates for strikes. For example, a general strike call against the Samey 
Government's wage policies (1987) met with minimal success and a similar strike in 
1988 was very poorly attended48. The union faced a concerted campaign by employers, 
the media and Government that strikes were not the appropriate role of unions.
Accordingly, the 1989 general strike campaign was more strongly targeted to 
local issues and specific local employers. Furthermore, since 1987 the union had started 
to broaden its interests and had introduced a number of vehicles for increased 
collaboration with workers. A few examples clearly demonstrate these changes.
First, for each of the years 1987-89 the union handed back the IS (to all 
workers) at a public ceremony49. This occasion was used to promote active unionism 
and to condemn current industrial relations structures. Secondly, the union was more 
regularly and successfully addressing the theme of health and safety, as a general issue 
but most importantly due to the abuses of particular local employers50.
46 See ibid., nos. 9 and 10, 1987. However, the union also argued that workers must push for the 
expansion o f Constitutional benefits, ibid., no. 24, 1988.
47 Ibid., no. 57, 1989.
48 Ibid., no. 14, 1988
49 See, ibid., nos. 59 and 60, 1989, for a summary o f IS devolution between 1987-89.
50 Ibid., nos. 58 and 59, 1989.
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Thirdly, the union held its first local conference (February, 1989), one that was 
more strongly directed to regional issues51. Fourthly, the union had begun printing 
regular (employer and thematic) bulletins about workers’ rights and employers' 
obligations52. Finally, the union started articulating the particular difficulties women 
faced at work53.
Moreover, while gaining an involved membership was a difficult task, the 
union was determined not to dispense with their political agenda54. However, while 
their log of claims went well beyond real wage recuperation, the union consistently 
accepted (with a proviso that the fight must continue) the vote of members to accept the 
more narrowly based offers of employers55. Another example of the way the union tried 
to balance its views with the less militant views of most workers was to stress the links 
between the union's medical services, the evaluation of work related injuries and the 
promotion of workers' health and safety rights56.
Despite the difficulties the Limeira group faced, by mid-1989 the union was 
able to boast formal agreements which made up most real wage losses since 198657. 
This high in bargaining gains coincided with a number of other important 
developments. The union was having some success in increasing affiliation (from 20% 
to 30% between 1986-88) and in 1988/89 the union co-ordinated a number of 
successful local issue strikes and local input into the single largest national mobilisation 
up to that point58.
The above discussion suggests that, up to 1990, the union was able to broaden 
its interests, keep a political agenda and develop more participative and accountable 
forms of relations with workers. During 1990 this process continued and included new
51 Ibid., no. 41, 1989.
52 e.g. in respect to danger money, FGTS contributions and the recognition o f extra hours.
53 See, ibid., no 36, 1988, for example.
54 As evident in, ibid., nos. 53, 57, and 65 for example.
55 See ibid., no. 36, 1988.
56 Well shown in, ibid., nos. 33 and 36, 1988.
57 Ibid., no. 55, 1989.
58 Ibid., no. 51, 1989
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initiatives such as59company level health and safety checks, strike and homeless 
support, training discounts, theme specific assemblies60 and workplace 
questionnaires61. However, competing expectations of unionism were complicating the 
orientation of the union, particularly as a number of local employers were starting to 
apply modernisation techniques.
For example, during 1990 the union began to criticise various local firms which 
were portraying themselves as the ‘family’ in which workers could show allegiance. 
One such firm (Varga) promoted itself as an example of democracy. However, they 
sacked union representatives, underfunded the Cesta Basica (food assistance basket) 
and used the police and overt supervision to deal with disputes62. Other firms promised 
an improved ambient but continued to permit poor working conditions63. However, 
while Varga was eventually required to readmit unionists64, the union had great 
difficulty finding ways to effectively dispute the strategies of Brastemp-Rio Claro.
The union mocked that workers entered Brastemp-Rio Claro with optimism and 
left it ‘clean and blue (politically sanitised)’65. When workers asked them to compare 
salaries at the factory relative to Brastemp-Sao Bernardo the union was put in some 
difficulty. Hourly rates were well below Sao Bernardo levels but reasonable by local 
standards. Secondly, Brastemp-Rio Claro labourers only worked a standard shift of just 
less than 40 hours per week whereas the union's campaign was for a reduction of the 
official standard from 44 to 40 hours. In further contrast to other companies, the firm 
provided a safe, clean workspace and workers had new opportunities to participate and 
a career scheme. The union thus responded that absolute salaries at Sao Bernardo were 
also low. More positively, they attacked Brastemp-Rio Claro for compressing salary 
differentials, for unfulfilled career expectations and for a pace of production that
59 For examples o f the following themes see, ibid., nos. 69-71, 85, 86, 1990
60 E.g. to peruse union accounts, discuss claims and decide on campaigns and delegates-see ibid., nos. 
76, 80, 85, 1990.
61 E.g. over strike preferences/locations and the IS; see ibid., nos. 85-87, 95, 96, 1990.
62 See ibid., (Special Edition - Varga), 2/90.
63 E.g. the companies Mastra and Gurgel, ibid., no. 70, 1990.
64 Ibid., no. 92, 1990.
65 Quoted in interview with Adilson Cesar da Silva, Union Officer-Rio Claro, Limeira Metals Union, 
17/3/93.
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allowed eight hours production in six66.
Yet these statements had little impact and were not pushed any further. This 
was because criticising the compression of relative wage levels might highlight the 
delicate balance they were treading between a professional wage policy for skilled 
socios and their desire to raise the wages of the unskilled. Moreover, many workers 
were enjoying/benefiting from many aspects of work at the firm. The union's lack of 
success and reticence to push may also have been because Brastemp-Rio Claro's 
transparent evaluation procedures made it easy for the company to locate and sack any 
who did not concur with their approach67.
Other companies were less integrated in their modernisation process and less 
subtle in their preference for employees who did not question ‘managerial prerogative’. 
Thus, for some companies where unionists were harassed and prevented from 
distributing bulletins, the union was able to mount a simpler campaign68. The ‘Re­
admission Campaign’ (1990) attempted to link the themes of union persecution, 
declining wages and reduced employment security in workers’ ‘eyes’69.
In summary, for a brief period after being elected the union reacted in a 
radical way to what they saw as a continuing level of exploitation by employers and 
the state. Yet they quickly recognised that they needed more regularised and down- 
to-earth campaigns and stronger relations with workers to have any chance of gaining 
their support. Moreover, while not an easy task, within their more practical approach 
they were still able to broaden their agenda and interests and be quite political. Their 
militant identity was quite successful when directed at partially modernising local 
factories. However, they found it far more difficult to adequately respond to the form 
of modernisation being employed at Brastemp-Rio Claro.
66 Limeira Metals Union, Boletim. (Special Edition - Brastemp-Rio Claro), 2/90.
67 A point made by the union and by many o f the worker interviewees.
68 See, Limeira Metals Union, Boletim, no. 75, 1990, for examples.
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b) The Complete De-mobilisation of Militant Unionism? -The Joinville Mecanicos
In contrast to the situation at Limeira, the Mecanicos of Joinville entered the 
1990s desperately trying to keep their radical approach intact after having three major 
firms removed from them. The union faced a dilemma. First, even if they discussed 
modernisation themes these held little relevance to the workers they now formally 
represented. On the other hand, while many aspects of modernisation had a political 
dimension, a political approach (their preference) was just that in which workers 
showed little interest. In consequence, as shown below, over this period the union's 
identity shows less clarity than the Limeira group.
Between 1989-90 the Mecanicos issued many bulletins condemning 
Sinditherme, the employers involved and the Government for allowing the situation to 
be legalised70. Workers were implored not to affiliate with Sinditherme nor authorise 
membership deductions. However, over time (and despite public protests) this became 
an increasingly futile strategy.
During 1990, therefore, while the union did not abandon its aggressive rhetoric, 
more emphasis was put on their considerable (but poorly used) services71. Also, the 
union was having some success in its wage campaigns. For example, in 1989 they 
gained total wage rises nearly three times that achieved by Sinditherme and in 1990 
they secured wage decisions nearly two times that of their ‘rival’72.
These results confirm that the Mecanicos were more militant as a wage 
negotiator. However, unless they could regain legal coverage for Consul and Embraco, 
those workers could not benefit from, or formally take part in, the union. A 1990 
stoppage of Consul and Embraco workers was a curious occurrence in this regard. It 
appears that the union informally advised workers to voice their grievances internally
69 Early ideas behind this campaign are noted in, ibid., no. 76, 1990.
70 e.g. Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Industrias e Oficinas Mecanicas de Joinville (hereafter 
Mecanicos), Boletim Informativo - Sindicato Forte. 'Trabalhadores da Consul, Embraco e Kavo do 
Brasil', no. 12, 1990.
71 Ibid., 6/90.
72 Noted in, ibid., 7/90; and in Sindicato dos Metalurgicos de Sao Bernardo e Diadema, Comissao de
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but the firms encouraged workers to leave. On exiting, factory workers were filmed and 
many of those with known sympathies to the Mecanicos were sacked73.
Historically, Embraco and Consul had lower labour turnover and more 
sophisticated employee relations than other local firms. However, the union believed 
that they were now starting to sack formally trained and higher paid skilled workers 
(often the most actively unionised), replacing them with younger, internally trained and 
lower paid workers74. Yet, most 1990 Mecanico bulletins did not pursue these issues. 
Instead they made strong calls for higher wages, an attack on inequalities, a debt 
moratorium, agrarian reform and class solidarity. While the union claimed to be 
interested in the workplace, in this period they articulated few constructive perspectives 
and did not set up mechanisms for worker involvement on these issues75.
For instance, they took a cynical attitude to internal training, a theme that could 
have been dealt with to some advantage. However, the involvement of the former 
training director of Consul in Sinditherme probably did not help to encourage such 
thinking. Secondly, the union recognised the difficulty of criticising internal employee 
policies when numerous workers were actually happy with many of these.
In summary, legally marginalised, the Mecanicos chose to take on an identity 
which involved minimal ambiguities - one which benefited a narrow industrial 
‘electorate’. In terms of their agenda, they supported CUT policies for a national 
system of collective contracts. However, they felt that if they pushed themes such as a 
professional wage policy too hard they could alienate many prospective members (i.e. 
the unskilled)76. In further contrast to the Limeira union, the Mecanicos took a less 
compromising approach to issues such as extra hours payments. They won premiums 
for extra hours twice their level in Limeira (100% vs. 50%)77 and they didn't pursue a 
‘no extra hours, extra jobs’ campaign until 1992-93.
Fdbrica dos Trabalhadores da Brastemp, SSo Bernardo do Campo, no 2, 12/91, p3.
73 As claimed by Wilson Vieira, President, Mecanicos, Joinville, (5/93).
74 Ibid.
75 The following points emerged from interviews with Wilson Viera, President, Mecanicos, 
particularly in 5/93. The union did, however, try to infiltrate CIPAs.
76 Ibid.
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The mecanicos were reacting aggressively and defensively to a very tough 
situation. In fact, after 1990 this union directorate had to fight very hard just to remain 
in existence. More generally, as the next subsection makes clear, nation-wide 
developments in the early 1990s served to force all these unions to make even greater 
changes to their identity than was the case in this period.
7.4.3 Macro Instability, Modernisation and Union Identity (1991-94)
The period 1991-94 was particularly challenging for all three unions. First, 
while the Government's more open economic policies led many employers to close or 
‘downsize’, there was clear evidence that many firms were applying modernisation 
policies78. Secondly, the economic and political environment was becoming very 
unstable. On the one hand, the Government had put a limit on wage negotiations. On 
another level, revelations about executive corruption encouraged a significant 
proportion of the Brazilian population to protest79.
These circumstances further exposed differences in the identities of these 
unions. First, modernisation developments and rising employment insecurity created 
difficulties for, and contrasts in, union policy and action80. Secondly, political turmoil 
opened up an opportunity for unions to pursue political objectives.
The response of Sinditherme was very passive and unrepresentative at both 
levels whereas the Mecanicos tried to reach out to workers and, eventually, to address 
modernisation themes. Yet politics and a regrouping of union structures remained their 
principal preoccupations. In contrast, the Limeira union demonstrated that it is possible 
for a union to have a broad agenda/interest base and representative, independent 
relations with workers. However, their local issue approach continued to work much 
less well in situations where modernisation strategies were well developed. The 
following discussion demonstrates these developments.
77 See, Mecanicos, Boletim Informative) - Sindicato Forte, 11/90.
78 As discussed in Chapters 2 & 3.
79 Nearly 500,000 people marched in the streets o f S2o Paulo city alone in September 1992 - Limeira 
Metals Union, Meta Luta. no. 175, 9/92.
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a) ‘New Unionism’- New Strategies: The Limeira (Rio Claro) Metal Workers
Between 1991-94, the Limeira union showed a more consistent preoccupation 
with the challenges of the internal strategies of employers. They tried to reach out to a 
broader concept of the worker by characterising the union as having a ‘body and a 
soul’81. The body related to leisure, health and so forth whereas the soul sprang from a 
combative, collective stance. Discussion forums and activities for the worker, their 
family and other social groups were intended to bind these together.
For example, by 1991 the combination of mass demissions and company 
reorganisation led the union to more methodically criticise aspects of factory 
modernisation. The union saw considerable mutual advantages to improvements in 
production and quality, including better health and safety, reduced hours and real wage 
growth82. Yet most local examples only served to confirm their view that employers 
were merely increasing work risks and holding down wages while not employing more 
workers or giving employees any real ‘voice’ at work. The union supported a 
professional attitude to work but not ‘quality of production without quality of life’83.
In their campaigns they also became more nuanced. For example, following the 
success of labour court decisions that unionists at a number of local firms should be 
reinstated84, the union took its reintegration campaign to new levels85. In line with its 
policy that ‘the place of a unionist is on the factory floor’, the union produced a media 
campaign which they took to the local council, Brasilia and the ILO86. Significant 
support was obtained encouraging the union to widen the campaign. They did this by 
combining the readmission issue with that of salary justice within their 1991 ‘Salary
80 Chapter 2, section 2.3.2 noted how this applied to the two main union ‘centrals’.
81 This concise terminology was used in 1993, e.g. Limeira Metals Union, Boletim Especial - 'A Alma 
e o Corpo do Sindicato', Limeira, (9/93). However, the approach can also be gleaned from the union's 
actions post-1991.
82 See, Limeira Metals Union, Boletim Especifico aos Trabalhadores da Varga. 19/8/91.
83 Ibid., this paraphrases the subtitle o f this bulletin.
84 By 1991, 30 trade union directors and other unionists had been demitted from local factories (ibid., 
no. 128, 1991).
85 These readmission decisions are reported in, ibid., no. 144, 1991.
86 See - Sindicato dos Metalurgicos de Limeira e Regiao, Dossier - Contra Demissoes e Afastamentos 
de Sindicalistas, Sao Paulo, 1991. On the campaign and the support it received see, Limeira Metals
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and Democracy’ campaign87.
In terms of the union’s interests, these broadened further and became more co­
ordinated between 1991-94. For instance, they helped establish a local group which 
developed an information and action campaign against the crisis and Collor88. The 
union also promoted stronger links with CUT unions in other sectors89. In 1992, they 
published a straight-forward, informative journal for the families of workers on the 
breadth and importance of unionism90 and in 1993 teachers rights were added to their 
interest base and the ‘body and soul’ campaign became more explicit91.
In relation to services and representative relations, during 1991 the union held 
more unionism courses, many questionnaires were carried out and another IS handing 
back party was held92. The year 1991 was also marked by their second regional 
conference. This conference recommended that more effort should be put into 
understanding workplace change and workplace attitudes93. These initiatives were 
bolstered in 1992 when the union structure was expanded94.
These policies and campaigns appeared to be having a positive effect as socio 
membership reached 35% by November 199195 and nearly eight thousand people 
attended the 1992 IS handing back party96. This was in spite of the union proposing, 
and an assembly accepting, a new tax to cover the costs of specific campaigns97. 
However, in spite of these apparent successes, it is sobering to note that none of the 240
Union, Meta Luta, no. 132, 1991.
87 Ibid., no. 142, 1991.
88 Ibid, no. 142, 1991.
89 Ibid, nos. 106, 107, 109, 110, 116, 136 (1991) and 23/12/91.
90 See, Limeira Metals Union, Informativo - O Metalurgico em Casa, ano 1, no. 1, 5/92.
91 Limeira Metals Union, Meta Luta. nos. 193, 193 207, 208, 209, 211 (1993) and Special bulletin - 
10/93 ("body and soul theme"; education)
92 Ibid, nos. 116, 123 and 122, (1991), (on the IS).
93 See, Sindicato dos Metalurgicos de Limeira e Regiao, Resolucoes - 2nd Congresso. Limeira, 15- 
17/3/91.
94 Limeira Metals Union, Meta Luta. 3/92 and nos. 160, 180 and 182, 1992.
95 Limeira Metals Union, Meta Luta. no. 137, 1991 and footnote 60.
96 Part o f the contributions made by members to a campaign fund were also returned on that day, but 
only to socios- ibid, no 171, 1992.
97 Ibid, no. 114, 1991. The campaign tax represented 5% of salaries in April and October.
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delegates to attend their 1991 conference were from Brastemp-Rio Claro98.
Contextual factors were still having a significant affect on the union's identity 
during these years. For example, improved economic conditions in 1993 allowed 
greater advances to be made on the industrial front. In comparison, in 1992 the political 
side of their campaigns peaked on the wave of protest sweeping the country. The union 
also had its own election in 1992.
Even still, the union's criticism of modernisation did not stop in 1992, 
especially when linked to their health and safety and unionist persecution campaigns. 
Despite the modernisation claims of many firms, few escaped accusations of 
dangerous, dirty work environments or that workers were not being provided with the 
required equipment99. The union used this situation to push the application of the law 
via an active campaign (‘My hands are the only ones I have’)100. This campaign 
included public meetings, the involvement of a doctor in factory evaluations and 
significant worker input101
Local companies such as Varga continued to be key targets for (modernisation) 
criticism102. However, Brastemp-Rio Claro was also strongly denounced when they 
became more open in their preference for non-unionists (by sacking a recently elected 
union delegate and offering non-unionists free transport). The union now felt it had a 
clear issue upon which to commence a more open critique of the company103. This was 
fuelled when Brastemp-Rio Claro fired a number of workers in defiance of a temporary 
stability decision104. The union also dared to criticise the strategic role of Brastemp-Rio 
Claro within Brasmotor /Whirlpool105.
98 Limeira Metals Union, ResolucSes - 2nd Congresso, p20.
99 Ibid., (Special - Accidents), 8/92.
100 Ibid. This bulletin notes initiatives taken and to be taken, as noted here.
101 Workers were encouraged to use their CIPAs and the newly created ‘map o f risk’ initiative to 
evaluate their factory’s safety conditions . These initiatives were expanded in 1993, see ibid., nos.
209, 210, 1993 and 10/93 (Special - Health).
102 Limeira Metals Union, Meta Luta. Special - Varga, 6/7/92.
103 See, union announcement in, Diario de Rio Claro. 5/2/92.
104 Limeira Metals Union, Meta Luta. Special - Limeira, 23/6/92
105 Limeira Metals Union, Meta Luta. no. 173, 1992.
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However, other issues of concern at Brastemp-Rio Claro continued to be less 
easy to articulate as pay and conditions were good by regional standards. Secondly, 
while the union saw faults in the proportion of workers who could progress in the 
career scheme and the criteria upon which promotions were made, they could not be 
seen to be against career schemes in principle. The union was increasingly aware (and 
critical) of the Brastemp-Rio Claro model but still unable to do much106.
With the demise of Collor in 1992, the union's campaigns took on a greater 
workplace emphasis during 1993. The union’s overriding complaint continued to be - 
what modernisation was, compared to what it could be107. Their specific criticisms 
included the negative effects of outsourcing, the lack of employment stability and the 
‘subversive’ nature of participation programmes.
The union portrayed modernisation as an attempt by companies to encourage 
individualism and turn worker allegiance away from the union and to the ‘family’ of 
the company108. They also won victories, forcing Varga to let its workers decide on 
shift times109 and gaining labour court and local government support for various other 
firms to meet their legal obligations. However, due to the greater consistency of the 
Brastemp-Rio Claro model, the company was not explicitly amongst these actions.
Yet the union had the issue of modernisation firmly in its sights110. For 
example, their 1993 congress concentrated on this theme and was preceded by the 
publication of a number of picture booklets and case studies which highlighted the 
union's view of how employer defined modernisation would only weaken worker 
‘voice’111. The positive potential of modernisation was not disputed but the union
106 Discussed during an interview with Adilson Cesar da Silva, Union Officer - Rio Claro, Limeira 
Metals Union, Limeira, 9/93.
107 Limeira Metals Union, Meta Luta, nos. 189, 191 and 207, 1993 and 6-10/93 (Special Bulletins on 
Varga).
108 This criticism included the 'Brazilian Skilled Worker" contest - Limeira Metals Union, Meta Luta, 
no. 210, 1993.
109Ibid., no. 204, 1993.
110 See, for example, ibid., no 190, 1993 and footnote .
111 Sindicato dos Metalurgicos de Limeira e Regiao, 3rd Congresso - tese/resolucoes, Limeira, 3-
5/12/93. The booklets were entitled - Fabrica do Futuro - Avanfo ou Retrocesso?’, 'Para Entender O 
Momento Politicd', 'Por uma Novo Estructura Sindical1 and 'A Ilha'.
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argued that this would only be guaranteed by collectivism and union co-ordinated 
involvement in such changes.
In summary, there appears to be little doubt that by 1994 this union had 
developed a type of identity which could be called broad, inclusive, militant and 
representative. Moreover, their strategies were at the same time practical, workplace 
based and political. However, the sophistication of the Brastemp model in this 
‘greenfields’ location led to their failure to raise unionisation among the factory’s well 
screened workers, at least up to 1994. As noted below, the Joinville Mecanicos also 
faced problems and choices in this period, albeit of a different nature.
b) Re-grouping to Confront Modernising Employers? -  The Joinville Mecanicos
Compared to the Limeira union, less clarity can be seen in the identity of the 
Mecanicos over the 1991-94 period. It took some time before they sought to engage 
workers, companies or Sinditherme over modernisation issues. However, this was not 
just because coverage of Consul (Embraco and Kavo) had been removed from them as 
the Mecanicos were keeping up informal relations with workers at those factories112. 
Also, other firms within their ambit were implementing modernisation strategies113.
For example, during 1991 the Mecanicos put principal emphasis on their salary 
campaign and into persuading workers that political activism was both necessary and 
legitimate. Like the Limeira group, they also mounted a campaign (with the Plasticos) 
against the recession and the presidency of Collor114. However, while the union tried to 
involve workers at factories and to encourage greater participation at assemblies, most 
campaigns bore little relation to workplace change115.
1.2 Interview - Wilson Vieira, Union President, Mecanicos, 5/93.
1.3 The union was acquainted with the strategy being used - SIGAM, 'Global System for Perfection 
and Improvement1 - and had information booklets on the scheme in their office.
114 Sindicato dos Mecanicos de Joinville (the Mecanicos), Tribuna. "Um ano de mentiras..." Joinville, 
2/91.
115 They and the Sao Bernardo metal workers did, however, have an understanding o f Consul's 
strategies and the role o f Brasmotor/Whirlpool (Sindicato dos Metalurgicos de Sao Bernardo, 
Comissao de Fdbrica, (12/91). Yet the Mecanicos did not publicise or push this.
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In terms of services and worker relations, the Mecanicos showed further 
contrasts with the Limeira union during 1991. For example, while the IS was criticised 
as a means of incorporation there was no suggestion that it would be devolved116. 
Secondly, expanded services were publicised as an important reason to be a socio but 
there were few explicit links of these to factory level, work rights activism. Thirdly, the 
union successfully continued its campaign for higher rates for extra hours, gaining 
200% as the formal basic premium in 1991117. Moreover, the union continued to 
promote the striking of industrial labour as the means by which workers in general 
would emerge from their exploitation118.
In consequence, during 1992 the Mecanicos continued to fight a rearguard 
action for salary growth and political unionism. While 1991 saw the union win a 
reasonably good salary claim in the local labour court, employers appealed the 
decision. In their 1992 campaign the union continued to urge greater militancy119.
As for the Limeira Union, 1992 was also a union election year. Thus, amidst 
growing evidence of corruption in the presidency, political themes dominated the 
Mecanico s agenda and interests120. Many assemblies were called and the union's policy 
approach, accounts and services were opened-up to scrutiny and debate121. However, 
only a limited turnout occurred for an anti-Collor protest and the union lamented the 
apathy of workers in not taking greater interest in politics, the wage campaign or even 
day-to-day topics122.
Unlike their close colleagues the Plasticos, the Mecanicos did not, however, 
choose to directly confront the ‘politics of modernisation’ during 1992123. They were
116 Mecanicos, Tribuna, no.5, 1991.
117 As reported in, ibid., no. 3, 1992.
118 Well illustrated in their 1991 publication, Mecanicos, 'A Greve' (the strike).
119 Mecanicos, Tribuna, no. 6, 1992; and, Mecanicos, Special leaflet on industrial action - 1989-92 
(untitled), 1992.
120 Nearly every bulletin in this period contained comments on either the Collor government, wages 
or the union election, but few other issues.
121 Mecanicos, Tribuna. 3/92 and nos. 5 and 6, 1992
122 A point well illustrated by the language of, ibid., no. 6, 1992.
123 The Plasticos were well versed on modernisation issues. See, for example, Sindicato dos Plasticos 
de Joinville, Boletim de Circulacao Nacional. 'Modemidade Pra Quern' (Modernity for who?), 1992,
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aware of Consul's internal policies and informally shared the view of the Plasticos and 
Limeira union that modernisation, as practised, was very negative and undemocratic124. 
Yet they remained committed to an emphasis on building links between other local 
metals unions and the plastics group.
This may have been a sensible strategy as directly confronting Consul from a 
non-legal position looked premature. Furthermore, while the Mecanicos supported 
national CUT calls for a system of collective contracts and a professional wage policy, 
the union was very sensitive to claims that they only cared for skilled workers. While 
Consul and Embraco's redeployment, training and wage policies were seen as a serious 
aggravating influence on union wage policy for the various skill groups, the Mecanicos 
mainly represented lower paid, less skilled workers in a diverse range of small 
factories.
However, they were preparing in other ways for new factory systems. During 
1992 they began work, along with state CUT headquarters, on a series of training 
courses for unionists and workers. The emphasis of these new courses was, how to 
improve relations with factory workers and how to confront the implications of new 
factory systems125.
Consequently, while critical, during 1993 the Mecanicos began to discuss 
modernisation more openly. For example, outsourcing was seen as a negative 
development rather than a feature of modernisation which may have both positive and 
negative effects126. More broadly, the development of a more ‘practical’ stance 
signified their recognition that they must widen their potential ‘electorate’.
For instance, they now took a more conciliatory stance to companies who were 
starting to lay-off workers or compete with the union for the provision of services127.
Joinville.
124 Interview with Wilson Vieira, President, Mecanicos, 5/93.
125 An exploratory course was held for 36 union officers and workers between 2-4 o f June 1992 - 
Mecanicos, ‘Relatorio da la  Tapa de Curso para Dirigentes’, 2-4 June, 1992.
126 Interview, Wilson Viera, Mecanicos President, 11/93.
127 Mecanicos, Tribuna, no 4 and 6, 1993.
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The survival of the union also required that their day-to-day activities turned more and 
more to the disclosure and enforcement of minimum standards incorporated in the 
Labour Code and local agreements128. Moreover, while their formal unification with the 
Plasticos signalled a more co-ordinated stance, the level of unemployment dictated that 
the union was now firmly against extra hours129.
In summary, it appears that practical problems had forced a broader and less 
radical identity onto the Mecanicos. Nevertheless, despite the adjustments they have 
been making, they still fall within the ‘black hole’ of those unions who have been 
marginalised. There are no similar legal barriers on Sinditherme. However, as discussed 
below, serious questions remain as to whether Sinditherme has developed an identity 
which adequately represents the expectations of Consul workers noted in Chapter 6.
c) Moderate Unionism-The New Reality?: The Sinditherme Experience
In great contrast to these two CUT unions, in Sinditherme's first journal (1991) 
they focused on four themes - labour law, quality and productivity, union services and, 
the negotiation of inflationary adjustments130. First, the union sought to define quality 
and productivity as vital, positive initiatives that workers should embrace as part of 
their common interests with employers131. The union argued that all actors must make 
sacrifices and that this put new responsibilities on workers to gain new skills through 
training and education. Stability was not a statutory right, they argued. It would, 
however, be won by the individual working harder, smarter and in collaboration with 
the employer132.
A similar attitude to negotiation and the use of the law was made in terms of 
health and safety. The union urged the individual worker to put greater efforts into 
suggestions for work place improvements rather than relying on the provisions of the
128 Increasingly, these issues dominated the union’s bulletins, e.g. ibid., nos. 5, 6 and 10, 1993.
129 See, Sindicatos dos Trabalhadores Mecanicas e Pl&sticos de Joinville, Portao de Fabrica, ano 1, no 
1, 11/93.
130 Sinditherme, Jomal, ano 1, no. 1, 11/91.
131Ibid., p2
132 Ibid., p2
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Labour Code or a collective militant stance133. Yet Sinditherme portrayed itself as the 
independent conduit through which workers should channel their concerns about real 
wages134. The other important area in which the union saw its role was as a service 
provider. That same journal detailed the extensive range of medical services, leisure 
activities and discounts that the union had for socios135.
Relations with workers, companies and factory politics took other distinctive 
forms. First, few calls appear to have been made by their (white-collar) factory 
representatives for assemblies or for views from the factory floor136. Secondly, the 
union actually supported holding down wage rises at Embraco in 1991 due to liquidity 
problems that the firm was facing137 and they did not seek the views of members on this 
issue or in respect to the use of the IS.
On the other hand, Sinditherme justified the lower 1991 wage decision with the 
observation that they had delivered an agreement through compromise, one which had 
not been appealed to Brasilia and delayed by a drawn-out legal process138. Furthermore, 
they stressed that they had obtained salary growth for all salary groups rather than just 
for the lower paid139. This appears to have been an attempt by them to reach out to 
skilled workers in the three factories and conflicts with their claim that the Mecanicos 
were ‘pandering’ to the skilled to the detriment of the bulk of industrial workers.
In terms of politics, Sinditherme also condemned Collor but stressed that they 
were a-political and that workers should vote with their conscience rather than a 
predetermined political agenda140. However, their optimistic, employer friendly 
approach to modernisation continued to stand out as their major identifying
133 Ibid, p3
134 Ibid, p3
135 Ibid, p4. The journal also included paid ads for products (e.g. Consul fridges) for which members 
could get discounts, ibid, pp2-4.
136 i.e. records o f only a few assemblies could be found for the 1989-93 period.
137 Confirmed at interview with, Evacir Meier, President, Sinditherme, 5/93. The unions first journal 
(Sinditherme, Jomal, no. 1, p i)  also underlines the union's view that workers’ objective should be to 
improve company efficiency.
138 Sinditherme, Jomal, ano 1, no.4, 10/92, p4.
Ibid, no.3, 8-9/92. Confirmed in Chapter 4, Table 4.6. It meant that they were not achieving wage 
growth for the bulk o f their workers (the unskilled) as was the Sao Bernardo metal workers union.
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characteristic. What the ‘challenges of the market’ required of workers was their further 
professional specialisation. From this would spring more efficient companies and 
improved conditions of employment141. Accordingly, they supported technological 
innovation and the outsourcing strategies of employers. While outsourcing might 
reduce the conditions of workers in outsourced firms, if workers took a conciliatory 
approach new internal opportunities would be more skilled and satisfying142.
Sinditherme saw itself as an archetype of progressive unions in ‘first world’ 
countries. Gone was an approach which condemned external, imperialist exploitation 
or the actions of an exploitative domestic elite143. Yet, while the union implied that its 
agenda was centred on the workplace, they did not seek workers’ views or believe that 
the union had the right to be involved in factory level change, industrial training or 
attitudinal education. Their job was simply to motivate workers, a job they lamented as 
difficult due to the ‘cynical and militant attitude’ of most labourers144.
A similar narrow and non-active approach can be seen in their interests. 
Sinditherme was very active in satisfying the service needs of its socios. However, 
workers in other unions or companies were of no concern to them and not a single 
reference was made in their infrequent journals or bulletins to women's rights, the 
homeless, the poor or any other cause.
However, after three years of moderate salary deals, and in stark contrast to the 
difficulties the Mecanicos were having on the wages front, in 1993 Sinditherme was 
able to boast a unique (1992 related) salary decision. They had gained the highest 
salary base (piso) in the region, salary adjustments for all salary groups and an 
agreement for immediate, full, monthly inflation adjustments for all their members145. 
This deal was better than the Government's guidelines and a very unusual occurrence 
anywhere in Brazil.
140 Ibid., no. 4, 1992, p2.
141 Ibid., no 3, p4.
142 Interview, Evacir Melor, Sinditherme President, 5/93.
143 Sinditherme, Jomal. no.3, p4.
144 Interview, Evacir Melor, Sinditherme, 5/93.
145 As shown in, Sinditherme, Jomal. ano II, no.4, 5/93; and listed in, 'Mecanicos, Tribuna.
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Furthermore, the rate of use of Sinditherme's services was reported as very 
high146. To these services the union proposed new holiday facilities and added a 
consumer co-operative to its range of functions for paid up socios141. The ‘Cesta 
Basica\ a negotiable right which was often left to employers to implement (e.g. in Rio 
Claro), had now become a major function of this union. Yet Sinditherme claimed that 
this was a major coup for workers and one which had been won through negotiation at 
the factory level148. The union was now prepared to push for further employee benefits 
such as creches. However, there were suggestions of dissent to the union directorates’ 
priorities. For example, an assembly was called for early 1994 to debate the Cesta 
Basica policy ‘in the face of rumours that there was a group of workers at the plants 
who were against the union's role in this important initiative’149.
Finally, by the end of 1993 Sinditherme could boast a higher level of 
unionisation than that for the other two unions in this analysis150. However, there are 
other developments which suggest that its strategy was not exactly what its members 
believed it was or wanted and that focussing on unionisation rates alone can be very 
misleading. First, despite professing an a-political orientation, in 1993 the union 
proposed that the Regional Metals Federation should affiliate with Forga Sindical151. 
Secondly, after nearly five years as the formal representative of workers at the three 
firms, Sinditherme decided that 1994 would be the year for the union to start 
conducting questionnaires at a factory level to find out what workers’ views and 
demands were152.
In summary, Sinditherme certainly has a respectable unionisation rate and it 
does provide many services for its members. However, their identity is by no means 
active, broad or representative. The views’ of workers at the two Consul plants make it
Sinditherme - Consul/Embraco/ Kavo - ‘Declaragao’, 9/12/93.
146 Interview, Evacir Meier, Sinditherme, (5/93). He suggested that the union's doctors saw 80 workers 
(or their family members) per day.
147 Sinditherme, Jomal. no. 10, 10-11/93.
148 Ibid., (Suplemento Especial), 2/94.
149 Ibid., p2.
150 That is, about 50% compared to 40% (Mecanicos- their firms) and the Limeira Metals Union (only 
16% at Brastemp-Rio Claro).
151 Interview, Jose Negerherbow, Secretary, Sinditherme, Joinville, 11/93.
152 Interview, Evacir Melor, President, Sinditherme, Joinville, 5/93.
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clear that wages are important but also that workplace concerns are crucial issues for 
which the union has failed. The union has become incorporated within the economic 
and ideological apparatus of the firm in the way that neither optimists nor sceptics 
would salute.
7.5 CONCLUSION: UNION IDENTITY - THEMES AND AMBIGUITIES
A prominent view in the recent literature is that factory modernisation will be a 
key force for changes in union identity. Optimists suggest that unions will be able to 
recapture their relevance to changed conditions by embracing more moderate identities. 
As was shown in Figure 7.2, there are two optimistic ideal types to how this 
moderation may evolve. First, unions may become more service orientated, company 
specific and narrow in their focus. Alternatively, union agendas and interests may 
broaden but lose a workplace focus. In contrast to optimists, this chapter’s analysis of 
union identity has suggested that more pessimistic incorporation and marginalisation 
outcomes are more likely in the typical Brazilian context.
There were two levels to this chapter’s interest in the union identity- 
modemisation debate. These were, how have unions adjusted and have they become 
effective and successful representatives at the workplace. Secondly, have unions’ 
political aims become more difficult to sustain as a result of a growth in the importance 
of workplace change. These questions were addressed through the application of a 
model of union identity to the unions’ experiences, especially those unions at the most 
modernised locations where both moderate and militant unions are involved. However, 
the experience of the unions at the least modernised sites provided a benchmark of 
what combative unions (e.g. the Sao Bernardo metal workers) can achieve in this 
industry and of how local circumstances can produce very different types of industrial 
relations outcomes (e.g. in Caxias do Sul).
The detailed review of union identity at the most modernised sites confirmed 
that a wide variety of union identities can emerge. Overall, the two CUT unions (the
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Limeira metal workers and the Mecanicos) stand out in stark contrast to Sinditherme. 
Their agendas are broader, their interests encompass other groups and both appear to 
have clear formal and informal intentions to create active participant relations with 
workers. However, there are some important differences between the two CUT unions. 
Secondly, it is not possible to categorically argue that Sinditherme is not interested in 
modernisation or that it is not delivering the principal demands that workers have of a 
union.
After winning control of their union, the Limeira group began to moderate their 
focus away from radical political-economic themes. Their agenda became more 
regularised, co-ordinated and focused on practical day-to-day issues. A greater reliance 
on state structures and decisions also emerged. Yet this did not stop them from 
developing a broad range of industrial claims, from actively pushing the limits of state 
regulation or from continuing to promote links to the CUT.
On the other hand, the Mecanicos were far more reluctant to moderate their 
approach. They continued to push a broad, political agenda but narrow range of 
interests up to the point where circumstances almost forced them to cease to exist. At 
this later date they started to think more seriously about modernisation issues. They 
also began to take a less categorical view of wage-employment tradeoffs and the ‘need’ 
for regulation, negotiation and compromise. However, horizontal union re-grouping 
continued to be important to their strategy.
Both these unions were facing difficult and contradictory decisions as a result 
of modernisation strategies in their regions. Nonetheless, the practical demonstration of 
the Limeira union's credentials (e.g. their health and safety campaigns, the devolution 
of the IS and their clearer attempt to confront modernisation issues) distinguishes them 
from the Mecanicos. A similar concerted and broad approach can be seen in their range 
of interests compared to the Mecanicos.
Sinditherme also had a policy on modernisation and at the end of the period 
their services were quite extensive compared to the other two unions. Unionisation for
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them was also much higher - overall (50%) and for their case study firm (50%). 
However, the analysis highlighted a number of serious formal and informally based 
caveats to the conclusion that they have been as representative as the other two unions. 
Their identity can best be summed up as active in its omission. Compared to the CUT 
unions, they do not wish to become involved in the workplace and feel that unions and 
workers should place less emphasis on the state and statutory regulation. Conciliatory 
relations with employers and a focus on the individual come through strongly in their 
policies and ‘actions’.
Furthermore, there are aspects of Sinditherme which call into question the 
notion of ‘modernity’ and its relation to the Brazilian industrial relations context. For 
example, Sinditherme considers itself to be a progressive union and it does engage in 
modernisation terminology. However, its inaction, service focus and inclination to 
accept employer policy illustrate that even workplace modernisation does not 
necessarily produce qualitatively distinct breaks from past industrial relations habits. 
These past habits are also far from democratic.
A further point which highlights the difficulty of the Brazilian context is that all 
three unions stress the difficulty they have engaging workers on any topic, particularly 
in relation to the most micro workplace issue and the most macro political theme. The 
Sinditherme identity stands out as it drives a wedge between a workplace and a political 
orientation, concentrating on the traditional areas of services and wage conciliation. 
This may be a sensible strategy in view of employers’ attitudes and as workers put a 
lot of weight on pay and union services. However, it does not mean that Sinditherme is 
representative, particularly in view of the picture of modernisation and workers’ 
attitudes given earlier.
Nevertheless, the worrying issue for groups such as the Limeira metal workers 
is that, despite their innovative attempts to meld workplace, local and national themes 
within a much more representative identity, this has had little effect at Brastemp-Rio 
Claro. It is sour consolation to the union that the application of more sophisticated 
modernisation strategies at a ‘greenfields’ site have helped ensure a virtually non-union
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factory in the midst of a region with rising union sympathies. Metal workers in 
Joinville seem more radical than their (unrepresentative) union while in Sao Bernardo 
and Caxias workers’ views are now being more closely matched by union policy. 
However, at the Brastemp-Rio Claro site it doesn’t appear to matter whether the union 
moderates its approach or not, workers still don’t appear very interested.
More broadly, the case studies confirm that union identity is certainly a very 
complex and contingent issue. In this regard, the 1985-94 period has redefined that 
more representative form of unionism which began to emerge in the late 1970s. For 
example, the CUT unions of this study can be distinguished from Sinditherme as they 
push, question and challenge the system. However, the difficulties all unions face is 
amply illustrated by the fact that at each case study location unions still have to rely 
heavily on state institutions to secure formal gains. Secondly, formal union structures, 
local political economy and old industrial habits have meant that, while CUT unions 
can be distinguished from others, their ability to wield power and influence may be 
minimal outside of regions such as Sao Bernardo. Thus while the labour aristocracy 
debate may be clearer in principle, most unions may not be able to gain the foothold in 
their locations which would allow them to be more representative and effective in 
practice.
Finally, a few points about the specific policy dilemmas created for Brazilian 
unions (by modernisation) need to be made. First, it would appear that the continuing 
evolution of more representative and effective unions requires detailed policies for 
particular skill groups and workplace issues, in addition to the articulation of general 
union principles. While a policy stance of this nature will be difficult, these will be the 
types of issues the Mecanicos will have to deal with if and when they regain coverage 
of Consul, Embraco and Kavo.
Secondly, unions must more explicitly discuss and articulate the areas in which 
they see a state role as necessary and the areas for which they see it as an intrusion. All 
competing industrial actors' views must be integrated within an industrial relations 
framework. As it stands, the present framework is very ambiguous and unhelpful to the
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development of an industrial relations system with some credibility.
The above point about the state serves to highlight another problem for the 
labour movement. Vertical union structures are important for the articulation of policies 
on issues such as Government regulation. However, firm specific modernisation 
practices may render the standardisation of anything beyond the most general of issues 
increasingly irrelevant. State regulation, political unionism and vertical union structures 
may become even more meaningless than they already are as modernisation progresses. 
The situation at Brastemp-Rio Claro may represent an early example of this dilemma.
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THESIS CONCLUSION:
THE ‘POLITICS OF MODERNISATION’ IN BRAZIL
This thesis has analysed the effects of industrial modernisation on industrial 
workers in Brazil. How are firms changing, what effects is this having on work and 
workers’ attitudes and how is this affecting union strategies? There are a number of 
schools of thought about what these effects might be. For example, optimists claim that 
management/workplace change and better firm level outcomes will be linked by a 
significant change in attitudes and behaviour.
Within the workplace, these linkages concern greater work satisfaction (due to 
new tasks) and employer allegiance as a result of more open employee relations and 
more generous employment conditions. This situation will require that unions be more 
moderate for them to have any chance of surviving. This may or may not involve them 
having a role within the workplace.
In contrast, other commentators claim that this schema is unrealistic. Many 
studies challenge the degree to which we will actually observe modernisation in a 
comprehensive form. One of the reasons for this is that the ‘indigenous’ context will 
modify the nature of any modernisation strategy.
A more fundamental critique concerns the attitudinal and behavioural links 
upon which the optimistic case is based. There may be comprehensively modernising 
firms and they may be achieving significantly better performance outcomes than other 
firms. However, sceptics argue that, rather than being based on worker allegiance and 
union co-operation, the attitudes and behaviour involved are rooted in more subtle and 
sophisticated forms of control.
Methodologically, the implication of these critiques is that a key way to test the 
optimistic argument is to compare the form, effects and linkages involved in examples 
of comprehensive modernisation with those involved at partially modernised sites. 
Empirically, therefore, this study chose a number of comparable firms from the white
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goods industry which appeared to fit this dichotomy. This supposition later came to be 
verified.
The hypotheses of this thesis were based on a sceptical vision of modernisation. 
Theoretically, the thesis’s re-evaluation of labour process theory helped to provide a 
framework for this study. The control argument emanating from many recent studies is 
an issue which has always been at the heart of labour process theory.
Moreover, the literature also confirmed that forces for change in work/labour 
processes emanate from many levels - from the factory regime, from the state and from 
TNCs. Yet the effects of these factors will not always be in same direction. For 
example, while most changes to work will reflect capital’s greater power relative to 
labour, TNCs may sometimes act to force improvements in workplace conditions. 
Moreover, workers’ responses to pressure (e.g. their ‘games’) may often act to further 
enhance the efficient running of the enterprise.
However, this study improved upon this ‘politics of production’ framework in a 
number of ways -  in the conceptualisation of control, in the analysis of resistance and 
in terms of the integration of local, national and international factors. For instance, 
unions’ responses to modernisation were analysed using a dynamic and contextually 
sensitive model of union identity. In addition, the study sought to integrate a 
consideration of how TNCs may be shaping the ‘politics of modernisation’. This 
analysis was set against the harsh institutional and attitudinal setting within which 
Brazilian workers and unions find themselves.
On the other hand, while the 1985-94 case study period was volatile 
economically, the environment was politically and institutionally more open and 
democratic. Increasingly, employers were being encouraged to modernise and, 
theoretically at least, workers and their representatives were being made to feel more 
confident to voice their views and aspirations. With the continuation of low wages and 
education levels and high turnover in most parts of industry, it could be argued that the 
time was ripe for more positive and comprehensive modernisation experiments. A 
move from ‘routinisation’ to ‘taylorised JIT’ to more comprehensive examples of
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modernisation, between 1980-1994, suggested to some that this would become the 
case.
Yet low wages, low education levels, high turnover and the continuation of 
many aspects of the corporatist industrial relations system may also have acted to 
encourage firms to embark on an ‘easy’ form of modernisation. Even if employers offer 
better conditions in ‘exchange’ for higher levels of quality and productivity, the balance 
of the ‘implicit bargain’ may still be very unequal. Brazilian employers may not have 
to offer ‘their associates’ many changes to their tasks, employee relations and 
employment conditions in order to secure motivated workers, dedicated employees, 
anti-unionists and moderate or inconsequential unions. Yet unravelling this debate 
required not only an indepth analysis of the companies but also detailed data from 
workers and their unions.
In this respect, while Chapter 4 noted that the comprehensive case study 
modernisers were achieving higher levels of quality, efficiency and productivity, 
managerial intent could be questioned. Workplace changes could be seen as controlling 
and unions were being excluded. However, the analysis was not conclusive as it was 
not based on interview data. Accordingly, Chapter 5 added a sample based analysis of 
work and work attitudes to the study. Chapters 6 and 7, on the other hand, examined 
the sample’s attitudes to the employer and the union and how unions responded to this 
situation. Each of these chapters was guided by the thesis hypotheses and the specific 
questions which emerged from the recent Brazilian literature on modernisation. The 
data reviewed within these chapters confirmed that, while there had been important 
changes to the workplace, workers’ attitudes were still very sceptical.
The study thus provided a unique snapshot of industrial sociology and 
industrial relations in Brazil. This applies not just in terms of the period but through the 
application of more refined analytical methods to detailed factory, worker and union 
data within a previously unstudied industry. A more detailed summary of the results of 
this research is presented below. The study's specific conclusions are placed within 
three thematic areas -  Management’s Control of the Workplace, Modernised Work and 
the Labour Process and the question of a ‘New’ Brazilian Industrial Relations. The
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thesis finishes with a few reflections on the implications of this study for the analysis of 
work and the labour process.
Management’s Control of the Workplace
The specific modernisation model which seems to most accurately fit the case 
study industry is ‘Japanese/lean production’. Yet the nature of modernisation showed 
variability between firms. Locational issues, TNC factors and anti-unionism were often 
behind this. Nevertheless, despite the differences between the firms’, the 
comprehensive modernisers reacted particularly harshly to the prospect that their quest 
for new levels of quality would make them more dependent on the skills and 
motivation of their workers. Either minimal changes were offered and/or changes 
simply acted to organise and control workers in new ways. The principle strategies of 
all of the case study firms, and their basis, are summarised below.
There are two aspects which stand out when comparing overall white goods 
management in Brazil. First, employers with very similar requirements of production 
have (re) organised in very different ways. This seems to be primarily due to a 
combination of who controls the company (domestic or international capital) and the 
perceived threat of union power. Secondly, even amongst the two comprehensively 
modernised factories (both of which have minimal union threat) there are important 
differences in approach. For example, at Brastemp-Rio Claro more significant changes 
to employee relations and employment conditions are occurring while there has been a 
clear decision to concentrate on technological change at Consul III.
Separating the modernisation concept into management philosophy, 
organisational structures and specific features of the factory floor permits a better 
comparison of each company. For example, during most of the case study period the 
domestic firm (Enxuta) did not embrace flatter structures and a total quality mission, as 
did two of the Brasmotor/Whirlpool firms (Consul and Brastemp-Rio Claro). Familial, 
hierarchical, and autocratic control characteristics determined Enxuta's corporate form 
up until the crash in the market. However, after the market crash, flatter structures were 
forced on the company by the market and due to the conditions attached to a
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Governm ent rescue plan.
In the case of Brastemp-Sao Bernardo, despite the firm's early inclusion in the 
Brasmotor/Whirlpool group, the influence of the local union appears to have been the 
major factor behind their slowness to change. After all, Consul had a very similar 
approach to Brastemp-Sao Bernardo up to 1990 but changed it after they had a 
compliant union. That companies' attitudes to unions (by moving away from them or 
neutralising them) are more important than their need for skills is also evident from the 
Brastemp-Rio Claro relocation. These observations cast doubt on whether HRM/TQM 
approaches can be consistent with an independent union role within the ‘new’ Brazilian 
context. Present Brazilian HRM/TQM efforts are clearly very unitarist.
The changes which occurred to the management styles of the two 
comprehensively modernised firms also show distinct features. First, there is no doubt 
that both Brastemp-Rio Claro and Consul III embraced strategic TQM/HRM 
principles. These plans, however, reflected the product, market and management 
principles being developed by Whirlpool International, as applied to Brazilian 
conditions by Brasmotor. Thus, while each company's new quality mission was 
couched in terms of the ‘family’ (a term with strong links to past paternalistic practices 
in Brazil), the Brasmotor ‘Vision’ is no more than the local application of a 
multinational's global approach.
The variation of management styles across Brasmotor operating units does not 
diminish this point. The philosophy of Whirlpool is global planning with some local 
variation in product and human resource style - if such opportunities arise, if they do 
not conflict with global plans and if they offer greater profitability. The flexibility and 
cheapness of Brazilian labour and less cohesive industrial relations norms are simply 
competitive advantages to be made the most of.
Other developments support this more sceptical view of management. For 
example, a leaner management structure is evident at Brastemp-Rio Claro but only 
because of its pre-planned function within Brasmotor's divisional structure. Consul, on 
the other hand, has always had a lean management structure even before its complete
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incorporation into Brasmotor. Brastemp-Sao Bernardo, however, remains a very top- 
heavy organisation despite its loss of operating autonomy to Brasmotor administrative 
structures. The interchange of key technical personnel between Brasmotor units and 
Whirlpool is another relevant observation in this respect.
Guaranteeing their investment in workers and work systems has also led the 
comprehensively modernised firms to develop structures which more strongly 
differentiate their labour force. On this issue there is variety amongst the firms also. For 
example, Brastemp-Rio Claro has been at the forefront in putting education-based 
barriers between their ILM and the external one. However, Consul also ‘vets’ the 
workers taken on at factory III through their knowledge of those workers employment 
history in factory II.
Secondly, it would appear that when a firm starts to modernise they might also 
feel pressures to (further) separate groups of workers. When Brastemp-Rio Claro first 
began operations management tried to minimise differences in the physical 
environment offered to the various skill groups. They also designed the career scheme 
so that, in theory, all workers would have the chance of filling the most skilled 
(‘innovator’) classification. However, despite being a ‘greenfields’ site, traditional 
relativities were interrupted. Men felt women were gaining unfairly from the training- 
based career scheme and the skilled saw the rise of a new type of semiskilled worker 
threaten their previous pivotal position in the factory. The company was forced to 
downgrade the importance of internal training as a factor in career growth and the 
career scheme itself was split so that the possibility of the semiskilled/unskilled 
competing with the skilled for promotion was reduced.
Consul uses a simpler method for separating skill groups. All tool room 
workers are housed in a separate area within factory II and the maintenance workers 
who work in factory III are functionally responsible to that factory II unit. Brastemp- 
Sao Bernardo has adopted a similar strategy. At that site, design and tool room workers 
(for a number of Brasmotor companies) are now housed in a different building. These 
labourers work under much better conditions than the direct production workers (their 
former colleagues) in the factories.
302
It therefore seems that even the company with the best chance of creating a new 
workplace culture and ‘skilling’ approach (Brastemp-Rio Claro) was, like the other 
firms, forced to differentiate their internal labour force. This was done for 
organisational and control reasons. More generally, these results suggest that 
modernisation may act to force Brazilian firms to build more sophisticated ILMs than 
was the case in the past.
The firms exhibited other significant differences in how they organised the 
factory floor. First, the imported technologies applied at the most modem firms greatly 
enhanced these firms productivity relative to the older plants. However, of no less 
importance to this outcome were factory layout adjustments and qualitative changes to 
worker responsibilities. Brastemp-Rio Claro and Consul III achieved much higher 
productivity by combining these elements in a complementary way. On the other hand, 
comparable factory examples suggest that mixed production systems (Consul II) fared 
worse in productivity terms than older but consistent factory systems (Brastemp-Sao 
Bernardo).
Nevertheless, the comprehensively modernised factory examples (Brastemp- 
Rio Claro and Consul III) showed some variety within their workplace models. Both 
firms have developed very streamlined production flow. Each has also introduced work 
systems such as JIT/Kanban and SPC. However, these work systems are more 
advanced in operation at Brastemp-Rio Claro. Moreover, Brastemp-Rio Claro has 
attempted to apply the principles of TQM/HRM in much more detailed ways. For 
example, while both firms provide significant training (on skills, systems and 
attitudes), at Brastemp Rio Claro quality circles discuss production and employment 
issues on a regular basis and, as noted above, an intricate career scheme was 
introduced. The scheme rewards training, work skills and attitudes and involves team 
members in the evaluation of themselves and others.
Despite the more advanced appearance of the Brastemp-Rio Claro model its 
effects were still questioned. The biggest uncertainty was whether the nature of control 
there was any less onerous than a Fordist model with no such opportunities, more 
supervision but less responsibility. Workers at Brastemp-Rio Claro have taken on many
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new tasks and evaluating one's own colleagues could be a very onerous role. More 
generally, despite the spectrum of ways in which all of the firms have approached the 
effort-bargain, worker control still seems to apply. However, in the most modem firms 
the process was different and more ‘negotiated’ than the explicit control mechanisms of 
the factories with predominantly Fordist orientations.
Modernised Work and the Labour Process:
The importance of considering both ‘objective’ and subjective aspects of work 
represents a key contribution of an approach based on the labour process. The 
distinction between task execution and its conception helps to make this clearer. 
Studies which start at the point of production generate a body of information about 
production relations which allow the ‘objective’ and subjective basis of the implicit 
bargain to be clarified.
In this regard, the relational data produced by this research suggests a number 
of conclusions. For example, many aspects of an optimistic interpretation of the effects 
of modernisation on ‘objective’ aspects of the labour process have been confirmed. 
Also, it appears that the more co-ordinated and comprehensive a modernisation plan 
the more these elements will change.
The two examples of comprehensive modernisation contrast with the other 
factories in the way work has been altered and in the attitudes of some workers, namely 
the semiskilled. While the skill debate remains inconclusive, for both structural and 
definitional reasons, there are clear differences in the types of skills workers at 
comprehensively modernised firms are performing. A distinct and new type of effort 
bargain seems to have been introduced for these workers.
Within this implicit bargain these workers have many new and more complex 
tasks and responsibilities, both practical and conceptual. While at work they have a 
greater degree of involvement in what is done and in how things might be improved. 
They are also given a less onerous system of direct supervision, many training and 
education opportunities and often the expectation of promotion and career
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development. Within this situation they are working harder, faster and smarter and with 
high expectations of further benefits. More generally, all workers like to be challenged, 
they want more skills and, in contrast to past studies, they enjoy the use of new 
techniques more than they do new technologies.
There were, however, a number of important caveats to this picture. All of these 
point to a more sceptical view modernisation. Due to workers’ fears that they have not 
been and will not be fairly rewarded or given any real involvement in conception 
related issues, as they analysis moves from ‘objective’ to subjective issues the picture 
becomes more negative.
For example, not coincidentally, the new bargain has allowed firms to continue 
to pay very low wages. This is in spite of the much higher levels of productivity that 
those workers are providing. A combination of ‘greenfields’ location (which allows 
low but locationally reasonable wages to be paid) and greater employee screening has 
helped these firms to apply this new bargain to great effect.
A number of more specific issues further highlight this situation. First, while 
greater involvement and participation are provided the more modem a firm, these are 
very narrowly based, production orientated opportunities. Moreover, explicit and 
implicit incentives are being cleverly used to encourage this ‘participation’. Secondly, 
there is both objective and subjective evidence to suggest that work in the most 
modernised firms has not made workers more skilled or more employable in the open 
labour market. In terms of education, the fact that the unskilled are now more qualified 
than the semiskilled confirms scepticism over the use of training and education by 
these firms.
Thirdly, in terms of work overall it is striking to note that Brastemp-Rio Claro 
workers are labouring very hard and intensively but they have relatively low feelings of 
interest or increased responsibility. In terms of specific tasks, Consul III workers are 
very unimpressed with their new responsibilities whereas Brastemp-Rio Claro workers 
are quite negative about the new techniques which they are expected to apply within 
their work. The new tasks of these workers are not in themselves harder or more
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demanding. It appears to be the manner in which they have been applied and the lack of 
compensation for new tasks which is causing dissatisfaction.
Fourthly, despite the sophistication of new employee relations systems at the 
comprehensively modernised firm, there exists a good deal of cynicism and uncertainty 
about promotion possibilities amongst their workers. In terms of actual promotions, it 
appears that workers at the less modernised Consul II have fared best - despite their use 
of simpler, manual skills. More pointedly, workers at the most modernised workplaces 
are less happy with their system of evaluation than are workers at more traditional 
locations. The two comprehensively modernising firms use more formal systems and 
all workers fear the personal bias possible in informal evaluation. However, modem 
firm workers are still less than content.
For example, the use of cells in the evaluation process and the downgrading of 
demonstrated practical work skills within the equation have created much 
dissatisfaction at the Brastemp-Rio Claro workplace. All workers wish to say more 
about a broad range of workplace issues. However, this desire appears to have been 
muted at this factory. In comparison, Consul III workers demonstrate the fragility and 
‘cage like’ effect of their situation through the expression of clear dissatisfaction with 
their wages (relative to Consul II), wages which are the same but are for very different 
levels of responsibility and effort. This is confirmed by the fact that Consul II workers 
actually feel less monitored and happier than do their colleagues in factory III, despite 
the much lower proportion of supervisory staff in Consul factory III.
Consequently, as in Burawoy's time, workers are still party to the production of 
goods, profits and their consent to these. Yet, while workers' new ‘games’ (e.g. their 
desire for career progress) help the firm, labourers are also making it clear that their 
consent is contingent on promises being fulfilled. Nevertheless, the policies of the new 
workplace encourage them to complain more about how quickly they progress, the 
criteria for progression, firm-based comparative wage justice, safety, cleanliness and 
training and think less about broader issues which might more deeply question the 
legitimacy of the firm. A key, possible vehicle for both other perspectives and 
resistance to the new factory regime is unionism. On the other hand, have Brazilian
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unions ‘realised’ that modernisation offers them better chances of success through 
moderation?
A ‘New’ Brazilian Industrial Relations?
An industrial relations system has many facets - the formal, informal and micro 
and macro dimensions. This thesis has provided material which allows some 
observations to be made on these aspects of the Brazilian industrial relations system. 
The 1985-94 period provided a unique opportunity to jointly examine macro, industry 
level and micro industrial relations themes using the experience of a previously 
unstudied industry in Brazil.
At the macro level, the years 1985-94 witnessed a further break from the very 
corporatist and normative model of industrial relations which had been instigated in the 
1930s. The first clear rupture in this system (1978-84) has been well documented. 
During this period a new type of unionism, more dedicated to shopfloor relations, 
participant representation and radical politics flexed its muscles to great effect. The 
continuing maturation of these groups has occurred into the 1990s. However, the 
degree to which real change has been achieved, and its continuing growth, can still be 
questioned. This study suggests that ‘new unionism’ has added greater depth to its 
identity between 1985-94 but that many uncertainties remain as to its future breadth of 
influence. Major reasons for this are as follows.
First, while on a formal level the system is more open and less normative, key 
aspects relating to automatic financing and local unions’ monopoly of representation 
still remain. While ‘new unionist’ groups often give back statutory contributions to 
workers, circumstances have led the ‘new unionist’ movement to support the 
continuation of these corporatist principles. Secondly, the existence of a number of 
union centrals vying for political hegemony (of what is still a very bureaucratic union 
system) has helped to perpetuate many of the labour movement divisions which existed 
in the past. One key legacy of this situation is very low levels of worker interest in 
vertical union relations and political unionism. Outside of key bastions of ‘new 
unionism’, this appears to have been maintained (if not exacerbated) in this period and
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industry.
The CUT and Forga Sindical are both very political organisations. Both also 
experience considerable difficulty gaining coverage of larger parts of the union 
movement. Forga Sindical is, however, much more ‘top down’ and conservative. CUT, 
while still having to rely on the state for many of its campaigns and policies, is much 
more radical, representative and questioning. For some industries (e.g. autos), areas 
(e.g. Sao Bernardo) and firms (e.g. Mercedes Benz), CUT strongholds have also made 
real advances in worker rights, particularly in terms of central aspects of factory 
modernisation. Thus, at the broader level and in these strongholds ‘new unionism’ has 
continued its development path. However, in other areas and industries modernisation 
is a major challenge. Achieving real change in industrial relations in these more 
‘typical’ contexts will be far more difficult. The case study locations, outside of Sao 
Bernardo, illustrated this.
The case studies of comprehensive modernisation encompassed examples of 
CUT radicalism, pragmatic ‘new unionism’ and traditional, bureaucratic but 
‘modernised’ unions. While the Mecanicos were much slower to develop an active, 
broad and coherent identity than the Limeira union, the identities of these two CUT 
unions were shown to be broader, more participative and more democratic than 
Sinditherme. However, Sinditherme has been able to achieve a high level of 
unionisation by offering extensive social services. Furthermore, it has achieved this 
without having to be very representative or interested in either labour process concerns 
or explicit political strategies. Its identity is one of modernisation rhetoric and old style 
unionism - one which is conspicuous by its inactivity.
The ‘weight’ of history, an uncertain political economy and the regional display 
of authoritarian values by local employers have had very strong effects on the fortunes 
of these unions. In contrast to some recent Western literature, a culture of unions as a 
service provider or as some distant, non-workplace based, political actor is not a recent 
idea - it is firmly enshrined in Brazilian labour history. In this regard, all three unions 
have noted the difficulty they have gaining greater worker involvement in the union. 
Also, all see that the standardisation of conditions and vertical trade union relations are
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distant issues in the ‘ey es’ o f  m ost workers.
However, state rules and local conditions have allowed Sinditherme officers to 
be comfortable and secure without much effort. In comparison, Mecanico unionists are 
desperately trying to keep to a more radical identity and find new ways, both structural 
and workplace based, to recapture and build their ‘electorate’. The most illustrative and 
ironic situation for unionism exists at Rio Claro. There the union has very cleverly 
melded broader issues with local, plant based circumstances and found many new ways 
to be representative. The irony is that this has been very effective at every local metals 
factory except the one where employer policies are the most sophisticated, Brastemp- 
Rio Claro.
The methodology of this thesis enabled this research to take an even deeper 
look at these micro, subjective aspects of industrial relations. First, in terms of workers' 
overall views, modernisation may have reduced the importance of the state and 
increased the importance of the firm in the ‘eyes’ of most. Moreover, unionism is of 
little real significance to all but the most active unionist.
In this regard, workers' detailed impressions of their employer's approach to 
them have changed. In particular, workers at the comprehensively modernising firms 
are more firm orientated. Also, at these factories the semiskilled are not only treated 
better they are the most enthusiastic. However, the research also suggests that only 
some of these workers have shifted their allegiance to the employer. The others have 
been selected on the basis of their attitudes and affiliation. The modem employer in 
question is more interested in workers who show the right attitude and inclination. It is 
not unionism per se that threatens the employer but challenges from active unionists. 
Passive unionism may even be a positive indicator of interest in self-development - one 
which might be moulded to the employer's advantage.
Furthermore, the implicit bargain is not as clear cut or static as it first might 
appear. For example, while workers at the comprehensive firms felt that their employer 
had more interest in them and had given them a much better situation, they were still 
quite sceptical. They were prepared to work harder, faster and smarter and deliver low
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turnover, high productivity results. However, what they felt they had gained and their 
expectations of the future at that employer were no greater than those of other workers. 
Moreover, they were most unhappy with promotional evaluation and were often just as 
sceptical about the reasons for their employer's policies as were workers from the 
partially modernised factories. However, they were less prepared to speak out.
Thus, while modernisation may have boosted work motivation, these results 
cast doubt on the degree to which employers have captured the ‘hearts and minds’ of 
workers and, in fact, on the use of words such as commitment and allegiance 
themselves. It may also give some unions hope that things may change. More broadly, 
workers' attitudes and their degree of attachment to either employer or union may vary, 
even by issue. Workers' demands appear to be very practical and instrumental. Neither 
false consciousness nor cultural dupe explanations appear to apply very well.
This brings the discussion to the specific nature of workers' views of their union 
and of unionism. First, the majority of Brazilian workers still don't have a very high 
level of attachment to their union. Yet this research has shown that (in some 
circumstances) when a union is more participative and acts to link its policies to 
practical local issues, workers will respond more wholeheartedly to both workplace and 
political themes. However, one principal caveat to this conclusion is when 
modernisation is carried out in a comprehensive fashion. In this case the combination 
of anti-union policies and employer persuasion will make it very difficult for a union to 
be both representative and successful. The case of Brastemp-Rio Claro clearly 
illustrates these problems for Brazilian unions. While Consul workers are much more 
unhappy with their union's approach, the solution employers there have engineered 
creates new problems for the original and more representative union (the Mecanicos).
Secondly, all workers except those at Brastemp-Rio Claro have a strong and 
largely unfilled desire for their union to be involved in labour process issues. Workers 
at Brastemp-Rio Claro saw the need for unions in general but not at their workplace. To 
survive, unions will have to take this issue very seriously. Thirdly, most workers did 
not favour the use of more explicit measures such as the strike. However, while a strike 
‘shy’ feeling also emerged from responses given by active unionists, there was some
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indication that if actions were clearly linked to practical themes greater strike support 
could be achieved.
Fourthly, as noted above, it must be of continuing concern to many union 
hierarchies that the degree of support for vertical union relations and political parties is 
low, even in key bastions of ‘new unionism’. Modernisation and associated policies 
(i.e. ‘greenfields’ location) have aggravated these problems for local unions and their 
hierarchies. Many employers are still very anti-union and the geographical and 
bureaucratic division of union groups weakens the ability of unions to adequately cover 
workplaces and co-ordinate policies.
Fifthly, while some aspects of modernisation suggest that unions may need 
specific policies for particular skill groups this may alienate other workers and further 
divide the union's electoral base. This will be a difficult theme to resolve. Relatedly, 
greater variability in employment conditions across firms may make the standardisation 
of conditions increasingly irrelevant.
Finally, to look at this debate from a different angle, for modernisation to be an 
uncategorically positive issue for unions will require a very real change in employers' 
attitudes. It may also require the enshrinement of more high trust industrial 
relationships and compromises within a national industrial relations framework. In 
view of Brazilian labour history this scenario looks to be very optimistic. Major 
changes in attitudes and policy will require a very different level of trust to that which 
exists. However, experience also suggests that clear ‘worker positive’ changes to 
employers' policies will not usually come about unless unions are strong, independent 
and combative. In this sense, little real change appears to have occurred beyond the fact 
that employers’ labour control and union exclusion policies are now more 
sophisticated.
Labour Process Theory and the ‘Politics of Modernisation’:
It is felt that the analysis of this thesis provides clear support for continuing 
studies of work based on the labour process and for labour process theory itself. Much
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past literature on the labour process became bogged down due to disputes over political 
determinism, the focus of analysis and definitional issues. Few have argued with the 
need to sensitively integrate macro and micro themes and the importance of solid micro 
data. Yet few have provided this.
The further development of Burawoy's ‘politics of production’ seems to have 
surmounted many of these earlier disputes. By extending his analysis and by the use of 
a rich body of data on firms, unions and workers, this study has produced solidly 
grounded observations and allowed the links between micro and macro issues to be 
made. As a result of this study, industrial modernisation has been shown to be a less 
clear model and process than many writers have suggested.
On a practical level, there is always the risk that an approach based on the 
labour process could become either narrow and limiting or too broad and superficial. 
However, this thesis has shown the richness of experience that can be exposed by a 
study which guides a course in between these two extremes. On a more theoretical 
level, this study has shown that concepts such as control and allegiance are important 
for more than just semantic debate. Exploring the shades of grey between their 
common and more academic meanings highlights the value of this type of social 
science framework.
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APPENDIX A:
THE BRAZILIAN WHITE GOODS INDUSTRY
Table Al: An Early Profile of the Brazilian White Goods Industry, Producers and 
Output (in units; % output change p.a.), 1955/56
Product /
Company
1955
output
1955 
(% change on 
1954)
1956
output
1956 
(% change on 
1955)
Refrigeration
G. Motors 35,000 62% 45,200 29%
Brasmotor 21,000 0% 30,000 43%
P.Lopez
(Climax)
30,000 20% 30,000 0%
G. Electric 20,000 100% 24,000 20%
Bercom 5,000 n.a. 10,000 100%
Maveroy
(Kelvinator)
n.a. n.a. 3,000 n.a.
Ibesa 12,000 0% 12,000 0%
Ind. de Refr. 3,000 50% 3,000 0%
Electrolux n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Total: 125,000 36% 167,200 34%
Clothes
Washers:
Bendix 12,000 n.a. 17,500 46%
Servux 4,500 n.a. 7,000 56%
Cipan 3,200 n.a. 4,500 41%
Westingbraz * n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
P. Lopez 
(Climax)
2,000 n.a. 3,000 50%
Beringhs n.a. n.a. 2,500 n.a.
Ind. National n.a. n.a. 800 n.a.
Total: 22,000 n.a. 36,200 64%
Source: Derived from, H. Lima 'Industrias Novos no Brasil - Fabrica^o de Aparelhos 
Domesticos, Observador Economico Financeiro. 8/58,23, 270, pp32-38.
Note: * While there are no figures available for Westingbraz (a Brazilian/Westinghouse 
venture) for 1955/6, they produced 20,000 washing machines in 1958. This represented 
27% of total output of washing machines (75,000) in that year.
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Table A2: Production and Market Demand - Selected White Goods Products,
1985-92
a) Refrigeration and Cooking Product Sales, 000's of units - % change p.a., 1985-92
Year Fridges Freezers Stoves Microwaves
1985 1689 - - 27
1986 1963 - - 70
% Change 16.2% - - 156.0%
1987 1907 - - 90
% Change -2.9% - - 27.9%
1988 1651 - - 134
% Change -13.4% - - 49.1%
1989 1931 589 2764 154
% Change 17.0% - - 14.9%
1990 1910 515 2222 216
% Change -1.1% -12.6% -19.6% 39.9%
1991 2117 525 2570 155
% Change 10.8% 1.9% 15.7% -28.1%
1992 1382 289 2385 306
% Change -34.7% -45.0% -7.2% 97.4%
Source: B. Neto et a l, ' A industria de electrodomesticos de linha branca: tendencias 
intemacionais e situa9 ao no Brasil', Institute of Economics. University of Campinas, 
Campinas, 1992, Table II.9, p96-97 and Table 11.10, pl01-102.
b) Washing Products - Market Demand, 000's of units - % change p.a., 1989-92
Year Dish Washers Clothing Dryer Clothing Washers
1989 265.07 327.57 597.10
1990 228.50 309.50 518.10
% Change -14.0% - 5.5% -13.2%
1991 187.48 405.12 544.05
% Change -18.0% 31.0% 5.0%
1992 116.64 124.00 386.81
% Change -38.0% -69.0% -29.0%
Source: Neto et al, 'Industria ...linha branca', Table II.9, p96-97 and Table 11.10, plOl- 
102.
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Table A3: Market Structure - Selected White Goods Products, % of total
production, 1985-92
a) Refrigerators and Freezers, % of total market output by major producer groups, 
1985-92
Fridge Freezer
Year Brasmotor Refripar Others Brasmotor Refripar Others
1985 74.6% 24.0% 1.4% 48.1% 46.2% 5.7%
1986 72.6% 26.2% 1.2% 51.3% 42.0% 6.7%
1987 71.9% 26.3% 1.8% 51.6% 36.7% 11.7%
1988 70.9% 27.0% 2.3% 54.3% 38.7% 7.0%
1989 66.2% 32.0% 1.8% 46.1% 46.3% 7.6%
1990 61.0% 36.4% 2.6% 42.5% 52.0% 5.5%
1991 67.5% 30.0% 2.5% 45.5% 50.0% 4.5%
1992 71.0% 27.0% 2.0% 51.3% 44.0% 4.7%
Sources: Derived from, Neto et al 
material supplied by companies.
ndustria..linha branca', Table 11.13 p i08. Additional
b) Washers and Dryers, % of total market output by major producer groups, 1989-92
Company / Year 1989 1990 1991 1992
ENXUTA
- washers
- dish washers
- dryers
28.07%
47.69%
66.90%
27.34%
50.13%
72.18%
25.03%
59.03%
66.27%
32.68%
45.38%
57.57%
BRASMOTOR: 
A) Brastemp
- washers
- dish washers
- dryers
60.15%
23.66%
18.20%
62.06%
27.09%
11.19%
64.79%
18.10%
8.0%
55.29%
34.17%
14.50%
B) Semer
- dish washers
- dryers
23.0%
4.85%
18.05%
6.8%
8.46%
0.10%
5.53%
REFRIPAR: 
A) Climax
- washers
- dryers
11.78% 10.6% 10.18%
0.88%
12.03%
OTHERS:
- dish washers
- dryers
5.65%
10.15%
4.53%
9.83%
14.34%
24.75%
14.91%
27.93%
Source: Derived from, Neto et al 'Industria .. linha branca', Table II. 11.a p i05, Table 
II. 11 .b p i06 and Table II. 11 .c p i06.
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APPENDIX B:
THE CASE STUDY CONTEXT -  INDICATORS
Table Bl: Regional Labour Market Characteristics - Sao Paulo State and the
Municipalities of Sao Bernardo and Rio Claro, 1980
Characteristic / Region Sao Paulo State Sao Bernardo Rio Claro
Population over 10 19.3 Million 0.325 Million 0.087 Million
Employment Rate 54% 55% 51%
% Employed in 
Manufacturing
30% 51% 26%
Manufacturing Labour Force
- number employed
- number unemployed
3.07 (M) 
1.93 (M)
0.09 (M) 
0.06 (M)
0.011(M) 
0.007(M)
Manufacturing Empl. Rate 61.4% 59.6% 62.7%
Total Wage Distribution
- 0-3 minimum salaries
- 3+ minimum salaries
67.4%
32.6%
54.4%
45.6%
71.9%
28.1%
Manufacturing Workers-%m/f 15%-25% N.A. N.A.
Manufacturing/Construction 
Employment Proportions:
- supervisors/technicians
- metals occupations
- electricians
- other manufacturing jobs
3.3%
23.5%
5.3%
15.7%
N.A. N.A.
Manufacturing Wage 
Distribution:
- 0-3 minimum salaries
- 3+ minimum salaries
61.7%
38.3%
N.A. N.A.
Average age in Manufacturing 28.8 years N.A. N.A.
Source: Derived from, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE), Censo 
Demografico. mao-de-obra. IX, Recenseamento Geral do Brasil, 1980, volume 1, 
various tomos.
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Table B2: Regional Labour Market Characteristics - Santa Catarina State and
the Municipality of Joinville, 1980
Characteristic / Region Santa Caterina State Joinville
Population over 10 2.72 million 0.177 million
Employment Rate 49.8% 55.0%
%Employed in Manufacturing 23.9% 52.8%
Manufacturing Labour Force: 
-number employed 
-number unemployed
0.319 million 
0.212 million
0.0498 million 
0.0295 million
Manufacturing Empl. Rate 60.1% 62.8%
Total Wage Distribution: 
-0-3 minimum salaries 
-3+ minimum salaries
79.6%
20.4%
75.8%
24.2%
Manufacturing workers -%m/f 73% - 27% N.A.
Manufacturing/Construction 
Employment Proportions:
- supervisors/technicians
- metals occupations
- electricians
- other manufacturing jobs
1.9%
15.7%
3.8%
11.3%
N.A.
Manufacturing Wage Distribution:
- 0-3 minimum salaries
- 3+ minimum salaries 83.4%
16.6%
N.A.
Average age in Manufacturing 27.2 years N.A.
Source: Derived from. IBGE. Censo Demoerafico. mao-de-obra. IX. Recenseamento
Geral do Brasil, 1980, volume 1, various tomos.
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Table B3: Regional Labour Market Characteristics - Rio Grande do Sul State and
the Municipality of Caxias do Sul, 19S0
Characteristic / Region Rio Grande do Sul State Caxias do Sul
Population over 10 6.1 million 0.176 million
Employment Rate 52.5% 58.5%
%Employed in Manufacturing 17.0% 43.0%
Manufacturing Labour Force:
-number employed 0.55 million 0.044 million
-number unemployed 0.30 million 0.019 million
Manufacturing Empl. Rate 64.5% 69.6%
Total Wage Distribution:
-0-3 minimum salaries 77.2% 72.7%
-3+ minimum salaries 22.8% 27.3%
Manufacturing workers -%m/f 70% - 30% N.A.
Manufacturing/Construction
Employment Proportions:
- supervisors/technicians 2.5% N.A.
- metals occupations 17.6%
- electricians 4.6%
- other manufacturing jobs 10.1%
Manufacturing Wage Distribution:
- 0-3 minimum salaries 80% N.A.
- 3+ minimum salaries 20%
Average age in Manufacturing 27.9 years N.A.
Source: Derived from, IBGE, Censo Demografico. mao-de-obra. IX, Recenseamento 
Geral do Brasil, 1980, volume 1, various tomos.
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Table B4: Employment in Sao Paulo Manufacturing - Indexes of Hourly Worker 
Employment in Production, Sao Paulo State, July of each year, 1985-93 (base: 
average of 1985 = 100)
Year Industry
Total
Metallurgy Mechanical Electrical
1985 101.15 99.08 99.34 102.12
1986 114.54 118.79 114.64 116.62
1987 112.28 111.01 112.51 125.55
1988 110.62 112.62 105.96 113.36
1989 113.57 107.82 107.50 112.59
1990 105.00 100.40 96.11 97.37
1991 97.93 92.87 88.06 90.43
1992 85.19 82.29 82.84 72.66
1993 85.53 83.61 77.57 75.01
Source: IBGE, Monthly Industrial Survey. 1985-94
Table B5: Employment in Southern Region Manufacturing - Indexes of Hourly 
Worker Employment in Production, Southern Region (Parana, Santa Catarina 
and Rio Grande do Sul), July of each year, 1985-93 (base: average of 1985 = 100)
Year Industry Total Metallurgy Mechanical Electrical
1985 99.22 96.18 97.00 102.31
1986 112.25 113.93 120.31 123.51
1987 103.85 126.71 110.20 127.99
1988 103.77 120.81 110.46 132.41
1989 107.77 128.02 116.17 139.71
1990 99.63 112.07 102.24 128.73
1991 92.33 103.95 92.14 112.57
1992 86.93 91.36 93.45 97.72
1993 86.87 98.24 98.86 89.01
Source: IBGE. Monthly Industrial Survey. 1985-94
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Table B6: Real Wages in Sao Paulo Manufacturing - Indexes of Real Wages of 
Production Workers, Sao Paulo State, 1985-93,(base: average of 1985 = 100)
Year Industry Total Metallurgy Mechanical Electrical
1985 100 100 100 100
1986 111.7 104.9 111.3 109.6
1987 88.7 84.5 88.7 85.5
1988 96.4 95.2 100.5 96.2
1989 88.6 89.2 88.7 86.1
1990 35.3 34.9 35.6 35.5
1991 63.7 63.8 67.3 62.5
1992 72.3 71.9 78.7 71.2
1993 71.8 71.1 76.2 75.6
Source: Calculated using nominal wage index data from - IBGE, Monthly Industrial 
Survey. 1985-94; deflated by mean annual inflation estimates calculated from ICV 
inflation estimates.
Table B7: Real Wages in Southern Region Manufacturing - Indexes of Real 
Wages of Production Workers, Southern Region (Parana, Santa Caterina, Rio 
Grande do Sul), 1985-93, (base: average of 1985 = 100)
Year Industry Total Metallurgy Mechanical Electrical
1985 100 100 100 100
1986 114.0 119.5 111.4 109.5
1987 92.4 99.8 100.3 89.0
1988 95.3 104.8 104.7 97.4
1989 95.1 110.1 99.7 90.2
1990 38.6 47.2 39.0 34.6
1991 65.0 81.8 65.7 60.5
1992 70.9 89.0 69.6 80.8
1993 72.3 88.1 72.7 81.1
Source: Calculated using nominal wage index data from - IBGE, Monthly Industrial 
Survey. 1985-94; deflated by mean annual inflation estimates calculated from ICV 
inflation estimates.
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Table B8: Labour Turnover in Manufacturing - Annual Rates of Turnover for 
employees in Manufacturing; Sao Paulo State (SP), Santa Catarina State (SC) 
and Rio Grande do Sul State (RS); 1985-94
Year Sao Paulo Santa Catarina Rio Grande do Sul
1985 33.95% 32.70% 44.99%
1986 44.94% 45.87% 61.86%
1987 44.67% 43.77% 56.48%
1988 39.72% 44.54% 63.04%
1989 39.77% 44.21% 58.57%
1990 36.90% 36.20% 50.34%
1992 23.59% 24.10% 37.16%
1993 29.19% 29.21% 43.24%
1994 31.26% 34.62% 39.87%
Source: Calculated using data from - Ministry of Labour, Cadastro Geral de 
Emnregados e Desemnregados. (Lei 4923/65), 1985-95.
Table B9: Indexes of the Cost of Living - Case Study Area Estimates, 1989 and 
1992 (base: metropolitan region of Sao Paulo = 100)
Area / Year: 1989 1992
Metropolitan Sao Paulo (SP) 100.00 100.00
Rio Claro (SP) 98.62 93.70
Joinville (SC) 102.19 101.74
Caixias do Sul (RS) 97.03 96.72
Source: Derived from regional price estimates shown in, DIEESE, Boletim DIESSE.
1988-93
Notes:
1) Index constructed after dividing the index of the cost of a basket of 13 food products 
in each of the regions (each year) by food expenditure proportions of total expenditures.
2) Proxy regions for food expenditure proportions - Caxias = Porto Alegre; Rio Claro 
= Metropolitan Sao Paulo; Joinville = Curitiba.
3) Proxy areas for 13 food product baskets/indexes - Caxias = Porto Alegre; Rio Claro 
= Sao Carlos; Joinville = Florianopolis.
323
Table BIO: Real Purchasing Power - Indexes of Relative Purchasing Power 
Change for Production Workers, the Case Study Locations, (base: 1989 = 100), 
1989 and 1992
Region / Year 1989 1992
Sao Bernardo:
- metalurgy workers 100.0 80.6
- mechanical workers 100.0 88.7
Rio Claro:
- metalurgy workers 100.0 84.6
- mechanical workers 100.0 93.4
Joinville:
- metalurgy workers 100.0 81.2
- mechanical workers 100.0 70.1
Caxias:
- metalurgy workers 100.0 81.1
- mechanical workers 100.0 70.0
Source: Calculated using the real wage indexes in Tables B6-7 and the cost of living 
indexes in Table B9.
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APPENDIX C: 
Defining Skill within the Study
Trying to define ‘skill’ raises a series of problematic issues. First, it can be seen 
to have both practical and conceptual elements. It will also depend on the attitude of the 
person involved and the judgements of others (e.g. employers and society) and thus has 
both subjective and objective sides. These issues are all very important and cannot be 
ignored.
However, for the practical purposes of a research project many of these 
questions can be dealt with by accepting that they will arise but with the focus put on 
‘levels of skill’ as defined by the environment in question. Yet even within the 
apparently homogeneous context of four Brazilian white goods producers the approach 
used required some consideration. Key judgements made within this study are noted 
below.
First, many of the good recent Brazilian studies focus on the distinction 
between direct production line workers and those whose work is indirect. This 
approach avoids absolute definitions and often even the need to make relative 
comparisons of skill within and between factories. Moreover, its use helps to highlight 
the qualitative changes that have been observed in direct production work and the 
quantitative shift towards different proportions of direct production workers as firms 
streamline their production process. As there seems to be a strong relation between 
direct and unskilled work and indirect and semi-skilled work, this study often makes 
use of the direct/indirect categories. However, a more precise definition of skill was 
also called for as workers’ responses on both objective and subjective themes were to 
be compared within and between factories.
An initial attempt to relate the occupations of each firm to national statistical 
skill categories proved to be unworkable. The approach decided on was to look at what 
occupations each firm considered to be skilled, semiskilled or unskilled and cross 
checking to make sure that no major discrepancies existed between firms. Where an 
occupation fits within the firm's (not the industry's) relative wage and occupational
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structure was used as a key cross check of these categories. Also, in the vast majority of 
cases, when length of service was an issue this meant movement within the broad 
category only.
For most occupations this approach made classification a relatively easy issue 
(see Table Cl below for examples). If, for example, a company outsourced more or 
less than another or if its products required more or less complicated processes than 
others this was usually reflected in their proportions of each broad category, in the 
types of occupations within their skill groups and in the different specific tasks of 
similarly defined occupations. These became issues to be explained within the 
analysis.
TABLE Cl: SKILL CATEGORIES AND OCCUPATIONAL EXAMPLES
SKILL
CATEGORY
OCCUPATIONAL EXAMPLES
Skilled tooling, modelling and design workers, mechanics, electricians, 
mechanical/ electrical / plastics / hydraulic maintenance 
workers, maintenance and tooling programmers, carpenters, 
stonemasons, prototype makers, electronic systems workers, 
locksmiths.
Semiskilled most parts production machine operators, some maintenance 
and tooling assistants, most drivers of large and small scale 
machinery, quality controllers, part and equipment preparers, 
guards, general soldering and painting and production line co­
ordinators.
Unskilled basic line workers (parts and final product), part production 
assistant, simple materials movement, stock control and parts 
"suppliers", simplest parts production machine operators and 
cleaners.
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APPENDIX D:
THE WORKER QUESTIONNAIRE AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WORKER SAMPLE
THE WORKER QUESTIONNAIRE:
A) GENERAL DATA:
1) Date of Birth
2) Sex
3) Date commenced at firm
4) Union member -  socio only / active also
5) Level of education on entering firm / now
6) Married or single / number of children
7) Where do you live / distance from factory
8) Industry/occupation of your mother/father
9) Present occupation/function in factory
10) Previous occupation in factory
11) Occupation in previous employer
B) REFLECTIONS ABOUT WORK / WORKING CONDITIONS
1) Preferences for working conditions - hierarchy based on a shown list
2) How does your present employer rate on those (same) conditions -  scale
3) How does your present employer rate on those (same) conditions compared to 
your previous employer -  scale
4) What are your key problem areas with your present conditions/employer -  
hierarchy based on same list
5) Informally, have other tasks been added to your work since being at the firm
- what / when / by whom / do you like them/ do they make work more 
interesting, easy, responsible, independent?
6) Formally, have you gained new tasks/qualifications/responsibilities/positions at 
the firm?
- who decides on them / do you like the way such decisions are made/ are 
they adequately compensated?
7) Do you participate in decisions / make suggestions about -  production, work and 
factory conditions?
- how/ when / how frequently / what type / to whom / do you receive a 
good-positive reaction?
- do these types of participation have any relation to your opportunities for 
progress/promotion in the firm?
8) Your work/job is now -
- easier/ faster/ more intense / more monitored / more responsible / more 
interesting
- uses more or new technologies and techniques?
- is adequately paid / is adequately compensated overall
- has more mobility/ independence/opportunity/perspectives for growth
9) Do you now -  wish to receive new tasks/ wish to make more suggestions/ have 
more interest in development in your position at the firm?
10) Do you expect new responsibilities / promotion within the firm in the next 2 
years?
where to / for what / depends on what and whom
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11) How probable is it that you will voluntarily change employers in the next 2 
years?
- why/ depends on what and whom/ to the same industry / in the same 
region
- do you think you have more skills and thus are more mobile to other firms 
now?
REFLECTIONS ABOUT FACTORY RELATIONS:
D
How are positions/ opportunities decided at your factory?
- formally or informally / who decides / what are the criteria used / 
decisions involve your cell / do you like-dislike this system?
When you have a problem / uncertainty in your work, do you try to resolve it 
yourself or do you speak to others? Who do you speak to?
Do your superiors/workmates have higher expectations that you should resolve 
problems yourself? Over what issues/problems? Whose expectations?
Compared to the past (2 years ago) and past employers -  have you noticed that 
your employer is taking a new approach to -  education / qualifications/ training / 
employee involvement / mobility to other positions?
Do you think that your employer has more interest in -  you / your opinions / 
your suggestions / your career development -  than previously and than other 
employers?
Is your supervisor here sympathetic/ helpful/ positive/ do they give you more 
opportunities? Has this changed since the past and past employers?
Do you know of your firms programmes for development / training / involvement 
and participation? What do they mean to you? Do you know what you need to do 
to gain promotion and new opportunities?
What have you gained from your present employment /employer?
What do you expect to gain from your present employment / employer?
REFLECTIONS ABOUT INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS:
1) Who has most power to determine your conditions of work / livelihood? -  the 
state/employer/other
In whom do you have most confidence to resolve/provide for your conditions of 
work / livelihood?
3) Is your union a good body/organisation?
4) Does your union have policies and proposals? What are they? Are they good 
policies?
5) What does the union do for you? -  inside and outside the factory
6) Should the union do something for you ?- inside and outside the factory
7) What should the union do for you -  inside and outside the factory
8) Your union has policies or proposals concerning -  list of issues (workplace 
related/wages and services/ strikes)
9) Do you agree with their policies? What types are appropriate and when should 
they use them?
10) Do you have sympathies with a union central or a political party?
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Table Dl: Socio-Economic Characteristics of the Worker Sample [*]
N Sex
%M
Union Type 
NM PM AM
Age in 
years
Service in 
Years
1] Sample 93 72% 49 30 14 30.5 4.8
2] Firm
RCL 25 80% 21 4 0 28.5 2.8
EN 20 45% 14 6 0 32.5 5.3
SB 25 88% 3 14 8 33.3 5.9
CII 17 71% 8 4 5 28.2 5.4
cm 6 67% 3 2 1 26.3 5.5
CTOT 23 70% 11 6 6 27.7 5.4
3] Sex
M 67 33 23 11 30.8 5.0
F 26 - 16 7 3 29.6 4.5
4] Unionist
NM 49 67% _ 28.4 3.6
PM 30 11% - 33.1 5.2
AM 14 79% - 32.2 8.2
5] SKILL
Skilled 23 96% 12 9 2 32.0 6.4
Semiskill 27 70% 11 12 4 32.4 5.0
Unskilled 43 60% 26 9 8 28.5 3.9
6] Section
m/t 21 95% 11 9 1 32.1 5.7
plas 19 74% 11 6 2 32.1 3.9
met 13 85% 6 4 3 29.2 5.1
trans 18 56% 4 8 6 32.4 6.4
line 22 54% 17 3 2 26.6 3.3
* Table Key:
N = number of respondents
Sex % M = percentage of group, male
NM = not a union member
PM = a passive union member
AM = an active union member
Section (of factory):
- m/t = maintenance/tool room
- plas = plastics 
met = metals
- trans = transport and materials movement 
line = assembly line
Firm:
RCL = Rio Claro 
EN = Enxuta
SB = Brastemp-Sao Bernardo 
CII/III = Consul M il  
CTOT = Consul Total
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